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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Here terminates the ' arambha^a ' adhikara^a. 2 1 . From the designation of the ' other ' (as non- different from Brahman) there result (Brahman s) not creating what is beneficial, and other imperfections. ' Thou art that ' ; ' this Self is Brahman ' — these and similar texts which declare the non-difference of the world from Brahman, teach, as has been said before, at the same time the non-difference from Brahman of the individual soul also. But an objection here presents itself. If these texts really imply that the ' other one/ i.e. the soul, is Brahman, there will follow certain imperfections on Brah- man's part, viz. that Brahman, endowed as it is with omniscience, the power of realising its purposes, and so on, does not create a world of a nature beneficial to itself, but rather creates a world non-beneficial to itself; and the like. This world no doubt is a storehouse of numberless pains, either originating in living beings themselves or due to the action of other natural beings, or caused by supernatural agencies. No rational independent person endeavours to produce what is clearly non-beneficial to himself. And as you hold the view of the non-difference of the world from Brahman, you yourself set aside all those texts which declare Brahman to be different from the soul ; for were there such difference, the doctrine of general non-difference could not be established. Should it be maintained that the texts declaring difference refer to difference due to limiting adjuncts, while the texts declaring non-difference mean essential non-difference, we must ask the following question — does the non-conditioned Brahman know, or does it not know, the soul which is essentially non-different from it? If it does not know it, Brahman's omniscience has to be abandoned. If, on the other hand, it knows it, then H h 2 468 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS.
2If it does not know it, Brahman's omniscience has to be abandoned. If, on the other hand, it knows it, then H h 2 468 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS. Brahman is conscious of the pains of the soul— which is non-different from Brahman — as its own pains ; and from this there necessarily follows an imperfection, viz. that Brah- man does not create what is beneficial and does create what is non-beneficial to itself. If, again, it be said that the difference of the soul and Brahman is due to Nescience on the part of both, and that the texts declaring difference refer to difference of this kind, the assumption of Nescience belonging to the soul leads us to the very alternatives just stated and to their respective results. Should the a^Tzana, on the other hand, belong to Brahman, we point out that Brahman, whose essential nature is self-illuminedness, can- not possibly be conscious of a^Tzana and the creation of the world effected by it. And if it be said that the light of Brahman is obscured by a^Tzana, we point to all the difficulties, previously set forth, which follow from this hypothesis — to obscure light means to make it cease, and to make cease the light of Brahman, of whom light is the essential nature, means no less than to destroy Brahman itself. The view of Brahman being the cause of the world thus shows itself to be untenable. — This prima facie view the next Sutra refutes. 22. But (Brahman is) additional, on account of the declaration of difference. The word ' but ' sets aside the prima facie view. To the individual soul capable of connexion with the various kinds of pain there is additional, i.e. from it there is different, Brahman. — On what ground ? — ' Owing to the declaration of difference.' For Brahman is spoken of as different from the soul in the following texts : — ' He who dwells in the Self and within the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who rules the Self within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal' (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 22) ; ' Knowing as separate the Self and the Mover, blessed by him he gains Immortality ' (Svet. Up. 1,6); ' He is the cause, the Lord of the lords of the organs' (i.e. the individual souls) (Svet Up. VI, 9) ; ' One of them eats the sweet fruit; without eating the other looks on' (5vet. Up. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 23. 469
3Up. 1,6); ' He is the cause, the Lord of the lords of the organs' (i.e. the individual souls) (Svet Up. VI, 9) ; ' One of them eats the sweet fruit; without eating the other looks on' (5vet. Up. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 23. 469 IV, 6) ; ' There are two, the one knowing, the other not knowing, both unborn, the one a ruler, the other not a ruler' (Svet Up. I, 9); 'Embraced by the pra^a Self (Bri Up. IV, 3, 31); ' Mounted by the pra^a Self (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 35) ; ' From that the ruler of mayd sends forth all this, in that the other is bound up through maya (Svet. Up. IV, 9) ; ' the Master of the Pradhdna and the souls, the lord of the gu/zas ' (Svet. Up. VI, 16) ; ' the eternal among eternals, the intelligent among the intelligent, who, one, fulfils the desires of many' (Svet. Up. VI, 13); 'who moves within the Unevolved, of whom the Unevolved is the body, whom the Unevolved does not know ; who moves within the Imperishable, of whom the Imperishable is the body, whom the Imperishable does not know ; who moves within Death, of whom Death is the body, whom Death does not know ; he is the inner Self of all beings, free from evil, the divine one, the one God, NarayaTza'; and other similar texts. 23. And as in the analogous case of stones and the like, there is impossibility of that. In the same way as it is impossible that the different non-sentient things such as stones, iron, wood, herbs, &c, which are of an extremely low constitution and subject to constant change, should be one in nature with Brahman, which is faultless, changeless, fundamentally antagonistic to all that is evil, &c. &c. ; so it is also impossible that the individual soul, which is liable to endless suffering, and a mere wretched glowworm as it were, should be one with Brahman who, as we know from the texts, comprises within himself the treasure of all auspicious qualities, &c. &c. Those texts, which exhibit Brahman and the soul in co- ordination, must be understood as conveying the doctrine, founded on passages such as ' of whom the Self is the body/ that as the gwa. constitutes Brahman's body and Brahman abides within the^*iva as its Self, Brahman has the^iva for its mode ; and with this doctrine the co-ordination referred to is not only not in conflict but even confirms it — as we have shown repeatedly, e.g. under Su. I, 4, 22. Brahman 4 70 ved Anta-sutr AS .
