Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Up. Ill, 1, 3); ' Taking their stand upon this knowledge they, attaining to an equality of attri- IV ADHYAYA, 4 PAD A, 5. 759 butes with me, are neither born at the time of a creation nor are they agitated when a pralaya takes place' (Bha. Gi. XIV, 2). — Against this view the Sutra declares itself ' in non-division.' The released soul is conscious of itself as non-divided from the highest Brahman. * For this is seen,' i. e. for the soul having reached Brahman and freed itself from the investment of Nescience sees itself in its true nature. And this true nature consists herein that the souls have for their inner Self the highest Self while they constitute the body of that Self and hence are modes (pra- kara) of it. This is proved by all those texts which exhibit the soul and Brahman in co-ordination — ' Thou art that/ * this Self is Brahman ' ; * In that all this has its Self'; 'All this in truth is Brahman'; and by other texts, such as ' He who dwells within the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body/ &c. ; and 'He who abides within, the ruler of creatures, he is thy Self ; as explained by us under Sutra I, 4, 22. The consciousness of the released soul therefore expresses itself in the following form : ' I am Brahman, without any division/ Where the texts speak of the soul's becoming equal to, or having equal attributes with, Brahman, the meaning is that the nature of the individual soul — which is a mere mode of Brahman — is equal to that of Brah- man, i. e. that on putting off its body it becomes equal to Brahman in purity. The text declaring that the soul ' attains all its desires together with Brahman ' intimates that the soul, together with Brahman of which it is a mode, is conscious of the attributes of Brahman. The different texts are thus in no conflict. Nor, on this view of the soul being non-divided from Brahman in so far as being its mode, is there any difficulty on account of what is said about the soul under Su. IV, 4, 8 ; or on account of the doc- trines conveyed in II, 1, 22 ; III, 4, 8. — Here terminates the adhikara/za of ' non-division, on account of its being seen/ 5. In (a nature like) that of Brahman, thus (-raimini thinks ; on account of suggestion and the rest. 760 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
2IV, 4, 8 ; or on account of the doc- trines conveyed in II, 1, 22 ; III, 4, 8. — Here terminates the adhikara/za of ' non-division, on account of its being seen/ 5. In (a nature like) that of Brahman, thus (-raimini thinks ; on account of suggestion and the rest. 760 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. Owing to the fact that different texts give different accounts, the question now arises of what character that essential nature of the Self is in which it manifests itself on reaching Brahman. Is that nature constituted by freedom from evil and sin and the rest (i. e. the attributes enume- rated Kk. Up. VIII, 7, 1) ; or by mere intelligence (vi^ana) ; or by both, there being no opposition between intelligence and those other attributes? — The teacher Caimini holds that the soul manifests itself in its Brahman character, i. e. in a character constituted by freedom from sin, and so on. These latter attributes are, in the text of the ' small lotus,' mentioned as belonging to Brahman (Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 5), and may hence be referred to as the ' Brahman ' character. And that this Brahman character is the character of the released soul also follows from ' suggestion and the rest.' For freedom from all evil and the rest are, in the teaching of Pra^apati, referred to as attributes of the soul (VIII, 7, 1). The ' and the rest ' of the Sutra refers to the activities of the released soul — laughing, playing, rejoicing, and so on (mentioned in VIII, 12, 3) — which depend on the power belonging to the soul in that state to realise all its ideas and wishes. It is for these reasons that Gaimini holds that mere intelligence does not constitute the true nature of the released soul. 6. In the sole nature of intelligence ; as that is its Self. Thus Au^iilomi thinks. Intelligence (consciousness; ^aitanya) alone is the true nature of the soul, and hence it is in that character only that the released soul manifests itself ; this is the view of the teacher Aiu/ulomi. That intelligence only constitutes the true being of the soul, we learn from the express state- ment ' As a lump of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste ; so this Self has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge ' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 13). When, therefore, the text attributes to the soul freedom from evil and the rest, it does not mean to predicate of it further positive qualities, but only IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 7. 76 1 to exclude all the qualities depending on avidya — change, pleasure, pain, and so on. — For these reasons Au^/ulomi holds that the released soul manifests itself as mere intelli- gence.— Next the teacher Badaraya^a determines the ques- tion by propounding his own view. 7. Thus also, on account of existence of the former qualities (as proved) by suggestion, Bada- raya?za holds absence of contradiction.
