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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1of being conscious of pleasure and pain, which are special modifica- tions of Prakrzti, it follows that, as Prakrzti is ever near, the soul will never accomplish emancipation. 49 2 VEDANTA-SUTR AS. 9. And (it is) objectionable on account of the contradictions. The Sankhya-system, moreover, labours from many in- ternal contradictions. — The Sankhyas hold that while Prakrzti is for the sake of another and the object of know- ledge and fruition, the soul is independent, an enjoying and knowing agent, and conscious of Prakrzti ; that the soul reaches isolation through the instrumentality of Prakrzti only, and that as its nature is pure, permanent, unchanging consciousness, absence of all activity and isolation belong to that nature ; that for this reason the accomplishing of the means of bondage and release and of release belong to Prakrzti only; and that, owing to Prakr/ti's proximity to the unchanging non-active soul, Prakr/ti, by a process of mutual superimposition (adhyasa), works towards the crea- tion of a world and subserves the purposes of the soul's fruition and emancipation. — ' Since the aggregate of things is for the sake of another ; since there is an opposite of the three gu/zas and the rest ; since there is superintendence ; since there is an experiencing subject ; and since there is activity for the sake of isolation ; the soul exists ' (Sankhya Ka. 17);' And from that contrast the soul is proved to be a witness, isolated, neutral, cognising, and inactive* (18). — And after having stated that the activity of the Pradhana is for the purpose of the release of the Self, the text says, ' therefore no (soul) is either bound or released, nor does it migrate ; it is Prakrzti, which, abiding in various beings, is bound and released and migrates ' (62). And c From this connexion therewith (i.e. with the soul) the non-intelligent appears as intelligent ; and although all agency belongs to the gu^as, the indifferent (soul) becomes an agent. In order that the soul may know the Pradhana and become isolated, the connexion of the two takes place like that of the lame and the blind ; and thence creation springs ' (30, 21). — Now to that which is eternally unchanging, non- active and isolated, the attributes of being a witness and an enjoying and cognising agent can in no way belong. Nor also can such a being be subject to error resting on II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 9. 493
2— Now to that which is eternally unchanging, non- active and isolated, the attributes of being a witness and an enjoying and cognising agent can in no way belong. Nor also can such a being be subject to error resting on II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 9. 493 superimposition ; for error and superimposition both are of the nature of change. And, on the other hand, they also cannot belong to Prakrzti, since they are attributes of in- telligent beings. For by superimposition we understand the attribution, on the part of an intelligent being, of the qualities of one thing to another thing ; and this is the doing of an intelligent being, and moreover a change. Nor is it possible that superimposition and the like should take place in the soul only if it is in approximation to Prakr/ti. — They may take place just on account of the non-changing nature of the soul ! — Then, we reply, they would take place permanently. And that mere proximity has no effective power we have already shown under II, 1, 4. And if it is maintained that it is Prakrzti only that migrates, is bound and released, how then can she be said to benefit the soul, which is eternally released ? That she does so the Sankhyas distinctly assert, * By manifold means Prakrzti, helpful and endowed with the gu/zas, without any benefit to herself, accomplishes the purpose of the soul, which is thankless and not composed of the gu/^as ' (Sankhya Ka. 60). — The Sankhyas further teach that Prakrz'ti, on being seen by any soul in her true nature, at once retires from that soul — * As a dancer having exhibited herself on the stage with- draws from the soul, so Prakrzti withdraws from the soul when she has manifested herself to it ' (59) ; ' My opinion is that there exists nothing more sensitive than Prakrzti, who knowing " I have been seen " does not again show itself to the soul' (61). But this doctrine also is inappro- priate. For, as the soul is eternally released and above all change, it never sees Prakrzti, nor does it attribute to itself her qualities ; and Prakrzti herself does not see herself since she is of non-intelligent nature ; nor can she wrongly impute to herself the soul's seeing of itself as her own seeing of herself, for she herself is non-intelligent and the soul is incapable of that change which consists in seeing or know- ing.— Let it then be said that the ' seeing ' means nothing more than the proximity of Prakrzti to the soul !— But this also does not help you ; for, as said above, from that there would follow eternal seeing, since the two are in eternal 494 VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.
