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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1The origin of the world cannot, therefore, be due to any action on the part of the atoms. [48] K k 49§ VEDANTA-SUTRAS. 12. And because owing to the acknowledgment of samavaya, there results a regressus in infinitum from equality. The Vafoeshika doctrine is further untenable on account of the acknowledgment of samavaya. — Why so ? — Because the samavaya also, like part, quality, and generic character- istics, requires something else to establish it, and that some- thing else again requires some further thing to establish it — from which there arises an infinite regress. To explain. The Vaueshikas assume the so-called samavaya relation, defining it as c that connexion which is the cause of the idea " this is here," in the case of things permanently and inseparably connected, and standing to each other in the relation of abode and thing abiding in the abode/ Now, if such a samavaya relation is assumed in order to account for the fact that things observed to be inseparably con- nected— as, e.g., class characteristics are inseparably con- nected with the individuals to which they belong — are such, i.e. inseparably connected, a reason has also to be searched for why the samavaya, which is of the same nature as those things (in so far, namely, as it is also inseparably connected with the things connected by it), is such ; and for that reason, again, a further reason has to be postulated, and so on, in infinitum. Nor can it be said that inseparable connexion must be assumed to constitute the essential nature of samavaya (so that no further reason need be demanded for its inseparable connexion) ; for on this reasoning you would have to assume the same essential nature for class characteristics, qualities, and so on (which would render the assumption of a samavaya needless for them also). Nor is it a legitimate proceeding to postulate an unseen entity such as the samavaya is, and then to assume for it such and such an essential nature. — These objections apply to the samavaya whether it be viewed as eternal or non-eternal. The next Sutra urges a further objection against it if viewed as eternal. 1 3. And because (the world also) would thus be eternal. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 5. 499 The samavaya is a relation, and if that relation is eternal that to which the relation belongs must also be eternal, so that we would arrive at the unacceptable conclusion that the world is eternal. 14. And on account of (the atoms) having colour and so on, the reverse (takes place) ; as it is observed.
214. And on account of (the atoms) having colour and so on, the reverse (takes place) ; as it is observed. From the view that the atoms of four kinds — viz. of earth or water or fire or air — possess colour, taste, smell, and touch, it would follow that the atoms are non-eternal, gross, and made up of parts — and this is the reverse of what the Vaueshikas actually teach as to their atoms, viz. that they are eternal, subtle, and not made up of parts. For things possessing colour, e.g. jars, are non-eternal, because it is observed that they are produced from other causes of the same, i.e. non-eternal nature, and so on. To a non-perceived thing which is assumed in accordance with what is actually perceived, we may not ascribe any attri- butes that would be convenient to us ; and it is in accor- dance with actual experience that you Vaueshikas assume the atoms to possess colour and other qualities. Hence your theory is untenable. — Let it then, in order to avoid this difficulty, be assumed that the atoms do not possess colour and other sensible qualities. To this alternative the next Sutra refers. 15. And as there are objections in both cases. A difficulty arises not only on the view of the atoms having colour and other sensible qualities, but also on the view of their being destitute of those qualities. For as the qualities of effected things depend on the qualities of their causes, earth, water, and so on, would in that case be destitute of qualities. And if to avoid this difficulty, it be held that the atoms do possess qualities, we are again met by the difficulty stated in the preceding Sutra. Objections thus arising in both cases, the theory of the atoms is untenable. K k 2 500 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. i 6, And as it is not accepted, it is altogether disregarded. Kapila's doctrine, although to be rejected on account of its being in conflict with Scripture and sound reasoning, yet recommends itself to the adherents of the Veda on some accounts — as e.g. its view of the existence of the effect in the cause. Ka/zada's theory, on the other hand, of which no part can be accepted and which is totally destitute of proof, cannot but be absolutely disregarded by all those who aim at the highest end of man. — Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' the big and long/ 17. Even on the aggregate with its two causes, there is non-establishment of that.
3— Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' the big and long/ 17. Even on the aggregate with its two causes, there is non-establishment of that. We so far have refuted the Vaweshikaj, who hold the doctrine of atoms constituting the general cause/4 Now the followers of Buddha also teach that the world originates from atoms, and the Sutras therefore proceed to declare that on their view also the origination, course, and so on, of the world cannot rationally be accounted for. These Bauddhas belong to four different classes. Some of them hold that all outward things, which are either elements (bhuta) or elemental (bhautika), and all inward things which are either mind (kitta) or mental (£aitta), — all these things consisting of aggregates of the atoms of earth, water, fire and air — are proved by means of Perception as well as Inference. Others hold that all external things, earth, and so on, are only to be inferred from ideas (vi^*«ana). Others again teach that the only reality are ideas to which no outward things correspond ; the (so-called) outward things are like the things seen in dreams. The three schools mentioned agree in holding that the things admitted by them have a momentary existence only, and do not allow that, in addition to the things mentioned, viz. elements and elemental things, mind and mental things, there are certain further independent entities such as ether, Self, and so on. — Others finally assert a universal void, i. e. the non- reality of everything. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I 7. 5OI
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1The origin of the world cannot, therefore, be due to any action on the part of the atoms. [48] K k 49§ VEDANTA-SUTRAS. 12. And because owing to the acknowledgment of samavaya, there results a regressus in infinitum from equality. The Vafoeshika doctrine is further untenable on account of the acknowledgment of samavaya. — Why so ? — Because the samavaya also, like part, quality, and generic character- istics, requires something else to establish it, and that some- thing else again requires some further thing to establish it — from which there arises an infinite regress. To explain. The Vaueshikas assume the so-called samavaya relation, defining it as c that connexion which is the cause of the idea " this is here," in the case of things permanently and inseparably connected, and standing to each other in the relation of abode and thing abiding in the abode/ Now, if such a samavaya relation is assumed in order to account for the fact that things observed to be inseparably con- nected— as, e.g., class characteristics are inseparably con- nected with the individuals to which they belong — are such, i.e. inseparably connected, a reason has also to be searched for why the samavaya, which is of the same nature as those things (in so far, namely, as it is also inseparably connected with the things connected by it), is such ; and for that reason, again, a further reason has to be postulated, and so on, in infinitum. Nor can it be said that inseparable connexion must be assumed to constitute the essential nature of samavaya (so that no further reason need be demanded for its inseparable connexion) ; for on this reasoning you would have to assume the same essential nature for class characteristics, qualities, and so on (which would render the assumption of a samavaya needless for them also). Nor is it a legitimate proceeding to postulate an unseen entity such as the samavaya is, and then to assume for it such and such an essential nature. — These objections apply to the samavaya whether it be viewed as eternal or non-eternal. The next Sutra urges a further objection against it if viewed as eternal. 1 3. And because (the world also) would thus be eternal. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 5. 499 The samavaya is a relation, and if that relation is eternal that to which the relation belongs must also be eternal, so that we would arrive at the unacceptable conclusion that the world is eternal. 14. And on account of (the atoms) having colour and so on, the reverse (takes place) ; as it is observed.
214. And on account of (the atoms) having colour and so on, the reverse (takes place) ; as it is observed. From the view that the atoms of four kinds — viz. of earth or water or fire or air — possess colour, taste, smell, and touch, it would follow that the atoms are non-eternal, gross, and made up of parts — and this is the reverse of what the Vaueshikas actually teach as to their atoms, viz. that they are eternal, subtle, and not made up of parts. For things possessing colour, e.g. jars, are non-eternal, because it is observed that they are produced from other causes of the same, i.e. non-eternal nature, and so on. To a non-perceived thing which is assumed in accordance with what is actually perceived, we may not ascribe any attri- butes that would be convenient to us ; and it is in accor- dance with actual experience that you Vaueshikas assume the atoms to possess colour and other qualities. Hence your theory is untenable. — Let it then, in order to avoid this difficulty, be assumed that the atoms do not possess colour and other sensible qualities. To this alternative the next Sutra refers. 15. And as there are objections in both cases. A difficulty arises not only on the view of the atoms having colour and other sensible qualities, but also on the view of their being destitute of those qualities. For as the qualities of effected things depend on the qualities of their causes, earth, water, and so on, would in that case be destitute of qualities. And if to avoid this difficulty, it be held that the atoms do possess qualities, we are again met by the difficulty stated in the preceding Sutra. Objections thus arising in both cases, the theory of the atoms is untenable. K k 2 500 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. i 6, And as it is not accepted, it is altogether disregarded. Kapila's doctrine, although to be rejected on account of its being in conflict with Scripture and sound reasoning, yet recommends itself to the adherents of the Veda on some accounts — as e.g. its view of the existence of the effect in the cause. Ka/zada's theory, on the other hand, of which no part can be accepted and which is totally destitute of proof, cannot but be absolutely disregarded by all those who aim at the highest end of man. — Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' the big and long/ 17. Even on the aggregate with its two causes, there is non-establishment of that.
3— Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' the big and long/ 17. Even on the aggregate with its two causes, there is non-establishment of that. We so far have refuted the Vaweshikaj, who hold the doctrine of atoms constituting the general cause/4 Now the followers of Buddha also teach that the world originates from atoms, and the Sutras therefore proceed to declare that on their view also the origination, course, and so on, of the world cannot rationally be accounted for. These Bauddhas belong to four different classes. Some of them hold that all outward things, which are either elements (bhuta) or elemental (bhautika), and all inward things which are either mind (kitta) or mental (£aitta), — all these things consisting of aggregates of the atoms of earth, water, fire and air — are proved by means of Perception as well as Inference. Others hold that all external things, earth, and so on, are only to be inferred from ideas (vi^*«ana). Others again teach that the only reality are ideas to which no outward things correspond ; the (so-called) outward things are like the things seen in dreams. The three schools mentioned agree in holding that the things admitted by them have a momentary existence only, and do not allow that, in addition to the things mentioned, viz. elements and elemental things, mind and mental things, there are certain further independent entities such as ether, Self, and so on. — Others finally assert a universal void, i. e. the non- reality of everything. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I 7. 5OI
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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