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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1This is proved by clauses in those ' negativing' texts themselves, ' Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self,' 'from that great Being there has been breathed forth the ^zg-veda,' &c. {Bri. Up. II, 4> 6, 10). — 1 44 vedanta-sCtras. On this method of interpretation we find that the texts declaring the essential distinction and separation of non- sentient matter, sentient beings, and the Lord, and those declaring him to be the cause and the world to be the effect, and cause and effect to be identical, do not in any way conflict with other texts declaring that matter and souls form the body of the Lord, and that matter and souls in their causal condition are in a subtle state, not admitting of the distinction of names and forms while in their ' effected ' gross state they are subject to that distinction. On the other hand, we do not see how there is any opening for theories maintaining the connexion of Brahman with Nescience, or distinctions in Brahman due to limiting adjuncts (upadhi) — such and similar doctrines rest on fallacious reasoning, and flatly contradict Scripture. There is nothing contradictory in allowing that certain texts declare the essential distinction of matter, souls, and the Lord, and their mutual relation as modes and that to which the modes belong, and that other texts again repre- sent them as standing in the relation of cause and effect, and teach cause and effect to be one. We may illustrate this by an analogous case from the Karmaka^a. There six separate oblations to Agni, and so on, are enjoined by separate so-called originative injunctions ; these are there- upon combined into two groups (viz. the new moon and the full-moon sacrifices) by a double clause referring to those groups, and finally a so-called injunction of quali- fication enjoins the entire sacrifice as something to be performed by persons entertaining a certain wish. In a similar way certain Vedanta-texts give instruction about matter, souls, and the Lord as separate entities (' Perishable is the pradhana, imperishable and immortal tiara,' &c, ►Svet. Up. I, 10 ; and others) ; then other texts teach that matter and souls in all their different states constitute the body of the highest Person, while the latter is their Self (' Whose body the earth is/ &c.) ; and finally another group of texts teaches — by means of words such as 'Being/ ' Brahman/ * Self/ denoting the highest Self to which the body belongs — that the one highest Self in its causal and I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, I. 1 45
21 45 effected states comprises within itself the triad of entities which had been taught in separation (' Being only this was in the beginning' ; ' In that all this has its Self; 'All this is Brahman'). — That the highest Self with matter and souls for its body should be simply called the highest Self, is no more objectionable than that that particular form of Self which is invested with a human body should simply be spoken of as Self or soul — as when we say ' This is a happy soul/ Nescience cannot be terminated by the simple act of cognising Brahman as the Universal Self. The doctrine, again, that Nescience is put an end to by the cognition of Brahman being the Self of all can in no way be upheld ; for as bondage is something real it cannot be put an end to by knowledge. How, we ask, can any one assert that bondage— which consists in the experience of pleasure and pain caused by the connexion of souls with bodies of various kind, a connexion springing from good or evil actions — is something false, unreal ? And that the cessation of such bondage is to be obtained only through the grace of the highest Self pleased by the devout medi- tation of the worshipper, we have already explained. As the cognition of universal oneness which you assume rests on a view of things directly contrary to reality, and therefore is false, the only effect it can have is to strengthen the ties of bondage. Moreover, texts such as ' But different is the highest Person' (Bha. Gi. XV, 17), and 'Having known the Self and the Mover as separate ' (6Vet. Up. I, 6), teach that it is the cognition of Brahman as the inward ruler different from the individual soul, that effects the highest aim of man, i. e. final release. And, further, as that 6 bondage-terminating ' knowledge which you assume is itself unreal, we should have to look out for another act of cognition to put an end to it. — But may it not be said that this terminating cognition, after having put an end to the whole aggregate of distinctions antagonistic to it, immediately passes away itself, because being of a merely [48] L 1 46 VEDANTA-stjTR AS.
3— But may it not be said that this terminating cognition, after having put an end to the whole aggregate of distinctions antagonistic to it, immediately passes away itself, because being of a merely [48] L 1 46 VEDANTA-stjTR AS. instantaneous nature ? — No, we reply. Since its nature, its origination, and its destruction are all alike fictitious, we have clearly to search for another agency capable of de- stroying that avidya which is the cause of the fiction of its destruction ! — Let us then say that the essential nature of Brahman itself is the destruction of that cognition ! — From this it would follow, we reply, that such c terminating ' know- ledge would not arise at all; for that the destruction of what is something permanent can clearly not originate ! — ■ Who moreover should, according to you, be the cognising subject in a cognition which has for its object the nega- tion of everything that is different from Brahman ? — That cognising subject is himself something fictitiously super- imposed on Brahman ! — This may not be, we reply : he himself would in that case be something to be negatived, and hence an object of the ' terminating ' cognition ; he could riot therefore be the subject of cognition ! — Well, then, let us assume that the essential nature of Brahman itself is the cognising subject! — Do you mean, we ask in reply, that Brahman^ being the knowing subject in that ' terminating ' cognition belongs to Brahman's essential nature, or that it is something fictitiously superimposed on Brahman ? In the latter case that superimposition and the Nescience founded on it would persist, because they would not be objects of the terminating cognition, and if a further ter- minating act of knowledge were assumed, that also would possess a triple aspect (viz. knowledge, object known, and subject knowing), and we thus should be led to assume an infinite series of knowing subjects. If, on the other hand, the essential nature of Brahman itself constitutes the knowing subject, your view really coincides with the one held by us 1. And if you should say that the terminating knowledge itself and the knowing subject in it are things separate from Brahman and themselves contained in the sphere of what is to be terminated by that knowledge, your statement would be no less absurd than if you were to say ' everything on the surface of the earth has been cut 1 According to which Brahman is not gT/anam, but gn&tri. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 1 47
