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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1The Sutras now proceed to refute the doctrine of the Self being (not a knower) but mere knowledge, and being omnipresent. 32. There would result permanent consciousness or non-consciousness, or else limitative restriction to either. On the other view, i. e. on the view of the Self being omnipresent and mere knowledge, it would follow either that consciousness and also non-consciousness would per- manently take place together everywhere ; or else that there would be definite permanent restriction to either of the two, i. e. either permanent consciousness or permanent non- consciousness. — If the omnipresent Self, consisting of mere knowledge only, were the cause of all that actual consciousness and non- consciousness on the part of Selfs which takes place in the world, it might be conceived either as the cause of both — i. e. consciousness and non-conscious- ness— and this would mean that there is everywhere and at all times simultaneous consciousness and non-consciousness. If, on the other hand, it were the cause of consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be unconsciousness of anything ; and if it were the cause of non-consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be consciousness of anything. On our view, on the other hand, the actually perceived distribution of consciousness and non-conscious- ness explains itself, since we hold the Self to abide within bodies only, so that naturally consciousness takes place there only, not anywhere else. — The view, finally (held by the Vaueshikas), of the consciousness of the Self depending on its organs (mind, senses, &c. ; while the omnipresent Self is, apart from those organs, non-sentient, gada), results in the same difficulties as the view criticised above ; for as all the Selfs are omnipresent they are in permanent conjunc- tion with all organs ; and moreover it would follow that the adrzsh/as (due to the actions of the different bodies) could II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 33. 553 not thus be held apart (but would cling to all Selfs, each of which is in contact with all bodies). Here terminates the adhikara/za of 'the knower! 33. (The soul is) an agent, on account of Scripture (thus) having a purport.
2553 not thus be held apart (but would cling to all Selfs, each of which is in contact with all bodies). Here terminates the adhikara/za of 'the knower! 33. (The soul is) an agent, on account of Scripture (thus) having a purport. It has been shown that the individual Self is a knowing subject and atomic. Now the question arises whether that Self is an agent or, being itself non-active, erroneously ascribes to itself the activity of the non-sentient gu/zas. The prima facie answer is that the individual Self is not an agent, since the sacred texts concerned wTith the Self declare that the Self does not act, while the gu^as do act. Thus, e. g. in the Ka/^avalli, where the text at first denies of the individual Self all the attributes of Prakrzti, such as being born, ageing and dying (c he is not born, he does not die'), and then also denies that the Self is the agent in acts such as killing and the like, ' If the slayer thinks that he slays, if the slain thinks that he is slain, they both do not understand ; for this one does not slay, nor is that one slain' (II, 18). This means — if one thinks the Self to be the slayer one does not know the Self. And the Lord himself teaches that non-agency is the essential nature of the individual soul, and that it is mere delusion on the Selfs part to ascribe to itself agency. ' By the attributes (gu^a) of Prakr/ti, actions are wrought all round/ He who is deluded by self-conceit thinks ' I am the agent ' ; { when the seer beholds no other agent than the gu/zas ' ; ' Prakrz'ti is said to be the cause of all agency of causes and effects, whilst the soul is the cause of all enjoyment of pleasure and pain'(Bha. Gi. Ill, 27 ; XIV, 19; XIII, 20).— The soul, therefore, is an enjoyer only, while all agency belongs to Prakrz'ti. — To this the Sutra replies, ' an agent, on account of Scripture thus having a meaning/ The Self only is an agent, not the gUTzas, because thus only Scripture has a meaning. For the scriptural injunctions, such as ' he who desires the heavenly world is to sacrifice,' ' He who desires Release is to meditate on Brahman,' and similar ones, enjoin action on him only who will enjoy the fruit 554 VED ANTA-SlJTR AS.