37. Thus also, on account of existence of the former qualities (as proved) by suggestion, Bada- raya?za holds absence of contradiction. The teacher Badaraya/za is of opinion that even thus, i. e. although the text declares the soul to have mere intel- ligence for its essential nature, all the same the previously stated attributes, viz. freedom from all sin, and so on, are not to be excluded. For the authority of a definite state- ment in the Upanishads proves them to exist (' That Self which is free from sin/ &c.) ; and of authorities of equal strength one cannot refute the other. Nor must you say that the case is one of essential contradiction, and that hence we necessarily must conclude that freedom from sin, and so on (do not belong to the true nature of the soul, but) are the mere figments of Nescience (from which the released soul is free). For as there is equal authority for both sides, why should the contrary view not be held ? (viz. that the soul is essentially free from sin, &c, and that the ^aitanya is non-essential.) For the principle is that where two statements rest on equal authority, that only which suffers from an intrinsic impossibility is to be interpreted in a different way (i. e. different from what it means on the face of it), so as not to conflict with the other. But while admitting this we deny that the text which describes the Self as a mass of mere knowledge implies that the nature of the Self comprises nothing whatever but knowledge. — But what then is the purport of that text ? — The mean- ing is clear, we reply ; the text teaches that the entire Self, different from all that is non-sentient, is self-illumined, i. e. not even a small part of it depends for its illumination on something else. The fact, vouched for in this text, of the soul in its entirety being a mere mass of knowledge in no way conflicts with the fact, vouched for by other texts, of its 762 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS. possessing qualities such as freedom from sin and so on, which inhere in it as the subject of those qualities ; not any more than the fact of the lump of salt being taste through and through — which fact is known through the sense of taste — conflicts with the fact of its possessing such other qualities as colour, hardness, and so on, which are known through the eye and the other sense-organs. The meaning of the entire text is as follows — just as the lump of salt has throughout one and the same taste, while other sapid things such as mangoes and other fruit have different tastes in their different parts, rind and so on ; so the soul is throughout of the nature of knowledge or self- illuminedness. — Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' that which is like Brahman.' 8. By the mere will ; Scripture stating that. Concerning the released soul Scripture states, ' He moves
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Up. Ill, 1, 3); ' Taking their stand upon this knowledge they, attaining to an equality of attri- IV ADHYAYA, 4 PAD A, 5. 759 butes with me, are neither born at the time of a creation nor are they agitated when a pralaya takes place' (Bha. Gi. XIV, 2). — Against this view the Sutra declares itself ' in non-division.' The released soul is conscious of itself as non-divided from the highest Brahman. * For this is seen,' i. e. for the soul having reached Brahman and freed itself from the investment of Nescience sees itself in its true nature. And this true nature consists herein that the souls have for their inner Self the highest Self while they constitute the body of that Self and hence are modes (pra- kara) of it. This is proved by all those texts which exhibit the soul and Brahman in co-ordination — ' Thou art that/ * this Self is Brahman ' ; * In that all this has its Self'; 'All this in truth is Brahman'; and by other texts, such as ' He who dwells within the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body/ &c. ; and 'He who abides within, the ruler of creatures, he is thy Self ; as explained by us under Sutra I, 4, 22. The consciousness of the released soul therefore expresses itself in the following form : ' I am Brahman, without any division/ Where the texts speak of the soul's becoming equal to, or having equal attributes with, Brahman, the meaning is that the nature of the individual soul — which is a mere mode of Brahman — is equal to that of Brah- man, i. e. that on putting off its body it becomes equal to Brahman in purity. The text declaring that the soul ' attains all its desires together with Brahman ' intimates that the soul, together with Brahman of which it is a mode, is conscious of the attributes of Brahman. The different texts are thus in no conflict. Nor, on this view of the soul being non-divided from Brahman in so far as being its mode, is there any difficulty on account of what is said about the soul under Su. IV, 4, 8 ; or on account of the doc- trines conveyed in II, 1, 22 ; III, 4, 8. — Here terminates the adhikara/za of ' non-division, on account of its being seen/ 5. In (a nature like) that of Brahman, thus (-raimini thinks ; on account of suggestion and the rest. 760 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
