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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— Nor can we allow you to say that, previously to sublation, the substrate was non-con- K 2 132 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. cealed in so far as (i.e. was known as) the object of error, for in its ' non-concealed ' aspect the substrate is opposed to all error, and when that aspect shines forth there is no room either for error or sublation. — The outcome of this is that as long as you do not admit that there is a real attri- bute in addition to the mere substrate, and that this attribute is for a time hidden, you cannot show the possibility either of error or sublation. We add an illustrative instance. That with regard to a man there should arise the error that he is a mere low-caste hunter is only possible on condition of a real additional attribute — e.g. the man's princely birth — being hidden at the time ; and the cessa- tion of that error is brought about by the declaration of this attribute of princely birth, not by a mere declaration of the person being a man : this latter fact being evident need not be declared at all, and if it is declared it sublates no error. — If, on the other hand, the text is understood to refer to Brahman as having the individual souls for its body, both words ('that' and 'thou') keep their primary denota- tion ; and, the text thus making a declaration about one substance distinguished by two aspects, the fundamental principle of ' co-ordination ' is preserved. On this interpre- tation the text further intimates that Brahman — free from all imperfection and comprising within itself all auspicious qualities — is the internal ruler of the individual souls and possesses lordly power. It moreover satisfies the demand of agreement with the teaching of the previous part of the section, and it also fulfils the promise as to all things being known through one thing, viz. in so far as Brahman having for its body all intelligent and non-intelligent beings in their gross state is the effect of Brahman having for its body the same things in their subtle state. And this inter- pretation finally avoids all conflict with other scriptural passages, such as ' Him the great Lord, the highest of Lords ' (vSvet. Up. VI, 7) ; ' His high power is revealed as manifold ' (ibid. VI, 8) ; ' He that is free from sin, whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true' (Kk. Up. VIII, 7, 1), and so on. But how, a question may be asked, can we decide, on I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 1 33
2Up. VI, 7) ; ' His high power is revealed as manifold ' (ibid. VI, 8) ; ' He that is free from sin, whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true' (Kk. Up. VIII, 7, 1), and so on. But how, a question may be asked, can we decide, on I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 1 33 your interpretation of the text, which of the two terms is meant to make an original assertion with regard to the other ? — The question does not arise, we reply ; for the text does not mean to make an original assertion at all, the truth which it states having already been established by the preceding clause, ' In that all this world has its Self.1 This clause does make an original statement — in agreement with the principle that * Scripture has a purport with regard to what is not established by other means , — that is, it predicates of 'all this,' i.e. this entire world together with all individual souls, that ' that/ i. e. Brahman is the Self of it. The reason of this the text states in a previous passage, 'All these creatures have their root in that which is, their dwelling and their rest in that which is ' ; a statement which is illustrated by an earlier one (belonging to a different section), viz. ' All this is Brahman ; let a man meditate with calm mind on this world as begin- ning, ending, and breathing in Brahman' (Kk. Up. Ill, 14, 1). Similarly other texts also teach that the world has its Self in Brahman, in so far as the whole aggregate of intelligent and non-intelligent beings constitutes Brah- man's body. Compare ' Abiding within, the ruler of beings, the Self of air ; ' He who dwells in the earth, different from the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the earth within — he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal. — He who dwells in the Self/ &c. (Br/. Up. Ill, 7, 3; 22); c He who moving within the earth, and so on — whose body is death, whom death does not know, he is the Self of all beings, free from sin, divine, the one God, Naraya//a ' (Subal. Up. VII, 1) ; ' Having created that he entered into it ; having entered it he became sat and tyat ' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). And also in the section under discussion the passage ' Having en- tered into them with this living Self let me evolve names and forms/ shows that it is only through the entering into them of the living soul whose Self is Brahman, that all things possess their substantiality and their connexion with the words denoting them. And as this passage must be understood in connexion with Taitt. Up. II, 6 (where the 1 34 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