3proximity. Moreover, the ever unchanging soul is not capable of an approximation which does not form an element of its unchanging nature. — Moreover, if you define the seeing as mere proximity and declare this to be the cause of Release, we point out that it equally is the cause of bondage — so that bondage and release would both be permanent. — Let it then be said that what causes bondage is wrong seeing — while intuition of the true nature of things is the cause of Release ! — But as both these kinds of seeing are nothing but proximity, it would follow that both take place permanently. And if, on the other hand, the prox- imity of Soul and Prakrzti were held not to be permanent, then the cause of such proximity would have to be assigned, and again the cause of that, and so on ad infinitum. — Let us then, to escape from these difficulties, define proximity as nothing more than the true nature of soul and Prakrzti ! — As the true nature is permanent, we reply, it would follow therefrom that bondage and release would be alike per- manent.— On account of all these contradictory views the system of the Sankhyas is untenable. We finally remark that the arguments here set forth by us at the same time prove the untenableness of the view of those who teach that there is an eternally unchang- ing Brahman whose nature is pure, non- differenced intelli- gence, and which by being conscious of Nescience experi- ences unreal bondage and release. For those philosophers can show no more than the Sankhyas do how their Brahman can be conscious of Nescience, can be subject to adhyasa, and so on. There is, however, the following difference be- tween the two theories. The Sankhyas, in order to account for the definite individual distribution of birth, death, and so on, assume a plurality of souls. The Vedantins, on the other hand, do not allow even so much, and their doctrine is thus all the more irrational. The assertion that there is a difference (in favour of the Vedantins) between the two doctrines, in so far as the Vedantins hold Prakrzti to be something unreal, while the Sankhyas consider it to be real, is unfounded ; for pure, homogeneous intelligence, eternally non-changing, cannot possibly be conscious of anything II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, IO. 495 different from itself, whether it be unreal or real. And if that thing is held to be unreal, there arise further difficulties, owing to its having to be viewed as the object of know- ledge, of refutation, and so on. Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' the impossibility of construction.' 10. Or in the same way as the big and long from the short and the atomic.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1of being conscious of pleasure and pain, which are special modifica- tions of Prakrzti, it follows that, as Prakrzti is ever near, the soul will never accomplish emancipation. 49 2 VEDANTA-SUTR AS. 9. And (it is) objectionable on account of the contradictions. The Sankhya-system, moreover, labours from many in- ternal contradictions. — The Sankhyas hold that while Prakrzti is for the sake of another and the object of know- ledge and fruition, the soul is independent, an enjoying and knowing agent, and conscious of Prakrzti ; that the soul reaches isolation through the instrumentality of Prakrzti only, and that as its nature is pure, permanent, unchanging consciousness, absence of all activity and isolation belong to that nature ; that for this reason the accomplishing of the means of bondage and release and of release belong to Prakrzti only; and that, owing to Prakr/ti's proximity to the unchanging non-active soul, Prakr/ti, by a process of mutual superimposition (adhyasa), works towards the crea- tion of a world and subserves the purposes of the soul's fruition and emancipation. — ' Since the aggregate of things is for the sake of another ; since there is an opposite of the three gu/zas and the rest ; since there is superintendence ; since there is an experiencing subject ; and since there is activity for the sake of isolation ; the soul exists ' (Sankhya Ka. 17);' And from that contrast the soul is proved to be a witness, isolated, neutral, cognising, and inactive* (18). — And after having stated that the activity of the Pradhana is for the purpose of the release of the Self, the text says, ' therefore no (soul) is either bound or released, nor does it migrate ; it is Prakrzti, which, abiding in various beings, is bound and released and migrates ' (62). And c From this connexion therewith (i.e. with the soul) the non-intelligent appears as intelligent ; and although all agency belongs to the gu^as, the indifferent (soul) becomes an agent. In order that the soul may know the Pradhana and become isolated, the connexion of the two takes place like that of the lame and the blind ; and thence creation springs ' (30, 21). — Now to that which is eternally unchanging, non- active and isolated, the attributes of being a witness and an enjoying and cognising agent can in no way belong. Nor also can such a being be subject to error resting on II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 9. 493
