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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1—The arguments set forth previously also prove the im- possibility of the fictitious existence of an individual soul considered as the abode of avidya, apart from Brahman considered as the abode of Maya. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 443 We thus arrive at the conclusion that those who hold the non-duality of Brahman must also admit that it is Brahman alone which is affected with beginningless avidya, and owing to this avidya is conscious of plurality within itself. Nor must it be urged against him who holds this view of avidya belonging to Brahman that he is unable to account for the distinction of bondage and release, for as there is only the one Brahman affected with Nescience and to be released by the cessation of that Nescience, the distinction of souls bound and released, &c, has no true existence : the empirical distinction of souls bound and re- leased, of teachers and pupils, &c. is a merely fictitious one, and all such fiction can be explained by means of the avidya of one intelligent being. The case is analogous to that of a person dreaming: the teachers and pupils and all the other persons and things he may see in his dream are fictitiously shaped out of the avidya of the one dreaming subject. For the same reason there is no valid foundation for the assumption of many avidyas. For those also who hold that avidya belongs to the individual souls do not maintain that the distinction of bondage and release, of one's own self and other persons, is real ; and if it is unreal it can be accounted for by the avidyd of one subject. This admits of being stated in various technical ways. — The distinctions of bondage and of one's own self and other persons are fictitiously shaped by one's own avidya ; for they are unreal like the distinctions seen by a dreaming person. — Other bodies also have a Self through me only ; for they are bodies like this my body. — Other bodies also are fictitiously shaped by my avidya ; for they are bodies or effects, or non-intelligent or fictitious creations, as this my body is. — The whole class of intelligent subjects is nothing but me ; for they are of intelligent nature ; what is not me is seen to be of non-intelligent nature ; as e. g. jars. — It thus follows that the distinctions of one's own self and other persons, of souls bound and released, of pupils and teachers, and so on, are fictitiously created by the avidya of one intelligent subject. The fact is that the upholder of Duality himself is not 444 vedanta-sOtras.
2g. jars. — It thus follows that the distinctions of one's own self and other persons, of souls bound and released, of pupils and teachers, and so on, are fictitiously created by the avidya of one intelligent subject. The fact is that the upholder of Duality himself is not 444 vedanta-sOtras. able to account for the distinction of souls bound and released. For as there is an infinity of past aeons, it follows that, even if one soul only should attain release in each aeon, all souls would by this time have attained release ; the actual existence of non-released souls cannot thus be rationally accounted for. — But the souls are ' infinite ' ; this accounts for there being souls not yet released ! — What, pray, do you understand by this ' infinity ' of souls ? Does it mean that they cannot be counted ? This we cannot allow, for although a being of limited knowledge may not be able to count them, owing to their large number, the all-knowing Lord surely can count them ; if he could not do so it would follow that he is not all-knowings — But the souls are really numberless, and the Lord's not knowing a definite number which does not exist does not prove that he is not all-knowing ! — Not so, we reply. Things which are definitely separate (bhinna) from each other cannot be without number. Souls have a number, because they are separate ; just as mustard seeds, beans, earthen vessels, pieces of cloth, and so on. And from their being separate it moreover follows that souls, like earthen vessels, and so on, are non-intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perish- able ; and it further follows therefrom that Brahman is not infinite. For by infinity we understand the absence of all limitation. Now on the theory which holds that there is a plurality of separate existences, Brahman which is con- sidered to differ in character from other existences cannot be said to be free from substantial limitation ; for sub- stantial limitation means nothing else than the existence of other substances. And what is substantially limited can- not be said to be free from temporal and spatial limitation ; for observation shows that it is just those things which differ in nature from other things and thus are substantially limited — such as earthen vessels, and so on — which are also limited in point of space and time. Hence all intelligent existences, including Brahman, being substantially limited, are also limited in point of space and time. But this con- clusion leads to a conflict with those scriptural texts which declare Brahman to be free from all limitation whatsoever II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 445 (' The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman/ and similar texts), and moreover would imply that the souls as well as Brahman are liable to origination, decay, and so on ; for limitation in time means nothing else but a being's passing through the stages of origination, decay, and so on.
