Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1enquiry into Brahman for the reason that the knowledge of Brahman has an infinite and permanent result, while the result of works is limited and non-permanent, is an alto- gether unjustified proceeding. To this we make the following reply. — To set aside the universally known mode of ascertaining the connexion of words and their meanings, and to assert that all words express only one non-worldly meaning (viz. those things to be done which the Veda inculcates), is a proceeding for which men paying due attention to the means of proof can have only a slight regard. A child avowedly learns the connexion of words and meanings in the following way. The father and mother and other people about him point with the finger at the child's mother, father, uncle, &c, as well as at various domestic and wild animals, birds, snakes, and so on, to the end that the child may at the same time pay attention to the terms they use and to the beings denoted thereby, and thus again and again make him understand that such and such words refer to such and such things. The child thus observing in course of time that these words of themselves give rise to certain ideas in his mind, and at the same time observing neither any different connexion of words and things, nor any person arbitrarily establishing such connexion, comes to the conclusion that the application of such and such words to such and such things is based on the denotative power of the words. And being taught later on by his elders that other words also, in addition to those learned first, have their definite meaning, he in the end becomes ac- quainted with the meanings of all words, and freely forms sentences conveying certain meanings for the purpose of imparting those meanings to other persons. And there is another way also in which the connexion of words and things can easily be ascertained. Some person orders another, by means of some expressive gesture, to go and inform Devadatta that his father is doing well, and the man ordered goes and tells Devadatta 'Your father is doing well.' A by-stander who is acquainted with the meaning of various gestures, and thus knows on what I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 151 errand the messenger is sent, follows him and hears the words employed by him to deliver his message : he there- fore readily infers that such and such words have such and such a meaning. — We thus see that the theory of words having a meaning only in relation to things to be done is baseless. The Vedanta-texts tell us about Brahman, which is an accomplished entity, and about meditation on Brahman as having an unlimited result, and hence it behoves us to undertake an enquiry into Brahman so as fully to ascertain its nature.
2The Vedanta-texts tell us about Brahman, which is an accomplished entity, and about meditation on Brahman as having an unlimited result, and hence it behoves us to undertake an enquiry into Brahman so as fully to ascertain its nature. We further maintain that even on the supposition of the Veda relating only to things to be done, an enquiry into Brahman must be undertaken. For c The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on ' (Br/. Up. II, 4, 5) ; c Fie is to be searched out, him we must try to understand ' (Kh. Up. VIII, 7,1); ' Let a Brahma^a having known him practise wisdom' (Bri. Up. XI, 4, 21) ; £ What is within that small ether, that is to be sought for, that is to be understood' (Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 1) ; ' What is in that small ether, that is to be meditated upon ' (Mahanar. Up. X, 7) — these and similar texts enjoin a certain action, viz. meditation on Brahman, and when we then read ' He who knows Brahman attains the highest/ we understand that the attainment of Brahman is meant as a reward for him who is qualified for and enters on such meditation. Brah- man itself and its attributes are thus established thereby only — that they subserve a certain action, viz. meditation. There are analogous instances in the Karmaka^a of the Veda. When an arthavada-passage describes the heavenly world as a place where there is no heat, no frost, no grief, &c, this is done merely with a view to those texts which enjoin certain sacrifices on those who are desirous of the heavenly world. Where another arthavada says that ' those who perform certain sattra-sacrifices are firmly established/ such ' firm establishment ' is referred to only because it is meant as the reward for those acting on the text which enjoins those sattras, c Let him perform the ratri-sattras * (Pu. Mi. Su. IV, 3, 17). And where a text says that a person threatening a Brahma/za is to be punished with 152 vedanta-sOtras. a fine of one hundred gold pieces, this statement is made merely with reference to the prohibitory passage, c Let him not threaten a Brahma^a ' (Pu. Mi. Su. Ill, 4, 17).
