Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1The permanency of the conscious subject is proved by the fact of recognition, 'This very same thing was formerly apprehended by me.' The non-permanency of conscious- T ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 57 ness, on the other hand, is proved by thought expressing itself in the following forms, i I know at present/ ' I knew at a time/ ' I, the knowing subject, no longer have know- ledge of this thing.' How then should consciousness and the conscious subject be one? If consciousness which changes every moment were admitted to constitute the conscious subject, it would be impossible for us to recognise the thing seen to-day as the one we saw yesterday ; for what has been perceived by one cannot be recognised by another. And even if consciousness were identified with the conscious subject and acknowledged as permanent, this would no better account for the fact of recognition. For recognition implies a conscious subject persisting from the earlier to the later moment, and not merely consciousness. Its expression is ' / myself perceived this thing on a former occasion.' According to your view the quality of being a conscious agent cannot at all belong to consciousness ; for consciousness, you say, is just consciousness and nothing more. And that there exists a pure consciousness devoid of substrate and objects alike, we have already refuted on the ground that of a thing of this kind we have absolutely no knowledge. And that the consciousness admitted by both of us should be the Self is refuted by immediate consciousness itself. And we have also refuted the falla- cious arguments brought forward to prove that mere consciousness is the only reality. — But, another objection is raised, should the relation of the Self and the ' I ' not rather be conceived as follows : — In self-consciousness which expresses itself in the judgment ' I know/ that intel- ligent something which constitutes the absolutely non- objective element, and is pure homogeneous light, is the Self; the objective element (yushmad-artha) on the other hand, which is established through its being illumined (revealed) by the Self is the / — in ' I know ' — and this is something different from pure intelligence, something objective or external ? By no means, we reply ; for this view contradicts the relation of attribute and substrate of attribute of which we are directly conscious, as implied in the thought ' I know.' 58 vedanta-sOtras. Consider also what follows. — ' If the / were not the Self, the inwardness of the Self would not exist; for it is just the consciousness of the / which separates the inward from the outward.
2Consider also what follows. — ' If the / were not the Self, the inwardness of the Self would not exist; for it is just the consciousness of the / which separates the inward from the outward. ' " May I, freeing myself from all pain, enter on free possession of endless delight ? " This is the thought which prompts the man desirous of release to apply himself to the study of the sacred texts. Were it a settled matter that release consists in the annihilation of the I, the same man would move away as soon as release were only hinted at. "When I myself have perished, there still persists some consciousness different from me;" to bring this about nobody truly will exert himself. ' Moreover the very existence of consciousness, its being a consciousness at all, and its being self-luminous, depend on its connexion with a Self; when that connexion is dis- solved, consciousness itself cannot be established, not any more than the act of cutting can take place when there is no person to cut and nothing to be cut. Hence it is certain that the I, i. e. the knowing subject, is the inward Self.' This scripture confirms when saying 'By what should he know the knower?' (Br/. Up. II, 4, 15); and Smriti also, ' Him who knows this they call the knower of the body ' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 1). And the Sutrakara also, in the section beginning with ' Not the Self on account of scriptural statement ' (II, 3, 17), will say ' For this very reason (it is) a knower' (II, 3, 18); and from this it follows that the Self is not mere consciousness. What is established by consciousness of the ' I ' is the I itself, while the not-I is given in the consciousness of the not-I ; hence to say that the knowing subject, which is established by the state of consciousness, ' I know/ is the not-I, is no better than to maintain that one's own mother is a barren woman. Nor can it be said that this ' 1/ the knowing subject, is dependent on its light for something else. It rather is self-luminous ; for to be self-luminous means to have consciousness for one's essential nature. And that which has light for its essential nature does not depend for its light on something else. The case is I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 59
3It rather is self-luminous ; for to be self-luminous means to have consciousness for one's essential nature. And that which has light for its essential nature does not depend for its light on something else. The case is I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 59 analogous to that of the flame of a lamp or candle. From the circumstance that the lamp illumines with its light other things, it does not follow either that it is not luminous, or that its luminousness depends on something else ; the fact rather is that the lamp being of luminous nature shines itself and illumines with its light other things also. To explain. — The one substance te^as, i.e. fire or heat, subsists in a double form, viz. as light (prabha), and as luminous matter. Although light is a quality of luminous substantial things, it is in itself nothing but the substance te^as, not a mere quality like e. g. whiteness ; for it exists also apart from its substrates, and possesses colour (which is a quality). Having thus attributes different from those of qualities such as whiteness and so on, and possessing illumining power, it is the substance te^as, not anything else (e. g. a quality). Illumining power belongs to it, because it lights up itself and other things. At the same time it is practically treated as a quality because it always has the substance te^as for its substrate, and depends on it. This must not be objected to on the ground that what is called light is really nothing but dissolving particles of matter which proceed from the substance te^-as; for if this were so, shining gems and the sun would in the end consume themselves completely. Moreover, if the flame of a lamp consisted of dissolving particles of matter, it would never be apprehended as a whole ; for no reason can be stated why those particles should regularly rise in an agglomerated form to the height of four fingers' breadth, and after that simultaneously disperse themselves uniformly in all directions — upwards, sideways, and down- wards. The fact is that the flame of the lamp together with its light is produced anew every moment and again vanishes every moment ; as we may infer from the succes- sive combination of sufficient causes (viz. particles of oil and wick) and from its coming to an end when those causes are completely consumed. Analogously to the lamp, the Self is essentially intelli- gent (£id-rupa), and has intelligence (£aitanya) for its quality. And to be essentially intelligent means to be 60 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1The