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Here terminates the ' arambha^a ' adhikara^a. 2 1 . From the designation of the ' other ' (as non- different from Brahman) there result (Brahman s) not creating what is beneficial, and other imperfections. ' Thou art that ' ; ' this Self is Brahman ' — these and similar texts which declare the non-difference of the world from Brahman, teach, as has been said before, at the same time the non-difference from Brahman of the individual soul also. But an objection here presents itself. If these texts really imply that the ' other one/ i.e. the soul, is Brahman, there will follow certain imperfections on Brah- man's part, viz. that Brahman, endowed as it is with omniscience, the power of realising its purposes, and so on, does not create a world of a nature beneficial to itself, but rather creates a world non-beneficial to itself; and the like. This world no doubt is a storehouse of numberless pains, either originating in living beings themselves or due to the action of other natural beings, or caused by supernatural agencies. No rational independent person endeavours to produce what is clearly non-beneficial to himself. And as you hold the view of the non-difference of the world from Brahman, you yourself set aside all those texts which declare Brahman to be different from the soul ; for were there such difference, the doctrine of general non-difference could not be established. Should it be maintained that the texts declaring difference refer to difference due to limiting adjuncts, while the texts declaring non-difference mean essential non-difference, we must ask the following question — does the non-conditioned Brahman know, or does it not know, the soul which is essentially non-different from it? If it does not know it, Brahman's omniscience has to be abandoned. If, on the other hand, it knows it, then H h 2 468 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS.
2If it does not know it, Brahman's omniscience has to be abandoned. If, on the other hand, it knows it, then H h 2 468 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS. Brahman is conscious of the pains of the soul— which is non-different from Brahman — as its own pains ; and from this there necessarily follows an imperfection, viz. that Brah- man does not create what is beneficial and does create what is non-beneficial to itself. If, again, it be said that the difference of the soul and Brahman is due to Nescience on the part of both, and that the texts declaring difference refer to difference of this kind, the assumption of Nescience belonging to the soul leads us to the very alternatives just stated and to their respective results. Should the a^Tzana, on the other hand, belong to Brahman, we point out that Brahman, whose essential nature is self-illuminedness, can- not possibly be conscious of a^Tzana and the creation of the world effected by it. And if it be said that the light of Brahman is obscured by a^Tzana, we point to all the difficulties, previously set forth, which follow from this hypothesis — to obscure light means to make it cease, and to make cease the light of Brahman, of whom light is the essential nature, means no less than to destroy Brahman itself. The view of Brahman being the cause of the world thus shows itself to be untenable. — This prima facie view the next Sutra refutes. 22. But (Brahman is) additional, on account of the declaration of difference. The word ' but ' sets aside the prima facie view. To the individual soul capable of connexion with the various kinds of pain there is additional, i.e. from it there is different, Brahman. — On what ground ? — ' Owing to the declaration of difference.' For Brahman is spoken of as different from the soul in the following texts : — ' He who dwells in the Self and within the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who rules the Self within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal' (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 22) ; ' Knowing as separate the Self and the Mover, blessed by him he gains Immortality ' (Svet. Up. 1,6); ' He is the cause, the Lord of the lords of the organs' (i.e. the individual souls) (Svet Up. VI, 9) ; ' One of them eats the sweet fruit; without eating the other looks on' (5vet. Up. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 23. 469
3Up. 1,6); ' He is the cause, the Lord of the lords of the organs' (i.e. the individual souls) (Svet Up. VI, 9) ; ' One of them eats the sweet fruit; without eating the other looks on' (5vet. Up. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 23. 469 IV, 6) ; ' There are two, the one knowing, the other not knowing, both unborn, the one a ruler, the other not a ruler' (Svet Up. I, 9); 'Embraced by the pra^a Self (Bri Up. IV, 3, 31); ' Mounted by the pra^a Self (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 35) ; ' From that the ruler of mayd sends forth all this, in that the other is bound up through maya (Svet. Up. IV, 9) ; ' the Master of the Pradhdna and the souls, the lord of the gu/zas ' (Svet. Up. VI, 16) ; ' the eternal among eternals, the intelligent among the intelligent, who, one, fulfils the desires of many' (Svet. Up. VI, 13); 'who moves within the Unevolved, of whom the Unevolved is the body, whom the Unevolved does not know ; who moves within the Imperishable, of whom the Imperishable is the body, whom the Imperishable does not know ; who moves within Death, of whom Death is the body, whom Death does not know ; he is the inner Self of all beings, free from evil, the divine one, the one God, NarayaTza'; and other similar texts. 23. And as in the analogous case of stones and the like, there is impossibility of that. In the same way as it is impossible that the different non-sentient things such as stones, iron, wood, herbs, &c, which are of an extremely low constitution and subject to constant change, should be one in nature with Brahman, which is faultless, changeless, fundamentally antagonistic to all that is evil, &c. &c. ; so it is also impossible that the individual soul, which is liable to endless suffering, and a mere wretched glowworm as it were, should be one with Brahman who, as we know from the texts, comprises within himself the treasure of all auspicious qualities, &c. &c. Those texts, which exhibit Brahman and the soul in co- ordination, must be understood as conveying the doctrine, founded on passages such as ' of whom the Self is the body/ that as the gwa. constitutes Brahman's body and Brahman abides within the^*iva as its Self, Brahman has the^iva for its mode ; and with this doctrine the co-ordination referred to is not only not in conflict but even confirms it — as we have shown repeatedly, e.g. under Su. I, 4, 22. Brahman 4 70 ved Anta-sutr AS .
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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