Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— But from this again it would follow that one jar existing in the previous moment would be the cause of all jars, to be met with in any place, existing in 504 vedanta-sCtras. the following moment ! — Perhaps you mean to say that one thing is the cause of one subsequent thing only. But how then are we to know which thing is the cause of which one subsequent thing ? — Well then I say that the momentarily existing jar which exists in a certain place is the cause of that one subsequent momentary jar only which exists at the very same place ! — Very good, then you hold that a place is something permanent ! (while yet your doctrine is that there is nothing permanent). — Moreover as, on your theory, the thing which has entered into contact with the eye or some other sense-organ does no longer exist at the time when the idea originates, nothing can ever be the object of a cognition. 20. There not being (a cause), there results con- tradiction of the admitted principle ; otherwise simul- taneousness. If it be said that the effect may originate even when a cause does not exist, then — as we have pointed out before — anything might originate anywhere and at any time. And not only would the origination of the effect thus remain unexplained, but an admitted principle would also be contradicted. For you hold the principle that there are four causes bringing about the origination of a cognition, viz. the adhipati-cause, the sahakari-cause, the alambhana-cause, and the samanantara-cause. The term adhipati denotes the sense-organs. — And if, in order to avoid opposition to an acknowledged principle, it be as- sumed that the origination of a further momentary jar takes place at the time when the previous momentary jar still exists, then it would follow that the two momentary jars, the causal one and the effected one, would be perceived together ; but as a matter of fact they are not so perceived. And, further, the doctrine of general momentariness would thus be given up. And should it be said that (this is not so, but that) momentariness remains, it would follow that the connexion of the sense-organ with the object and the cognition are simultaneous. 21. There is non-establishment of pratisankhyi II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2 2. 505 and apratisankhyd destruction, on account of non- interruption.
221. There is non-establishment of pratisankhyi II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2 2. 505 and apratisankhyd destruction, on account of non- interruption. So far the hypothesis of origination from that which is not has been refuted. The present Sutra now goes on to declare that also the absolute (niranvaya) destruction of that which is cannot rationally be demonstrated. Those who maintain the momentariness of all things teach that there are two kinds of destruction, one of a gross kind, which consists in the termination of a series of similar momentary existences, and is capable of being perceived as immediately resulting from agencies such as the blow of a hammer (breaking a jar, e.g.); and the other of a subtle kind, not capable of being perceived, and taking place in a series of similar momentary existences at every moment. The former is called pratisankhya-destruction ; the latter apratisahkhya-destruction. — Both these kinds of destruction are not possible. — Why? — On account of the non-interruption, i.e. on account of the impossibility of the complete destruction of that which is. The impossi- bility of such destruction was proved by us under II, 1, 14, where we showed that origination and destruction mean only the assumption of new states on the part of one and the same permanent substance, and therefrom proved the non-difference of the effect from the cause. — Here it may possibly be objected that as we see that a light when extinguished passes away absolutely, such absolute destruc- tion may be inferred in other cases also. But against this we point out that in the case of a vessel of clay being smashed we perceive that the material, i. e. clay, continues to exist, and that therefrom destruction is ascertained to be nothing else but the passing over of a real sub- stance into another state. The proper assumption, therefore, is that the extinguished light also has passed over into a different state, and that in that state it is no longer perceptible may be explained by that state being an extremely subtle one. 22. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case. 506 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.
322. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case. 506 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. It has been shown that neither origination from nothing, as held by the advocates of general momentariness, is possible ; nor the passing away into nothing on the part of the thing originated. The acknowledgment of either of these views gives rise to difficulties. If the effect originates from nothing, it is itself of the nature of nothing ; for it is observed that effects share the nature of what they originate from. Pitchers and ornaments, e. g. which are produced from clay and gold respectively, possess the nature of their causal substances. But you hold yourself that the world is not seen to be of the nature of nothing- ness ; and certainly it is not observed to be so. — Again, if that which is underwent absolute destruction, it would follow that after one moment the entire world would pass away into nothingness ; and subsequently the world again originating from nothingness, it would follow that, as shown above, it would itself be of the nature of nothingness (i. e. there would no longer be a real world). — There being thus difficulties on both views, origination and destruction cannot take place as described by you. 23. And in the case of space also, on account of there being no difference. In order to prove the permanency of external and internal things, we have disproved the view that the two forms of destruction called pratisankhya and apratisankhya mean reduction of an existing thing to nothing. This gives us an opportunity to disprove the view of Ether (space) being likewise a mere irrational non-entity, as the Bauddhas hold it to be. Ether cannot be held to be a mere irrational non-entity, because, like those things which are admitted to be positive existences, i. e. earth, and so on, it is proved by consciousness not invalidated by any means of proof. For the formation of immediate judgments such as ' here a hawk flies, and there a vulture/ implies our being con- scious of ether as marking the different places of the flight of the different birds. Nor is it possible to hold that Space is nothing else but the non-existence (abhava) of earth, and so on ; for this view collapses as soon as set II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 24. 507 forth in definite alternatives. For whether we define Space as the antecedent and subsequent non-existence of earth, and so on, or as their mutual non-existence, or as their absolute non-existence — on none of these alternatives we attain the proper idea of Space. If, in the first place, we define it as the antecedent and subsequent non-existence of earth, and so on, it will follow that, as the idea of Space can thus not be connected with earth and other things existing at the present moment, the whole world is without Space.