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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
11 65 fore have no right to infer for them intelligent producers. Hence the quality of being an effected thing can be used as an argument for proving the existence of an intelligent causal agent, only where that quality is found in things, the production of which, and the knowledge of the causes of which, is possible at all. — Experience further teaches that earthen pots and similar things are produced by intelligent agents possessing material bodies, using implements, not endowed with the power of a Supreme Lord, limited in knowledge and so on ; the quality of being an effect there- fore supplies a reason for inferring an intelligent agent of the kind described only, and thus is opposed to the inference of attributes of a contrary nature, viz. omniscience, omni- potence, and those other attributes that belong to the highest Soul, whose existence you wish to establish. — Nor does this (as might be objected) imply an abandonment of all inference. Where the thing to be inferred is known through other means of proof also, any qualities of an opposite nature which may be suggested by the inferential mark (linga) are opposed by those other means of proof, and therefore must be dropped. In the case under discussion, however, the thing to be inferred is something not guaranteed by any other means of proof, viz. a person capable of constructing the entire universe : here there is nothing to interfere with the ascription to such a person of all those qualities which, on the basis of methodical inference, necessarily belong to it. — The conclusion from all this is that, apart from Scripture, the existence of a Lord does not admit of proof. Against all this the Purvapakshin now restates his case as follows : — It cannot be gainsaid that the world is some- thing effected, for it is made up of parts. We may state this argument in various technical forms. ' The earth, mountains, &c, are things effected, because they consist of parts ; in the same way as jars and similar things/ ' The earth, seas, mountains, &c, are effects, because, while being big (i.e. non-atomic), they are capable of motion ; just as jars and the like.' ' Bodies, the world, &c, are effects, because, while being big, they are solid (murtta) ; just as jars and the like.' — But, an objection is raised, in the case 1 66 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
2non-atomic), they are capable of motion ; just as jars and the like.' ' Bodies, the world, &c, are effects, because, while being big, they are solid (murtta) ; just as jars and the like.' — But, an objection is raised, in the case 1 66 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. of things made up of parts we do not, in addition to this attribute of consisting of parts, observe any other aspect determining that the thing is an effect — so as to enable us to say ' this thing is effected, and that thing is not ' ; and, on the other hand, we do observe it as an indispensable condition of something being an effect, that there should be the possibility of such an effect being brought about, and of the existence of such knowledge of material causes, &c. (as the bringing about of the effect presupposes). — Not so, we reply. In the case of a cause being inferred on the ground of an effect, the knowledge and power of the cause must be inferred in accordance with the nature of the effect. From the circumstance of a thing consisting of parts we know it to be an effect, and on this basis we judge of the power and knowledge of the cause. A person recognises pots, jars and the like, as things produced, and therefrom infers the constructive skill and knowledge of their maker ; when, after this, he sees for the first time a kingly palace with all its various wonderful parts and structures, he concludes from the special way in which the parts are joined that this also is an effected thing, and then makes an inference as to the architect's manifold knowledge and skill. Analogously, when a living body and the world have once been recognised to be effects, we infer — as their maker — some special intelligent being, possessing direct insight into their nature and skill to construct them. — Pleasure and pain, moreover, by which men are requited for their merit and demerit, are themselves of a non-intelligent nature, and hence cannot bring about their results unless they are controlled by an intelligent principle, and this also compels us to assume a being capable of allotting to each individual soul a fate corresponding to its deserts. For we do not observe that non-intelligent implements, such as axes and the like, however much they may be favoured by circumstances of time, place, and so on, are capable of producing posts and pillars unless they be handled by a carpenter. And to quote against the generalization on which we rely the instance of the seed and sprout and the like can only spring from an ignorance and stupidity which I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 1 67
3And to quote against the generalization on which we rely the instance of the seed and sprout and the like can only spring from an ignorance and stupidity which I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 1 67 may be called truly demoniac. The same remark would apply to pleasure and pain if used as a counter instance. (For in all these cases the action which produces an effect must necessarily be guided by an intelligent principle.) — Nor may we assume, as a * less complicated hypothesis/ that the guiding principle in the construction of the world is the individual souls, whose existence is acknowledged by both parties. For on the testimony of observation we must deny to those souls the power of seeing what is extremely subtle or remote in time or place (while such power must necessarily be ascribed to a world-constructing intelligence). On the other hand, we have no ground for concluding that the Lord is, like the individual souls, destitute of such power ; hence it cannot be said that other means of knowledge make it impossible to infer such a Lord. The fact rather is that as his existence is proved by the argument that any definite effect presupposes a causal agent competent to produce that effect, he is proved at the same time as possessing the essential power of intuitively knowing and ruling all things in the universe. — The contention that from the world being an effect it follows that its maker does not possess lordly power and so on, so that the proving reason would prove something contrary to the special attributes (belonging to a supreme agent, viz. omnipotence, omniscience, &c), is founded on evident ignorance of the nature of the inferential process. For the inference clearly does not prove that there exist in the thing inferred all the attributes belonging to the proving collateral instances, including even those attributes which stand in no causal relation to the effect. A certain effect which is produced by some agent presupposes just so much power and knowledge on the part of that agent as is requisite for the production of the effect, but in no way presupposes any incapability or ignorance on the part of that agent with regard to things other than the particular effect ; for such incapability and ignorance do not stand towards that effect in any causal relation. If the origina- tion of the effect can be accounted for on the basis of the agent's capability of bringing it about, and of his knowledge 1 68 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