3Mi. Su. IV, 3, 17). And where a text says that a person threatening a Brahma/za is to be punished with 152 vedanta-sOtras. a fine of one hundred gold pieces, this statement is made merely with reference to the prohibitory passage, c Let him not threaten a Brahma^a ' (Pu. Mi. Su. Ill, 4, 17). We, however, really object to the whole theory of the meaning of words depending on their connexion with 'things to be done/ since this is not even the case in imperative clauses such as ' bring the cow.' For you are quite unable to give a satisfactory definition of your ' thing to be done ' (karya). You understand by ' karya ' that which follows on the existence of action (kriti) and is aimed at by action. Now to be aimed at by action is to be the object (karman) of action, and to be the object of action is to be that which it is most desired to obtain by action (according to the grammarian's definition). But what one desires most to obtain is pleasure or the cessation of pain. When a person desirous of some pleasure or cessa- tion of pain is aware that his object is not to be accom- plished without effort on his part, he resolves on effort and begins to act : in no case we observe an object of desire to be aimed at by action in any other sense than that of its accomplishment depending on activity. The prompting quality (prerakatva) also, which belongs to objects of desire, is nothing but the attribute of their accomplishment de- pending on activity; for it is this which moves to action. — Nor can it be said that ' to be aimed at by action ' means to be that which is ' agreeable ' (anukula) to man ; for it is pleasure only that is agreeable to man. The cessation of pain, on the other hand, is not what is ' agreeable ' to man. The essential distinction between pleasure and pain is that the former is agreeable to man, and the latter disagreeable (pratikula), and the cessation of pain is desired not because it is agreeable, but because pain is disagreeable : absence of pain means that a person is in his normal condition, affected neither with pain nor pleasure. Apart from pleasure, action cannot possibly be agreeable, nor does it become so by being subservient to pleasure ; for its essential nature is pain. Its being helpful to pleasure merely causes the resolve of undertaking it. — Nor, again, can we define that which is aimed at by action as that to which action is I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I 53
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1enquiry into Brahman for the reason that the knowledge of Brahman has an infinite and permanent result, while the result of works is limited and non-permanent, is an alto- gether unjustified proceeding. To this we make the following reply. — To set aside the universally known mode of ascertaining the connexion of words and their meanings, and to assert that all words express only one non-worldly meaning (viz. those things to be done which the Veda inculcates), is a proceeding for which men paying due attention to the means of proof can have only a slight regard. A child avowedly learns the connexion of words and meanings in the following way. The father and mother and other people about him point with the finger at the child's mother, father, uncle, &c, as well as at various domestic and wild animals, birds, snakes, and so on, to the end that the child may at the same time pay attention to the terms they use and to the beings denoted thereby, and thus again and again make him understand that such and such words refer to such and such things. The child thus observing in course of time that these words of themselves give rise to certain ideas in his mind, and at the same time observing neither any different connexion of words and things, nor any person arbitrarily establishing such connexion, comes to the conclusion that the application of such and such words to such and such things is based on the denotative power of the words. And being taught later on by his elders that other words also, in addition to those learned first, have their definite meaning, he in the end becomes ac- quainted with the meanings of all words, and freely forms sentences conveying certain meanings for the purpose of imparting those meanings to other persons. And there is another way also in which the connexion of words and things can easily be ascertained. Some person orders another, by means of some expressive gesture, to go and inform Devadatta that his father is doing well, and the man ordered goes and tells Devadatta 'Your father is doing well.' A by-stander who is acquainted with the meaning of various gestures, and thus knows on what I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 151 errand the messenger is sent, follows him and hears the words employed by him to deliver his message : he there- fore readily infers that such and such words have such and such a meaning. — We thus see that the theory of words having a meaning only in relation to things to be done is baseless. The Vedanta-texts tell us about Brahman, which is an accomplished entity, and about meditation on Brahman as having an unlimited result, and hence it behoves us to undertake an enquiry into Brahman so as fully to ascertain its nature.
