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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— The bhedabheda view implies that owing to Brahman's con- nexion with limiting adjuncts (upadhi) all the imperfections 1 Such as ' The True, knowledge/ &c. i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 135 resulting therefrom — and which avowedly belong to the individual soul — would manifest themselves in Brahman itself ; and as this contradicts the doctrine that the Self of all is constituted by a Brahman free from all imperfection and comprising within itself all auspicious qualities, the texts conveying that doctrine would have to be disregarded. If, on the other, hand, the theory be held in that form that ' bhedabheda ' belongs to Brahman by its own nature (not only owing to an upadhi), the view that Brahman by its essential .nature appears as individual soul, implies that imperfections no less than perfections are essential to Brahman, and this is in conflict with the texts teaching that everything is identical with Brahman free from all imperfections. — For those finally who maintain absolute difference, the doctrine of Brahman being the Self of all has no meaning whatsoever — for things absolutely different can in no way be one — and this implies the abandonment of all Vedanta-texts together. Those, on the other hand, who take their stand on the doctrine, proclaimed by all Upanishads, that the entire world forms the body of Brahman, may accept in their fulness all the texts teaching the identity of the world with Brahman. For as genus (^Ati) and quality (gu;za), so substances (dravya) also may occupy the position of determining attributes (vLresha/sa), in so far namely as they constitute the body of something else. Enunciations such as ' the Self (soul) is, according to its works, born either (as) a god, or a man, or a horse, or a bull/ show that in ordinary speech as well as in the Veda co-ordination has to be taken in a real primary (not implied) sense. In the same way it is also in the case of generic character and of qualities the relation of 'mode' only (in which generic character and qualities stand to substances) which determines statements of co-ordination, such as ' the ox is broken-horned/ 'the cloth is white/ And as material bodies bearing the generic marks of humanity are definite things, in so far only as they are modes of a Self or soul, enunciations of co-ordination such as ' the soul has been born as a man, or a eunuch, or a woman,' are in every way 1 36 vedAnta-sCtras.
2appropriate. What determines statements of co-ordination is thus only the relation of 'mode ' in which one thing stands to another, not the relation of generic character, quality, and so on, which are of an exclusive nature (and cannot therefore be exhibited in co-ordination with substances). Such words indeed as denote substances capable of sub- sisting by themselves occasionally take suffixes, indicating that those substances form the distinguishing attributes of other substances — as when from danda, ' staff,' we form dandin, ' staff-bearer ' ; in the case, on the other hand, of substances not capable of subsisting and being apprehended apart from others, the fact of their holding the position of attributes is ascertained only from their appearing in grammatical co-ordination. — But, an objection is raised, if it is supposed that in sentences such as ' the Self is born, as god, man, animal/ &c, the body of a man, god, &c, stands towards the Self in the relation of a mode, in the same way as in sentences such as ' the ox is broken-horned/ * the cloth is white/ the generic characteristic and the quality stand in the relation of modes to the substances ('cow/ ' cloth ') to which they are grammatically co-ordinated ; then there would necessarily be simultaneous cognition of the mode, and that to which the mode belongs, i. e. of the body and the Self; just as there is simultaneous cognition of the generic character and the individual. But as a matter of fact this is not the case ; we do not necessarily observe a human, divine, or animal body together with the Self. The co-ordination expressed in the form € the Self is a man/ is therefore an ' implied ' one only (the statement not admitting of being taken in its primary literal sense). — This is not so, we reply. The relation of bodies to the Self is strictly analogous to that of class characteristics and qualities to the substances in which they inhere ; for it is the Self only which is their substrate and their final cause (prayq^ana), and they are modes of the Self. That the Self only is their substrate, appears from the fact that when the Self separates itself from the body the latter perishes ; that the Self alone is their final cause, appears from the fact that they exist to I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I 37
3That the Self only is their substrate, appears from the fact that when the Self separates itself from the body the latter perishes ; that the Self alone is their final cause, appears from the fact that they exist to I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I 37 the end that the fruits of the actions of the Self may be enjoyed ; and that they are modes of the Self, appears from the fact that they are mere attributes of the Self manifest- ing itself as god, man, or the like. These are just the circumstances on account of which words like ( cow ' extend in their meaning (beyond the class characteristics) so as to comprise the individual also. Where those circumstances are absent, as in the case of staffs, earrings, and the like, the attributive position is expressed (not by co-ordination but) by means of special derivative forms — such as da/z^in (staff-bearer), ku^alin (adorned with earrings). In the case of bodies divine, human, &c, on the other hand, the essential nature of which it is to be mere modes of the Self which constitutes their substrate and final cause, both ordinary and Vedic language express the relation sub- sisting between the two, in the form of co-ordination, 1 This Self is a god, or a man,' &c. That class charac- teristics and individuals are invariably observed together, is due to the fact of both being objects of visual perception ; the Self, on the other hand, is not such, and hence is not apprehended by the eye, while the body is so apprehended. Nor must you raise the objection that it is hard to under- stand how that which is capable of being apprehended by itself can be a mere mode of something else : for that the body's essential nature actually consists in being a mere mode of the Self is proved — just as in the case of class characteristics and so on — by its having the Self only for its substrate and final cause, and standing to it in the relation of a distinguishing attribute. That two things are invariably perceived together, depends, as already observed, on their being apprehended by means of the same apparatus, visual or otherwise. Earth is naturally connected with smell, taste, and so on, and yet these qualities are not perceived by the eye ; in the same way the eye which perceives the body does not perceive that essential charac- teristic of the body which consists in its being a mere mode of the Self; the reason of the difference being that the eye has no capacity to apprehend the Self. But this does not imply that the body does not possess that essential 1 38 