Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1JO5 the non-knowledge of the true nature of Brahman is not touched by it. — Against this it will perhaps be urged that what is here called the non-knowledge of the true nature of Brahman, really is the view of Brahman being dual in nature, and that this view is put an end to by the cognition of the falsity of whatever is other than Brahman ; while the true nature of Brahman itself is established by its own consciousness. — But this too we refuse to admit. If non- duality constitutes the true nature of Brahman, and is proved by Brahman's own consciousness, there is room neither for what is contradictory to it, viz. that non-know- ledge which consists in the view of duality, nor for the sublation of that non-knowledge. — Let then non-duality be taken for an attribute (not the essential nature) of Brahman ! — This too we refuse to admit ; for you yourself have proved that Brahman, which is pure Consciousness, is free from attributes which are objects of Consciousness. — From all this it follows that Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, cannot be the substrate of Nescience : the theory, in fact, involves a flat contradiction. When, in the next place, you maintain that Brahman, whose nature is homogeneous intelligence, is invested and hidden by Nescience, you thereby assert the destruction of Brahman's essential nature. Causing light to disappear means either obstructing the origination of light, or else destroying light that exists. And as you teach that light (consciousness) cannot originate, the ' hiding ' or ' making to disappear' of light can only mean its destruction. — Consider the following point also. Your theory is that self-luminous consciousness, which is without object and without substrate, becomes, through the influence of an imperfection residing within itself, conscious of itself as connected with innumerous substrata and innumerous objects. — Is then, we ask, that imperfection residing within consciousness something real or something unreal? — The former alternative is excluded, as not being admitted by yourself. Nor can we accept the latter alternative ; for if we did we should have to view that imperfection as being either a knowing subject, or an object of knowledge, 1 06 vedanta-sCtras. or Knowing itself. Now it cannot be ' Knowing,' as you deny that there is any distinction in the nature of knowing ; and that ' Knowing,' which is the substrate of the imper- fection, cannot be held to be unreal, because that would involve the acceptance of the Madhyamika doctrine, viz. of a general void l.
2Now it cannot be ' Knowing,' as you deny that there is any distinction in the nature of knowing ; and that ' Knowing,' which is the substrate of the imper- fection, cannot be held to be unreal, because that would involve the acceptance of the Madhyamika doctrine, viz. of a general void l. And if knowers, objects of knowledge and knowing as determined by those two are fictitious, i. e. unreal, we have to assume another fundamental imperfection, and are thus driven into a regressus in infinitum. — To avoid this diffi- culty, it might now be said that real consciousness itself, which constitutes Brahman's nature, is that imperfection. — But if Brahman itself constitutes the imperfection, then Brahman is the basis of the appearance of a world, and it is gratuitous to assume an additional avidya to account for the world. Moreover, as Brahman is eternal, it would follow from this hypothesis that no release could ever take place. Unless, therefore, you admit a real imperfection apart from Brahman, you are unable to account for the great world-error. What, to come to the next point, do you understand by the inexplicability (anirva^aniyata) of Nescience? — Its dif- ference in nature from that which is, as well as that which is not! — A thing of such kind would be inexplicable indeed ; for none of the means of knowledge apply to it. That is to say — the whole world of objects must be ordered according to our states of consciousness, and every state of consciousness presents itself in the form, either of some- thing existing or of something non-existing. If, therefore, we should assume that of states of consciousness which are limited to this double form, the object can be something which is neither existing nor non-existing, then anything 1 If the imperfection inhering in Consciousness is itself of the nature of consciousness, and at the same time unreal, we should have to distinguish two kinds of Consciousness — which is contrary to the fundamental doctrine of the oneness of Consciousness. And if, on the other hand, we should say that the Consciousness in which the imperfection inheres is of the same nature as the latter, i. e. unreal, we are landed in the view of universal unreality. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. IO7 whatever might be the object of any state of consciousness whatever.
