Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— You do not know, we rejoin, that this denial of the per- 1 I. e. the reflection as to the perception of pleasure refers to the past state of sleep only, not to the present moment of reflection. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 69 sistence of the ' I ' flatly contradicts the state of conscious- ness expressed in the judgment 'I was not conscious of myself and the verbal form of the judgment itself! — But what then is denied by the words 'of myself? — This, we admit, is a reasonable question. Let us consider the point. What is negatived in that judgment is not the knowing ' I ' itself, but merely the distinctions of caste, condition of life, &c. which belong to the ' I ' at the time of waking. We must distinguish the objects of the several parts of the judgment under discussion. The object of the 8 (me) myself is the ' 1 5 distinguished by class characteris- tics as it presents itself in the waking state ; the object of the word ' I ' (in the judgment) is that * I ' which consists of a uniform flow of self-consciousness which persists in sleep also, but is then not quite distinct. The judgment * I did not know myself ' therefore means that the sleeper was not conscious of the place where he slept, of his special charac- teristics, and so on. — It is, moreover, your own view that in deep sleep the Self occupies the position of a witnessing principle with regard to Nescience. But by a witness (sakshin) we understand some one who knows about some- thing by personal observation (sakshat) ; a person who does not know cannot be a witness. Accordingly, in scripture as well as in ordinary language a knowing subject only, not mere knowledge, is spoken of as a witness ; and with this the Reverend Pacini also agrees when teaching that the word ' sakshin' means one who knows in person (Pa. Su. V, 2, 91). Now this witness is nothing else but the 'I' which is apprehended in the judgment ' I know ' ; and how then should this ' I ' not be apprehended in the state of sleep? That which itself appears to the Self appears as the ' I,' and it thus follows that also in deep sleep and similar states the Self which then shines forth appears as the ' I.' The conscious subject persists in the state of release. To maintain that the consciousness of the ' I ' does not persist in the state of final release is again altogether inap- 70 vedanta-sOtras.
2To maintain that the consciousness of the ' I ' does not persist in the state of final release is again altogether inap- 70 vedanta-sOtras. propriate. It in fact amounts to the doctrine — only ex- pressed in somewhat different words — that final release is the annihilation of the Self. The ' I ' is not a mere attri- bute of the Self so that even after its destruction the essen- tial nature of the Self might persist — as it persists on the cessation of ignorance ; but it constitutes the very nature of the Self. Such judgments as ' I know,' ' Knowledge has arisen in me/ show, on the other hand, that we are con- scious of knowledge as a mere attribute of the Self. — Moreover, a man who suffering pain, mental or of other kind — whether such pain be real or due to error only — puts himself in relation to pain — ' I am suffering pain ' — naturally begins to reflect how he may once for all free himself from all these manifold afflictions and enjoy a state of untroubled ease ; the desire of final release thus having arisen in him he at once sets to work to accomplish it. If, on the other hand, he were to realise that the effect of such activity would be the loss of personal existence, he surely would turn away as soon as somebody began to tell him about ' release/ And the result of this would be that, in the absence of willing and qualified pupils, the whole scrip- tural teaching as to final release would lose its authorita- tive character. — Nor must you maintain against this that even in the state of release there persists pure conscious- ness ; for this by no means improves your case. No sensible person exerts himself under the influence of the idea that after he himself has perished there will remain some entity termed 'pure light!' — What constitutes the ' inward ' Self thus is the ' 1/ the knowing subject. This ' inward ' Self shines forth in the state of final release also as an ' I ' ; for it appears to itself. The general principle is that whatever being appears to itself appears as an ' I ' ; both parties in the present dispute establish the existence of the transmigrating Self on such appearance. On the contrary, whatever does not appear as an ' I,' does not appear to itself; as jars and the like. Now the emanci- pated Self does thus appear to itself, and therefore it appears as an ' I.' Nor does this appearance as an f I ' imply in any way that the released Self is subject to I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 7 1
