Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' that which has the nature of depending on a motive.' 480 vedanta-sOtras. SECOND PADA. 1. Not that which is inferred, on account of the impossibility of construction, and on account of activity. The Sutras have sq far set forth the doctrine that the highest Brahman is the cause of the origination and so on of the world, and have refuted the objections raised by others. They now, in order to safeguard their own position, proceed to demolish the positions held by those very adversaries. For otherwise it might happen that some slow-witted persons, unaware of those other views resting on mere fallacious arguments, would imagine them possibly to be authoritative, and hence might be somewhat shaken in their belief in the Vedic doctrine. Another pada there- fore is begun to the express end of refuting the theories of others. The beginning is made with the theory of Kapila, because that theory has several features, such as the view of the existence of the effect in the cause, which are approved of by the followers of the Veda, and hence is more likely, than others, to give rise to the erroneous view of its being the true doctrine. The Sutras I, 1, 5 and ff. have proved only that the Vedic texts do not set forth the Sankhya view, while the task of the present pada is to demolish that view itself: the Sutras cannot therefore be charged with needless reiteration. The outline of the Sankhya doctrine is as follows. ' There is the fundamental Prakrzti, which is not an effect ; there are the seven effects of Prakrzti, viz. the Mahat and so on, and the sixteen effects of those effects ; and there is the soul, which is neither Prakrzti nor effect ' — such is the comprehensive statement of the principles. The entity called ' fundamental Prakrzti' is constituted by the three II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I. 48 1
2the Mahat and so on, and the sixteen effects of those effects ; and there is the soul, which is neither Prakrzti nor effect ' — such is the comprehensive statement of the principles. The entity called ' fundamental Prakrzti' is constituted by the three II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I. 48 1 substances called Sattva, Ra^as, and Tamas, (when) in a state of complete equipoise, none of the three being either in defect or in excess ; the essential nature of those three consists respectively in pleasure, pain, and dullness; they have for their respective effects lightness and illumination, excitement and mobility, heaviness and obstruction ; they are absolutely non-perceivable by means of the senses, and to be defined and distinguished through their effects only. Prakrzti, consisting in the equipoise of Sattva, Ra^as, and Tamas, is one, itself non-sentient but subserving the enjoy- ment and final release of the many sentient beings, eternal, all-pervading, ever active, not the effect of anything, but the one general cause. There are seven Principles which are the effects of Prakrzti and the causal substances of everything else ; these seven are the Mahat, the ahankara, the subtle matter (tanmatra) of sound, the subtle matter of touch, the subtle matter of colour, the subtle matter of taste, and the subtle matter of smell. The ahankara is threefold, being either modified (vaikarika), or active (tai^asa), or the originator of the elements (bhutadi). The vaikarika is of sattva-nature and the originator of the sense-organs ; the bhutadi is of tamas-nature, and the cause of those subtle matters (tanmatra) which in their turn are the cause of the gross elements ; the tai^*asa is of the nature of ra^as, and assists the other two. The five gross elements are the ether and so on ; the five intellectual senses are hearing and so on ; the five organs of action are speech and so on. With the addition of the internal organ (manas) these are the sixteen entities which are mere effects. — The soul, not being capable of any change, is not either the causal matter or the effect of anything. For the same reason it is without attributes, consisting of mere intelligence, eternal, non-active, all-pervading, and different in each body. Being incapable of change and non-active, it can neither be an agent nor an enjoyer ; but although this is so, men in their confusion of mind, due to the close- ness to each other of Prakrzti and the soul, erroneously attribute to Prakrzti the intelligence of the soul, and to the soul the activity of Prakrzti — just as the redness of the rose [48] 1 i 48 2 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.
3superimposes itself on the crystal near it, — and thus con- sider the soul to be an ' I ' and an enjoyer. Fruition thus results from ignorance, and release from knowledge of the truth. This their theory the Sankhyas prove by means of perception, inference, and authoritative tradition. Now with regard to those matters which are proved by percep- tion, we Vedantins have no very special reason for dis- senting from the Sankhyas ; and what they say about their authoritative tradition, claiming to be founded on the knowledge of all-knowing persons such as Kapila, has been pretty well disproved by us in the first adhyaya. If, now, we further manage to refute the inference which leads them to assume the Pradhana as the cause of the world, we shall have disestablished their whole theory. We therefore proceed to give this refutation. On this point the Sankhyas reason as follows. It must necessarily be admitted that the entire world has one cause only ; for if effects were assumed to originate from several causes we should never arrive at an ultimate cause. Assume that parts such as e. g. threads produce a whole (i. e. in the case of threads, a piece of cloth) in the way of their being joined together by means of their six sides, which are parts of the threads. You must then further assume that the threads themselves are in the same way produced by their parts, having a similar constitution. And these parts again by their parts, until you reach the atoms ; these also must be assumed to produce their immediate effects by being joined together with their six sides, for otherwise solid extension (prathiman) could not be brought about. And then the atoms also as being wholes, consisting of parts 1, must be viewed as produced by their parts, and these again by their parts and so on, so that we never arrive at an ultimate cause. In order therefore to establish such an ultimate cause we must have recourse to the hypothesis of the general cause being con- stituted by one substance, which possesses the power of transforming itself in various different ways, without at the 1 As follows from their having six sides. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I. 483
