The Vedânta-Sûtras with the Commentary of Râmânuja, Part III — SBE Vol. 48 (trans. George Thibaut, 1904)

II, 5). The knowledge again of the essential unity and non-difference of Brahman — which is ascertained from decisive texts such as 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman ' (Taitt. Up. II, 1) ; ' Knowledge, bliss is

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Brahman' (Bri. Up. Ill, 9, 38)— is confirmed by other passages, such as 'Now if a man meditates on another deity, thinking the deity is one and he another, he does not know' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10); 'Let men meditate upon him as the Self (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7); 'Thou art that' (Kit. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'Am I thou, O holy deity? and art thou me, O holy deity ? > ; ' What I am that is he ; what he is that am I.' — This the Sutrakara himself will declare ' But as the Self (scriptural texts) acknowledge and make us apprehend (the Lord)' (Ve. Su. IV, 1, 3). Thus the Vakyakara also, ' It is the Self — thus one should apprehend (everything), for everything is effected by that/ And to hold that by such cognition of the oneness of Brahman essentially false bondage, together with its cause, comes to an end, is only reasonable.

Scripture is of greater force than Perception.

But, an objection is raised — how can knowledge, springing from the sacred texts, bring about a cessation of the view of difference, in manifest opposition to the evidence of Perception ? — How then, we rejoin, can the knowledge that this thing is a rope and not a snake bring about, in opposition to actual perception, the cessation of the (idea of the) snake ? — You will perhaps reply that in this latter case there is a conflict between two forms of perception, while in the case under discussion the conflict is between direct perception and Scripture which is based on perception. But against this we would ask the question how, in the case of a conflict between two equal cognitions, we decide as to which of the two is refuted (sublated) by the other. If — as is to be expected — you reply that what makes the difference between the two is that one of them is due to a defective cause while the other is not : we point out that this distinction holds good also in the case of Scripture and perception being in conflict. It is not considerations as to the equality of conflicting cognitions, as to their being dependent or independent, and so on, that determine which of the two sublates the other ; if that were

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It is not considerations as to the equality of conflicting cognitions, as to their being dependent or independent, and so on, that determine which of the two sublates the other ; if that werep. 25 the case, the perception which presents to us the flame of the lamp as one only would not be sublated by the cognition arrived at by inference that there is a succession of different flames. Wherever there is a conflict between cognitions based on two different means of knowledge we assign the position of the ' sublated one ' to that which admits of being accounted for in some other way ; while that cognition which affords no opening for being held unauthoritative and cannot be accounted for in another way, is the ' sublating one V This is the principle on which the relation between * what sublates ' and ' what is sublated ' is decided everywhere. Now apprehension of Brahman — which is mere intelligence, eternal, pure, free, self-luminous — is effected by Scripture which rests on endless unbroken tradition, cannot therefore be suspected of any, even the least, imperfection, and hence cannot be non-authoritative ; the state of bondage, on the other hand, with its manifold distinctions is proved by Perception, Inference, and so on, which are capable of imperfections and therefore may be non-authoritative. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the state of bondage is put an end to by the apprehension of Brahman. And that imperfection of which Perception — through which we apprehend a world of manifold distinctions — may be assumed to be capable, is socalled Nescience, which consists in the beginningless wrong imagination of difference. — Well then — a further objection is raised— let us admit that Scripture is perfect because

1 The distinction is illustrated by the different views Perception and Inference cause us to take of the nature of the flame of the lamp. To Perception the flame, as long as it burns, seems one and the same: but on the ground of the observation that the different particles of the wick and the oil are consumed in succession, we infer that there are many distinct flames succeeding one another. And we accept the Inference as valid, and as sublating or refuting the immediate perception, because the perceived oneness of the flame admits of being accounted for c otherwise/ viz. on the ground of the many distinct flames originating in such rapid succession that the eye mistakes them for one. The inference on the other hand does not admit of being explained in another way.

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on the ground of the many distinct flames originating in such rapid succession that the eye mistakes them for one. The inference on the other hand does not admit of being explained in another way.

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resting on an endless unbroken tradition ; but must we then not admit that texts evidently presupposing the view of duality, as e. g. ' Let him who desires the heavenly world offer the Cyotish/oma-sacrifice ' — are liable to refutation ? — True, we reply. As in the case of the Udgâtri and Pratihartrz breaking the chain (not at the same time, but) in succession1, so here also the earlier texts (which refer to duality and transitory rewards) are sublated by the later texts which teach final release, and are not themselves sublated by anything else.

The texts which represent Brahman as devoid of qualities have greater force.

The same reasoning applies to those passages in the Vedanta-texts which inculcate meditation on the qualified Brahman, since the highest Brahman is without any qualities.— But consider such passages as 'He who cognises all, who knows all ' (Mu. Up. I, 1,9); ' His high power is revealed as manifold, as essential, acting as force and knowledge ' (Svet Up. VI, 8) ; ' He whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true' (Kh, Up. VIII, 1, 5) ; how can these passages, which clearly aim at defining the nature of Brahman, be liable to refutation ? — Owing to the greater weight, we reply, of those texts which set forth Brahman as devoid of qualities. ' It is not coarse, not fine, not short, not long' (Br/. Up. Ill, 8, 8); 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman ' (Taitt. Up. II, 1) ; ' That which is free from qualities/ ' that which is free from stain ' — these and similar texts convey the notion of Brahman being changeless, eternal intelligence devoid of all difference ; while the other texts — quoted before — teach the qualified Brahman. And there being a conflict between the two sets of passages, we — according to the Mima^sa principle referred to above — decide that the texts referring to Brahman as devoid of qualities are of greater force, because they are later inp. 27 order 1 than those which speak of Brahman as having qualities. Thus everything is settled.

1 The reference is to the point discussed Pu. Mi. Su. VI, 5, 54 ((•raim. Nya. Mala Vistara, p. 285).

The text Taitt. Up. II, 1 refers to Brahman as devoid of qualities.