Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1consciousness, we have thereby disproved the alleged impossibility of antecedent non-existence being proved by other means. Herewith falls the assertion that the non- origination of consciousness can be proved. Consciousness is capable of change. Against the assertion that the alleged non-origination of consciousness at the same time proves that consciousness is not capable of any other changes (p. 36), we remark that the general proposition on which this conclusion rests is too wide : it would extend to antecedent non-existence itself, of which it is evident that it comes to an end, although it does not originate. In qualifying the changes as changes of ' Being,' you manifest great logical acumen indeed ! For according to your own view Nescience also (which is not ' Being ') does not originate, is the substrate of manifold changes, and comes to an end through the rise of knowledge ! Perhaps you will say that the changes of Nescience are all unreal. But, do you then, we ask in reply, admit that any change is real ? You do not ; and yet it is only this admission which would give a sense to the distinction expressed by the word £ Being V Nor is it true that consciousness does not admit of any division within itself, because it has no beginning (p. 36). For the non-originated Self is divided from the body, the senses, &c, and Nescience also, which is avowedly without a beginning, must needs be admitted to be divided from the Self. And if you say that the latter division is unreal, we ask whether you have ever observed a real division invariably connected with origination ! Moreover, if the distinction of Nescience from the Self is not real, it follows that Nescience and the Self are essentially one. You further have yourself proved the difference of views by means of the difference of the objects of knowledge as established by non-refuted knowledge ; an analogous case 1 The *Sarikara is not entitled to refer to a distinction of real and unreal division, because according to his theory all distinction is unreal. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 55
2I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 55 being furnished by the difference of acts of cleaving, which results from the difference of objects to be cleft. And if you assert that of this knowing — which is essentially knowing only — -nothing that is an object of knowledge can be an attribute, and that these objects — just because they are objects of knowledge — cannot be attributes of knowing ; we point out that both these remarks would apply also to eternity, self-luminousness, and the other attributes of ' knowing/ which are acknowledged by yourself, and esta- blished by valid means of proof. Nor may you urge against this that all these alleged attributes are in reality mere 'consciousness' or ' knowing'; for they are essentially distinct. By c being conscious ' or * knowing,' we under- stand the illumining or manifesting of some object to its own substrate (i. e. the substrate of knowledge), by its own existence (i. e. the existence of knowledge) merely ; by self- luminousness (or * self-illuminatedness ') we understand the shining forth or being manifest by its own existence merely to its own substrate ; the terms ' shining forth,' ' illumining,' ' being manifest ' in both these definitions meaning the capability of becoming an object of thought and speech which is common to all things, whether intelligent or non- intelligent. Eternity again means * being present ..in—all time' ; oneness means * being defined by the number one.' Even if you say that these attributes are only negative ones, i. e. equal to the absence of non-intelligence and so on, you still cannot avoid the admission that they are attributes of consciousness. If, on the other hand, being of a nature opposite to non-intelligence and so on, be not admitted as attributes of consciousness — whether of a positive or a negative kind — in addition to its essential nature ; it is an altogether unmeaning proceeding to deny to it such qualities, as non-intelligence and the like. We moreover must admit the following alternative : consciousness is either proved (established) or not. If it is proved it follows that it possesses attributes ; if it is not, it is something absolutely nugatory, like a sky-flower, and similar purely imaginary things. 56 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. Consciousness is the attribute of a permanent Conscious Self.
3If it is proved it follows that it possesses attributes ; if it is not, it is something absolutely nugatory, like a sky-flower, and similar purely imaginary things. 56 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. Consciousness is the attribute of a permanent Conscious Self. Let it then be said that consciousness is proof (siddhi^) itself. Proof of what, we ask in reply, and to whom ? If no definite answer can be given to these two questions, consciousness cannot be defined as* proof; for* proof is a relative notion, like ' son.' You will perhaps reply * Proof to the Self ' ; and if we go on asking ' But what is that Self? you will say, * Just consciousness as already said by us before.' True, we reply, you said so ; but it certainly was not well said. For if it is the nature of consciousness to be 'proof' ('light/ 'enlightenment') on the part of a person with regard to something, how can this consciousness which is thus connected with the person and the thing be itself conscious of itself? To explain : the essential character of consciousness or knowledge is that by its very existence it renders things capable of becoming objects, to its own substrate, of thought and speech. This conscious- ness (anubhuti), which is also termed ^ana, avagati, sawvid, is a particular attribute belonging to a conscious Self and related to an object : as such it is known to every one on the testimony of his own Self — as appears from ordinary judgments such as ' I know the jar,' ' I understand this matter/ ' I am conscious of (the presence of) this piece of cloth.' That such is the essential nature of conscious- ness you yourself admit ; for you have proved thereby its self-luminousness. Of this consciousness which thus clearly presents itself as the attribute of an agent and as related to an object, it would be difficult indeed to prove that at the same time it is itself the agent ; as difficult as it would be to prove that the object of action is the agent. For we clearly see that this agent (the subject of con- sciousness) is permanent (constant), while its attribute, i. e. consciousness, not differing herein from joy, grief, and the like, rises, persists for some time, and then comes to an end. The permanency of the conscious subject is proved by the fact of recognition, 'This very same thing was formerly apprehended by me.' The non-permanency of conscious- T ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 57
