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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1171 of the proving collateral instances being destitute of what has to be proved — for experience does not exhibit to us one agent capable of producing everything. If, on the other hand, what you wish to prove is merely the existence of an intelligent creative agent, you prove only what is proved already (not contested by any one). — Moreover, if you use the attribute of being an effect (which belongs to the totality of things) as a means to prove the existence of one omniscient and omnipotent creator, do you view this attribute as belonging to all things in so far as pro- duced together, or in so far as produced in succession ? In the former case the attribute of being an effect is not established (for experience does not show that all things are produced together) ; and in the latter case the attribute would really prove what is contrary to the hypothesis of one creator (for experience shows that things produced in succession have different causes). In attempting to prove the agency of one intelligent creative being only, we thus enter into conflict with Perception and Inference, and we moreover contradict Scripture, which says that ' the potter is born ' and ' the cartwright is born ' (and thus declares a plurality of intelligent agents). Moreover, as we observe that all effected things, such as living bodies and so on, are connected with pleasure and the like, which are the effects of sattva (goodness) and the other primary constituents of matter, we must conclude that effected things have sattva and so on for their causes. Sattva and so on — which constitute the distinctive elements of the causal substance — are thecausesof the various nature of the effects. Now those effects can be connected with their causes only in so far as the internal organ of a person possessing sattva and so on undergoes modifications. And that a person possesses those qualities is due to karman. Thus, in order to account for the origination of different effects we must necessarily assume the connexion of an intelligent agent with karman, whereby alone he can become the cause of effects ; and moreover the various character of knowledge and power (which the various effects pre- suppose) has its reason in karman. And if it be said that 172 VEDANT A-SUTR AS.
2And if it be said that 172 VEDANT A-SUTR AS. it is (not the various knowledge, &c, but) the mere wish of the agent that causes the origination of effects, we point out that the wish, as being specialised by its particular object, must be based on sattva and so on, and hence is necessarily connected with karman. From all this it follows that individual souls only can be causal agents : no legitimate inference leads to a Lord different from them in nature. — This admits of various expressions in technical form. * Bodies, worlds, &c, are effects due to the causal energy of individual souls, just as pots are ' ; ' the Lord is not a causal agent, because he has no aims; just as the released souls have none ' ; ' the Lord is not an agent, because he has no body; just as the released souls have none.' (This last argumentation cannot be objected to on the ground that individual souls take possession of bodies ; for in their case there exists a beginningless subtle body by means of which they enter into gross bodies). — 'Time is never devoid of created worlds ; because it is time, just like the present time (which has its created world).' Consider the following point also. Does the Lord pro- duce his effects, with his body or apart from his body ? Not the latter ; for we do not observe causal agency on the part of any bodiless being : even the activities of the internal organ are found only in beings having a body, and although the internal organ be eternal we do not know of its producing any effects in the case of released disembodied souls. Nor again is the former alternative admissible ; for in that case the Lord's body would either be permanent or non-permanent. The former alternative would imply that something made up of parts is eternal ; and if we once admit this we may as well admit that the world itself is eternal, and then there is no reason to infer a Lord. And the latter alternative is inadmissible because in that case there would be no cause of the body, different from it (which would account for the origination of the body). Nor could the Lord himself be assumed as the cause of the body, since a bodiless being cannot be the cause of a body. Nor could it be maintained that the Lord can be assumed to be ' embodied ' by means of some other body ; for this I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. I 73
3Nor could the Lord himself be assumed as the cause of the body, since a bodiless being cannot be the cause of a body. Nor could it be maintained that the Lord can be assumed to be ' embodied ' by means of some other body ; for this I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. I 73 leads us into a regressus in infinitum. — Should we, more- over, represent to ourselves the Lord (when productive) as engaged in effort or not ? — The former is inadmissible, because he is without a body. And the latter alternative is excluded because a being not making an effort does not produce effects. And if it be said that the effect, i. e. the world, has for its causal agent one whose activity consists in mere desire, this would be to ascribe to the subject of the conclusion (i. e. the world) qualities not known from experience ; and moreover the attribute to be proved would be absent in the case of the proving instances (such as jars, &c, which are not the work of agents engaged in mere wishing). Thus the inference of a creative Lord which claims to be in agreement with observation is refuted by reasoning which itself is in agreement with observation, and we hence conclude that Scripture is the only source of knowledge with regard to a supreme soul that is the Lord of all and constitutes the highest Brahman. What Scripture tells us of is a being which comprehends within itself infinite, altogether unsurpassable excellences such as omnipotence and so on, is antagonistic to all evil, and totally different in character from whatever is cognised by the other means of knowledge : that to such a being there should attach even the slightest imperfection due to its similarity in nature to the things known by the ordinary means of knowledge, is thus altogether excluded. — The Purvapakshin had remarked that the oneness of the in- strumental and the material cause is neither matter of observation nor capable of proof, and that the same holds good with regard to the theory that certain non-composite substances such as ether are created things ; that these points also are in no way contrary to reason, we shall show later on under Su. I, 4, 23, and Su. II, 3, 1. The conclusion meanwhile is that, since Brahman does not fall within the sphere of the other means of knowledge, and is the topic of Scripture only, the text ' from whence these creatures/ &c., does give authoritative information as to a Brahman possessing the characteristic qualities so often enumerated. Here terminates the adhikara/za of * Scripture being the source.' 1 74 VEDANTA-sftTRAS. A new objection here presents itself. — Brahman does not indeed fall within the province of the other means of knowledge ; but all the same Scripture does not give authoritative information regarding it : for Brahman is not something that has for its purport activity or cessation from activity, but is something fully established and ac- complished within itself. — To this objection the following Sutra replies.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1171 of the proving collateral instances being destitute of what has to be proved — for experience does not exhibit to us one agent capable of producing everything. If, on the other hand, what you wish to prove is merely the existence of an intelligent creative agent, you prove only what is proved already (not contested by any one). — Moreover, if you use the attribute of being an effect (which belongs to the totality of things) as a means to prove the existence of one omniscient and omnipotent creator, do you view this attribute as belonging to all things in so far as pro- duced together, or in so far as produced in succession ? In the former case the attribute of being an effect is not established (for experience does not show that all things are produced together) ; and in the latter case the attribute would really prove what is contrary to the hypothesis of one creator (for experience shows that things produced in succession have different causes). In attempting to prove the agency of one intelligent creative being only, we thus enter into conflict with Perception and Inference, and we moreover contradict Scripture, which says that ' the potter is born ' and ' the cartwright is born ' (and thus declares a plurality of intelligent agents). Moreover, as we observe that all effected things, such as living bodies and so on, are connected with pleasure and the like, which are the effects of sattva (goodness) and the other primary constituents of matter, we must conclude that effected things have sattva and so on for their causes. Sattva and so on — which constitute the distinctive elements of the causal substance — are thecausesof the various nature of the effects. Now those effects can be connected with their causes only in so far as the internal organ of a person possessing sattva and so on undergoes modifications. And that a person possesses those qualities is due to karman. Thus, in order to account for the origination of different effects we must necessarily assume the connexion of an intelligent agent with karman, whereby alone he can become the cause of effects ; and moreover the various character of knowledge and power (which the various effects pre- suppose) has its reason in karman. And if it be said that 172 VEDANT A-SUTR AS.
