Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Mi. Su. VI, 5, 54 ((•raim. Nya. Mala Vistara, p. 285). I ADHYAYA, I PA DA, I. 27 order 1 than those which speak of Brahman as having quali- ties. Thus everything is settled. The text Taitt. Up. II, 1 refers to Brahman as devoid of qualities. But — an objection is raised — even the passage ' The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman ' intimates certain qualities of Brahman, viz. true being, knowledge, infinity ! — Not so, we reply. From the circumstance that all the terms of the sentence stand in co-ordination, it follows that they convey the idea of one matter (sense) only. If against this you urge that the sentence may convey the idea of one matter only, even if directly expressing a thing distinguished by several qualities ; we must remark that you display an ignorance of the meaning of language which appears to point to some weakmindedness on your part. A sentence conveys the idea of one matter (sense) only when all its constitutive words denote -one and the same thing; if, on the other hand, it expresses a thing possessing several attributes, the difference of these attributes necessarily leads to a difference in meaning on the part of the individual words, and then the oneness of meaning of the sentence is lost. — But from your view of the passage it would follow that the several words are mere synonyms ! — Give us your attention, we reply, and learn that several words may convey one meaning without being idle synonyms. From the determination of the unity of purport of the whole sentence 2 we conclude that the several words, applied to one thing, aim at expressing what is opposite in nature to whatever is contrary to the meanings of the several words, and that thus they have meaning and unity of meaning and yet are not mere synonyms. The details 1 The texts which deny all qualities of Brahman are later in order than the texts which refer to Brahman as qualified, because denial presupposes that which is to be denied. 2 The unity of purport of the sentence is inferred from its con- stituent words having the same case-ending. 28 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
22 The unity of purport of the sentence is inferred from its con- stituent words having the same case-ending. 28 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. are as follows. Brahman is to be defined as what is con- trary in nature to all other things. Now whatever is opposed to Brahman is virtually set aside by the three words (constituting the definition of Brahman in the Taittiriya-text). The word ' true ' (or ' truly being ') has the purport of distinguishing Brahman from whatever things have no truth, as being the abodes of change ; the word c knowledge' distinguishes Brahman from all non-sentient things whose light depends on something else (which are not self-luminous) ; and the word ' infinite ' distinguishes it from whatever is limited in time or space or nature. Nor is this ' distinction ' some positive or negative attribute of Brahman, it rather is just Brahman itself as opposed to everything else ; just as the distinction of white colour from black and other colours is just the true nature of white, not an attribute of it. The three words constituting the text thus have a meaning, have one meaning, and are non-synonymous, in so far as they convey the essential distinction of one thing, viz. Brahman from everything else. The text thus declares the one Brahman which is self-luminous and free from all differ- ence. On this interpretation of the text we discern its oneness in purport with other texts, such as ' Being only this was in the beginning, one only, without a second.' Texts such as ' That from whence these beings are born ' (Taitt. Up. Ill, i) ; ' Being only this was in the beginning ' (Kk. Up. VI, 2, i); 'Self alone was this in the beginning' (Bri. Up. I, 4, i), &c, describe Brahman as the cause of the world; and of this Brahman the Taittiriya passage ' The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman ' gives the strict definition. In agreement with the principle that all jakhas teach the same doctrine we have to understand that, in all the texts which speak of Brahman as cause, Brahman must be taken as being 'without a second/ i.e. without any other being of the same or a different kind ; and the text which aims at defining Brahman has then to be interpreted in accordance with this characteristic of Brahman, viz. its being without a second. The statement of the .Oandogya I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, I. 29 as to Brahman being without a second must also be taken to imply that Brahman is non-dual as far as qualities are concerned ; otherwise it would conflict with those passages which speak of Brahman as being without qualities and without stain. We therefore conclude that the defining Taittiriya-text teaches Brahman to be an absolutely homogeneous s.ubstance.