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1consciousness, we have thereby disproved the alleged impossibility of antecedent non-existence being proved by other means. Herewith falls the assertion that the non- origination of consciousness can be proved. Consciousness is capable of change. Against the assertion that the alleged non-origination of consciousness at the same time proves that consciousness is not capable of any other changes (p. 36), we remark that the general proposition on which this conclusion rests is too wide : it would extend to antecedent non-existence itself, of which it is evident that it comes to an end, although it does not originate. In qualifying the changes as changes of ' Being,' you manifest great logical acumen indeed ! For according to your own view Nescience also (which is not ' Being ') does not originate, is the substrate of manifold changes, and comes to an end through the rise of knowledge ! Perhaps you will say that the changes of Nescience are all unreal. But, do you then, we ask in reply, admit that any change is real ? You do not ; and yet it is only this admission which would give a sense to the distinction expressed by the word £ Being V Nor is it true that consciousness does not admit of any division within itself, because it has no beginning (p. 36). For the non-originated Self is divided from the body, the senses, &c, and Nescience also, which is avowedly without a beginning, must needs be admitted to be divided from the Self. And if you say that the latter division is unreal, we ask whether you have ever observed a real division invariably connected with origination ! Moreover, if the distinction of Nescience from the Self is not real, it follows that Nescience and the Self are essentially one. You further have yourself proved the difference of views by means of the difference of the objects of knowledge as established by non-refuted knowledge ; an analogous case 1 The *Sarikara is not entitled to refer to a distinction of real and unreal division, because according to his theory all distinction is unreal. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 55
2I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 55 being furnished by the difference of acts of cleaving, which results from the difference of objects to be cleft. And if you assert that of this knowing — which is essentially knowing only — -nothing that is an object of knowledge can be an attribute, and that these objects — just because they are objects of knowledge — cannot be attributes of knowing ; we point out that both these remarks would apply also to eternity, self-luminousness, and the other attributes of ' knowing/ which are acknowledged by yourself, and esta- blished by valid means of proof. Nor may you urge against this that all these alleged attributes are in reality mere 'consciousness' or ' knowing'; for they are essentially distinct. By c being conscious ' or * knowing,' we under- stand the illumining or manifesting of some object to its own substrate (i. e. the substrate of knowledge), by its own existence (i. e. the existence of knowledge) merely ; by self- luminousness (or * self-illuminatedness ') we understand the shining forth or being manifest by its own existence merely to its own substrate ; the terms ' shining forth,' ' illumining,' ' being manifest ' in both these definitions meaning the capability of becoming an object of thought and speech which is common to all things, whether intelligent or non- intelligent. Eternity again means * being present ..in—all time' ; oneness means * being defined by the number one.' Even if you say that these attributes are only negative ones, i. e. equal to the absence of non-intelligence and so on, you still cannot avoid the admission that they are attributes of consciousness. If, on the other hand, being of a nature opposite to non-intelligence and so on, be not admitted as attributes of consciousness — whether of a positive or a negative kind — in addition to its essential nature ; it is an altogether unmeaning proceeding to deny to it such qualities, as non-intelligence and the like. We moreover must admit the following alternative : consciousness is either proved (established) or not. If it is proved it follows that it possesses attributes ; if it is not, it is something absolutely nugatory, like a sky-flower, and similar purely imaginary things. 56 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. Consciousness is the attribute of a permanent Conscious Self.
3If it is proved it follows that it possesses attributes ; if it is not, it is something absolutely nugatory, like a sky-flower, and similar purely imaginary things. 56 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. Consciousness is the attribute of a permanent Conscious Self. Let it then be said that consciousness is proof (siddhi^) itself. Proof of what, we ask in reply, and to whom ? If no definite answer can be given to these two questions, consciousness cannot be defined as* proof; for* proof is a relative notion, like ' son.' You will perhaps reply * Proof to the Self ' ; and if we go on asking ' But what is that Self? you will say, * Just consciousness as already said by us before.' True, we reply, you said so ; but it certainly was not well said. For if it is the nature of consciousness to be 'proof' ('light/ 'enlightenment') on the part of a person with regard to something, how can this consciousness which is thus connected with the person and the thing be itself conscious of itself? To explain : the essential character of consciousness or knowledge is that by its very existence it renders things capable of becoming objects, to its own substrate, of thought and speech. This conscious- ness (anubhuti), which is also termed ^ana, avagati, sawvid, is a particular attribute belonging to a conscious Self and related to an object : as such it is known to every one on the testimony of his own Self — as appears from ordinary judgments such as ' I know the jar,' ' I understand this matter/ ' I am conscious of (the presence of) this piece of cloth.' That such is the essential nature of conscious- ness you yourself admit ; for you have proved thereby its self-luminousness. Of this consciousness which thus clearly presents itself as the attribute of an agent and as related to an object, it would be difficult indeed to prove that at the same time it is itself the agent ; as difficult as it would be to prove that the object of action is the agent. For we clearly see that this agent (the subject of con- sciousness) is permanent (constant), while its attribute, i. e. consciousness, not differing herein from joy, grief, and the like, rises, persists for some time, and then comes to an end. The permanency of the conscious subject is proved by the fact of recognition, 'This very same thing was formerly apprehended by me.' The non-permanency of conscious- T ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 57
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
No commentary for this page.