3And as this passage must be understood in connexion with Taitt. Up. II, 6 (where the 1 34 VEDANTA-stjTRAS. ' sat ' denotes the individual soul) it follows that the indi- vidual soul also has Brahman for its Self, owing to the fact of Brahman having entered into it. — From all this it follows that the entire aggregate of things, intelligent and non- intelligent, has its Self in Brahman in so far as it constitutes Brahman's body. And as, thus, the whole world different from Brahman derives its substantial being only from con- stituting Brahman's body, any term denoting the world or something in it conveys a meaning which has its proper consummation in Brahman only : in other words all terms whatsoever denote Brahman in so far as distinguished by the different things which we associate with those terms on the basis of ordinary use of speech and etymology. — The text ' that art thou ' we therefore understand merely as a special expression of the truth already propounded in the clause * in that all this has its Self.' This being so, it appears that those as well who hold the theory of the absolute unity of one non-differenced sub- stance, as those who teach the doctrine of bhedabheda (co-existing difference and non-difference), and those who teach the absolute difference of several substances, give up all those scriptural texts wThich teach that Brahman is the universal Self. With regard to the first-mentioned doctrine, we ask 'if there is only one substance; to what can the doctrine of universal identity refer ? ' — The reply will perhaps be ' to that very same substance.' — But, we reply, this point is settled already by the texts defining the nature of Brahman 1, and there is nothing left to be determined by the passages declaring the identity of everything with Brahman. — But those texts serve to dispel the idea of fictitious difference! — This, we reply, cannot, as has been shown above, be effected by texts stating universal identity in the way of co-ordination ; and statements of co-ordination, moreover, introduce into Brahman a doubleness of aspect, and thus contradict the theory of absolute oneness. — The bhedabheda view implies that owing to Brahman's con- nexion with limiting adjuncts (upadhi) all the imperfections 1 Such as ' The True, knowledge/ &c. i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 135
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— Nor can we allow you to say that, previously to sublation, the substrate was non-con- K 2 132 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. cealed in so far as (i.e. was known as) the object of error, for in its ' non-concealed ' aspect the substrate is opposed to all error, and when that aspect shines forth there is no room either for error or sublation. — The outcome of this is that as long as you do not admit that there is a real attri- bute in addition to the mere substrate, and that this attribute is for a time hidden, you cannot show the possibility either of error or sublation. We add an illustrative instance. That with regard to a man there should arise the error that he is a mere low-caste hunter is only possible on condition of a real additional attribute — e.g. the man's princely birth — being hidden at the time ; and the cessa- tion of that error is brought about by the declaration of this attribute of princely birth, not by a mere declaration of the person being a man : this latter fact being evident need not be declared at all, and if it is declared it sublates no error. — If, on the other hand, the text is understood to refer to Brahman as having the individual souls for its body, both words ('that' and 'thou') keep their primary denota- tion ; and, the text thus making a declaration about one substance distinguished by two aspects, the fundamental principle of ' co-ordination ' is preserved. On this interpre- tation the text further intimates that Brahman — free from all imperfection and comprising within itself all auspicious qualities — is the internal ruler of the individual souls and possesses lordly power. It moreover satisfies the demand of agreement with the teaching of the previous part of the section, and it also fulfils the promise as to all things being known through one thing, viz. in so far as Brahman having for its body all intelligent and non-intelligent beings in their gross state is the effect of Brahman having for its body the same things in their subtle state. And this inter- pretation finally avoids all conflict with other scriptural passages, such as ' Him the great Lord, the highest of Lords ' (vSvet. Up. VI, 7) ; ' His high power is revealed as manifold ' (ibid. VI, 8) ; ' He that is free from sin, whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true' (Kk. Up. VIII, 7, 1), and so on. But how, a question may be asked, can we decide, on I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 1 33
