The Vedânta-Sûtras with the Commentary of Râmânuja, Part III — SBE Vol. 48 (trans. George Thibaut, 1904)

Up. II, 8), arrives at bliss, supreme and not to be surpassed, by successively multiplying inferior stages of bliss by ap. 213 hundred ; now such supreme bliss cannot possibly belong to the individual soul which enjoys only a small share of very limited happiness, mixed with endless pain and grief ; and therefore clearly indicates, as its abode, the highest Self, which differs from all other Selfs in so far as being radically opposed to all evil and of an unmixed blessed nature. The text says, ' Different from this Self consisting of understanding (vi^ana) there is the inner Self consisting of bliss/ Now that which consists of understanding (vi£-«ana) is the individual soul (^iva), not the internal organ (buddhi) only ; for the formative element, ' maya,' (• consisting of ' ; in vi^anamaya) indicates a difference (between vlgnans. and vi^Tzanamaya). The term * pra^amaya ' (' consisting of breath ') we explain to mean ' pr&#a ' only, because no other explanation is possible ; but as vi^anamaya may be explained as ^"iva, we have no right to neglect ' maya ' as unmeaning. And this interpretation is quite suitable, as the soul in the states of bondage and release alike is a * knowing ' subject. That moreover even in * pra/zamaya,' and so on, the affix ' maya ' may be taken as having a meaning will be shown further on. — But how is it then that in the jloka which refers to the vi^&namaya, 4 Understanding (vi^ana) performs the sacrifice/ the term 4 vigmina ' only is used ? — The essential nature, we reply, of the knowing subject is suitably called ' knowledge/ and this term is transferred to the knowing subject itself which is defined as possessing that nature. For we generally see that words which denote attributes defining the essential nature of a thing also convey the notion of the essential nature of the thing itself. This also accounts for the fact that the jloka (' Vi^ana performs the sacrifice, it performs all sacred acts ') speaks of vignkna. as being the agent in sacrifices and so on ; the buddhi alone could not be called an agent. For this reason the text does not ascribe agency to the other Selfs (the prawamaya and so on) which are mentioned before the vy^anamaya ; for they are non-intelligent instruments of intelligence, and the latter only can be an agent. With the same view the text further on (II, 6), distinguishing the intelligent and the non-intelligent

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With the same view the text further on
(II, 6), distinguishing the intelligent and the non-intelligent

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by means of their different characteristic attributes, says in the end 6 knowledge and non-knowledge/ meaning thereby that which possesses the attribute of knowledge and that which does not. An analogous case is met with in the so-called antaryami-brahma^a (Bri. Up. Ill, 7). There the Ka/zvas read, * He who dwells in knowledge ' (vi^ana; III* 7, 16), but instead of this the Madhyandinas read 'he who dwells in the Self,' and so make clear that what the Ka^vas designate as ' knowledge ' really is the knowing Self. — > That the word vi^ana, although denoting the knowing Self, yet has a neuter termination, is meant to denote it as something substantial. We hence conclude that he who is different from the Self consisting of knowledge, i. e. the individual Self, is the highest Self which consists of bliss.

It is true indeed that the jloka, c Knowledge performs the sacrifice/ directly mentions knowledge only, not the knowing Self; all the same we have to understand that what is meant is the latter, who is referred to in the clause, 'different from this is the inner Self which consists of knowledge.' This conclusion is supported by the jloka referring to the Self which consists of food (II, 2); for that jloka refers to food only, ' From food are produced all creatures,' &c, all the same the preceding clause ' this man consists of the essence of food ' does not refer to food, but to an effect of it which consists of food. Considering all this the Sutrakara himself in a subsequent Sutra (1, 1, 18) bases his view on the declaration, in the scriptural text, of difference.— We now turn to the assertion, made by the Purvapakshin, that the cause of the world is not different from the individual soul because in two KMndogya. passages it is exhibited in co-ordination with the latter (' having entered into them with this living Self/ ' Thou art that ') ; and that hence the introductory clause of the Taitt. passage (' He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest') refers to the individual soul — which further on is called ' consisting of bliss/ because it is free from all that is not pleasure. — This view cannot be upheld ; for although the individual soul is intelligent, it is incapable of producing through its volition this infinite and wonderful Universe — a process described in texts such

I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, I 3. 21 5

— This view cannot be upheld ; for although the individual soul is intelligent, it is incapable of producing through its volition this infinite and wonderful Universe — a process described in texts suchI ADHYAYA, I PAD A, I 3. 21 5 as ( It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth.— It sent forth fire/ &c. That even the released soul is unequal to such ' world businesses creation, two later Sutras will expressly declare. But, if you deny that Brahman, the cause of the world, is identical with the individual soul, how then do you account for the co-ordination in which the two appear in the .Oandogya texts ? — How, we ask in return, can Brahman, the cause of all, free from all shadow of imperfection, omniscient, omnipotent, &c. &c, be one with the individual soul, all whose activities— whether it be thinking, or winking of an eye, or anything else — depend on karman, which implies endless suffering of various kind ? — If you reply that this is possible if one of two things is unreal, we ask — which then do you mean to be unreal ? Brahman's connexion with what is evil ? — or its essential nature, owing to which it is absolutely good and antagonistic to all evil ? — -You will perhaps reply that, owing to the fact of Brahman, which is absolutely good and antagonistic to all evil, being the substrate of beginningless Nescience, there presents itself the false appearance of its being connected with evil. But there you maintain what is contradictory. On the one side there is Brahman's absolute perfection and antagonism to all evil ; on the other it is the substrate of Nescience, and thereby the substrate of a false appearance which is involved in endless pain ; for to be connected with evil means to be the substrate of Nescience and the appearance of suffering which is produced thereby. Now it is a contradiction to say that Brahman is connected with all this and at the same time antagonistic to it ! — Nor can we allow you to say that there is no real contradiction because that appearance is something false. For whatever is false belongs to that group of things contrary to man's true interest, for the destruction of which the Vedânta-texts are studied. To be connected with what is hurtful to man, and to be absolutely perfect and antagonistic to all evil is self-contradictory. — But, our adversary now rejoins, what after all are we to do ? The holy text at first clearly promises that through the cognition of one thing everything will be known (' by which that which is

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