2IV, 4, 8 ; or on account of the doc- trines conveyed in II, 1, 22 ; III, 4, 8. — Here terminates the adhikara/za of ' non-division, on account of its being seen/ 5. In (a nature like) that of Brahman, thus (-raimini thinks ; on account of suggestion and the rest. 760 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. Owing to the fact that different texts give different accounts, the question now arises of what character that essential nature of the Self is in which it manifests itself on reaching Brahman. Is that nature constituted by freedom from evil and sin and the rest (i. e. the attributes enume- rated Kk. Up. VIII, 7, 1) ; or by mere intelligence (vi^ana) ; or by both, there being no opposition between intelligence and those other attributes? — The teacher Caimini holds that the soul manifests itself in its Brahman character, i. e. in a character constituted by freedom from sin, and so on. These latter attributes are, in the text of the ' small lotus,' mentioned as belonging to Brahman (Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 5), and may hence be referred to as the ' Brahman ' character. And that this Brahman character is the character of the released soul also follows from ' suggestion and the rest.' For freedom from all evil and the rest are, in the teaching of Pra^apati, referred to as attributes of the soul (VIII, 7, 1). The ' and the rest ' of the Sutra refers to the activities of the released soul — laughing, playing, rejoicing, and so on (mentioned in VIII, 12, 3) — which depend on the power belonging to the soul in that state to realise all its ideas and wishes. It is for these reasons that Gaimini holds that mere intelligence does not constitute the true nature of the released soul. 6. In the sole nature of intelligence ; as that is its Self. Thus Au^iilomi thinks. Intelligence (consciousness; ^aitanya) alone is the true nature of the soul, and hence it is in that character only that the released soul manifests itself ; this is the view of the teacher Aiu/ulomi. That intelligence only constitutes the true being of the soul, we learn from the express state- ment ' As a lump of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste ; so this Self has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge ' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 13). When, therefore, the text attributes to the soul freedom from evil and the rest, it does not mean to predicate of it further positive qualities, but only IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 7. 76 1 to exclude all the qualities depending on avidya — change, pleasure, pain, and so on. — For these reasons Au^/ulomi holds that the released soul manifests itself as mere intelli- gence.— Next the teacher Badaraya^a determines the ques- tion by propounding his own view. 7. Thus also, on account of existence of the former qualities (as proved) by suggestion, Bada- raya?za holds absence of contradiction.
37. Thus also, on account of existence of the former qualities (as proved) by suggestion, Bada- raya?za holds absence of contradiction. The teacher Badaraya/za is of opinion that even thus, i. e. although the text declares the soul to have mere intel- ligence for its essential nature, all the same the previously stated attributes, viz. freedom from all sin, and so on, are not to be excluded. For the authority of a definite state- ment in the Upanishads proves them to exist (' That Self which is free from sin/ &c.) ; and of authorities of equal strength one cannot refute the other. Nor must you say that the case is one of essential contradiction, and that hence we necessarily must conclude that freedom from sin, and so on (do not belong to the true nature of the soul, but) are the mere figments of Nescience (from which the released soul is free). For as there is equal authority for both sides, why should the contrary view not be held ? (viz. that the soul is essentially free from sin, &c, and that the ^aitanya is non-essential.) For the principle is that where two statements rest on equal authority, that only which suffers from an intrinsic impossibility is to be interpreted in a different way (i. e. different from what it means on the face of it), so as not to conflict with the other. But while admitting this we deny that the text which describes the Self as a mass of mere knowledge implies that the nature of the Self comprises nothing whatever but knowledge. — But what then is the purport of that text ? — The mean- ing is clear, we reply ; the text teaches that the entire Self, different from all that is non-sentient, is self-illumined, i. e. not even a small part of it depends for its illumination on something else. The fact, vouched for in this text, of the soul in its entirety being a mere mass of knowledge in no way conflicts with the fact, vouched for by other texts, of its 762 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS. possessing qualities such as freedom from sin and so on, which inhere in it as the subject of those qualities ; not any more than the fact of the lump of salt being taste through and through — which fact is known through the sense of taste — conflicts with the fact of its possessing such other qualities as colour, hardness, and so on, which are known through the eye and the other sense-organs. The meaning of the entire text is as follows — just as the lump of salt has throughout one and the same taste, while other sapid things such as mangoes and other fruit have different tastes in their different parts, rind and so on ; so the soul is throughout of the nature of knowledge or self- illuminedness. — Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' that which is like Brahman.' 8. By the mere will ; Scripture stating that. Concerning the released soul Scripture states, ' He moves
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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