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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1473 is also known through the Veda. — Here terminates the adhikara^a of 'the observation of employment/ 26. Or the consequence of the entire (Brahman entering into the effect), and stultification of (Brah- man's) being devoid of parts. ' Being only was this in the beginning ' ; * This indeed was in the beginning not anything' ; c The Self alone indeed was this in the beginning ' — these and other texts state that in the beginning Brahman was one only, i. e. without parts — that means : Brahman, in its causal state, was with- out parts because then all distinction of matter and souls had disappeared. This one, non-divided, Brahman there- upon having formed the resolution of being many divided itself into the aggregate of material things — ether, air, and so on — and the aggregate of souls from Brahmd down to blades of grass. This being so, it must be held that the entire highest Brahman entered into the effected state ; that its intelligent part divided itself into the individual souls, and its non-intelligent part into ether, air, and so on. This however stultifies all those often-quoted texts which declare Brahman in its causal state to be devoid of parts. For although the cause is constituted by Brahman in so far as having for its body matter and souls in their subtle state, and the effect by Brahman invested with matter and souls in their gross state ; the difficulty stated above cannot be avoided, since also that element in Brahman which is embodied is held to enter into the effect. If, on the other hand, Brahman is without parts, it cannot become many, and it is not possible that there should persist a part not entering into the effected state. On the ground of these unacceptable results we conclude that Brahman cannot be the cause. — This objection the next Sfttra disposes of. 27. But on account of Scripture; (Brahman s possession of various powers) being founded upon the word. The ' but ' sets aside the difficulty raised. There is no 474 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS. inappropriateness ; ' on account of Scripture.' Scripture declares on the one hand that Brahman is not made up of parts, and on the other that from it a multiform creation proceeds. And in matters vouched for by Scrip- ture we must conform our ideas to what Scripture actually says. — But then Scripture might be capable of conveying to us ideas of things altogether self-contra- dictory ; like as if somebody were to tell us ' Water with fire ' ! — The Sutra therefore adds ' on account of its being founded on the word/ As the possession, on Brah- man's part, of various powers (enabling it to emit the world) rests exclusively on the authority of the word of the Veda and thus differs altogether from other matters (which fall within the sphere of the other means of know- ledge also), the admission of such powers is not contrary to reason. Brahman cannot be either proved or disproved by means of generalisations from experience. 28. And thus in the Self; for (there are) manifold (powers).
2Brahman cannot be either proved or disproved by means of generalisations from experience. 28. And thus in the Self; for (there are) manifold (powers). If attributes belonging to one thing were on that account to be ascribed to other things also, it would follow that attributes observed in non-sentient things, such as jars and the like, belong also to the intelligent eternal Self, which is of an altogether different kind. But that such attributes do not extend to the Self is due to the variety of the essential nature of things. This the Sutra expresses in ' for (there are) manifold (powers)/ We perceive that fire, water, and so on, which are of different kind, possess different powers, viz. heat, and so on : there is therefore nothing unreasonable in the view that the highest Brahman which differs in kind from all things observed in ordinary life should possess innumerous powers not perceived in ordinary things. Thus Par&yara also — in reply to a ques- tion founded on ordinary observation — viz. ' How can creative energy be attributed to Brahman, devoid of qualities, pure, &c. ? ' — declares ' Numberless powers, lying beyond the sphere of all ordinary thought, belong to Brahman, and qualify it for creation, and so on ; just as II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 29. 475 heat belongs to fire/ Similarly, Scripture says, ' what was that wood, what was that tree from which they built heaven and earth?' &c. (Ri. Sa/^h. X, 81); and ' Brah- man was that wood, Brahman was that tree/ and so on. — Objections founded on ordinary generalisations have no force against Brahman which differs in nature from all other things. 29. And on account of the defects of his view also. On his view, i.e. on the view of him who holds the theory of the Pradhana or something similar, the imper- fections observed in ordinary things would attach them- selves to the Pradhana also, since it does not differ in nature from those things. The legitimate conclusion there- fore is that Brahman only which differs in nature from all other things can be held to be the general cause.