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— But from this again it would follow that one jar existing in the previous moment would be the cause of all jars, to be met with in any place, existing in 504 vedanta-sCtras. the following moment ! — Perhaps you mean to say that one thing is the cause of one subsequent thing only. But how then are we to know which thing is the cause of which one subsequent thing ? — Well then I say that the momentarily existing jar which exists in a certain place is the cause of that one subsequent momentary jar only which exists at the very same place ! — Very good, then you hold that a place is something permanent ! (while yet your doctrine is that there is nothing permanent). — Moreover as, on your theory, the thing which has entered into contact with the eye or some other sense-organ does no longer exist at the time when the idea originates, nothing can ever be the object of a cognition. 20. There not being (a cause), there results con- tradiction of the admitted principle ; otherwise simul- taneousness. If it be said that the effect may originate even when a cause does not exist, then — as we have pointed out before — anything might originate anywhere and at any time. And not only would the origination of the effect thus remain unexplained, but an admitted principle would also be contradicted. For you hold the principle that there are four causes bringing about the origination of a cognition, viz. the adhipati-cause, the sahakari-cause, the alambhana-cause, and the samanantara-cause. The term adhipati denotes the sense-organs. — And if, in order to avoid opposition to an acknowledged principle, it be as- sumed that the origination of a further momentary jar takes place at the time when the previous momentary jar still exists, then it would follow that the two momentary jars, the causal one and the effected one, would be perceived together ; but as a matter of fact they are not so perceived. And, further, the doctrine of general momentariness would thus be given up. And should it be said that (this is not so, but that) momentariness remains, it would follow that the connexion of the sense-organ with the object and the cognition are simultaneous. 21. There is non-establishment of pratisankhyi II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2 2. 505 and apratisankhyd destruction, on account of non- interruption.
221. There is non-establishment of pratisankhyi II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2 2. 505 and apratisankhyd destruction, on account of non- interruption. So far the hypothesis of origination from that which is not has been refuted. The present Sutra now goes on to declare that also the absolute (niranvaya) destruction of that which is cannot rationally be demonstrated. Those who maintain the momentariness of all things teach that there are two kinds of destruction, one of a gross kind, which consists in the termination of a series of similar momentary existences, and is capable of being perceived as immediately resulting from agencies such as the blow of a hammer (breaking a jar, e.g.); and the other of a subtle kind, not capable of being perceived, and taking place in a series of similar momentary existences at every moment. The former is called pratisankhya-destruction ; the latter apratisahkhya-destruction. — Both these kinds of destruction are not possible. — Why? — On account of the non-interruption, i.e. on account of the impossibility of the complete destruction of that which is. The impossi- bility of such destruction was proved by us under II, 1, 14, where we showed that origination and destruction mean only the assumption of new states on the part of one and the same permanent substance, and therefrom proved the non-difference of the effect from the cause. — Here it may possibly be objected that as we see that a light when extinguished passes away absolutely, such absolute destruc- tion may be inferred in other cases also. But against this we point out that in the case of a vessel of clay being smashed we perceive that the material, i. e. clay, continues to exist, and that therefrom destruction is ascertained to be nothing else but the passing over of a real sub- stance into another state. The proper assumption, therefore, is that the extinguished light also has passed over into a different state, and that in that state it is no longer perceptible may be explained by that state being an extremely subtle one. 22. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case. 506 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.
322. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case. 506 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. It has been shown that neither origination from nothing, as held by the advocates of general momentariness, is possible ; nor the passing away into nothing on the part of the thing originated. The acknowledgment of either of these views gives rise to difficulties. If the effect originates from nothing, it is itself of the nature of nothing ; for it is observed that effects share the nature of what they originate from. Pitchers and ornaments, e. g. which are produced from clay and gold respectively, possess the nature of their causal substances. But you hold yourself that the world is not seen to be of the nature of nothing- ness ; and certainly it is not observed to be so. — Again, if that which is underwent absolute destruction, it would follow that after one moment the entire world would pass away into nothingness ; and subsequently the world again originating from nothingness, it would follow that, as shown above, it would itself be of the nature of nothingness (i. e. there would no longer be a real world). — There being thus difficulties on both views, origination and destruction cannot take place as described by you. 23. And in the case of space also, on account of there being no difference. In order to prove the permanency of external and internal things, we have disproved the view that the two forms of destruction called pratisankhya and apratisankhya mean reduction of an existing thing to nothing. This gives us an opportunity to disprove the view of Ether (space) being likewise a mere irrational non-entity, as the Bauddhas hold it to be. Ether cannot be held to be a mere irrational non-entity, because, like those things which are admitted to be positive existences, i. e. earth, and so on, it is proved by consciousness not invalidated by any means of proof. For the formation of immediate judgments such as ' here a hawk flies, and there a vulture/ implies our being con- scious of ether as marking the different places of the flight of the different birds. Nor is it possible to hold that Space is nothing else but the non-existence (abhava) of earth, and so on ; for this view collapses as soon as set II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 24. 507 forth in definite alternatives. For whether we define Space as the antecedent and subsequent non-existence of earth, and so on, or as their mutual non-existence, or as their absolute non-existence — on none of these alternatives we attain the proper idea of Space. If, in the first place, we define it as the antecedent and subsequent non-existence of earth, and so on, it will follow that, as the idea of Space can thus not be connected with earth and other things existing at the present moment, the whole world is without Space.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
No commentary for this page.