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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Now being fundamentally opposed to evil implies having a character the opposite of grossness and all similar qualities which belong to the empirical world, material and mental. He therefore who thinks of 654 VEDANTA-StJTRAS. Brahman must think of it as having for its essential nature bliss, knowledge, and so on, in so far as distinguished by- absence of grossness and the like, and those qualities, being no less essential than bliss, and so on, must therefore be included in all meditations on Brahman. — The Sutra gives an instance illustrating the principle that qualities (secondary matters) follow the principal matter to which they belong. As the mantra ' Agnir vai hotra^ vetu/ although given in the Sama-veda, yet has to be recited in the Yagnr-veda style, with a subdued voice, because it stands in a subordinate relation to the upasad-offerings prescribed for the four-days' sacrifice called Gamadagnya ; those offerings are the principal matter to which the subordinate matter — the mantra — has to conform. This point is explained in the first section, i.e. in the Purva Mima;/zsa-sutras III, 3, 9. — But this being admitted, it would follow that as Brahman is the principal matter in all meditations on Brahman, and secondary matters have to follow the principal matter, also such qualities as ' doing all works, enjoying all odours and the like/ which are men- tioned in connexion with special meditations only, would indiscriminately have to be included in all meditations. — With reference to this the next Sutra says. 34. So much ; on account of reflection. Only so much, i. e. only those qualities which have to be included in all meditations on Brahman, without which the essential special nature of Brahman cannot be conceived, i. e. bliss, knowledge, and so on, characterised by absence of grossness and the like. Other qualities, such as doing all works and the like, although indeed following their substrate, are explicitly to be meditated on in special meditations only. — Here terminates the adhikara;/a of 'the idea of the Imperishable.' 35. Should it be said that (the former reply refers) to that Self to which the aggregate of mate- rial things belongs (since) otherwise the difference (of the two replies) could not be accounted for ; we say — no ; as in the case of instruction. Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 35. 655
2Should it be said that (the former reply refers) to that Self to which the aggregate of mate- rial things belongs (since) otherwise the difference (of the two replies) could not be accounted for ; we say — no ; as in the case of instruction. Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 35. 655 In the Brzhad-ara/zyaka (III, 4 ; 5) the same question is asked twice in succession ('Tell me the Brahman which is visible, not invisible, the Self who is within all '), while Ya^avalkya gives a different answer to each (' He who breathes in the upbreathing/ &c. ; * He who overcomes hunger and thirst/ &c). The question here is whether the two meditations, suggested by these sections, are different or not. They are different, since the difference of reply effects a distinction between the two vidyas. The former reply declares him who is the maker of breathing forth, and so on, to be the inner Self of all ; the latter describes him as free from hunger, thirst, and so on. It thence appears that the former passage refers to the inner (indi- vidual) Self which is different from foody, sense-organs, internal organ, and vital breath; while the latter refers to that which again differs from the inner Self, viz. the highest Self, free from hunger, thirst, and so on. As the individual soul is inside the aggregate of material things, it may be spoken of as being that inner Self of all. Although this kind of inwardness is indeed only a relative one, we never- theless must accept it in this place ; for if, desirous of taking this * being the inner Self of all ' in its literal sense, we assumed the highest Self to be meant, the difference of the two replies could not be accounted for. The former reply evidently refers to the individual soul, since the highest Self cannot be conceived as breathing forth, and so on ; and the latter reply, which declares the Self to be raised above hunger, &c, evidently refers to the highest Self. This is expressed in the earlier part of the Sutra : ' The former reply refers to the Self to which there belongs the aggregate of material things, i. e. the individual soul as being the inner Self of all ; otherwise we could not account for the difference of the two replies.' — The last words of the Sutra negative this — ' not so/ i. e. there is no dif- ference of vidyas, since both assertions and replies refer to the highest Self. The question says in both places, * the Brahman which is visible, not invisible, the Self who is within all/ and this clearly refers to the highest Self only. We indeed observe that in some places the term Brahman 6 K 6 VEDANTA-S^TR AS.