3For the scriptural injunctions, such as ' he who desires the heavenly world is to sacrifice,' ' He who desires Release is to meditate on Brahman,' and similar ones, enjoin action on him only who will enjoy the fruit 554 VED ANTA-SlJTR AS. of the action — whether the heavenly world, or Release, or anything else. If a non-sentient thing were the agent, the injunction would not be addressed to another being (viz. to an intelligent being — to which it actually is addressed). The term * ^astra ' (scriptural injunction) moreover comes from sas, to command, and commanding means impelling to action. But scriptural injunctions impel to action through giving rise to a certain conception (in the mind of the being addressed), and the non-sentient Pradhana cannot be made to conceive anything. Scripture therefore has a sense only, if we admit that none but the intelligent enjoyer of the fruit of the action is at the same time the agent. Thus the Purva Mima;/zsa declares 'the fruit of the injunction belongs to the agent' (III, 7, 18). The Purva- pakshin had contended that the text ' if the slayer thinks, &c./ proves the Self not to be the agent in the action of slaying ; but what the text really means is only that the Self as being eternal cannot be killed. The text, from Smrz'ti, which was alleged as proving that the gu/zas only possess active power, refers to the fact that in all activities lying within the sphere of the sa^sara, the activity of the Self is due not to its own nature but to its contact with the different gu^as. The activity of the gu/zas, therefore, must be viewed not as permanent, but occasional only. In the same sense Smrz'ti says ' the reason is the connexion of the soul with the gu/zas, in its births, in good and evil wombs ' (Bha. Gt. XIII, 21). Similarly it is said there (XVIII, 16) that * he who through an untrained understanding looks upon the isolated Self as an agent, that man of perverted mind does not see ' ; the meaning being that, since it appears from a previous passage that the activity of the Self depends on five factors (as enumerated in si. 16), he who views the isolated Self to be an agent has no true insight. 34. On account of taking and the declaration as to its moving about. The text beginning f And as a great king/ &c, declares that ' the Self taking the pra/zas moves about in its own body, II ADHYAVA, 3 PADA, 37. 555 according to its pleasure' (Br/. Up. II, 1, 18), i. e. it teaches that the Self is active in taking to itself the pra/zas and moving about in the body. 35. And on account of the designation (of the Self as the agent) in actions. If not so, there would be change of grammatical expression.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1The Sutras now proceed to refute the doctrine of the Self being (not a knower) but mere knowledge, and being omnipresent. 32. There would result permanent consciousness or non-consciousness, or else limitative restriction to either. On the other view, i. e. on the view of the Self being omnipresent and mere knowledge, it would follow either that consciousness and also non-consciousness would per- manently take place together everywhere ; or else that there would be definite permanent restriction to either of the two, i. e. either permanent consciousness or permanent non- consciousness. — If the omnipresent Self, consisting of mere knowledge only, were the cause of all that actual consciousness and non- consciousness on the part of Selfs which takes place in the world, it might be conceived either as the cause of both — i. e. consciousness and non-conscious- ness— and this would mean that there is everywhere and at all times simultaneous consciousness and non-consciousness. If, on the other hand, it were the cause of consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be unconsciousness of anything ; and if it were the cause of non-consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be consciousness of anything. On our view, on the other hand, the actually perceived distribution of consciousness and non-conscious- ness explains itself, since we hold the Self to abide within bodies only, so that naturally consciousness takes place there only, not anywhere else. — The view, finally (held by the Vaueshikas), of the consciousness of the Self depending on its organs (mind, senses, &c. ; while the omnipresent Self is, apart from those organs, non-sentient, gada), results in the same difficulties as the view criticised above ; for as all the Selfs are omnipresent they are in permanent conjunc- tion with all organs ; and moreover it would follow that the adrzsh/as (due to the actions of the different bodies) could II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 33. 553 not thus be held apart (but would cling to all Selfs, each of which is in contact with all bodies). Here terminates the adhikara/za of 'the knower! 33. (The soul is) an agent, on account of Scripture (thus) having a purport.