permanency of the conscious subject is proved by the fact of recognition, 'This very same thing was formerly apprehended by me.' The non-permanency of conscious- T ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 57 ness, on the other hand, is proved by thought expressing itself in the following forms, i I know at present/ ' I knew at a time/ ' I, the knowing subject, no longer have know- ledge of this thing.' How then should consciousness and the conscious subject be one? If consciousness which changes every moment were admitted to constitute the conscious subject, it would be impossible for us to recognise the thing seen to-day as the one we saw yesterday ; for what has been perceived by one cannot be recognised by another. And even if consciousness were identified with the conscious subject and acknowledged as permanent, this would no better account for the fact of recognition. For recognition implies a conscious subject persisting from the earlier to the later moment, and not merely consciousness. Its expression is ' / myself perceived this thing on a former occasion.' According to your view the quality of being a conscious agent cannot at all belong to consciousness ; for consciousness, you say, is just consciousness and nothing more. And that there exists a pure consciousness devoid of substrate and objects alike, we have already refuted on the ground that of a thing of this kind we have absolutely no knowledge. And that the consciousness admitted by both of us should be the Self is refuted by immediate consciousness itself. And we have also refuted the falla- cious arguments brought forward to prove that mere consciousness is the only reality. — But, another objection is raised, should the relation of the Self and the ' I ' not rather be conceived as follows : — In self-consciousness which expresses itself in the judgment ' I know/ that intel- ligent something which constitutes the absolutely non- objective element, and is pure homogeneous light, is the Self; the objective element (yushmad-artha) on the other hand, which is established through its being illumined (revealed) by the Self is the / — in ' I know ' — and this is something different from pure intelligence, something objective or external ? By no means, we reply ; for this view contradicts the relation of attribute and substrate of attribute of which we are directly conscious, as implied in the thought ' I know.' 58 vedanta-sOtras. Consider also what follows. — ' If the / were not the Self, the inwardness of the Self would not exist; for it is just the consciousness of the / which separates the inward from the outward.
2Consider also what follows. — ' If the / were not the Self, the inwardness of the Self would not exist; for it is just the consciousness of the / which separates the inward from the outward. ' " May I, freeing myself from all pain, enter on free possession of endless delight ? " This is the thought which prompts the man desirous of release to apply himself to the study of the sacred texts. Were it a settled matter that release consists in the annihilation of the I, the same man would move away as soon as release were only hinted at. "When I myself have perished, there still persists some consciousness different from me;" to bring this about nobody truly will exert himself. ' Moreover the very existence of consciousness, its being a consciousness at all, and its being self-luminous, depend on its connexion with a Self; when that connexion is dis- solved, consciousness itself cannot be established, not any more than the act of cutting can take place when there is no person to cut and nothing to be cut. Hence it is certain that the I, i. e. the knowing subject, is the inward Self.' This scripture confirms when saying 'By what should he know the knower?' (Br/. Up. II, 4, 15); and Smriti also, ' Him who knows this they call the knower of the body ' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 1). And the Sutrakara also, in the section beginning with ' Not the Self on account of scriptural statement ' (II, 3, 17), will say ' For this very reason (it is) a knower' (II, 3, 18); and from this it follows that the Self is not mere consciousness. What is established by consciousness of the ' I ' is the I itself, while the not-I is given in the consciousness of the not-I ; hence to say that the knowing subject, which is established by the state of consciousness, ' I know/ is the not-I, is no better than to maintain that one's own mother is a barren woman. Nor can it be said that this ' 1/ the knowing subject, is dependent on its light for something else. It rather is self-luminous ; for to be self-luminous means to have consciousness for one's essential nature. And that which has light for its essential nature does not depend for its light on something else. The case is I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 59
3It rather is self-luminous ; for to be self-luminous means to have consciousness for one's essential nature. And that which has light for its essential nature does not depend for its light on something else. The case is I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 59 analogous to that of the flame of a lamp or candle. From the circumstance that the lamp illumines with its light other things, it does not follow either that it is not luminous, or that its luminousness depends on something else ; the fact rather is that the lamp being of luminous nature shines itself and illumines with its light other things also. To explain. — The one substance te^as, i.e. fire or heat, subsists in a double form, viz. as light (prabha), and as luminous matter. Although light is a quality of luminous substantial things, it is in itself nothing but the substance te^as, not a mere quality like e. g. whiteness ; for it exists also apart from its substrates, and possesses colour (which is a quality). Having thus attributes different from those of qualities such as whiteness and so on, and possessing illumining power, it is the substance te^as, not anything else (e. g. a quality). Illumining power belongs to it, because it lights up itself and other things. At the same time it is practically treated as a quality because it always has the substance te^as for its substrate, and depends on it. This must not be objected to on the ground that what is called light is really nothing but dissolving particles of matter which proceed from the substance te^-as; for if this were so, shining gems and the sun would in the end consume themselves completely. Moreover, if the flame of a lamp consisted of dissolving particles of matter, it would never be apprehended as a whole ; for no reason can be stated why those particles should regularly rise in an agglomerated form to the height of four fingers' breadth, and after that simultaneously disperse themselves uniformly in all directions — upwards, sideways, and down- wards. The fact is that the flame of the lamp together with its light is produced anew every moment and again vanishes every moment ; as we may infer from the succes- sive combination of sufficient causes (viz. particles of oil and wick) and from its coming to an end when those causes are completely consumed. Analogously to the lamp, the Self is essentially intelli- gent (£id-rupa), and has intelligence (£aitanya) for its quality. And to be essentially intelligent means to be 60 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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