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— The bhedabheda view implies that owing to Brahman's con- nexion with limiting adjuncts (upadhi) all the imperfections 1 Such as ' The True, knowledge/ &c. i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 135 resulting therefrom — and which avowedly belong to the individual soul — would manifest themselves in Brahman itself ; and as this contradicts the doctrine that the Self of all is constituted by a Brahman free from all imperfection and comprising within itself all auspicious qualities, the texts conveying that doctrine would have to be disregarded. If, on the other, hand, the theory be held in that form that ' bhedabheda ' belongs to Brahman by its own nature (not only owing to an upadhi), the view that Brahman by its essential .nature appears as individual soul, implies that imperfections no less than perfections are essential to Brahman, and this is in conflict with the texts teaching that everything is identical with Brahman free from all imperfections. — For those finally who maintain absolute difference, the doctrine of Brahman being the Self of all has no meaning whatsoever — for things absolutely different can in no way be one — and this implies the abandonment of all Vedanta-texts together. Those, on the other hand, who take their stand on the doctrine, proclaimed by all Upanishads, that the entire world forms the body of Brahman, may accept in their fulness all the texts teaching the identity of the world with Brahman. For as genus (^Ati) and quality (gu;za), so substances (dravya) also may occupy the position of determining attributes (vLresha/sa), in so far namely as they constitute the body of something else. Enunciations such as ' the Self (soul) is, according to its works, born either (as) a god, or a man, or a horse, or a bull/ show that in ordinary speech as well as in the Veda co-ordination has to be taken in a real primary (not implied) sense. In the same way it is also in the case of generic character and of qualities the relation of 'mode' only (in which generic character and qualities stand to substances) which determines statements of co-ordination, such as ' the ox is broken-horned/ 'the cloth is white/ And as material bodies bearing the generic marks of humanity are definite things, in so far only as they are modes of a Self or soul, enunciations of co-ordination such as ' the soul has been born as a man, or a eunuch, or a woman,' are in every way 1 36 vedAnta-sCtras.
2appropriate. What determines statements of co-ordination is thus only the relation of 'mode ' in which one thing stands to another, not the relation of generic character, quality, and so on, which are of an exclusive nature (and cannot therefore be exhibited in co-ordination with substances). Such words indeed as denote substances capable of sub- sisting by themselves occasionally take suffixes, indicating that those substances form the distinguishing attributes of other substances — as when from danda, ' staff,' we form dandin, ' staff-bearer ' ; in the case, on the other hand, of substances not capable of subsisting and being apprehended apart from others, the fact of their holding the position of attributes is ascertained only from their appearing in grammatical co-ordination. — But, an objection is raised, if it is supposed that in sentences such as ' the Self is born, as god, man, animal/ &c, the body of a man, god, &c, stands towards the Self in the relation of a mode, in the same way as in sentences such as ' the ox is broken-horned/ * the cloth is white/ the generic characteristic and the quality stand in the relation of modes to the substances ('cow/ ' cloth ') to which they are grammatically co-ordinated ; then there would necessarily be simultaneous cognition of the mode, and that to which the mode belongs, i. e. of the body and the Self; just as there is simultaneous cognition of the generic character and the individual. But as a matter of fact this is not the case ; we do not necessarily observe a human, divine, or animal body together with the Self. The co-ordination expressed in the form € the Self is a man/ is therefore an ' implied ' one only (the statement not admitting of being taken in its primary literal sense). — This is not so, we reply. The relation of bodies to the Self is strictly analogous to that of class characteristics and qualities to the substances in which they inhere ; for it is the Self only which is their substrate and their final cause (prayq^ana), and they are modes of the Self. That the Self only is their substrate, appears from the fact that when the Self separates itself from the body the latter perishes ; that the Self alone is their final cause, appears from the fact that they exist to I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I 37
3That the Self only is their substrate, appears from the fact that when the Self separates itself from the body the latter perishes ; that the Self alone is their final cause, appears from the fact that they exist to I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I 37 the end that the fruits of the actions of the Self may be enjoyed ; and that they are modes of the Self, appears from the fact that they are mere attributes of the Self manifest- ing itself as god, man, or the like. These are just the circumstances on account of which words like ( cow ' extend in their meaning (beyond the class characteristics) so as to comprise the individual also. Where those circumstances are absent, as in the case of staffs, earrings, and the like, the attributive position is expressed (not by co-ordination but) by means of special derivative forms — such as da/z^in (staff-bearer), ku^alin (adorned with earrings). In the case of bodies divine, human, &c, on the other hand, the essential nature of which it is to be mere modes of the Self which constitutes their substrate and final cause, both ordinary and Vedic language express the relation sub- sisting between the two, in the form of co-ordination, 1 This Self is a god, or a man,' &c. That class charac- teristics and individuals are invariably observed together, is due to the fact of both being objects of visual perception ; the Self, on the other hand, is not such, and hence is not apprehended by the eye, while the body is so apprehended. Nor must you raise the objection that it is hard to under- stand how that which is capable of being apprehended by itself can be a mere mode of something else : for that the body's essential nature actually consists in being a mere mode of the Self is proved — just as in the case of class characteristics and so on — by its having the Self only for its substrate and final cause, and standing to it in the relation of a distinguishing attribute. That two things are invariably perceived together, depends, as already observed, on their being apprehended by means of the same apparatus, visual or otherwise. Earth is naturally connected with smell, taste, and so on, and yet these qualities are not perceived by the eye ; in the same way the eye which perceives the body does not perceive that essential charac- teristic of the body which consists in its being a mere mode of the Self; the reason of the difference being that the eye has no capacity to apprehend the Self. But this does not imply that the body does not possess that essential 1 38 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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