3445 (' The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman/ and similar texts), and moreover would imply that the souls as well as Brahman are liable to origination, decay, and so on ; for limitation in time means nothing else but a being's passing through the stages of origination, decay, and so on. The dvaita-view thus being found untenable on all sides, we adhere to our doctrine that this entire world, from Brahma down to a blade of grass, springs from the avidya attached to Brahman which in itself is absolutely unlimited ; and that the distinctions of consciousness of pleasure and pain, and all similar distinctions, explain themselves from the fact of all of them being of the nature of avidya, just as the distinctions of which a dreaming person is conscious. The one Brahman, whose nature is eternal self-illumined- ness, free from all heterogeneous elements, owing to the influence of avidya illusorily manifests itself (vivarttate) in the form of this world ; and as thus in reality there exists nothing whatever different from Brahman, we hold that the world is ' non-different ' from Brahman. To this the Dvaitavadin, i. e. the VaLreshika, replies as follows. The doctrine that Brahman, which in itself is pure, non-differenced self-illuminedness, has its own true nature hidden by avidya and hence sees plurality within itself, is in conflict with all the valid means of right knowledge ; for as Brahman is without parts, obscuration, i. e. cessation, of the light of Brahman, would mean com- plete destruction of Brahman ; so that the hypothesis of obscuration is altogether excluded. This and other argu- ments have been already set forth; as also* that the hypothesis of obscuration contradicts other views held by the Advaitin. Nor is there any proof for the assertion that effects apart from their causes are mere error, like shell-silver, the separate existence of the effect being refuted by Reasoning ; for as a matter of fact there is no valid reasoning of the kind. The assertion? that the cause only is real because it persists, while the non-continuous effects — such as jars and waterpots — are unreal, has also been refuted before, on the ground that the fact of a thing not existing at one place and one time does not sublate its 446 vedanta-sOtras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1—The arguments set forth previously also prove the im- possibility of the fictitious existence of an individual soul considered as the abode of avidya, apart from Brahman considered as the abode of Maya. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 443 We thus arrive at the conclusion that those who hold the non-duality of Brahman must also admit that it is Brahman alone which is affected with beginningless avidya, and owing to this avidya is conscious of plurality within itself. Nor must it be urged against him who holds this view of avidya belonging to Brahman that he is unable to account for the distinction of bondage and release, for as there is only the one Brahman affected with Nescience and to be released by the cessation of that Nescience, the distinction of souls bound and released, &c, has no true existence : the empirical distinction of souls bound and re- leased, of teachers and pupils, &c. is a merely fictitious one, and all such fiction can be explained by means of the avidya of one intelligent being. The case is analogous to that of a person dreaming: the teachers and pupils and all the other persons and things he may see in his dream are fictitiously shaped out of the avidya of the one dreaming subject. For the same reason there is no valid foundation for the assumption of many avidyas. For those also who hold that avidya belongs to the individual souls do not maintain that the distinction of bondage and release, of one's own self and other persons, is real ; and if it is unreal it can be accounted for by the avidyd of one subject. This admits of being stated in various technical ways. — The distinctions of bondage and of one's own self and other persons are fictitiously shaped by one's own avidya ; for they are unreal like the distinctions seen by a dreaming person. — Other bodies also have a Self through me only ; for they are bodies like this my body. — Other bodies also are fictitiously shaped by my avidya ; for they are bodies or effects, or non-intelligent or fictitious creations, as this my body is. — The whole class of intelligent subjects is nothing but me ; for they are of intelligent nature ; what is not me is seen to be of non-intelligent nature ; as e. g. jars. — It thus follows that the distinctions of one's own self and other persons, of souls bound and released, of pupils and teachers, and so on, are fictitiously created by the avidya of one intelligent subject. The fact is that the upholder of Duality himself is not 444 vedanta-sOtras.
