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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1And of our judgment (viz. ' the Reality is a Void ') it may truly be said that all further negation is impossible. — But there is no need to continue this demolition of an altogether baseless theory. No scriptural texts teach a Brahman devoid of all difference. We now turn to the assertion that certain scriptural texts, as e. g. ' Being only was this in the beginning/ are meant to teach that there truly exists only one homo- geneous substance, viz. Intelligence free from all difference. — This we cannot allow. For the section in which the quoted text occurs, in order to make good the initial declaration that by the knowledge of one thing all things are known, shows that the highest Brahman which is denoted by the term 'Being' is the substantial and also the operative cause of the world ; that it is all-knowing, endowed with all powers ; that its purposes come true ; that it is the inward principle, the support and the ruler of everything ; and that distinguished by these and other good qualities it constitutes the Self of the entire world ; and then finally proceeds to instruct Svetaketu that this Brahman consti- tutes his Self also (' Thou art that '). We have fully set forth this point in the Vedartha-sa^graha, and shall estab- lish it in greater detail in the present work also, in the so-called arambha^a-adhikara^a. — In the same way the passage ' the higher knowledge is that by which the Inde- structible is apprehended, &c.' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5) first denies of Brahman all the evil qualities connected with Prakrzti, and then teaches that to it there belong eternity, all-per- vadingness, subtilty, omnipresence, omniscience, imperish- I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 . 79
2Up. I, 1, 5) first denies of Brahman all the evil qualities connected with Prakrzti, and then teaches that to it there belong eternity, all-per- vadingness, subtilty, omnipresence, omniscience, imperish- I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 . 79 ableness, creativeness with regard to all beings, and other auspicious qualities. Now we maintain that also the text 'True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman/ does not prove a substance devoid of all difference, for the reason that the co-ordination of the terms of which it consists explains itself in so far only as denoting one thing distinguished by several attributes. For ' co-ordination ' (samanadhikara/zya, lit. ' the abiding of several things in a common substrate ') means the reference (of several terms) to one thing, there being a difference of reason for the application (of several terms to one thing). Now whether we take the several terms, * True,' ' Knowledge/ ' Infinite/ in their primary sense, i.e. as denoting qualities, or as denoting modes of being opposed to whatever is contrary to those qualities ; in either case we must needs admit a plurality of causes for the application of those several terms to one thing. There is however that difference between the two alternatives that in the former case the terms preserve their primary mean- ing, while in the latter case their denotative power depends on so-called ' implication ' (laksha^a). Nor can it be said that the opposition in nature to non-knowledge, &c. (which is the purport of the terms on the hypothesis of laksha^a), constitutes nothing more than the essential nature (of one non-differenced substance ; the three terms thus having one purport only) ; for as such essential nature would be sufficiently apprehended through one term, the employ- ment of further terms would be purposeless. This view would moreover be in conflict with co-ordination, as it would not allow of difference of motive for several terms applied to one thing. On the other hand it cannot be urged against the former alternative that the distinction of several attributes predicated of one thing implies a dis- tinction in the thing to which the attributes belong, and that from this it follows that the several terms denote several things — a result which also could not be recon- ciled with ' co-ordination ' ; for what ' co-ordination ' aims at is just to convey the idea of one thing being qualified by several attributes. For the grammarians define 'co- ordination * as the application, to one thing, of several words, 80 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. for the application of each of which there is a different motive.
3For the grammarians define 'co- ordination * as the application, to one thing, of several words, 80 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. for the application of each of which there is a different motive. You have further maintained the following view : — In the text ' one only without a second/ the phrase { without a second ' negatives all duality on Brahman's part even in so far as qualities are concerned. We must therefore, accord- ing to the principle that all 6akhas convey the same doc- trine, assume that all texts which speak of Brahman as cause, aim at setting forth an absolutely non-dual sub- stance. Of Brahman thus indirectly defined as a cause, the text 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' contains a direct definition ; the Brahman here meant to be defined must thus be devoid of all qualities. Otherwise, moreover, the text would be in conflict with those other texts which declare Brahman to be without qualities and blemish. — But this also cannot be admitted. What the phrase 'without a second ' really aims at intimating is that Brahman possesses manifold powers, and this it does by denying the existence of another ruling principle different from Brahman. That Brahman actually possesses manifold powers the text shows further on, ' It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and ' it sent forth fire/ and so on. — But how are we to know that the mere phrase ' without a second ' is meant to negative the existence of all other causes in general ? — As follows, we reply. The clause ' Being only this was in the beginning, one only/ teaches that Brahman when about to create constitutes the substantial cause of the world. Here the idea of some further operative cause capable of giving rise to the effect naturally presents itself to the mind, and hence we understand that the added clause ' without a second ' is meant to negative such an additional cause. If it were meant absolutely to deny all duality, it would deny also the eternity and other attributes of Brahman which you yourself assume. You in this case make just the wrong use of the principle of all the 6akhas containing the same doctrine; what this principle demands is that the qualities attributed in all vSakhas to Brahman as cause should be taken over into the passage under discussion also. The same consideration teaches us that also the I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 8 1