2553 not thus be held apart (but would cling to all Selfs, each of which is in contact with all bodies). Here terminates the adhikara/za of 'the knower! 33. (The soul is) an agent, on account of Scripture (thus) having a purport. It has been shown that the individual Self is a knowing subject and atomic. Now the question arises whether that Self is an agent or, being itself non-active, erroneously ascribes to itself the activity of the non-sentient gu/zas. The prima facie answer is that the individual Self is not an agent, since the sacred texts concerned wTith the Self declare that the Self does not act, while the gu^as do act. Thus, e. g. in the Ka/^avalli, where the text at first denies of the individual Self all the attributes of Prakrzti, such as being born, ageing and dying (c he is not born, he does not die'), and then also denies that the Self is the agent in acts such as killing and the like, ' If the slayer thinks that he slays, if the slain thinks that he is slain, they both do not understand ; for this one does not slay, nor is that one slain' (II, 18). This means — if one thinks the Self to be the slayer one does not know the Self. And the Lord himself teaches that non-agency is the essential nature of the individual soul, and that it is mere delusion on the Selfs part to ascribe to itself agency. ' By the attributes (gu^a) of Prakr/ti, actions are wrought all round/ He who is deluded by self-conceit thinks ' I am the agent ' ; { when the seer beholds no other agent than the gu/zas ' ; ' Prakrz'ti is said to be the cause of all agency of causes and effects, whilst the soul is the cause of all enjoyment of pleasure and pain'(Bha. Gi. Ill, 27 ; XIV, 19; XIII, 20).— The soul, therefore, is an enjoyer only, while all agency belongs to Prakrz'ti. — To this the Sutra replies, ' an agent, on account of Scripture thus having a meaning/ The Self only is an agent, not the gUTzas, because thus only Scripture has a meaning. For the scriptural injunctions, such as ' he who desires the heavenly world is to sacrifice,' ' He who desires Release is to meditate on Brahman,' and similar ones, enjoin action on him only who will enjoy the fruit 554 VED ANTA-SlJTR AS.
3For the scriptural injunctions, such as ' he who desires the heavenly world is to sacrifice,' ' He who desires Release is to meditate on Brahman,' and similar ones, enjoin action on him only who will enjoy the fruit 554 VED ANTA-SlJTR AS. of the action — whether the heavenly world, or Release, or anything else. If a non-sentient thing were the agent, the injunction would not be addressed to another being (viz. to an intelligent being — to which it actually is addressed). The term * ^astra ' (scriptural injunction) moreover comes from sas, to command, and commanding means impelling to action. But scriptural injunctions impel to action through giving rise to a certain conception (in the mind of the being addressed), and the non-sentient Pradhana cannot be made to conceive anything. Scripture therefore has a sense only, if we admit that none but the intelligent enjoyer of the fruit of the action is at the same time the agent. Thus the Purva Mima;/zsa declares 'the fruit of the injunction belongs to the agent' (III, 7, 18). The Purva- pakshin had contended that the text ' if the slayer thinks, &c./ proves the Self not to be the agent in the action of slaying ; but what the text really means is only that the Self as being eternal cannot be killed. The text, from Smrz'ti, which was alleged as proving that the gu/zas only possess active power, refers to the fact that in all activities lying within the sphere of the sa^sara, the activity of the Self is due not to its own nature but to its contact with the different gu^as. The activity of the gu/zas, therefore, must be viewed not as permanent, but occasional only. In the same sense Smrz'ti says ' the reason is the connexion of the soul with the gu/zas, in its births, in good and evil wombs ' (Bha. Gt. XIII, 21). Similarly it is said there (XVIII, 16) that * he who through an untrained understanding looks upon the isolated Self as an agent, that man of perverted mind does not see ' ; the meaning being that, since it appears from a previous passage that the activity of the Self depends on five factors (as enumerated in si. 16), he who views the isolated Self to be an agent has no true insight. 34. On account of taking and the declaration as to its moving about. The text beginning f And as a great king/ &c, declares that ' the Self taking the pra/zas moves about in its own body, II ADHYAVA, 3 PADA, 37. 555 according to its pleasure' (Br/. Up. II, 1, 18), i. e. it teaches that the Self is active in taking to itself the pra/zas and moving about in the body. 35. And on account of the designation (of the Self as the agent) in actions. If not so, there would be change of grammatical expression.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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