11 65 fore have no right to infer for them intelligent producers. Hence the quality of being an effected thing can be used as an argument for proving the existence of an intelligent causal agent, only where that quality is found in things, the production of which, and the knowledge of the causes of which, is possible at all. — Experience further teaches that earthen pots and similar things are produced by intelligent agents possessing material bodies, using implements, not endowed with the power of a Supreme Lord, limited in knowledge and so on ; the quality of being an effect there- fore supplies a reason for inferring an intelligent agent of the kind described only, and thus is opposed to the inference of attributes of a contrary nature, viz. omniscience, omni- potence, and those other attributes that belong to the highest Soul, whose existence you wish to establish. — Nor does this (as might be objected) imply an abandonment of all inference. Where the thing to be inferred is known through other means of proof also, any qualities of an opposite nature which may be suggested by the inferential mark (linga) are opposed by those other means of proof, and therefore must be dropped. In the case under discussion, however, the thing to be inferred is something not guaranteed by any other means of proof, viz. a person capable of constructing the entire universe : here there is nothing to interfere with the ascription to such a person of all those qualities which, on the basis of methodical inference, necessarily belong to it. — The conclusion from all this is that, apart from Scripture, the existence of a Lord does not admit of proof. Against all this the Purvapakshin now restates his case as follows : — It cannot be gainsaid that the world is some- thing effected, for it is made up of parts. We may state this argument in various technical forms. ' The earth, mountains, &c, are things effected, because they consist of parts ; in the same way as jars and similar things/ ' The earth, seas, mountains, &c, are effects, because, while being big (i.e. non-atomic), they are capable of motion ; just as jars and the like.' ' Bodies, the world, &c, are effects, because, while being big, they are solid (murtta) ; just as jars and the like.' — But, an objection is raised, in the case 1 66 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
2non-atomic), they are capable of motion ; just as jars and the like.' ' Bodies, the world, &c, are effects, because, while being big, they are solid (murtta) ; just as jars and the like.' — But, an objection is raised, in the case 1 66 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. of things made up of parts we do not, in addition to this attribute of consisting of parts, observe any other aspect determining that the thing is an effect — so as to enable us to say ' this thing is effected, and that thing is not ' ; and, on the other hand, we do observe it as an indispensable condition of something being an effect, that there should be the possibility of such an effect being brought about, and of the existence of such knowledge of material causes, &c. (as the bringing about of the effect presupposes). — Not so, we reply. In the case of a cause being inferred on the ground of an effect, the knowledge and power of the cause must be inferred in accordance with the nature of the effect. From the circumstance of a thing consisting of parts we know it to be an effect, and on this basis we judge of the power and knowledge of the cause. A person recognises pots, jars and the like, as things produced, and therefrom infers the constructive skill and knowledge of their maker ; when, after this, he sees for the first time a kingly palace with all its various wonderful parts and structures, he concludes from the special way in which the parts are joined that this also is an effected thing, and then makes an inference as to the architect's manifold knowledge and skill. Analogously, when a living body and the world have once been recognised to be effects, we infer — as their maker — some special intelligent being, possessing direct insight into their nature and skill to construct them. — Pleasure and pain, moreover, by which men are requited for their merit and demerit, are themselves of a non-intelligent nature, and hence cannot bring about their results unless they are controlled by an intelligent principle, and this also compels us to assume a being capable of allotting to each individual soul a fate corresponding to its deserts. For we do not observe that non-intelligent implements, such as axes and the like, however much they may be favoured by circumstances of time, place, and so on, are capable of producing posts and pillars unless they be handled by a carpenter. And to quote against the generalization on which we rely the instance of the seed and sprout and the like can only spring from an ignorance and stupidity which I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 1 67
3And to quote against the generalization on which we rely the instance of the seed and sprout and the like can only spring from an ignorance and stupidity which I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 1 67 may be called truly demoniac. The same remark would apply to pleasure and pain if used as a counter instance. (For in all these cases the action which produces an effect must necessarily be guided by an intelligent principle.) — Nor may we assume, as a * less complicated hypothesis/ that the guiding principle in the construction of the world is the individual souls, whose existence is acknowledged by both parties. For on the testimony of observation we must deny to those souls the power of seeing what is extremely subtle or remote in time or place (while such power must necessarily be ascribed to a world-constructing intelligence). On the other hand, we have no ground for concluding that the Lord is, like the individual souls, destitute of such power ; hence it cannot be said that other means of knowledge make it impossible to infer such a Lord. The fact rather is that as his existence is proved by the argument that any definite effect presupposes a causal agent competent to produce that effect, he is proved at the same time as possessing the essential power of intuitively knowing and ruling all things in the universe. — The contention that from the world being an effect it follows that its maker does not possess lordly power and so on, so that the proving reason would prove something contrary to the special attributes (belonging to a supreme agent, viz. omnipotence, omniscience, &c), is founded on evident ignorance of the nature of the inferential process. For the inference clearly does not prove that there exist in the thing inferred all the attributes belonging to the proving collateral instances, including even those attributes which stand in no causal relation to the effect. A certain effect which is produced by some agent presupposes just so much power and knowledge on the part of that agent as is requisite for the production of the effect, but in no way presupposes any incapability or ignorance on the part of that agent with regard to things other than the particular effect ; for such incapability and ignorance do not stand towards that effect in any causal relation. If the origina- tion of the effect can be accounted for on the basis of the agent's capability of bringing it about, and of his knowledge 1 68 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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