2g. jars. — It thus follows that the distinctions of one's own self and other persons, of souls bound and released, of pupils and teachers, and so on, are fictitiously created by the avidya of one intelligent subject. The fact is that the upholder of Duality himself is not 444 vedanta-sOtras. able to account for the distinction of souls bound and released. For as there is an infinity of past aeons, it follows that, even if one soul only should attain release in each aeon, all souls would by this time have attained release ; the actual existence of non-released souls cannot thus be rationally accounted for. — But the souls are ' infinite ' ; this accounts for there being souls not yet released ! — What, pray, do you understand by this ' infinity ' of souls ? Does it mean that they cannot be counted ? This we cannot allow, for although a being of limited knowledge may not be able to count them, owing to their large number, the all-knowing Lord surely can count them ; if he could not do so it would follow that he is not all-knowings — But the souls are really numberless, and the Lord's not knowing a definite number which does not exist does not prove that he is not all-knowing ! — Not so, we reply. Things which are definitely separate (bhinna) from each other cannot be without number. Souls have a number, because they are separate ; just as mustard seeds, beans, earthen vessels, pieces of cloth, and so on. And from their being separate it moreover follows that souls, like earthen vessels, and so on, are non-intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perish- able ; and it further follows therefrom that Brahman is not infinite. For by infinity we understand the absence of all limitation. Now on the theory which holds that there is a plurality of separate existences, Brahman which is con- sidered to differ in character from other existences cannot be said to be free from substantial limitation ; for sub- stantial limitation means nothing else than the existence of other substances. And what is substantially limited can- not be said to be free from temporal and spatial limitation ; for observation shows that it is just those things which differ in nature from other things and thus are substantially limited — such as earthen vessels, and so on — which are also limited in point of space and time. Hence all intelligent existences, including Brahman, being substantially limited, are also limited in point of space and time. But this con- clusion leads to a conflict with those scriptural texts which declare Brahman to be free from all limitation whatsoever II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 445 (' The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman/ and similar texts), and moreover would imply that the souls as well as Brahman are liable to origination, decay, and so on ; for limitation in time means nothing else but a being's passing through the stages of origination, decay, and so on.
3445 (' The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman/ and similar texts), and moreover would imply that the souls as well as Brahman are liable to origination, decay, and so on ; for limitation in time means nothing else but a being's passing through the stages of origination, decay, and so on. The dvaita-view thus being found untenable on all sides, we adhere to our doctrine that this entire world, from Brahma down to a blade of grass, springs from the avidya attached to Brahman which in itself is absolutely unlimited ; and that the distinctions of consciousness of pleasure and pain, and all similar distinctions, explain themselves from the fact of all of them being of the nature of avidya, just as the distinctions of which a dreaming person is conscious. The one Brahman, whose nature is eternal self-illumined- ness, free from all heterogeneous elements, owing to the influence of avidya illusorily manifests itself (vivarttate) in the form of this world ; and as thus in reality there exists nothing whatever different from Brahman, we hold that the world is ' non-different ' from Brahman. To this the Dvaitavadin, i. e. the VaLreshika, replies as follows. The doctrine that Brahman, which in itself is pure, non-differenced self-illuminedness, has its own true nature hidden by avidya and hence sees plurality within itself, is in conflict with all the valid means of right knowledge ; for as Brahman is without parts, obscuration, i. e. cessation, of the light of Brahman, would mean com- plete destruction of Brahman ; so that the hypothesis of obscuration is altogether excluded. This and other argu- ments have been already set forth; as also* that the hypothesis of obscuration contradicts other views held by the Advaitin. Nor is there any proof for the assertion that effects apart from their causes are mere error, like shell-silver, the separate existence of the effect being refuted by Reasoning ; for as a matter of fact there is no valid reasoning of the kind. The assertion? that the cause only is real because it persists, while the non-continuous effects — such as jars and waterpots — are unreal, has also been refuted before, on the ground that the fact of a thing not existing at one place and one time does not sublate its 446 vedanta-sOtras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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