3The question says in both places, * the Brahman which is visible, not invisible, the Self who is within all/ and this clearly refers to the highest Self only. We indeed observe that in some places the term Brahman 6 K 6 VEDANTA-S^TR AS. is, in a derived sense, applied to the individual soul also ; but the text under discussion, for distinction's sake, adds the qualification ' the Brahman which is manifest ' (sakshat). The quality of ' aparokshatva ' (i. e. being that which does not transcend the senses but lies openly revealed) also, which implies being connected with all space and all time, suits Brahman only, which from texts such as ' the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman ' is known to be infinite. In the same way the attribute of being the inner Self of all can belong to the highest Self only, which texts such as * He who dwelling within the earth,' &c., declare to be the inner ruler of the universe. The replies to the two ques- tions likewise can refer to Brahman only. The uncon- ditional causal agency with regard to breath, declared in the clause ' he who breathes in the upbreathing/ &c, can belong to the highest Self only, not to the individual soul, since the latter possesses no such causal power when in the state of deep sleep. Ushasta thereupon, being not fully enlightened, since causality with regard to breathing may in a sense be attributed to the individual soul also, again asks a question, in reply to which Ya^avalkya clearly indicates Brahman, 'Thou mayest not see the seer of sight/ &c, i.e. thou must not think that my previous speech has named as the causal agent of breathing the individual soul, which is the causal agent with regard to those activities which depend on the sense-organs, viz. seeing, hearing, thinking, and knowing ; for in the state of deep sleep, swoon, and so on, the soul possesses no such power. And moreover another text also — ' Who could breathe if that bliss existed not in the ether ? ' (Taitt. Up. II, 7) — declares that the highest Self only is the cause of the breathing of all living beings. In the same way the answer to the second question can refer to the highest Self only, which alone can be said to be raised above hunger, thirst, and so on. For this reason also both replies wind up with the same phrase, * Everything else is of evil/ The iteration of question and reply serves the purpose of show- ing that the same highest Brahman which is the cause of all breathing is beyond all hunger, thirst, and so on. — The Ill ADHYAYA, 3 pAdA, $6. 657
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Now being fundamentally opposed to evil implies having a character the opposite of grossness and all similar qualities which belong to the empirical world, material and mental. He therefore who thinks of 654 VEDANTA-StJTRAS. Brahman must think of it as having for its essential nature bliss, knowledge, and so on, in so far as distinguished by- absence of grossness and the like, and those qualities, being no less essential than bliss, and so on, must therefore be included in all meditations on Brahman. — The Sutra gives an instance illustrating the principle that qualities (secondary matters) follow the principal matter to which they belong. As the mantra ' Agnir vai hotra^ vetu/ although given in the Sama-veda, yet has to be recited in the Yagnr-veda style, with a subdued voice, because it stands in a subordinate relation to the upasad-offerings prescribed for the four-days' sacrifice called Gamadagnya ; those offerings are the principal matter to which the subordinate matter — the mantra — has to conform. This point is explained in the first section, i.e. in the Purva Mima;/zsa-sutras III, 3, 9. — But this being admitted, it would follow that as Brahman is the principal matter in all meditations on Brahman, and secondary matters have to follow the principal matter, also such qualities as ' doing all works, enjoying all odours and the like/ which are men- tioned in connexion with special meditations only, would indiscriminately have to be included in all meditations. — With reference to this the next Sutra says. 34. So much ; on account of reflection. Only so much, i. e. only those qualities which have to be included in all meditations on Brahman, without which the essential special nature of Brahman cannot be conceived, i. e. bliss, knowledge, and so on, characterised by absence of grossness and the like. Other qualities, such as doing all works and the like, although indeed following their substrate, are explicitly to be meditated on in special meditations only. — Here terminates the adhikara;/a of 'the idea of the Imperishable.' 35. Should it be said that (the former reply refers) to that Self to which the aggregate of mate- rial things belongs (since) otherwise the difference (of the two replies) could not be accounted for ; we say — no ; as in the case of instruction. Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 35. 655
