Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1For the bringing about of such activity, the material clay II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 5. 455 (which had been mentioned just before) touches (enters into contact with) an effect (vikara), i. e. a particular make or configuration, distinguished by having a broad bottom and resembling the shape of a belly, and a special name (namadheya), viz. pitcher ', and so on, which is applied to that effect ; or, to put it differently, to the end that certain activities may be accomplished, the substance clay receives a new configuration and a new name \ Hence jars and other things of clay are clay (mrzttika), i. e. are of the substance of clay, only ; this only is true (satyam), i. e. known through authoritative means of proof; only (eva), because the effects are not known as different substances. One and the same substance therefore, such as clay or gold, gives occasion for different ideas and words only as it assumes different configurations ; just as we ob- serve that one and the same Devadatta becomes the object of different ideas and terms, and gives rise to different effects, according to the different stages of life — youth, old age, &c. — which he has reached. — The fact of our saying ' the jar has perished ' while yet the clay persists, was referred to by the Purvapakshin as proving that the effect is something different from the cause ; but this view is disproved by the view held by us that origination, destruction, and so on, are merely different states of one and the same causal substance. According as one and the same substance is in this or that state, there belong to it different terms and different activities, and these different states may rightly be viewed as depending on the activity 1 The meaning of the four words constituting the clause there- fore would be, ' On account of speech (i. e. for the sake of the accomplishment of certain activities such as the bringing of water, which are preceded by speech), there is touched (by the previously mentioned substance clay) an effect and a name ; i. e. for the sake of, &c, clay modifies itself into an effect having a special name/ The Commentary remarks that ' arambhanam ' cannot be taken in the sense of upadana ; since, on the theory of the unreality of effects, the effect is originated not by speech but by thought (imagination) only ; and on the pari/zama doctrine the effect is likewise not originated by^peedi^but by Brahman. 456 vedanta-s^tras.
2456 vedanta-s^tras. of an agent. The objections again which are connected with the theory of ' manifestation ' are refuted by our not acknowledging such a thing at all as ' manifestation.' Nor does the admission of origination render the doctrine of the reality of the effect irrational ; for it is only the Real that originates. — But it is a contradiction to maintain that that which previously exists is originated ! — This, we reply, is the objection of a person who knows nothing about the true nature of origination and destruction. A substance enters into different states in succession ; what passes away is the substance in its previous states, what originates is the substance in its subsequent states. As thus the substance in all its states has being, there is nothing irrational in the satkarya theory. — But the admission of the origination of a non-existing state lands us in the asatkarya theory !— If he, we retort, who holds the asatkarya theory is of opinion that the origination of the effect does not itself originate, he is similarly landed in the satkarya theory ; and if he holds that the origination itself originates, he is led into a regressus in infinitum. According to us, on the other hand, who hold that states are incapable of being apprehended and of acting apart from that of which they are states, origination, destruction, and so on, belong only to a substance which is in a certain state ; and on this theory no difficulty remains. And in the same way as the state of being a jar results from the clay abandoning the condition of being either two halves of a jar or a lump of clay, plurality results from a substance giving up the state of oneness, and oneness from the giving up of plurality; hence this point also gives rise to no difficulty. We now consider the whole iTMndogya-text in con- nexion. ' Sad eva somye*dam agra asid ekam evadvitiyam.' This means — That which is Being, i.e. this world which now, owing to the distinction of names and forms, bears a manifold shape, was in the beginning one only, owing to the absence of the distinction of names and forms. And as, owing to the * Sat ' being endowed with all powers, a further ruling principle is out of the question, the world was II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 457 also ' without a second/ This proves the non-difference of the world from Brahman. In the same way the next clause also, ' It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth/ which describes the creation of the world as proceeding from a resolve of the Self to differentiate itself into a world consisting of manifold beings movable and immovable, viz. Fire, and so on, enables us to determine that the effect, i. e. the world, is non-different from the highest cause, i. e. the highest Brahman.