3The legitimate conclusion there- fore is that Brahman only which differs in nature from all other things can be held to be the general cause. The Pradhana, moreover, is without parts ; how then is it possible that it should give rise to a manifold world, comprising the * great principle/ and so on ? — But there are parts of the Pradhana, viz. Goodness, Passion, and Dark- ness!— This we reply necessitates the following distinc- tion. Does the aggregate of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness constitute the Pradhana ? or is the Pradhana the effect of those three ? The latter alternative is in conflict with your own doctrine according to which the Pradhana is cause only. It moreover contradicts the number of tattvas (viz. 24) admitted by you ; and as those three gu/zas also have no parts one does not see how they can produce an effect. On the former alternative, the gu/zas not being composed of parts must be held to aggregate or join themselves without any reference to difference of space, and from such conjunction the production of gross effects cannot result. — The same objection applies to the doctrine of atoms being the general cause. For atoms, being without parts and spatial distinction of parts, can join only without any reference to such spatial distinc- tion, and hence do not possess the power of originating effects. 476 ved Ant a-s6 tr as. 30. And (the divinity is) endowed with all powers, because that is seen. The highest divinity which is different in nature from all other things is endowed with all powers ; for scriptural texts show it to be such, ' His high power is revealed as manifold, as essential, and so his knowledge, force, and action ' (5vet. Up. VI, 8). In the same way another text first declares the highest divinity to differ in nature from everything else, ' Free from sin, from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst/ and then goes on to represent it as endowed with all powers, * realising all its wishes, realising all its intentions/ &c. (Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 5). Compare also * He, consisting of mind, having pra^a for his body, whose form is light, who realises his wishes/ &c. (KA. Up. Ill, 14, 2). 31. Not, on account of the absence of organs ; this has been explained (before).
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1473 is also known through the Veda. — Here terminates the adhikara^a of 'the observation of employment/ 26. Or the consequence of the entire (Brahman entering into the effect), and stultification of (Brah- man's) being devoid of parts. ' Being only was this in the beginning ' ; * This indeed was in the beginning not anything' ; c The Self alone indeed was this in the beginning ' — these and other texts state that in the beginning Brahman was one only, i. e. without parts — that means : Brahman, in its causal state, was with- out parts because then all distinction of matter and souls had disappeared. This one, non-divided, Brahman there- upon having formed the resolution of being many divided itself into the aggregate of material things — ether, air, and so on — and the aggregate of souls from Brahmd down to blades of grass. This being so, it must be held that the entire highest Brahman entered into the effected state ; that its intelligent part divided itself into the individual souls, and its non-intelligent part into ether, air, and so on. This however stultifies all those often-quoted texts which declare Brahman in its causal state to be devoid of parts. For although the cause is constituted by Brahman in so far as having for its body matter and souls in their subtle state, and the effect by Brahman invested with matter and souls in their gross state ; the difficulty stated above cannot be avoided, since also that element in Brahman which is embodied is held to enter into the effect. If, on the other hand, Brahman is without parts, it cannot become many, and it is not possible that there should persist a part not entering into the effected state. On the ground of these unacceptable results we conclude that Brahman cannot be the cause. — This objection the next Sfttra disposes of. 27. But on account of Scripture; (Brahman s possession of various powers) being founded upon the word. The ' but ' sets aside the difficulty raised. There is no 474 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS. inappropriateness ; ' on account of Scripture.' Scripture declares on the one hand that Brahman is not made up of parts, and on the other that from it a multiform creation proceeds. And in matters vouched for by Scrip- ture we must conform our ideas to what Scripture actually says. — But then Scripture might be capable of conveying to us ideas of things altogether self-contra- dictory ; like as if somebody were to tell us ' Water with fire ' ! — The Sutra therefore adds ' on account of its being founded on the word/ As the possession, on Brah- man's part, of various powers (enabling it to emit the world) rests exclusively on the authority of the word of the Veda and thus differs altogether from other matters (which fall within the sphere of the other means of know- ledge also), the admission of such powers is not contrary to reason. Brahman cannot be either proved or disproved by means of generalisations from experience. 28. And thus in the Self; for (there are) manifold (powers).
