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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— Otherwise a conflict would arise with texts declaring the knowership of the Self, such as ' whereby should he know the knower ? ' (Brz. Up. IV, 5, 15). Your assertion that the text ' Bliss is Brahman ' (Taitt. Up. Ill, 6, 1) proves pure ^Bliss to constitute the essential nature of Brahman is already disposed of by the refutation of the view that knowledge '(consciousness) constitutes the essential nature of Brahman ; Brahman being in reality the substrate only of knowledge. For by bliss we under- stand a pleasing state of consciousness. Such passages as ' consciousness, bliss fs Brahman/ therefore mean ' con- sciousness— the essential character of which is bliss — is Brahman.' On this identity of the two things there rests that homogeneous character of Brahman, so much insisted upon by yourself. And in the same way as numerous passages teach that Brahman, while having knowledge for its essential nature, is at the same time a knowing subject ; so other passages, speaking of Brahman as something separate from mere bliss, show it to be not mere bliss but a subject enjoying bliss ; cp. 'That is one bliss of Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 8, 4); 'he knowing the bliss of Brahman ' (Taitt. Up. II, 9, 1). To be a subject enjoying bliss is in fact the same as to be a conscious subject. We now turn to the numerous texts which, according to the view of our opponent, negative the existence of plurality. — ' Where there is duality as it were ' (Brz. Up. IV, 5, 15) ; ' There is not any plurality here ; from death to death goes he who sees here any plurality ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 19) ; * But when for him the Self alone has become all, by what means, and whom, should he see?' (Br/. Up. IV, 5, 15) &c. — But what all these texts deny is only plurality in so far as con- tradicting that unity of the world which depends on its I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, I. being in its entirety an effect of Brahman, and having Brahman for its inward ruling principle and its true Self. They do not, on the other hand, deny that plurality on Brahman's part which depends on its intention to become manifold — a plurality proved by the text c May I be many, may I grow forth ' (K/i. Up. VI, 2, 3). Nor can our op- ponent urge against this that, owing to the denial of plurality contained in other passages this last text refers to something not real ; for it is an altogether laughable assertion that Scripture should at first teach the doctrine, difficult to comprehend, that plurality as suggested by Perception and the other means of Knowledge belongs to Brahman also, and should afterwards negative this very doctrine !
2Nor is it true that the text { If he makes but the smallest " antaram " (i. e. difference, interval, break) in it there is fear for him1 (Taitt. Up. II, 7) implies that he wrho sees plurality within Brahman encounters fear. For the other text 'All this is Brahman ; let a man meditate with calm mind on all this as beginning, ending and breathing in it, i.e. Brahman' (K/i. Up. Ill, 14, 1) teaches directly that reflection on the plurality of Brahman is the cause of peace of mind. For this passage declares that peace of mind is produced by a reflection on the entire world as springing from, abiding within, and being absorbed into Brahman, and thus having Brahman for its Self; and as thus the view of Brahman constituting the Self of the world with all its manifold distinctions of gods, men, animals, inanimate matter and so on, is said to be the cause of peace of mind, and, consequently, of absence of fear, that same view surely cannot be a cause of fear! — But how then is it that the Taitt. text declares that ' there is fear for him ' ? — That text, we reply, declares in its earlier part that rest in Brahman is the cause of fearlessness (' when he finds freedom from fear, rest, in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported ; then he has obtained fearlessness ') ; its latter part therefore means that fear takes place when there is an interval, a break, in this resting in Brahman. As the great 7?zshi says ' When Vasudeva is not meditated on for 86 VEDANTA-StjTRAS. an hour or even a moment only ; that is loss, that is great calamity, that is error, that is change.' The Sutra III, 2, 11 does not, as our opponent alleges, refer to a Brahman free from all difference, but to Brahman as possessing attributes — as we shall show in its place. And the Sutra IV, 2, 3 declares that the things seen in dreams are mere ' Maya ' because they differ in character from the things perceived in the waking state ; from which it follows that the latter things are real. Nor do Smriti and Pur&wa teach such a doctrine.