3Fire, and so on, enables us to determine that the effect, i. e. the world, is non-different from the highest cause, i. e. the highest Brahman. And as now a further doubt may arise as to how the highest Brahman with all its perfections can be designated as one with the world, and how the world can be desig- nated as one, without a second, not dependent on another guiding principle ; and how this thought, i.e. the resolution, on the part of the Supreme cause, of differentiating itself into a manifold world, and the creation corresponding to that resolution are possible ; the text continues, ' That deity thought — Let me now enter those three beings with this living Self (g*iva atman) and distinguish names and forms ' — which means, * Let me make the aggregate of non-sentient things (for this is meant by the " three beings ") to possess various names and forms, by entering into them by means of the ^iva which is of the nature of my Self/ The possession of names and forms must thus be understood to be effected by the ^iva entering into matter as its Self. There is another scriptural text also which makes it clear that the highest Brahman enters, so as to be their Self, into the world together with the ^ivas. ' Having sent forth that he entered into it. Having entered into it he became sat and tyat (i.e. sentient and non-sentient beings)/ And that the entire aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings, gross or subtle, in their effected or their causal state, constitutes the body of the highest Brahman, and that on the other hand the highest Brahman constitutes their Self — this is proved by the antaryamin- brahma^a and similar texts. This disposes of the doubt raised above. Since Brahman abides, as their Self, in all non-sentient matter together with the ^ivas, Brahman is denoted by the term ' world* in so far only as it (i.e. 45 8 vedanta-s6tras. Brahman) has non-sentient and sentient beings for its body, and hence utterances such as ' This which is Being only was in the beginning one only' are unobjectionable in every way. All change and all imperfection belongs only to the beings constituting Brahman's body, and Brahman itself is thus proved to be free from all imperfection, a treasure as it were of all imaginable holy qualites. This point will be further elucidated under II, i, 22. — The .Oandogya-text then further teaches that all sentient and non-sentient beings have their Self in Brahman ' in that all this has its Self ' ; and further inculcates this truth in ' Thou art that.'
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1For the bringing about of such activity, the material clay II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 5. 455 (which had been mentioned just before) touches (enters into contact with) an effect (vikara), i. e. a particular make or configuration, distinguished by having a broad bottom and resembling the shape of a belly, and a special name (namadheya), viz. pitcher ', and so on, which is applied to that effect ; or, to put it differently, to the end that certain activities may be accomplished, the substance clay receives a new configuration and a new name \ Hence jars and other things of clay are clay (mrzttika), i. e. are of the substance of clay, only ; this only is true (satyam), i. e. known through authoritative means of proof; only (eva), because the effects are not known as different substances. One and the same substance therefore, such as clay or gold, gives occasion for different ideas and words only as it assumes different configurations ; just as we ob- serve that one and the same Devadatta becomes the object of different ideas and terms, and gives rise to different effects, according to the different stages of life — youth, old age, &c. — which he has reached. — The fact of our saying ' the jar has perished ' while yet the clay persists, was referred to by the Purvapakshin as proving that the effect is something different from the cause ; but this view is disproved by the view held by us that origination, destruction, and so on, are merely different states of one and the same causal substance. According as one and the same substance is in this or that state, there belong to it different terms and different activities, and these different states may rightly be viewed as depending on the activity 1 The meaning of the four words constituting the clause there- fore would be, ' On account of speech (i. e. for the sake of the accomplishment of certain activities such as the bringing of water, which are preceded by speech), there is touched (by the previously mentioned substance clay) an effect and a name ; i. e. for the sake of, &c, clay modifies itself into an effect having a special name/ The Commentary remarks that ' arambhanam ' cannot be taken in the sense of upadana ; since, on the theory of the unreality of effects, the effect is originated not by speech but by thought (imagination) only ; and on the pari/zama doctrine the effect is likewise not originated by^peedi^but by Brahman. 456 vedanta-s^tras.
