Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— The next .rioka sums up the whole doctrine ; the words ' true and untrue ' there denote what in the preceding verses had been called ' being ' and ' non-being ' ; the second half of the jloka refers to the practical plurality of the world as due to karman. Now all these ^lokas do not contain a single word sup- porting the doctrine of a Brahman free from all difference ; of a principle called Nescience abiding within Brahman and to be defined neither as that which is nor as that which is not ; and of the world being wrongly imagined, owing to Nescience. The expressions ' that which is ' and i that which is not ' (si. 35), and ' satya ' (true) and ' asatya ' (untrue ; si. 45), can in no way denote something not to be defined either as being or non-being. By ' that which is not ' or ' which is untrue/ we have to understand not what is undefinable, but that which has no true being, in so far as it is changeable and perishable. Of this character is all non-intelligent matter. This also appears from the instance adduced in si. 42 : the jar is something perishable, but not a thing devoid of proof or to be sublated by true knowledge. ' Non-being ' we may call it, in so far as while it is observed at a certain moment in a certain form it is at some other moment observed in a different condition. But there is no contradiction between two different conditions of a thing which are perceived at different times ; and hence there is no reason to call it something futile (tuMMa) or false (mithya), &c. Scripture does not teach that Release is due to the know- ledge of a non-qualified Brahman. — The meaning of 'tat tvam asi.* Nor can we admit the assertion that Scripture teaches the cessation of avidya to spring only from the cognition of a Brahman devoid of all difference. Such a view is clearly negatived by passages such as the following : ' I know that great person of sun-like lustre beyond darkness ; knowing him a man becomes immortal, there is no other [48] K 1 30 vedanta-s6tras. path to go' (Svet. Up. Ill, 8); 'All moments sprang from lightning, the Person — none is lord over him, his name is great glory — they who know him become immortal ' (Mahana. Up. I, 8-1 1). For the reason that Brahman is characterised by difference all Vedic texts declare that final release results from the cognition of a qualified Brahman. And that even those texts which describe Brahman by means of negations really aim at setting forth a Brahman possessing attributes, we have already shown above.
2And that even those texts which describe Brahman by means of negations really aim at setting forth a Brahman possessing attributes, we have already shown above. In texts, again, such as ' Thou art that/ the co-ordination of the constituent parts is not meant to convey the idea of the absolute unity of a non-differenced substance : on the contrary, the words cthat' and 'thou ' denote a Brahman distinguished by difference. The word ' that ' refers to Brahman omniscient, &c, which had been introduced as the general topic of consideration in previous passages of the same section, such as ' It thought, may I be many ' ; the word 'thou/ which stands in co-ordination to 'that,' conveys the 'idea of Brahman in so far as having for its body the individual souls connected with non-intelligent matter. This is in accordance with the general principle that co-ordination is meant to express one thing subsisting in a twofold form. If such doubleness of form (or cha- racter) were abandoned, there could be no difference of aspects giving rise to the application of different terms, and the entire principle of co-ordination would thus be given up. And it would further follow that the two words co-ordinated would have to be taken in an implied sense (instead of their primary direct meaning). Nor is there any need of our assuming implication (laksha^a) in sentences * such as c this person is that Devadatta (known to me from former occasions) ' ; for there is no contradiction in the cognition of the oneness of a thing connected with the past on the one hand, and the present on the other, the contra- diction that arises from difference of place being removed 1 Which are alleged to prove that samanadhikarawya is to be explained on the basis of laksha/za. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 131
3I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 131 by the accompanying difference of time. If the text ' Thou art that ' were meant to express absolute oneness, it would, moreover, conflict with a previous statement in the same section, viz. ' It thought, may I be many ' ; and, further, the promise (also made in the same section) that by the know- ledge of one thing all things are to be known could not be considered as fulfilled. It, moreover, is not possible (while, however, it would result from the absolute oneness of ' tat ' and 'tvam') that to Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, which is free from all imperfections, omniscient, comprising within itself all auspicious qualities, there should belong Nescience ; and that it should be the substrate of all those defects and afflictions which spring from Nescience. If, further, the statement of co-ordination (' thou art that ') were meant to sublate (the previously existing wrong notion of plurality), we should have to admit that the two terms * that ' and ' thou ' have an implied meaning, viz. in so far as denoting, on the one hand, one substrate only, and, on the other, the cessation of the different attributes (directly expressed by the two terms) ; and thus implica- tion and the other shortcomings mentioned above would cling to this interpretation as well. And there would be even further difficulties. When we form the sublative judgment ' this is not silver/ the sublation is founded on an independent positive judgment, viz. c this is a shell'; in the case under discussion, however, the sublation would not be known (through an independent positive judgment), but would be assumed merely on the ground that it cannot be helped. And, further, there is really no possibility of sublation, since the word ' that ' does not convey the idea of an attribute in addition to the mere substrate. To this it must not be objected that the substrate was previously concealed, and that hence it is the special function of the word 'that' to present the substrate in its non-concealed aspect; for if, previously to the sublative judgment, the substrate was not evident (as an object of consciousness), there is no possibility of its becoming the object either of an error or its sublation. — Nor can we allow you to say that, previously to sublation, the substrate was non-con- K 2 132 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— The