2And if it be said that 172 VEDANT A-SUTR AS. it is (not the various knowledge, &c, but) the mere wish of the agent that causes the origination of effects, we point out that the wish, as being specialised by its particular object, must be based on sattva and so on, and hence is necessarily connected with karman. From all this it follows that individual souls only can be causal agents : no legitimate inference leads to a Lord different from them in nature. — This admits of various expressions in technical form. * Bodies, worlds, &c, are effects due to the causal energy of individual souls, just as pots are ' ; ' the Lord is not a causal agent, because he has no aims; just as the released souls have none ' ; ' the Lord is not an agent, because he has no body; just as the released souls have none.' (This last argumentation cannot be objected to on the ground that individual souls take possession of bodies ; for in their case there exists a beginningless subtle body by means of which they enter into gross bodies). — 'Time is never devoid of created worlds ; because it is time, just like the present time (which has its created world).' Consider the following point also. Does the Lord pro- duce his effects, with his body or apart from his body ? Not the latter ; for we do not observe causal agency on the part of any bodiless being : even the activities of the internal organ are found only in beings having a body, and although the internal organ be eternal we do not know of its producing any effects in the case of released disembodied souls. Nor again is the former alternative admissible ; for in that case the Lord's body would either be permanent or non-permanent. The former alternative would imply that something made up of parts is eternal ; and if we once admit this we may as well admit that the world itself is eternal, and then there is no reason to infer a Lord. And the latter alternative is inadmissible because in that case there would be no cause of the body, different from it (which would account for the origination of the body). Nor could the Lord himself be assumed as the cause of the body, since a bodiless being cannot be the cause of a body. Nor could it be maintained that the Lord can be assumed to be ' embodied ' by means of some other body ; for this I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. I 73
3Nor could the Lord himself be assumed as the cause of the body, since a bodiless being cannot be the cause of a body. Nor could it be maintained that the Lord can be assumed to be ' embodied ' by means of some other body ; for this I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. I 73 leads us into a regressus in infinitum. — Should we, more- over, represent to ourselves the Lord (when productive) as engaged in effort or not ? — The former is inadmissible, because he is without a body. And the latter alternative is excluded because a being not making an effort does not produce effects. And if it be said that the effect, i. e. the world, has for its causal agent one whose activity consists in mere desire, this would be to ascribe to the subject of the conclusion (i. e. the world) qualities not known from experience ; and moreover the attribute to be proved would be absent in the case of the proving instances (such as jars, &c, which are not the work of agents engaged in mere wishing). Thus the inference of a creative Lord which claims to be in agreement with observation is refuted by reasoning which itself is in agreement with observation, and we hence conclude that Scripture is the only source of knowledge with regard to a supreme soul that is the Lord of all and constitutes the highest Brahman. What Scripture tells us of is a being which comprehends within itself infinite, altogether unsurpassable excellences such as omnipotence and so on, is antagonistic to all evil, and totally different in character from whatever is cognised by the other means of knowledge : that to such a being there should attach even the slightest imperfection due to its similarity in nature to the things known by the ordinary means of knowledge, is thus altogether excluded. — The Purvapakshin had remarked that the oneness of the in- strumental and the material cause is neither matter of observation nor capable of proof, and that the same holds good with regard to the theory that certain non-composite substances such as ether are created things ; that these points also are in no way contrary to reason, we shall show later on under Su. I, 4, 23, and Su. II, 3, 1. The conclusion meanwhile is that, since Brahman does not fall within the sphere of the other means of knowledge, and is the topic of Scripture only, the text ' from whence these creatures/ &c., does give authoritative information as to a Brahman possessing the characteristic qualities so often enumerated. Here terminates the adhikara/za of * Scripture being the source.' 1 74 VEDANTA-sftTRAS. A new objection here presents itself. — Brahman does not indeed fall within the province of the other means of knowledge ; but all the same Scripture does not give authoritative information regarding it : for Brahman is not something that has for its purport activity or cessation from activity, but is something fully established and ac- complished within itself. — To this objection the following Sutra replies.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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