3And the Sutra IV, 2, 3 declares that the things seen in dreams are mere ' Maya ' because they differ in character from the things perceived in the waking state ; from which it follows that the latter things are real. Nor do Smriti and Pur&wa teach such a doctrine. Nor is it true that also according to Smrzti and Pura/zas only non-differenced consciousness is real and everything else unreal. — ' He who knows me as unborn and without a beginning, the supreme Lord of the worlds ' (Bha. Gi. X, 3) ; * All beings abide in me, I abide not in them. Nay, the beings abide not in me — behold my lordly power. My Self bringing forth the beings supports them but does not abide in them ' (Bha. Gi. IX, 4, 5) ; ' I am the origin and the dissolution of the entire world ; higher than I there is nothing else : on me all this is strung as pearls on a thread ' (Bha. Gi. VII, 6, 7) ; 'Pervading this entire Universe by a portion (of mine) I abide ' (Bha. Gi. X, 42) ; ' But another, the highest Person, is called the highest Self who, per- vading the three worlds supports them, the eternal Lord. Because I transcend the Perishable and am higher than the Imperishable even, I am among the people and in the Veda celebrated as the supreme Person* (Bha. Gi. XV, 17, 18). * He transcends the fundamental matter of all beings, its modifications, properties and imperfections ; he transcends all investing (obscuring) influences, he who is the Self of all. Whatever (room) there is in the interstices of the world is filled by him ; all auspicious qualities constitute his nature. The whole creation of beings is taken out of a small part of his power. Assuming at will whatever form he desires he bestows benefits on the whole world effected by him. Glory, strength, dominion, wisdom, energy, power and other attributes are collected in him, Supreme of the supreme in whom no troubles abide, ruler over high and I ADIIYAYA, I PADA, I. 87
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— Otherwise a conflict would arise with texts declaring the knowership of the Self, such as ' whereby should he know the knower ? ' (Brz. Up. IV, 5, 15). Your assertion that the text ' Bliss is Brahman ' (Taitt. Up. Ill, 6, 1) proves pure ^Bliss to constitute the essential nature of Brahman is already disposed of by the refutation of the view that knowledge '(consciousness) constitutes the essential nature of Brahman ; Brahman being in reality the substrate only of knowledge. For by bliss we under- stand a pleasing state of consciousness. Such passages as ' consciousness, bliss fs Brahman/ therefore mean ' con- sciousness— the essential character of which is bliss — is Brahman.' On this identity of the two things there rests that homogeneous character of Brahman, so much insisted upon by yourself. And in the same way as numerous passages teach that Brahman, while having knowledge for its essential nature, is at the same time a knowing subject ; so other passages, speaking of Brahman as something separate from mere bliss, show it to be not mere bliss but a subject enjoying bliss ; cp. 'That is one bliss of Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 8, 4); 'he knowing the bliss of Brahman ' (Taitt. Up. II, 9, 1). To be a subject enjoying bliss is in fact the same as to be a conscious subject. We now turn to the numerous texts which, according to the view of our opponent, negative the existence of plurality. — ' Where there is duality as it were ' (Brz. Up. IV, 5, 15) ; ' There is not any plurality here ; from death to death goes he who sees here any plurality ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 19) ; * But when for him the Self alone has become all, by what means, and whom, should he see?' (Br/. Up. IV, 5, 15) &c. — But what all these texts deny is only plurality in so far as con- tradicting that unity of the world which depends on its I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, I. being in its entirety an effect of Brahman, and having Brahman for its inward ruling principle and its true Self. They do not, on the other hand, deny that plurality on Brahman's part which depends on its intention to become manifold — a plurality proved by the text c May I be many, may I grow forth ' (K/i. Up. VI, 2, 3). Nor can our op- ponent urge against this that, owing to the denial of plurality contained in other passages this last text refers to something not real ; for it is an altogether laughable assertion that Scripture should at first teach the doctrine, difficult to comprehend, that plurality as suggested by Perception and the other means of Knowledge belongs to Brahman also, and should afterwards negative this very doctrine !