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1This is proved by clauses in those ' negativing' texts themselves, ' Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self,' 'from that great Being there has been breathed forth the ^zg-veda,' &c. {Bri. Up. II, 4> 6, 10). — 1 44 vedanta-sCtras. On this method of interpretation we find that the texts declaring the essential distinction and separation of non- sentient matter, sentient beings, and the Lord, and those declaring him to be the cause and the world to be the effect, and cause and effect to be identical, do not in any way conflict with other texts declaring that matter and souls form the body of the Lord, and that matter and souls in their causal condition are in a subtle state, not admitting of the distinction of names and forms while in their ' effected ' gross state they are subject to that distinction. On the other hand, we do not see how there is any opening for theories maintaining the connexion of Brahman with Nescience, or distinctions in Brahman due to limiting adjuncts (upadhi) — such and similar doctrines rest on fallacious reasoning, and flatly contradict Scripture. There is nothing contradictory in allowing that certain texts declare the essential distinction of matter, souls, and the Lord, and their mutual relation as modes and that to which the modes belong, and that other texts again repre- sent them as standing in the relation of cause and effect, and teach cause and effect to be one. We may illustrate this by an analogous case from the Karmaka^a. There six separate oblations to Agni, and so on, are enjoined by separate so-called originative injunctions ; these are there- upon combined into two groups (viz. the new moon and the full-moon sacrifices) by a double clause referring to those groups, and finally a so-called injunction of quali- fication enjoins the entire sacrifice as something to be performed by persons entertaining a certain wish. In a similar way certain Vedanta-texts give instruction about matter, souls, and the Lord as separate entities (' Perishable is the pradhana, imperishable and immortal tiara,' &c, ►Svet. Up. I, 10 ; and others) ; then other texts teach that matter and souls in all their different states constitute the body of the highest Person, while the latter is their Self (' Whose body the earth is/ &c.) ; and finally another group of texts teaches — by means of words such as 'Being/ ' Brahman/ * Self/ denoting the highest Self to which the body belongs — that the one highest Self in its causal and I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, I. 1 45
21 45 effected states comprises within itself the triad of entities which had been taught in separation (' Being only this was in the beginning' ; ' In that all this has its Self; 'All this is Brahman'). — That the highest Self with matter and souls for its body should be simply called the highest Self, is no more objectionable than that that particular form of Self which is invested with a human body should simply be spoken of as Self or soul — as when we say ' This is a happy soul/ Nescience cannot be terminated by the simple act of cognising Brahman as the Universal Self. The doctrine, again, that Nescience is put an end to by the cognition of Brahman being the Self of all can in no way be upheld ; for as bondage is something real it cannot be put an end to by knowledge. How, we ask, can any one assert that bondage— which consists in the experience of pleasure and pain caused by the connexion of souls with bodies of various kind, a connexion springing from good or evil actions — is something false, unreal ? And that the cessation of such bondage is to be obtained only through the grace of the highest Self pleased by the devout medi- tation of the worshipper, we have already explained. As the cognition of universal oneness which you assume rests on a view of things directly contrary to reality, and therefore is false, the only effect it can have is to strengthen the ties of bondage. Moreover, texts such as ' But different is the highest Person' (Bha. Gi. XV, 17), and 'Having known the Self and the Mover as separate ' (6Vet. Up. I, 6), teach that it is the cognition of Brahman as the inward ruler different from the individual soul, that effects the highest aim of man, i. e. final release. And, further, as that 6 bondage-terminating ' knowledge which you assume is itself unreal, we should have to look out for another act of cognition to put an end to it. — But may it not be said that this terminating cognition, after having put an end to the whole aggregate of distinctions antagonistic to it, immediately passes away itself, because being of a merely [48] L 1 46 VEDANTA-stjTR AS.
3— But may it not be said that this terminating cognition, after having put an end to the whole aggregate of distinctions antagonistic to it, immediately passes away itself, because being of a merely [48] L 1 46 VEDANTA-stjTR AS. instantaneous nature ? — No, we reply. Since its nature, its origination, and its destruction are all alike fictitious, we have clearly to search for another agency capable of de- stroying that avidya which is the cause of the fiction of its destruction ! — Let us then say that the essential nature of Brahman itself is the destruction of that cognition ! — From this it would follow, we reply, that such c terminating ' know- ledge would not arise at all; for that the destruction of what is something permanent can clearly not originate ! — ■ Who moreover should, according to you, be the cognising subject in a cognition which has for its object the nega- tion of everything that is different from Brahman ? — That cognising subject is himself something fictitiously super- imposed on Brahman ! — This may not be, we reply : he himself would in that case be something to be negatived, and hence an object of the ' terminating ' cognition ; he could riot therefore be the subject of cognition ! — Well, then, let us assume that the essential nature of Brahman itself is the cognising subject! — Do you mean, we ask in reply, that Brahman^ being the knowing subject in that ' terminating ' cognition belongs to Brahman's essential nature, or that it is something fictitiously superimposed on Brahman ? In the latter case that superimposition and the Nescience founded on it would persist, because they would not be objects of the terminating cognition, and if a further ter- minating act of knowledge were assumed, that also would possess a triple aspect (viz. knowledge, object known, and subject knowing), and we thus should be led to assume an infinite series of knowing subjects. If, on the other hand, the essential nature of Brahman itself constitutes the knowing subject, your view really coincides with the one held by us 1. And if you should say that the terminating knowledge itself and the knowing subject in it are things separate from Brahman and themselves contained in the sphere of what is to be terminated by that knowledge, your statement would be no less absurd than if you were to say ' everything on the surface of the earth has been cut 1 According to which Brahman is not gT/anam, but gn&tri. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 1 47
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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