2Brahman cannot be either proved or disproved by means of generalisations from experience. 28. And thus in the Self; for (there are) manifold (powers). If attributes belonging to one thing were on that account to be ascribed to other things also, it would follow that attributes observed in non-sentient things, such as jars and the like, belong also to the intelligent eternal Self, which is of an altogether different kind. But that such attributes do not extend to the Self is due to the variety of the essential nature of things. This the Sutra expresses in ' for (there are) manifold (powers)/ We perceive that fire, water, and so on, which are of different kind, possess different powers, viz. heat, and so on : there is therefore nothing unreasonable in the view that the highest Brahman which differs in kind from all things observed in ordinary life should possess innumerous powers not perceived in ordinary things. Thus Par&yara also — in reply to a ques- tion founded on ordinary observation — viz. ' How can creative energy be attributed to Brahman, devoid of qualities, pure, &c. ? ' — declares ' Numberless powers, lying beyond the sphere of all ordinary thought, belong to Brahman, and qualify it for creation, and so on ; just as II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 29. 475 heat belongs to fire/ Similarly, Scripture says, ' what was that wood, what was that tree from which they built heaven and earth?' &c. (Ri. Sa/^h. X, 81); and ' Brah- man was that wood, Brahman was that tree/ and so on. — Objections founded on ordinary generalisations have no force against Brahman which differs in nature from all other things. 29. And on account of the defects of his view also. On his view, i.e. on the view of him who holds the theory of the Pradhana or something similar, the imper- fections observed in ordinary things would attach them- selves to the Pradhana also, since it does not differ in nature from those things. The legitimate conclusion there- fore is that Brahman only which differs in nature from all other things can be held to be the general cause.
3The legitimate conclusion there- fore is that Brahman only which differs in nature from all other things can be held to be the general cause. The Pradhana, moreover, is without parts ; how then is it possible that it should give rise to a manifold world, comprising the * great principle/ and so on ? — But there are parts of the Pradhana, viz. Goodness, Passion, and Dark- ness!— This we reply necessitates the following distinc- tion. Does the aggregate of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness constitute the Pradhana ? or is the Pradhana the effect of those three ? The latter alternative is in conflict with your own doctrine according to which the Pradhana is cause only. It moreover contradicts the number of tattvas (viz. 24) admitted by you ; and as those three gu/zas also have no parts one does not see how they can produce an effect. On the former alternative, the gu/zas not being composed of parts must be held to aggregate or join themselves without any reference to difference of space, and from such conjunction the production of gross effects cannot result. — The same objection applies to the doctrine of atoms being the general cause. For atoms, being without parts and spatial distinction of parts, can join only without any reference to such spatial distinc- tion, and hence do not possess the power of originating effects. 476 ved Ant a-s6 tr as. 30. And (the divinity is) endowed with all powers, because that is seen. The highest divinity which is different in nature from all other things is endowed with all powers ; for scriptural texts show it to be such, ' His high power is revealed as manifold, as essential, and so his knowledge, force, and action ' (5vet. Up. VI, 8). In the same way another text first declares the highest divinity to differ in nature from everything else, ' Free from sin, from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst/ and then goes on to represent it as endowed with all powers, * realising all its wishes, realising all its intentions/ &c. (Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 5). Compare also * He, consisting of mind, having pra^a for his body, whose form is light, who realises his wishes/ &c. (KA. Up. Ill, 14, 2). 31. Not, on account of the absence of organs ; this has been explained (before).
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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