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' that which has the nature of depending on a motive.' 480 vedanta-sOtras. SECOND PADA. 1. Not that which is inferred, on account of the impossibility of construction, and on account of activity. The Sutras have sq far set forth the doctrine that the highest Brahman is the cause of the origination and so on of the world, and have refuted the objections raised by others. They now, in order to safeguard their own position, proceed to demolish the positions held by those very adversaries. For otherwise it might happen that some slow-witted persons, unaware of those other views resting on mere fallacious arguments, would imagine them possibly to be authoritative, and hence might be somewhat shaken in their belief in the Vedic doctrine. Another pada there- fore is begun to the express end of refuting the theories of others. The beginning is made with the theory of Kapila, because that theory has several features, such as the view of the existence of the effect in the cause, which are approved of by the followers of the Veda, and hence is more likely, than others, to give rise to the erroneous view of its being the true doctrine. The Sutras I, 1, 5 and ff. have proved only that the Vedic texts do not set forth the Sankhya view, while the task of the present pada is to demolish that view itself: the Sutras cannot therefore be charged with needless reiteration. The outline of the Sankhya doctrine is as follows. ' There is the fundamental Prakrzti, which is not an effect ; there are the seven effects of Prakrzti, viz. the Mahat and so on, and the sixteen effects of those effects ; and there is the soul, which is neither Prakrzti nor effect ' — such is the comprehensive statement of the principles. The entity called ' fundamental Prakrzti' is constituted by the three II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I. 48 1
2the Mahat and so on, and the sixteen effects of those effects ; and there is the soul, which is neither Prakrzti nor effect ' — such is the comprehensive statement of the principles. The entity called ' fundamental Prakrzti' is constituted by the three II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I. 48 1 substances called Sattva, Ra^as, and Tamas, (when) in a state of complete equipoise, none of the three being either in defect or in excess ; the essential nature of those three consists respectively in pleasure, pain, and dullness; they have for their respective effects lightness and illumination, excitement and mobility, heaviness and obstruction ; they are absolutely non-perceivable by means of the senses, and to be defined and distinguished through their effects only. Prakrzti, consisting in the equipoise of Sattva, Ra^as, and Tamas, is one, itself non-sentient but subserving the enjoy- ment and final release of the many sentient beings, eternal, all-pervading, ever active, not the effect of anything, but the one general cause. There are seven Principles which are the effects of Prakrzti and the causal substances of everything else ; these seven are the Mahat, the ahankara, the subtle matter (tanmatra) of sound, the subtle matter of touch, the subtle matter of colour, the subtle matter of taste, and the subtle matter of smell. The ahankara is threefold, being either modified (vaikarika), or active (tai^asa), or the originator of the elements (bhutadi). The vaikarika is of sattva-nature and the originator of the sense-organs ; the bhutadi is of tamas-nature, and the cause of those subtle matters (tanmatra) which in their turn are the cause of the gross elements ; the tai^*asa is of the nature of ra^as, and assists the other two. The five gross elements are the ether and so on ; the five intellectual senses are hearing and so on ; the five organs of action are speech and so on. With the addition of the internal organ (manas) these are the sixteen entities which are mere effects. — The soul, not being capable of any change, is not either the causal matter or the effect of anything. For the same reason it is without attributes, consisting of mere intelligence, eternal, non-active, all-pervading, and different in each body. Being incapable of change and non-active, it can neither be an agent nor an enjoyer ; but although this is so, men in their confusion of mind, due to the close- ness to each other of Prakrzti and the soul, erroneously attribute to Prakrzti the intelligence of the soul, and to the soul the activity of Prakrzti — just as the redness of the rose [48] 1 i 48 2 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.
3superimposes itself on the crystal near it, — and thus con- sider the soul to be an ' I ' and an enjoyer. Fruition thus results from ignorance, and release from knowledge of the truth. This their theory the Sankhyas prove by means of perception, inference, and authoritative tradition. Now with regard to those matters which are proved by percep- tion, we Vedantins have no very special reason for dis- senting from the Sankhyas ; and what they say about their authoritative tradition, claiming to be founded on the knowledge of all-knowing persons such as Kapila, has been pretty well disproved by us in the first adhyaya. If, now, we further manage to refute the inference which leads them to assume the Pradhana as the cause of the world, we shall have disestablished their whole theory. We therefore proceed to give this refutation. On this point the Sankhyas reason as follows. It must necessarily be admitted that the entire world has one cause only ; for if effects were assumed to originate from several causes we should never arrive at an ultimate cause. Assume that parts such as e. g. threads produce a whole (i. e. in the case of threads, a piece of cloth) in the way of their being joined together by means of their six sides, which are parts of the threads. You must then further assume that the threads themselves are in the same way produced by their parts, having a similar constitution. And these parts again by their parts, until you reach the atoms ; these also must be assumed to produce their immediate effects by being joined together with their six sides, for otherwise solid extension (prathiman) could not be brought about. And then the atoms also as being wholes, consisting of parts 1, must be viewed as produced by their parts, and these again by their parts and so on, so that we never arrive at an ultimate cause. In order therefore to establish such an ultimate cause we must have recourse to the hypothesis of the general cause being con- stituted by one substance, which possesses the power of transforming itself in various different ways, without at the 1 As follows from their having six sides. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I. 483
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
No commentary for this page.