next .rioka sums up the whole doctrine ; the words ' true and untrue ' there denote what in the preceding verses had been called ' being ' and ' non-being ' ; the second half of the jloka refers to the practical plurality of the world as due to karman. Now all these ^lokas do not contain a single word sup- porting the doctrine of a Brahman free from all difference ; of a principle called Nescience abiding within Brahman and to be defined neither as that which is nor as that which is not ; and of the world being wrongly imagined, owing to Nescience. The expressions ' that which is ' and i that which is not ' (si. 35), and ' satya ' (true) and ' asatya ' (untrue ; si. 45), can in no way denote something not to be defined either as being or non-being. By ' that which is not ' or ' which is untrue/ we have to understand not what is undefinable, but that which has no true being, in so far as it is changeable and perishable. Of this character is all non-intelligent matter. This also appears from the instance adduced in si. 42 : the jar is something perishable, but not a thing devoid of proof or to be sublated by true knowledge. ' Non-being ' we may call it, in so far as while it is observed at a certain moment in a certain form it is at some other moment observed in a different condition. But there is no contradiction between two different conditions of a thing which are perceived at different times ; and hence there is no reason to call it something futile (tuMMa) or false (mithya), &c. Scripture does not teach that Release is due to the know- ledge of a non-qualified Brahman. — The meaning of 'tat tvam asi.* Nor can we admit the assertion that Scripture teaches the cessation of avidya to spring only from the cognition of a Brahman devoid of all difference. Such a view is clearly negatived by passages such as the following : ' I know that great person of sun-like lustre beyond darkness ; knowing him a man becomes immortal, there is no other [48] K 1 30 vedanta-s6tras. path to go' (Svet. Up. Ill, 8); 'All moments sprang from lightning, the Person — none is lord over him, his name is great glory — they who know him become immortal ' (Mahana. Up. I, 8-1 1). For the reason that Brahman is characterised by difference all Vedic texts declare that final release results from the cognition of a qualified Brahman. And that even those texts which describe Brahman by means of negations really aim at setting forth a Brahman possessing attributes, we have already shown above.
2And that even those texts which describe Brahman by means of negations really aim at setting forth a Brahman possessing attributes, we have already shown above. In texts, again, such as ' Thou art that/ the co-ordination of the constituent parts is not meant to convey the idea of the absolute unity of a non-differenced substance : on the contrary, the words cthat' and 'thou ' denote a Brahman distinguished by difference. The word ' that ' refers to Brahman omniscient, &c, which had been introduced as the general topic of consideration in previous passages of the same section, such as ' It thought, may I be many ' ; the word 'thou/ which stands in co-ordination to 'that,' conveys the 'idea of Brahman in so far as having for its body the individual souls connected with non-intelligent matter. This is in accordance with the general principle that co-ordination is meant to express one thing subsisting in a twofold form. If such doubleness of form (or cha- racter) were abandoned, there could be no difference of aspects giving rise to the application of different terms, and the entire principle of co-ordination would thus be given up. And it would further follow that the two words co-ordinated would have to be taken in an implied sense (instead of their primary direct meaning). Nor is there any need of our assuming implication (laksha^a) in sentences * such as c this person is that Devadatta (known to me from former occasions) ' ; for there is no contradiction in the cognition of the oneness of a thing connected with the past on the one hand, and the present on the other, the contra- diction that arises from difference of place being removed 1 Which are alleged to prove that samanadhikarawya is to be explained on the basis of laksha/za. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 131
3I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 131 by the accompanying difference of time. If the text ' Thou art that ' were meant to express absolute oneness, it would, moreover, conflict with a previous statement in the same section, viz. ' It thought, may I be many ' ; and, further, the promise (also made in the same section) that by the know- ledge of one thing all things are to be known could not be considered as fulfilled. It, moreover, is not possible (while, however, it would result from the absolute oneness of ' tat ' and 'tvam') that to Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, which is free from all imperfections, omniscient, comprising within itself all auspicious qualities, there should belong Nescience ; and that it should be the substrate of all those defects and afflictions which spring from Nescience. If, further, the statement of co-ordination (' thou art that ') were meant to sublate (the previously existing wrong notion of plurality), we should have to admit that the two terms * that ' and ' thou ' have an implied meaning, viz. in so far as denoting, on the one hand, one substrate only, and, on the other, the cessation of the different attributes (directly expressed by the two terms) ; and thus implica- tion and the other shortcomings mentioned above would cling to this interpretation as well. And there would be even further difficulties. When we form the sublative judgment ' this is not silver/ the sublation is founded on an independent positive judgment, viz. c this is a shell'; in the case under discussion, however, the sublation would not be known (through an independent positive judgment), but would be assumed merely on the ground that it cannot be helped. And, further, there is really no possibility of sublation, since the word ' that ' does not convey the idea of an attribute in addition to the mere substrate. To this it must not be objected that the substrate was previously concealed, and that hence it is the special function of the word 'that' to present the substrate in its non-concealed aspect; for if, previously to the sublative judgment, the substrate was not evident (as an object of consciousness), there is no possibility of its becoming the object either of an error or its sublation. — Nor can we allow you to say that, previously to sublation, the substrate was non-con- K 2 132 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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