2Nor is it true that the text { If he makes but the smallest " antaram " (i. e. difference, interval, break) in it there is fear for him1 (Taitt. Up. II, 7) implies that he wrho sees plurality within Brahman encounters fear. For the other text 'All this is Brahman ; let a man meditate with calm mind on all this as beginning, ending and breathing in it, i.e. Brahman' (K/i. Up. Ill, 14, 1) teaches directly that reflection on the plurality of Brahman is the cause of peace of mind. For this passage declares that peace of mind is produced by a reflection on the entire world as springing from, abiding within, and being absorbed into Brahman, and thus having Brahman for its Self; and as thus the view of Brahman constituting the Self of the world with all its manifold distinctions of gods, men, animals, inanimate matter and so on, is said to be the cause of peace of mind, and, consequently, of absence of fear, that same view surely cannot be a cause of fear! — But how then is it that the Taitt. text declares that ' there is fear for him ' ? — That text, we reply, declares in its earlier part that rest in Brahman is the cause of fearlessness (' when he finds freedom from fear, rest, in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported ; then he has obtained fearlessness ') ; its latter part therefore means that fear takes place when there is an interval, a break, in this resting in Brahman. As the great 7?zshi says ' When Vasudeva is not meditated on for 86 VEDANTA-StjTRAS. an hour or even a moment only ; that is loss, that is great calamity, that is error, that is change.' The Sutra III, 2, 11 does not, as our opponent alleges, refer to a Brahman free from all difference, but to Brahman as possessing attributes — as we shall show in its place. And the Sutra IV, 2, 3 declares that the things seen in dreams are mere ' Maya ' because they differ in character from the things perceived in the waking state ; from which it follows that the latter things are real. Nor do Smriti and Pur&wa teach such a doctrine.
3And the Sutra IV, 2, 3 declares that the things seen in dreams are mere ' Maya ' because they differ in character from the things perceived in the waking state ; from which it follows that the latter things are real. Nor do Smriti and Pur&wa teach such a doctrine. Nor is it true that also according to Smrzti and Pura/zas only non-differenced consciousness is real and everything else unreal. — ' He who knows me as unborn and without a beginning, the supreme Lord of the worlds ' (Bha. Gi. X, 3) ; * All beings abide in me, I abide not in them. Nay, the beings abide not in me — behold my lordly power. My Self bringing forth the beings supports them but does not abide in them ' (Bha. Gi. IX, 4, 5) ; ' I am the origin and the dissolution of the entire world ; higher than I there is nothing else : on me all this is strung as pearls on a thread ' (Bha. Gi. VII, 6, 7) ; 'Pervading this entire Universe by a portion (of mine) I abide ' (Bha. Gi. X, 42) ; ' But another, the highest Person, is called the highest Self who, per- vading the three worlds supports them, the eternal Lord. Because I transcend the Perishable and am higher than the Imperishable even, I am among the people and in the Veda celebrated as the supreme Person* (Bha. Gi. XV, 17, 18). * He transcends the fundamental matter of all beings, its modifications, properties and imperfections ; he transcends all investing (obscuring) influences, he who is the Self of all. Whatever (room) there is in the interstices of the world is filled by him ; all auspicious qualities constitute his nature. The whole creation of beings is taken out of a small part of his power. Assuming at will whatever form he desires he bestows benefits on the whole world effected by him. Glory, strength, dominion, wisdom, energy, power and other attributes are collected in him, Supreme of the supreme in whom no troubles abide, ruler over high and I ADIIYAYA, I PADA, I. 87
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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