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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1555 according to its pleasure' (Br/. Up. II, 1, 18), i. e. it teaches that the Self is active in taking to itself the pra/zas and moving about in the body. 35. And on account of the designation (of the Self as the agent) in actions. If not so, there would be change of grammatical expression. Because in the text ' Knowledge performs the sacrifice, it performs all works ' (Taitt. Up. II, 5) the Self is designated as the agent in all worldly and Vedic works, for this reason also the Self must be held to be an agent. And should it be said that the word ' knowledge ' in that text denotes not the Self, but the internal organ or buddhi, we point out that in that case there would be a change of gram- matical expression, that is to say, as the buddhi is the instrument of action, the text would exhibit the instru- mental case instead of the nominative case ' by knowledge, and so on ' (vi^Tzanena instead of vi^&nam). 36. (There would be) absence of definite rule, as in the case of consciousness. The Sutra points out a difficulty which arises on the view of the Self not being an agent. Sutra 32 has declared that if the Self were all-pervading it would follow that there would be no definite determination with regard to con- sciousness. Similarly, if the Self were not an agent but all activity belonged to Prakrzti, it would follow that as Prakrzti is a common possession of all souls, all actions would result in enjoyment (experience) on the part of all souls, or else on the part of none ; for as each Self is held to be omnipresent, they are all of them in equal proximity to all parts of the Pradhana. For the same reason it could not be maintained that the distribution of results between the different souls depends on the different internal organs which are joined to the souls ; for if the souls are omni- present, no soul will be exclusively connected with any particular internal organ. 37. On account of the inversion of power. If the internal organ were the agent, then — since it is 556 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. impossible that a being other than the agent should be the enjoyer of the fruit of the action — the power of enjoy- ment also would belong to the internal organ, and would consequently have to be denied of the Self. But if this were so, there would be no longer any proof for the exist- ence of the Self; for they expressly teach that 'the person (i. e. the soul) exists, on account of the fact of enjoyment.' 38. And on account of the absence of samadhi.
2But if this were so, there would be no longer any proof for the exist- ence of the Self; for they expressly teach that 'the person (i. e. the soul) exists, on account of the fact of enjoyment.' 38. And on account of the absence of samadhi. If the internal organ were the agent, it would be such even in that final state of meditation, called samadhi, which is the instrument of Release. But that state consists therein that the meditating being realises its difference from Pra- krzti, and this is a conception which Prakrzti itself (of which the internal organ is only a modification) cannot form. — The Self alone, therefore, is the agent. — But this would imply that the activity of the Self is never at rest! — Of this difficulty the next Sutra disposes. 39. And as the carpenter, in both ways. The Self, although always provided with the instruments of action, such as the organ of speech, and so on, acts when it wishes to do so, and does not act when it does not wish to do so. Just as a carpenter, although having his axe and other implements ready at hand5 works or does not work just as he pleases. — If the internal organ, on the contrary, were essentially active, it would constantly be acting, since as a non-intelligent being it could not be influenced by particular reasons for action, such as the desire for enjoy- ment. Here terminates the adhikara/za of ' the agent.' 40. But from the highest, this being declared by Scripture. Is the activity of the individual soul independent (free), or does it depend on the highest Self? — It is free; for if it were dependent on the highest Self, the whole body of scriptural injunctions and prohibitions would be un- meaning. For commandments can be addressed to such II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 41. 557 agents only as are capable of entering on action or refrain- ing from action, according to their own thought and will. This prima facie view is set aside by the Sutra. The activity of the individual soul proceeds from the highest Self as its cause. For Scripture teaches this. ' Entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of air ; ' who dwelling in the Self is different from the Self, whom the Self does not know, whose body the Self is, who rules the Self from within, he is thy Self, the inward ruler, the immortal one.' Smrzti teaches the same, ' I dwell within the heart of all ; memory and knowledge as well as their loss come from me' (Bha. Gi. XV, 15); ' The Lord, O Ar^una, dwells in the heart of all creatures, whirling, by his mysterious power, all creatures as if mounted on a machine' (Bha. Gi. XVIII, 61). — But this view implies the meaninglessness of all scriptural injunctions and prohibitions! — To this the next Sutra replies. 41. But with a view to the efforts made (the Lord makes the soul act) on account of the (thus resulting) non-meaninglessness of injunctions and prohibitions and the rest.
