The Vedânta-Sûtras with the Commentary of Râmânuja, Part III — SBE Vol. 48 (trans. George Thibaut, 1904)

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16. If it be said that knowledge and mind (which are mentioned) between (breath and the elements) (are stated) in order of succession, owing to an inferential mark of this ; we say, not so, on account of non-difference.

' Knowledge' in the Sutra denotes the means of knowledge, i. e. the sense-organs. — An objection is raised against the conclusion arrived at under the preceding Sutra. We cannot, the opponent says, admit the conclusion that the passage from the Mundaka. Up. ' from him is born breath, mind,' &c, declares the immediate origination from Brahman of all things, and that hence the passage confirms the view, first suggested by the inferential mark of ' thought ' (see above, Su. 14), that everything springs from Brahman direct. For the purport of the text is to state a certain order of succession, and we hence conclude that all the beings mentioned were successively created. In the second half of the text we recognise the series of ether, air, fire, &c, which is known to us from other texts, and from the fact of their being exhibited in one and the same text we conclude that knowledge and mind — which are mentioned between breath on the one side and the elements on thep. 539 other — must be viewed as created in that order. The text therefore in no way confirms the direct origination of everything from Brahman. To this the Sfitra replies, * Not so, on account of non-difference/ The first words of the text ' from him is born ' connect themselves equally with breath, and knowledge, and mind, and the series of elements beginning with ether ; and the meaning of the whole therefore is to declare that all the entities spring directly from Brahman, not to teach the order of succession in which they are produced. It moreover cannot have the purport of teaching a certain order of succession, because the order stated contradicts the order established by other scriptural passages ; such as the one beginning ' the earth is merged in water,' and ending 'darkness becomes one.' We hence hold to the conclusion that all effects originate from Brahman only, in so far as embodied in the Unevolved, and so on, and that the terms ' fire ' and so on denote Brahman, which is the Self of all those substances. — But to interpret all these words as denoting Brahman is to set aside their special denotative power as established by etymology ! — To this objection the next Sutra replies.

17. But that which abides in the things movable and immovable, i.e. the terms denoting those things, are non-secondary (i. e. of primary denotative power, viz. with regard to Brahman) ; since (their denotative power) is effected by the being of that (i.e. Brahman).

17. But that which abides in the things movable and immovable, i.e. the terms denoting those things, are non-secondary (i. e. of primary denotative power, viz. with regard to Brahman) ; since (their denotative power) is effected by the being of that (i.e. Brahman).

The 'but' sets aside the objection raised. (The primd facie view here is as follows.) As Brahman, which has all things for its modes, is not the object of Perception and the other means of knowledge which give rise to the apprehension of the things only which are Brahman's modes, and as hence, previously to the study of the Vedanta-texts, the idea of that to which the modes belong (i. e. of Brahman) does not arise, and as the knowledge of all words finally denoting Brahman depends on the existence of the idea of that to which the modes belong (i. e. Brahman) ; all the

540 vedanta-sCtras.

individual words are used in worldly language only separately to denote special things. In other words, as the terms ' fire ' and so on have denotative power with regard to particular things only, their denotative power with regard to Brahman is secondary, indirect only. — Of this view the Sutra disposes by saying ' that which abides in the moving and the non-moving/ &c. The meaning is — the terms which abide in, i. e. are connected with, the different moving and non-moving things, and hence denote those things, possess with regard to Brahman a denotative power which is not 'bhakta/ i.e. secondary or figurative, but primary and direct. ' Why so ? ' Because the denotative power of all words is dependent on the being of Brahman. For this we know from the scriptural passage which tells how names and forms were evolved by Brahman. — Here terminates the adhikara/^a of 'fire/

1 8. Not the Self, on account of scriptural statement, and on account of the eternity (which results) from them.

The Sutras so far have stated that this entire world, from Ether downwards, originates from the highest Brahman. It now becomes a matter for discussion whether the individual soul also originates in the same way or not. — It does so originate, the Purvapakshin maintains. For on this assumption only the scriptural statement as to the cognition of all things through the cognition of one thing holds good, and moreover Scripture declares that before creation everything was one. Moreover, there are texts directly stating that the soul also was produced in the same way as Ether and other created things.

' Pra^apati sent forth all creatures ' ; i All these creatures have their root in the True, they abide in the True, they rest on the True' (Kk. Up. VI, 8, 6) ; 'From whence these beings are produced' (Taitt. Up. Ill, i, i). As these passages declare the origination of the world inclusive of sentient beings, we conclude that the souls also originate. Nor must this be objected to on the ground that from the fact that Brahman is eternal, and the other fact that texts

II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 8. 54 1

Up. Ill, i, i). As these passages declare the origination of the world inclusive of sentient beings, we conclude that the souls also originate. Nor must this be objected to on the ground that from the fact that Brahman is eternal, and the other fact that textsII ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 8. 54 1 such as ' That art thou ' teach the soul to be of the nature of Brahman, it follows that the soul also is eternal. For if we reasoned in this style we should have to admit also that the Ether and the other elements are eternal, since texts such as * in that all this has its Self ' and ' all this indeed is Brahman ' intimate them also to be of the nature of Brahman. Hence the individual soul also originates no less than Ether and the rest. — To this the Sutra replies, ' Not the Self, on account of scriptural statement.' The Self is not produced, since certain texts directly deny its origination ; cp. ' the intelligent one is not born nor does he die ' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 18) ; ' There are two unborn ones, one intelligent and strong, the other non-intelligent and weak ' (Svet. Up.

I, 9). And the eternity of the soul is learned from the same texts, cp. ' There is one eternal thinker/ &c. (Ka. Up.

II, 5, 13) ; ' Unborn, eternal, everlasting is that ancient one ;
he is not killed though the body is killed ' (Ka. Up. I, 2,
18). — For these reasons the soul is not produced.

But how then about the declaration that through the cognition of one thing everything is known ? — There is no difficulty here, since the soul also is an effect, and since effect and cause are non-different. — But this implies that the soul is an originated thing just like Ether and so on ! — Not so, we reply. By a thing being an effect we mean its being due to a substance passing over into some other state ; and from this point of view the soul also is an effect. There is, however, the difference, that the ' other condition' which is represented by the soul is of a different kind from that which constitutes non-sentient things, such as Ether and so on. The * otherness ' on which the soul depends consists in the contraction and expansion of intelligence ; while the change on which the origination of Ether and so on depends is a change of essential nature. And change of the latter kind is what we deny of the soul. We have shown that there are three entities of distinct nature, viz. objects of fruition, enjoying subjects, and a Ruler ; that origination and so on which are characteristic of the objects do not belong to the subjects, and that the latter are eternal ; that the characteristic qualities of the objects and

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