3Now the emanci- pated Self does thus appear to itself, and therefore it appears as an ' I.' Nor does this appearance as an f I ' imply in any way that the released Self is subject to I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 7 1 Nescience and implicated in the Sa;/zsara ; for this would contradict the nature of final release, and moreover the consciousness of the * I ' cannot be the cause of Nescience and so on. Nescience (ignorance) is either ignorance as to essential nature, or the cognition of something under an aspect different from the real one (as when a person suffer- ing from jaundice sees all things yellow) ; or cognition of what is altogether opposite in nature (as when mother o' pearl is mistaken for silver). Now the ' I ' constitutes the essential nature of the Self ; how then can the conscious- ness of the ' I,' i. e. the consciousness of its own true nature, implicate the released Self in Nescience, or, in the Sa^sara ? The fact rather is that such consciousness destroys Nes- cience, and so on, because it is essentially opposed to them. In agreement with this we observe that persons like the rishi Vamadeva, in whom the intuition of their identity with Brahman had totally destroyed all Nescience, en- joyed the consciousness of the personal ' I ' ; for scripture says, ' Seeing this the rishi Vamadeva understood, / was Manu and the Sun' (Br/. Up. I, 4, 10). And the highest Brahman also, which is opposed to all other forms of Nescience and denoted and conceived as pure Being, is spoken of in an analogous way ; cp. ' Let me make each of these three deities/ &c. (Kk. Up. VI, 3, 3) ; ' May I be many, may I grow forth ' (Kk. Up. VI, 2, 3) ; ' He thought, shall I send forth worlds?' (Ait. Ar. 11,4, i> 1); and again, ' Since I transcend the Destructible, and am higher also than the Indestructible, therefore I am proclaimed in the world and in the Veda as the highest Person' (Bha. Gi. XV, 18); < I am the Self, O GiWakeja ' (Bha. Gi. X, 20) ; ' Never was I not' (Bha. Gi. II, 12) ; ' I am the source and the destruc- tion of the whole world' (Bha. Gi. VII, 6); 'I am the source of all ; from me proceeds everything ' (Bha. Gi. X, 8) ; ' I am he who raises them from the ocean of the world of death' (Bha. Gi. XII, 7) ; 'I am the giver of seed, the father ' (Bha. Gi. XIV, 4) ; ' I know the things past ' (Bha. Gi. VII, 26).— But if the ' I ' (aham) constitutes the essen- tial nature of the Self, how is it that the Holy One teaches the principle of egoity (aha//zkara) to belong to the sphere 7 2 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— You do not know, we rejoin, that this denial of the per- 1 I. e. the reflection as to the perception of pleasure refers to the past state of sleep only, not to the present moment of reflection. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 69 sistence of the ' I ' flatly contradicts the state of conscious- ness expressed in the judgment 'I was not conscious of myself and the verbal form of the judgment itself! — But what then is denied by the words 'of myself? — This, we admit, is a reasonable question. Let us consider the point. What is negatived in that judgment is not the knowing ' I ' itself, but merely the distinctions of caste, condition of life, &c. which belong to the ' I ' at the time of waking. We must distinguish the objects of the several parts of the judgment under discussion. The object of the 8 (me) myself is the ' 1 5 distinguished by class characteris- tics as it presents itself in the waking state ; the object of the word ' I ' (in the judgment) is that * I ' which consists of a uniform flow of self-consciousness which persists in sleep also, but is then not quite distinct. The judgment * I did not know myself ' therefore means that the sleeper was not conscious of the place where he slept, of his special charac- teristics, and so on. — It is, moreover, your own view that in deep sleep the Self occupies the position of a witnessing principle with regard to Nescience. But by a witness (sakshin) we understand some one who knows about some- thing by personal observation (sakshat) ; a person who does not know cannot be a witness. Accordingly, in scripture as well as in ordinary language a knowing subject only, not mere knowledge, is spoken of as a witness ; and with this the Reverend Pacini also agrees when teaching that the word ' sakshin' means one who knows in person (Pa. Su. V, 2, 91). Now this witness is nothing else but the 'I' which is apprehended in the judgment ' I know ' ; and how then should this ' I ' not be apprehended in the state of sleep? That which itself appears to the Self appears as the ' I,' and it thus follows that also in deep sleep and similar states the Self which then shines forth appears as the ' I.' The conscious subject persists in the state of release. To maintain that the consciousness of the ' I ' does not persist in the state of final release is again altogether inap- 70 vedanta-sOtras.