2The Vedanta-texts tell us about Brahman, which is an accomplished entity, and about meditation on Brahman as having an unlimited result, and hence it behoves us to undertake an enquiry into Brahman so as fully to ascertain its nature. We further maintain that even on the supposition of the Veda relating only to things to be done, an enquiry into Brahman must be undertaken. For c The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on ' (Br/. Up. II, 4, 5) ; c Fie is to be searched out, him we must try to understand ' (Kh. Up. VIII, 7,1); ' Let a Brahma^a having known him practise wisdom' (Bri. Up. XI, 4, 21) ; £ What is within that small ether, that is to be sought for, that is to be understood' (Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 1) ; ' What is in that small ether, that is to be meditated upon ' (Mahanar. Up. X, 7) — these and similar texts enjoin a certain action, viz. meditation on Brahman, and when we then read ' He who knows Brahman attains the highest/ we understand that the attainment of Brahman is meant as a reward for him who is qualified for and enters on such meditation. Brah- man itself and its attributes are thus established thereby only — that they subserve a certain action, viz. meditation. There are analogous instances in the Karmaka^a of the Veda. When an arthavada-passage describes the heavenly world as a place where there is no heat, no frost, no grief, &c, this is done merely with a view to those texts which enjoin certain sacrifices on those who are desirous of the heavenly world. Where another arthavada says that ' those who perform certain sattra-sacrifices are firmly established/ such ' firm establishment ' is referred to only because it is meant as the reward for those acting on the text which enjoins those sattras, c Let him perform the ratri-sattras * (Pu. Mi. Su. IV, 3, 17). And where a text says that a person threatening a Brahma/za is to be punished with 152 vedanta-sOtras. a fine of one hundred gold pieces, this statement is made merely with reference to the prohibitory passage, c Let him not threaten a Brahma^a ' (Pu. Mi. Su. Ill, 4, 17).
3Mi. Su. IV, 3, 17). And where a text says that a person threatening a Brahma/za is to be punished with 152 vedanta-sOtras. a fine of one hundred gold pieces, this statement is made merely with reference to the prohibitory passage, c Let him not threaten a Brahma^a ' (Pu. Mi. Su. Ill, 4, 17). We, however, really object to the whole theory of the meaning of words depending on their connexion with 'things to be done/ since this is not even the case in imperative clauses such as ' bring the cow.' For you are quite unable to give a satisfactory definition of your ' thing to be done ' (karya). You understand by ' karya ' that which follows on the existence of action (kriti) and is aimed at by action. Now to be aimed at by action is to be the object (karman) of action, and to be the object of action is to be that which it is most desired to obtain by action (according to the grammarian's definition). But what one desires most to obtain is pleasure or the cessation of pain. When a person desirous of some pleasure or cessa- tion of pain is aware that his object is not to be accom- plished without effort on his part, he resolves on effort and begins to act : in no case we observe an object of desire to be aimed at by action in any other sense than that of its accomplishment depending on activity. The prompting quality (prerakatva) also, which belongs to objects of desire, is nothing but the attribute of their accomplishment de- pending on activity; for it is this which moves to action. — Nor can it be said that ' to be aimed at by action ' means to be that which is ' agreeable ' (anukula) to man ; for it is pleasure only that is agreeable to man. The cessation of pain, on the other hand, is not what is ' agreeable ' to man. The essential distinction between pleasure and pain is that the former is agreeable to man, and the latter disagreeable (pratikula), and the cessation of pain is desired not because it is agreeable, but because pain is disagreeable : absence of pain means that a person is in his normal condition, affected neither with pain nor pleasure. Apart from pleasure, action cannot possibly be agreeable, nor does it become so by being subservient to pleasure ; for its essential nature is pain. Its being helpful to pleasure merely causes the resolve of undertaking it. — Nor, again, can we define that which is aimed at by action as that to which action is I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I 53
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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