2Should it be said that (the former reply refers) to that Self to which the aggregate of mate- rial things belongs (since) otherwise the difference (of the two replies) could not be accounted for ; we say — no ; as in the case of instruction. Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 35. 655 In the Brzhad-ara/zyaka (III, 4 ; 5) the same question is asked twice in succession ('Tell me the Brahman which is visible, not invisible, the Self who is within all '), while Ya^avalkya gives a different answer to each (' He who breathes in the upbreathing/ &c. ; * He who overcomes hunger and thirst/ &c). The question here is whether the two meditations, suggested by these sections, are different or not. They are different, since the difference of reply effects a distinction between the two vidyas. The former reply declares him who is the maker of breathing forth, and so on, to be the inner Self of all ; the latter describes him as free from hunger, thirst, and so on. It thence appears that the former passage refers to the inner (indi- vidual) Self which is different from foody, sense-organs, internal organ, and vital breath; while the latter refers to that which again differs from the inner Self, viz. the highest Self, free from hunger, thirst, and so on. As the individual soul is inside the aggregate of material things, it may be spoken of as being that inner Self of all. Although this kind of inwardness is indeed only a relative one, we never- theless must accept it in this place ; for if, desirous of taking this * being the inner Self of all ' in its literal sense, we assumed the highest Self to be meant, the difference of the two replies could not be accounted for. The former reply evidently refers to the individual soul, since the highest Self cannot be conceived as breathing forth, and so on ; and the latter reply, which declares the Self to be raised above hunger, &c, evidently refers to the highest Self. This is expressed in the earlier part of the Sutra : ' The former reply refers to the Self to which there belongs the aggregate of material things, i. e. the individual soul as being the inner Self of all ; otherwise we could not account for the difference of the two replies.' — The last words of the Sutra negative this — ' not so/ i. e. there is no dif- ference of vidyas, since both assertions and replies refer to the highest Self. The question says in both places, * the Brahman which is visible, not invisible, the Self who is within all/ and this clearly refers to the highest Self only. We indeed observe that in some places the term Brahman 6 K 6 VEDANTA-S^TR AS.
3The question says in both places, * the Brahman which is visible, not invisible, the Self who is within all/ and this clearly refers to the highest Self only. We indeed observe that in some places the term Brahman 6 K 6 VEDANTA-S^TR AS. is, in a derived sense, applied to the individual soul also ; but the text under discussion, for distinction's sake, adds the qualification ' the Brahman which is manifest ' (sakshat). The quality of ' aparokshatva ' (i. e. being that which does not transcend the senses but lies openly revealed) also, which implies being connected with all space and all time, suits Brahman only, which from texts such as ' the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman ' is known to be infinite. In the same way the attribute of being the inner Self of all can belong to the highest Self only, which texts such as * He who dwelling within the earth,' &c., declare to be the inner ruler of the universe. The replies to the two ques- tions likewise can refer to Brahman only. The uncon- ditional causal agency with regard to breath, declared in the clause ' he who breathes in the upbreathing/ &c, can belong to the highest Self only, not to the individual soul, since the latter possesses no such causal power when in the state of deep sleep. Ushasta thereupon, being not fully enlightened, since causality with regard to breathing may in a sense be attributed to the individual soul also, again asks a question, in reply to which Ya^avalkya clearly indicates Brahman, 'Thou mayest not see the seer of sight/ &c, i.e. thou must not think that my previous speech has named as the causal agent of breathing the individual soul, which is the causal agent with regard to those activities which depend on the sense-organs, viz. seeing, hearing, thinking, and knowing ; for in the state of deep sleep, swoon, and so on, the soul possesses no such power. And moreover another text also — ' Who could breathe if that bliss existed not in the ether ? ' (Taitt. Up. II, 7) — declares that the highest Self only is the cause of the breathing of all living beings. In the same way the answer to the second question can refer to the highest Self only, which alone can be said to be raised above hunger, thirst, and so on. For this reason also both replies wind up with the same phrase, * Everything else is of evil/ The iteration of question and reply serves the purpose of show- ing that the same highest Brahman which is the cause of all breathing is beyond all hunger, thirst, and so on. — The Ill ADHYAYA, 3 pAdA, $6. 657
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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