2456 vedanta-s^tras. of an agent. The objections again which are connected with the theory of ' manifestation ' are refuted by our not acknowledging such a thing at all as ' manifestation.' Nor does the admission of origination render the doctrine of the reality of the effect irrational ; for it is only the Real that originates. — But it is a contradiction to maintain that that which previously exists is originated ! — This, we reply, is the objection of a person who knows nothing about the true nature of origination and destruction. A substance enters into different states in succession ; what passes away is the substance in its previous states, what originates is the substance in its subsequent states. As thus the substance in all its states has being, there is nothing irrational in the satkarya theory. — But the admission of the origination of a non-existing state lands us in the asatkarya theory !— If he, we retort, who holds the asatkarya theory is of opinion that the origination of the effect does not itself originate, he is similarly landed in the satkarya theory ; and if he holds that the origination itself originates, he is led into a regressus in infinitum. According to us, on the other hand, who hold that states are incapable of being apprehended and of acting apart from that of which they are states, origination, destruction, and so on, belong only to a substance which is in a certain state ; and on this theory no difficulty remains. And in the same way as the state of being a jar results from the clay abandoning the condition of being either two halves of a jar or a lump of clay, plurality results from a substance giving up the state of oneness, and oneness from the giving up of plurality; hence this point also gives rise to no difficulty. We now consider the whole iTMndogya-text in con- nexion. ' Sad eva somye*dam agra asid ekam evadvitiyam.' This means — That which is Being, i.e. this world which now, owing to the distinction of names and forms, bears a manifold shape, was in the beginning one only, owing to the absence of the distinction of names and forms. And as, owing to the * Sat ' being endowed with all powers, a further ruling principle is out of the question, the world was II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 457 also ' without a second/ This proves the non-difference of the world from Brahman. In the same way the next clause also, ' It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth/ which describes the creation of the world as proceeding from a resolve of the Self to differentiate itself into a world consisting of manifold beings movable and immovable, viz. Fire, and so on, enables us to determine that the effect, i. e. the world, is non-different from the highest cause, i. e. the highest Brahman.
3Fire, and so on, enables us to determine that the effect, i. e. the world, is non-different from the highest cause, i. e. the highest Brahman. And as now a further doubt may arise as to how the highest Brahman with all its perfections can be designated as one with the world, and how the world can be desig- nated as one, without a second, not dependent on another guiding principle ; and how this thought, i.e. the resolution, on the part of the Supreme cause, of differentiating itself into a manifold world, and the creation corresponding to that resolution are possible ; the text continues, ' That deity thought — Let me now enter those three beings with this living Self (g*iva atman) and distinguish names and forms ' — which means, * Let me make the aggregate of non-sentient things (for this is meant by the " three beings ") to possess various names and forms, by entering into them by means of the ^iva which is of the nature of my Self/ The possession of names and forms must thus be understood to be effected by the ^iva entering into matter as its Self. There is another scriptural text also which makes it clear that the highest Brahman enters, so as to be their Self, into the world together with the ^ivas. ' Having sent forth that he entered into it. Having entered into it he became sat and tyat (i.e. sentient and non-sentient beings)/ And that the entire aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings, gross or subtle, in their effected or their causal state, constitutes the body of the highest Brahman, and that on the other hand the highest Brahman constitutes their Self — this is proved by the antaryamin- brahma^a and similar texts. This disposes of the doubt raised above. Since Brahman abides, as their Self, in all non-sentient matter together with the ^ivas, Brahman is denoted by the term ' world* in so far only as it (i.e. 45 8 vedanta-s6tras. Brahman) has non-sentient and sentient beings for its body, and hence utterances such as ' This which is Being only was in the beginning one only' are unobjectionable in every way. All change and all imperfection belongs only to the beings constituting Brahman's body, and Brahman itself is thus proved to be free from all imperfection, a treasure as it were of all imaginable holy qualites. This point will be further elucidated under II, i, 22. — The .Oandogya-text then further teaches that all sentient and non-sentient beings have their Self in Brahman ' in that all this has its Self ' ; and further inculcates this truth in ' Thou art that.'
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
No commentary for this page.