3We therefore conclude that the defining Taittiriya-text teaches Brahman to be an absolutely homogeneous s.ubstance. But, the above explanation of the passage being accepted, it follows that the words ctrue being,' ' knowledge/ &c, have to be viewed as abandoning their direct sense, and merely suggesting a thing distinct in nature from all that is opposite (to what the three words directly denote), and this means that we resort to so-called implication (implied meaning, laksha/za) ! — What objection is there to such a proceeding ? we reply. The force of the general purport of a sentence is greater than that of the direct denotative power of the simple terms, and it is generally admitted that the purport of grammatical co-ordination is oneness (of the matter denoted by the terms co-ordinated). — But we never observe that all words of a sentence are to be understood in an implied sense ! — Is it then not observed, we reply, that one word is to be taken in its implied mean- ing if otherwise it would contradict the purport of the whole sentence ? And if the purport of the sentence, which is nothing but an aggregate of words employed together, has once been ascertained, why should we not take two or three or all words in an implied sense — just as we had taken one — and thus make them fit in with the general purport? In agreement herewith those scholars who explain to us the sense of imperative sentences, teach that in imperative sentences belonging to ordinary speech all words have an implied meaning only (not their directly denotative meaning). For, they maintain, imperative forms have their primary meaning only in (Vedic) sentences which enjoin something not established by other means ; and hence in ordinary speech the effect of the action is conveyed by implication only. The other words also, which form part of those imperative sentences and denote matters connected with the action, have their primary meaning 30 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. only if connected with an action not established by other means ; while if connected with an ordinary action they have a secondary, implied, meaning only1. Perception reveals to us non-differenced substance only.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Mi. Su. VI, 5, 54 ((•raim. Nya. Mala Vistara, p. 285). I ADHYAYA, I PA DA, I. 27 order 1 than those which speak of Brahman as having quali- ties. Thus everything is settled. The text Taitt. Up. II, 1 refers to Brahman as devoid of qualities. But — an objection is raised — even the passage ' The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman ' intimates certain qualities of Brahman, viz. true being, knowledge, infinity ! — Not so, we reply. From the circumstance that all the terms of the sentence stand in co-ordination, it follows that they convey the idea of one matter (sense) only. If against this you urge that the sentence may convey the idea of one matter only, even if directly expressing a thing distinguished by several qualities ; we must remark that you display an ignorance of the meaning of language which appears to point to some weakmindedness on your part. A sentence conveys the idea of one matter (sense) only when all its constitutive words denote -one and the same thing; if, on the other hand, it expresses a thing possessing several attributes, the difference of these attributes necessarily leads to a difference in meaning on the part of the individual words, and then the oneness of meaning of the sentence is lost. — But from your view of the passage it would follow that the several words are mere synonyms ! — Give us your attention, we reply, and learn that several words may convey one meaning without being idle synonyms. From the determination of the unity of purport of the whole sentence 2 we conclude that the several words, applied to one thing, aim at expressing what is opposite in nature to whatever is contrary to the meanings of the several words, and that thus they have meaning and unity of meaning and yet are not mere synonyms. The details 1 The texts which deny all qualities of Brahman are later in order than the texts which refer to Brahman as qualified, because denial presupposes that which is to be denied. 2 The unity of purport of the sentence is inferred from its con- stituent words having the same case-ending. 28 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
22 The unity of purport of the sentence is inferred from its con- stituent words having the same case-ending. 28 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. are as follows. Brahman is to be defined as what is con- trary in nature to all other things. Now whatever is opposed to Brahman is virtually set aside by the three words (constituting the definition of Brahman in the Taittiriya-text). The word ' true ' (or ' truly being ') has the purport of distinguishing Brahman from whatever things have no truth, as being the abodes of change ; the word c knowledge' distinguishes Brahman from all non-sentient things whose light depends on something else (which are not self-luminous) ; and the word ' infinite ' distinguishes it from whatever is limited in time or space or nature. Nor is this ' distinction ' some positive or negative attribute of Brahman, it rather is just Brahman itself as opposed to everything else ; just as the distinction of white colour from black and other colours is just the true nature of white, not an attribute of it. The three words constituting the text thus have a meaning, have one meaning, and are non-synonymous, in so far as they convey the essential distinction of one thing, viz. Brahman from everything else. The text thus declares the one Brahman which is self-luminous and free from all differ- ence. On this interpretation of the text we discern its oneness in purport with other texts, such as ' Being only this was in the beginning, one only, without a second.' Texts such as ' That from whence these beings are born ' (Taitt. Up. Ill, i) ; ' Being only this was in the beginning ' (Kk. Up. VI, 2, i); 'Self alone was this in the beginning' (Bri. Up. I, 4, i), &c, describe Brahman as the cause of the world; and of this Brahman the Taittiriya passage ' The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman ' gives the strict definition. In agreement with the principle that all jakhas teach the same doctrine we have to understand that, in all the texts which speak of Brahman as cause, Brahman must be taken as being 'without a second/ i.e. without any other being of the same or a different kind ; and the text which aims at defining Brahman has then to be interpreted in accordance with this characteristic of Brahman, viz. its being without a second. The statement of the .Oandogya I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, I. 29 as to Brahman being without a second must also be taken to imply that Brahman is non-dual as far as qualities are concerned ; otherwise it would conflict with those passages which speak of Brahman as being without qualities and without stain. We therefore conclude that the defining Taittiriya-text teaches Brahman to be an absolutely homogeneous s.ubstance.
3We therefore conclude that the defining Taittiriya-text teaches Brahman to be an absolutely homogeneous s.ubstance. But, the above explanation of the passage being accepted, it follows that the words ctrue being,' ' knowledge/ &c, have to be viewed as abandoning their direct sense, and merely suggesting a thing distinct in nature from all that is opposite (to what the three words directly denote), and this means that we resort to so-called implication (implied meaning, laksha/za) ! — What objection is there to such a proceeding ? we reply. The force of the general purport of a sentence is greater than that of the direct denotative power of the simple terms, and it is generally admitted that the purport of grammatical co-ordination is oneness (of the matter denoted by the terms co-ordinated). — But we never observe that all words of a sentence are to be understood in an implied sense ! — Is it then not observed, we reply, that one word is to be taken in its implied mean- ing if otherwise it would contradict the purport of the whole sentence ? And if the purport of the sentence, which is nothing but an aggregate of words employed together, has once been ascertained, why should we not take two or three or all words in an implied sense — just as we had taken one — and thus make them fit in with the general purport? In agreement herewith those scholars who explain to us the sense of imperative sentences, teach that in imperative sentences belonging to ordinary speech all words have an implied meaning only (not their directly denotative meaning). For, they maintain, imperative forms have their primary meaning only in (Vedic) sentences which enjoin something not established by other means ; and hence in ordinary speech the effect of the action is conveyed by implication only. The other words also, which form part of those imperative sentences and denote matters connected with the action, have their primary meaning 30 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. only if connected with an action not established by other means ; while if connected with an ordinary action they have a secondary, implied, meaning only1. Perception reveals to us non-differenced substance only.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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