2— Now to that which is eternally unchanging, non- active and isolated, the attributes of being a witness and an enjoying and cognising agent can in no way belong. Nor also can such a being be subject to error resting on II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 9. 493 superimposition ; for error and superimposition both are of the nature of change. And, on the other hand, they also cannot belong to Prakrzti, since they are attributes of in- telligent beings. For by superimposition we understand the attribution, on the part of an intelligent being, of the qualities of one thing to another thing ; and this is the doing of an intelligent being, and moreover a change. Nor is it possible that superimposition and the like should take place in the soul only if it is in approximation to Prakr/ti. — They may take place just on account of the non-changing nature of the soul ! — Then, we reply, they would take place permanently. And that mere proximity has no effective power we have already shown under II, 1, 4. And if it is maintained that it is Prakrzti only that migrates, is bound and released, how then can she be said to benefit the soul, which is eternally released ? That she does so the Sankhyas distinctly assert, * By manifold means Prakrzti, helpful and endowed with the gu/zas, without any benefit to herself, accomplishes the purpose of the soul, which is thankless and not composed of the gu/^as ' (Sankhya Ka. 60). — The Sankhyas further teach that Prakrz'ti, on being seen by any soul in her true nature, at once retires from that soul — * As a dancer having exhibited herself on the stage with- draws from the soul, so Prakrzti withdraws from the soul when she has manifested herself to it ' (59) ; ' My opinion is that there exists nothing more sensitive than Prakrzti, who knowing " I have been seen " does not again show itself to the soul' (61). But this doctrine also is inappro- priate. For, as the soul is eternally released and above all change, it never sees Prakrzti, nor does it attribute to itself her qualities ; and Prakrzti herself does not see herself since she is of non-intelligent nature ; nor can she wrongly impute to herself the soul's seeing of itself as her own seeing of herself, for she herself is non-intelligent and the soul is incapable of that change which consists in seeing or know- ing.— Let it then be said that the ' seeing ' means nothing more than the proximity of Prakrzti to the soul !— But this also does not help you ; for, as said above, from that there would follow eternal seeing, since the two are in eternal 494 VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.
3proximity. Moreover, the ever unchanging soul is not capable of an approximation which does not form an element of its unchanging nature. — Moreover, if you define the seeing as mere proximity and declare this to be the cause of Release, we point out that it equally is the cause of bondage — so that bondage and release would both be permanent. — Let it then be said that what causes bondage is wrong seeing — while intuition of the true nature of things is the cause of Release ! — But as both these kinds of seeing are nothing but proximity, it would follow that both take place permanently. And if, on the other hand, the prox- imity of Soul and Prakrzti were held not to be permanent, then the cause of such proximity would have to be assigned, and again the cause of that, and so on ad infinitum. — Let us then, to escape from these difficulties, define proximity as nothing more than the true nature of soul and Prakrzti ! — As the true nature is permanent, we reply, it would follow therefrom that bondage and release would be alike per- manent.— On account of all these contradictory views the system of the Sankhyas is untenable. We finally remark that the arguments here set forth by us at the same time prove the untenableness of the view of those who teach that there is an eternally unchang- ing Brahman whose nature is pure, non- differenced intelli- gence, and which by being conscious of Nescience experi- ences unreal bondage and release. For those philosophers can show no more than the Sankhyas do how their Brahman can be conscious of Nescience, can be subject to adhyasa, and so on. There is, however, the following difference be- tween the two theories. The Sankhyas, in order to account for the definite individual distribution of birth, death, and so on, assume a plurality of souls. The Vedantins, on the other hand, do not allow even so much, and their doctrine is thus all the more irrational. The assertion that there is a difference (in favour of the Vedantins) between the two doctrines, in so far as the Vedantins hold Prakrzti to be something unreal, while the Sankhyas consider it to be real, is unfounded ; for pure, homogeneous intelligence, eternally non-changing, cannot possibly be conscious of anything II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, IO. 495 different from itself, whether it be unreal or real. And if that thing is held to be unreal, there arise further difficulties, owing to its having to be viewed as the object of know- ledge, of refutation, and so on. Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' the impossibility of construction.' 10. Or in the same way as the big and long from the short and the atomic.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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