2Up. VI, 7) ; ' His high power is revealed as manifold ' (ibid. VI, 8) ; ' He that is free from sin, whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true' (Kk. Up. VIII, 7, 1), and so on. But how, a question may be asked, can we decide, on I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 1 33 your interpretation of the text, which of the two terms is meant to make an original assertion with regard to the other ? — The question does not arise, we reply ; for the text does not mean to make an original assertion at all, the truth which it states having already been established by the preceding clause, ' In that all this world has its Self.1 This clause does make an original statement — in agreement with the principle that * Scripture has a purport with regard to what is not established by other means , — that is, it predicates of 'all this,' i.e. this entire world together with all individual souls, that ' that/ i. e. Brahman is the Self of it. The reason of this the text states in a previous passage, 'All these creatures have their root in that which is, their dwelling and their rest in that which is ' ; a statement which is illustrated by an earlier one (belonging to a different section), viz. ' All this is Brahman ; let a man meditate with calm mind on this world as begin- ning, ending, and breathing in Brahman' (Kk. Up. Ill, 14, 1). Similarly other texts also teach that the world has its Self in Brahman, in so far as the whole aggregate of intelligent and non-intelligent beings constitutes Brah- man's body. Compare ' Abiding within, the ruler of beings, the Self of air ; ' He who dwells in the earth, different from the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the earth within — he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal. — He who dwells in the Self/ &c. (Br/. Up. Ill, 7, 3; 22); c He who moving within the earth, and so on — whose body is death, whom death does not know, he is the Self of all beings, free from sin, divine, the one God, Naraya//a ' (Subal. Up. VII, 1) ; ' Having created that he entered into it ; having entered it he became sat and tyat ' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). And also in the section under discussion the passage ' Having en- tered into them with this living Self let me evolve names and forms/ shows that it is only through the entering into them of the living soul whose Self is Brahman, that all things possess their substantiality and their connexion with the words denoting them. And as this passage must be understood in connexion with Taitt. Up. II, 6 (where the 1 34 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
3And as this passage must be understood in connexion with Taitt. Up. II, 6 (where the 1 34 VEDANTA-stjTRAS. ' sat ' denotes the individual soul) it follows that the indi- vidual soul also has Brahman for its Self, owing to the fact of Brahman having entered into it. — From all this it follows that the entire aggregate of things, intelligent and non- intelligent, has its Self in Brahman in so far as it constitutes Brahman's body. And as, thus, the whole world different from Brahman derives its substantial being only from con- stituting Brahman's body, any term denoting the world or something in it conveys a meaning which has its proper consummation in Brahman only : in other words all terms whatsoever denote Brahman in so far as distinguished by the different things which we associate with those terms on the basis of ordinary use of speech and etymology. — The text ' that art thou ' we therefore understand merely as a special expression of the truth already propounded in the clause * in that all this has its Self.' This being so, it appears that those as well who hold the theory of the absolute unity of one non-differenced sub- stance, as those who teach the doctrine of bhedabheda (co-existing difference and non-difference), and those who teach the absolute difference of several substances, give up all those scriptural texts wThich teach that Brahman is the universal Self. With regard to the first-mentioned doctrine, we ask 'if there is only one substance; to what can the doctrine of universal identity refer ? ' — The reply will perhaps be ' to that very same substance.' — But, we reply, this point is settled already by the texts defining the nature of Brahman 1, and there is nothing left to be determined by the passages declaring the identity of everything with Brahman. — But those texts serve to dispel the idea of fictitious difference! — This, we reply, cannot, as has been shown above, be effected by texts stating universal identity in the way of co-ordination ; and statements of co-ordination, moreover, introduce into Brahman a doubleness of aspect, and thus contradict the theory of absolute oneness. — The bhedabheda view implies that owing to Brahman's con- nexion with limiting adjuncts (upadhi) all the imperfections 1 Such as ' The True, knowledge/ &c. i adhyAya, i pAda, i. 135
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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