3— But this view implies the meaninglessness of all scriptural injunctions and prohibitions! — To this the next Sutra replies. 41. But with a view to the efforts made (the Lord makes the soul act) on account of the (thus resulting) non-meaninglessness of injunctions and prohibitions and the rest. The inwardly ruling highest Self promotes action in so far as it regards in the case of any action the volitional effort made by the individual soul, and then aids that effort by granting its favour or permission (anumati) ; action is not possible without permission on the part of the highest Self. In this way (i.e. since the action primarily depends on the volitional effort of the soul) injunctions and pro- hibitions are not devoid of meaning. The ' and the rest ' of the Sutra is meant to suggest the grace and punishments awarded by the Lord. — The case is analogous to that of property of which two men are joint owners. If one of these wishes to transfer that property to a third person he cannot do so without the permission of his partner, but that that permission is given is after all his own doing, and hence the fruit of the action (reward or anything) properly belongs to him only. — That, in the case of eviL 558 vedanta-sOtras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1555 according to its pleasure' (Br/. Up. II, 1, 18), i. e. it teaches that the Self is active in taking to itself the pra/zas and moving about in the body. 35. And on account of the designation (of the Self as the agent) in actions. If not so, there would be change of grammatical expression. Because in the text ' Knowledge performs the sacrifice, it performs all works ' (Taitt. Up. II, 5) the Self is designated as the agent in all worldly and Vedic works, for this reason also the Self must be held to be an agent. And should it be said that the word ' knowledge ' in that text denotes not the Self, but the internal organ or buddhi, we point out that in that case there would be a change of gram- matical expression, that is to say, as the buddhi is the instrument of action, the text would exhibit the instru- mental case instead of the nominative case ' by knowledge, and so on ' (vi^Tzanena instead of vi^&nam). 36. (There would be) absence of definite rule, as in the case of consciousness. The Sutra points out a difficulty which arises on the view of the Self not being an agent. Sutra 32 has declared that if the Self were all-pervading it would follow that there would be no definite determination with regard to con- sciousness. Similarly, if the Self were not an agent but all activity belonged to Prakrzti, it would follow that as Prakrzti is a common possession of all souls, all actions would result in enjoyment (experience) on the part of all souls, or else on the part of none ; for as each Self is held to be omnipresent, they are all of them in equal proximity to all parts of the Pradhana. For the same reason it could not be maintained that the distribution of results between the different souls depends on the different internal organs which are joined to the souls ; for if the souls are omni- present, no soul will be exclusively connected with any particular internal organ. 37. On account of the inversion of power. If the internal organ were the agent, then — since it is 556 VEDANTA-stiTRAS. impossible that a being other than the agent should be the enjoyer of the fruit of the action — the power of enjoy- ment also would belong to the internal organ, and would consequently have to be denied of the Self. But if this were so, there would be no longer any proof for the exist- ence of the Self; for they expressly teach that 'the person (i. e. the soul) exists, on account of the fact of enjoyment.' 38. And on account of the absence of samadhi.
2But if this were so, there would be no longer any proof for the exist- ence of the Self; for they expressly teach that 'the person (i. e. the soul) exists, on account of the fact of enjoyment.' 38. And on account of the absence of samadhi. If the internal organ were the agent, it would be such even in that final state of meditation, called samadhi, which is the instrument of Release. But that state consists therein that the meditating being realises its difference from Pra- krzti, and this is a conception which Prakrzti itself (of which the internal organ is only a modification) cannot form. — The Self alone, therefore, is the agent. — But this would imply that the activity of the Self is never at rest! — Of this difficulty the next Sutra disposes. 39. And as the carpenter, in both ways. The Self, although always provided with the instruments of action, such as the organ of speech, and so on, acts when it wishes to do so, and does not act when it does not wish to do so. Just as a carpenter, although having his axe and other implements ready at hand5 works or does not work just as he pleases. — If the internal organ, on the contrary, were essentially active, it would constantly be acting, since as a non-intelligent being it could not be influenced by particular reasons for action, such as the desire for enjoy- ment. Here terminates the adhikara/za of ' the agent.' 40. But from the highest, this being declared by Scripture. Is the activity of the individual soul independent (free), or does it depend on the highest Self? — It is free; for if it were dependent on the highest Self, the whole body of scriptural injunctions and prohibitions would be un- meaning. For commandments can be addressed to such II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 41. 557 agents only as are capable of entering on action or refrain- ing from action, according to their own thought and will. This prima facie view is set aside by the Sutra. The activity of the individual soul proceeds from the highest Self as its cause. For Scripture teaches this. ' Entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of air ; ' who dwelling in the Self is different from the Self, whom the Self does not know, whose body the Self is, who rules the Self from within, he is thy Self, the inward ruler, the immortal one.' Smrzti teaches the same, ' I dwell within the heart of all ; memory and knowledge as well as their loss come from me' (Bha. Gi. XV, 15); ' The Lord, O Ar^una, dwells in the heart of all creatures, whirling, by his mysterious power, all creatures as if mounted on a machine' (Bha. Gi. XVIII, 61). — But this view implies the meaninglessness of all scriptural injunctions and prohibitions! — To this the next Sutra replies. 41. But with a view to the efforts made (the Lord makes the soul act) on account of the (thus resulting) non-meaninglessness of injunctions and prohibitions and the rest.
3— But this view implies the meaninglessness of all scriptural injunctions and prohibitions! — To this the next Sutra replies. 41. But with a view to the efforts made (the Lord makes the soul act) on account of the (thus resulting) non-meaninglessness of injunctions and prohibitions and the rest. The inwardly ruling highest Self promotes action in so far as it regards in the case of any action the volitional effort made by the individual soul, and then aids that effort by granting its favour or permission (anumati) ; action is not possible without permission on the part of the highest Self. In this way (i.e. since the action primarily depends on the volitional effort of the soul) injunctions and pro- hibitions are not devoid of meaning. The ' and the rest ' of the Sutra is meant to suggest the grace and punishments awarded by the Lord. — The case is analogous to that of property of which two men are joint owners. If one of these wishes to transfer that property to a third person he cannot do so without the permission of his partner, but that that permission is given is after all his own doing, and hence the fruit of the action (reward or anything) properly belongs to him only. — That, in the case of eviL 558 vedanta-sOtras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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