2To maintain that the consciousness of the ' I ' does not persist in the state of final release is again altogether inap- 70 vedanta-sOtras. propriate. It in fact amounts to the doctrine — only ex- pressed in somewhat different words — that final release is the annihilation of the Self. The ' I ' is not a mere attri- bute of the Self so that even after its destruction the essen- tial nature of the Self might persist — as it persists on the cessation of ignorance ; but it constitutes the very nature of the Self. Such judgments as ' I know,' ' Knowledge has arisen in me/ show, on the other hand, that we are con- scious of knowledge as a mere attribute of the Self. — Moreover, a man who suffering pain, mental or of other kind — whether such pain be real or due to error only — puts himself in relation to pain — ' I am suffering pain ' — naturally begins to reflect how he may once for all free himself from all these manifold afflictions and enjoy a state of untroubled ease ; the desire of final release thus having arisen in him he at once sets to work to accomplish it. If, on the other hand, he were to realise that the effect of such activity would be the loss of personal existence, he surely would turn away as soon as somebody began to tell him about ' release/ And the result of this would be that, in the absence of willing and qualified pupils, the whole scrip- tural teaching as to final release would lose its authorita- tive character. — Nor must you maintain against this that even in the state of release there persists pure conscious- ness ; for this by no means improves your case. No sensible person exerts himself under the influence of the idea that after he himself has perished there will remain some entity termed 'pure light!' — What constitutes the ' inward ' Self thus is the ' 1/ the knowing subject. This ' inward ' Self shines forth in the state of final release also as an ' I ' ; for it appears to itself. The general principle is that whatever being appears to itself appears as an ' I ' ; both parties in the present dispute establish the existence of the transmigrating Self on such appearance. On the contrary, whatever does not appear as an ' I,' does not appear to itself; as jars and the like. Now the emanci- pated Self does thus appear to itself, and therefore it appears as an ' I.' Nor does this appearance as an f I ' imply in any way that the released Self is subject to I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 7 1
3Now the emanci- pated Self does thus appear to itself, and therefore it appears as an ' I.' Nor does this appearance as an f I ' imply in any way that the released Self is subject to I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 7 1 Nescience and implicated in the Sa;/zsara ; for this would contradict the nature of final release, and moreover the consciousness of the * I ' cannot be the cause of Nescience and so on. Nescience (ignorance) is either ignorance as to essential nature, or the cognition of something under an aspect different from the real one (as when a person suffer- ing from jaundice sees all things yellow) ; or cognition of what is altogether opposite in nature (as when mother o' pearl is mistaken for silver). Now the ' I ' constitutes the essential nature of the Self ; how then can the conscious- ness of the ' I,' i. e. the consciousness of its own true nature, implicate the released Self in Nescience, or, in the Sa^sara ? The fact rather is that such consciousness destroys Nes- cience, and so on, because it is essentially opposed to them. In agreement with this we observe that persons like the rishi Vamadeva, in whom the intuition of their identity with Brahman had totally destroyed all Nescience, en- joyed the consciousness of the personal ' I ' ; for scripture says, ' Seeing this the rishi Vamadeva understood, / was Manu and the Sun' (Br/. Up. I, 4, 10). And the highest Brahman also, which is opposed to all other forms of Nescience and denoted and conceived as pure Being, is spoken of in an analogous way ; cp. ' Let me make each of these three deities/ &c. (Kk. Up. VI, 3, 3) ; ' May I be many, may I grow forth ' (Kk. Up. VI, 2, 3) ; ' He thought, shall I send forth worlds?' (Ait. Ar. 11,4, i> 1); and again, ' Since I transcend the Destructible, and am higher also than the Indestructible, therefore I am proclaimed in the world and in the Veda as the highest Person' (Bha. Gi. XV, 18); < I am the Self, O GiWakeja ' (Bha. Gi. X, 20) ; ' Never was I not' (Bha. Gi. II, 12) ; ' I am the source and the destruc- tion of the whole world' (Bha. Gi. VII, 6); 'I am the source of all ; from me proceeds everything ' (Bha. Gi. X, 8) ; ' I am he who raises them from the ocean of the world of death' (Bha. Gi. XII, 7) ; 'I am the giver of seed, the father ' (Bha. Gi. XIV, 4) ; ' I know the things past ' (Bha. Gi. VII, 26).— But if the ' I ' (aham) constitutes the essen- tial nature of the Self, how is it that the Holy One teaches the principle of egoity (aha//zkara) to belong to the sphere 7 2 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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