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1And of our judgment (viz. ' the Reality is a Void ') it may truly be said that all further negation is impossible. — But there is no need to continue this demolition of an altogether baseless theory. No scriptural texts teach a Brahman devoid of all difference. We now turn to the assertion that certain scriptural texts, as e. g. ' Being only was this in the beginning/ are meant to teach that there truly exists only one homo- geneous substance, viz. Intelligence free from all difference. — This we cannot allow. For the section in which the quoted text occurs, in order to make good the initial declaration that by the knowledge of one thing all things are known, shows that the highest Brahman which is denoted by the term 'Being' is the substantial and also the operative cause of the world ; that it is all-knowing, endowed with all powers ; that its purposes come true ; that it is the inward principle, the support and the ruler of everything ; and that distinguished by these and other good qualities it constitutes the Self of the entire world ; and then finally proceeds to instruct Svetaketu that this Brahman consti- tutes his Self also (' Thou art that '). We have fully set forth this point in the Vedartha-sa^graha, and shall estab- lish it in greater detail in the present work also, in the so-called arambha^a-adhikara^a. — In the same way the passage ' the higher knowledge is that by which the Inde- structible is apprehended, &c.' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5) first denies of Brahman all the evil qualities connected with Prakrzti, and then teaches that to it there belong eternity, all-per- vadingness, subtilty, omnipresence, omniscience, imperish- I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 . 79
2Up. I, 1, 5) first denies of Brahman all the evil qualities connected with Prakrzti, and then teaches that to it there belong eternity, all-per- vadingness, subtilty, omnipresence, omniscience, imperish- I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 . 79 ableness, creativeness with regard to all beings, and other auspicious qualities. Now we maintain that also the text 'True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman/ does not prove a substance devoid of all difference, for the reason that the co-ordination of the terms of which it consists explains itself in so far only as denoting one thing distinguished by several attributes. For ' co-ordination ' (samanadhikara/zya, lit. ' the abiding of several things in a common substrate ') means the reference (of several terms) to one thing, there being a difference of reason for the application (of several terms to one thing). Now whether we take the several terms, * True,' ' Knowledge/ ' Infinite/ in their primary sense, i.e. as denoting qualities, or as denoting modes of being opposed to whatever is contrary to those qualities ; in either case we must needs admit a plurality of causes for the application of those several terms to one thing. There is however that difference between the two alternatives that in the former case the terms preserve their primary mean- ing, while in the latter case their denotative power depends on so-called ' implication ' (laksha^a). Nor can it be said that the opposition in nature to non-knowledge, &c. (which is the purport of the terms on the hypothesis of laksha^a), constitutes nothing more than the essential nature (of one non-differenced substance ; the three terms thus having one purport only) ; for as such essential nature would be sufficiently apprehended through one term, the employ- ment of further terms would be purposeless. This view would moreover be in conflict with co-ordination, as it would not allow of difference of motive for several terms applied to one thing. On the other hand it cannot be urged against the former alternative that the distinction of several attributes predicated of one thing implies a dis- tinction in the thing to which the attributes belong, and that from this it follows that the several terms denote several things — a result which also could not be recon- ciled with ' co-ordination ' ; for what ' co-ordination ' aims at is just to convey the idea of one thing being qualified by several attributes. For the grammarians define 'co- ordination * as the application, to one thing, of several words, 80 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. for the application of each of which there is a different motive.
3For the grammarians define 'co- ordination * as the application, to one thing, of several words, 80 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. for the application of each of which there is a different motive. You have further maintained the following view : — In the text ' one only without a second/ the phrase { without a second ' negatives all duality on Brahman's part even in so far as qualities are concerned. We must therefore, accord- ing to the principle that all 6akhas convey the same doc- trine, assume that all texts which speak of Brahman as cause, aim at setting forth an absolutely non-dual sub- stance. Of Brahman thus indirectly defined as a cause, the text 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' contains a direct definition ; the Brahman here meant to be defined must thus be devoid of all qualities. Otherwise, moreover, the text would be in conflict with those other texts which declare Brahman to be without qualities and blemish. — But this also cannot be admitted. What the phrase 'without a second ' really aims at intimating is that Brahman possesses manifold powers, and this it does by denying the existence of another ruling principle different from Brahman. That Brahman actually possesses manifold powers the text shows further on, ' It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and ' it sent forth fire/ and so on. — But how are we to know that the mere phrase ' without a second ' is meant to negative the existence of all other causes in general ? — As follows, we reply. The clause ' Being only this was in the beginning, one only/ teaches that Brahman when about to create constitutes the substantial cause of the world. Here the idea of some further operative cause capable of giving rise to the effect naturally presents itself to the mind, and hence we understand that the added clause ' without a second ' is meant to negative such an additional cause. If it were meant absolutely to deny all duality, it would deny also the eternity and other attributes of Brahman which you yourself assume. You in this case make just the wrong use of the principle of all the 6akhas containing the same doctrine; what this principle demands is that the qualities attributed in all vSakhas to Brahman as cause should be taken over into the passage under discussion also. The same consideration teaches us that also the I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 8 1
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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