3And if, on the other hand, we should say that the Consciousness in which the imperfection inheres is of the same nature as the latter, i. e. unreal, we are landed in the view of universal unreality. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. IO7 whatever might be the object of any state of consciousness whatever. Against this our opponent may now argue as follows : — There is, after all, something, called avidya, or a^T/ana, or by some other name, which is a positive entity (bhava), different from the antecedent non-existence of knowledge ; which effects the obscuration of the Real ; which is the material cause of the erroneous superimposition on the Real, of manifold external and internal things ; and which is terminated by the cognition of the true nature of the one substance which constitutes Reality. For this avidya is apprehended through Perception as well as Inference. Brahman, in so far as limited by this avidya, is the material cause of the erroneous superimposition — upon the inward Self, which in itself is changeless pure intelligence, but has its true nature obscured by this superimposition — of that plurality which comprises the aha;/zkara, all acts of know- ledge and all objects of knowledge. Through special forms of this defect (i. e. avidya) there are produced, in this world superimposed upon Reality, the manifold special superim- positions presenting themselves in the form of things and cognitions of things — such as snakes (superimposed upon ropes), silver (superimposed on shells), and the like. Avidya constitutes the material cause of this entire false world ; since for a false thing we must needs infer a false cause. That this avidya or a^/zana (non-knowledge) is an object of internal Perception, follows from the fact that judgments such as ' I do not know,5 ' I do not know either myself or others,' directly present themselves to the mind. A mental state of this kind has for its object not that non-knowledge which is the antecedent non-existence of knowledge — for such absence of knowledge is ascertained by the sixth means of proof (anupalabdhi) ; it rather is a state which presents its object directly, and thus is of the same kind as the state expressed in the judgment ' I am experiencing pleasure.' Even if we admit that ' absence of something ' (abhava) can be the object of perception, the state of con- sciousness under discussion cannot have absence of know- ledge in the Self for its object. For at the very moment 1 08 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1JO5 the non-knowledge of the true nature of Brahman is not touched by it. — Against this it will perhaps be urged that what is here called the non-knowledge of the true nature of Brahman, really is the view of Brahman being dual in nature, and that this view is put an end to by the cognition of the falsity of whatever is other than Brahman ; while the true nature of Brahman itself is established by its own consciousness. — But this too we refuse to admit. If non- duality constitutes the true nature of Brahman, and is proved by Brahman's own consciousness, there is room neither for what is contradictory to it, viz. that non-know- ledge which consists in the view of duality, nor for the sublation of that non-knowledge. — Let then non-duality be taken for an attribute (not the essential nature) of Brahman ! — This too we refuse to admit ; for you yourself have proved that Brahman, which is pure Consciousness, is free from attributes which are objects of Consciousness. — From all this it follows that Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, cannot be the substrate of Nescience : the theory, in fact, involves a flat contradiction. When, in the next place, you maintain that Brahman, whose nature is homogeneous intelligence, is invested and hidden by Nescience, you thereby assert the destruction of Brahman's essential nature. Causing light to disappear means either obstructing the origination of light, or else destroying light that exists. And as you teach that light (consciousness) cannot originate, the ' hiding ' or ' making to disappear' of light can only mean its destruction. — Consider the following point also. Your theory is that self-luminous consciousness, which is without object and without substrate, becomes, through the influence of an imperfection residing within itself, conscious of itself as connected with innumerous substrata and innumerous objects. — Is then, we ask, that imperfection residing within consciousness something real or something unreal? — The former alternative is excluded, as not being admitted by yourself. Nor can we accept the latter alternative ; for if we did we should have to view that imperfection as being either a knowing subject, or an object of knowledge, 1 06 vedanta-sCtras. or Knowing itself. Now it cannot be ' Knowing,' as you deny that there is any distinction in the nature of knowing ; and that ' Knowing,' which is the substrate of the imper- fection, cannot be held to be unreal, because that would involve the acceptance of the Madhyamika doctrine, viz. of a general void l.
2Now it cannot be ' Knowing,' as you deny that there is any distinction in the nature of knowing ; and that ' Knowing,' which is the substrate of the imper- fection, cannot be held to be unreal, because that would involve the acceptance of the Madhyamika doctrine, viz. of a general void l. And if knowers, objects of knowledge and knowing as determined by those two are fictitious, i. e. unreal, we have to assume another fundamental imperfection, and are thus driven into a regressus in infinitum. — To avoid this diffi- culty, it might now be said that real consciousness itself, which constitutes Brahman's nature, is that imperfection. — But if Brahman itself constitutes the imperfection, then Brahman is the basis of the appearance of a world, and it is gratuitous to assume an additional avidya to account for the world. Moreover, as Brahman is eternal, it would follow from this hypothesis that no release could ever take place. Unless, therefore, you admit a real imperfection apart from Brahman, you are unable to account for the great world-error. What, to come to the next point, do you understand by the inexplicability (anirva^aniyata) of Nescience? — Its dif- ference in nature from that which is, as well as that which is not! — A thing of such kind would be inexplicable indeed ; for none of the means of knowledge apply to it. That is to say — the whole world of objects must be ordered according to our states of consciousness, and every state of consciousness presents itself in the form, either of some- thing existing or of something non-existing. If, therefore, we should assume that of states of consciousness which are limited to this double form, the object can be something which is neither existing nor non-existing, then anything 1 If the imperfection inhering in Consciousness is itself of the nature of consciousness, and at the same time unreal, we should have to distinguish two kinds of Consciousness — which is contrary to the fundamental doctrine of the oneness of Consciousness. And if, on the other hand, we should say that the Consciousness in which the imperfection inheres is of the same nature as the latter, i. e. unreal, we are landed in the view of universal unreality. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. IO7 whatever might be the object of any state of consciousness whatever.
3And if, on the other hand, we should say that the Consciousness in which the imperfection inheres is of the same nature as the latter, i. e. unreal, we are landed in the view of universal unreality. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. IO7 whatever might be the object of any state of consciousness whatever. Against this our opponent may now argue as follows : — There is, after all, something, called avidya, or a^T/ana, or by some other name, which is a positive entity (bhava), different from the antecedent non-existence of knowledge ; which effects the obscuration of the Real ; which is the material cause of the erroneous superimposition on the Real, of manifold external and internal things ; and which is terminated by the cognition of the true nature of the one substance which constitutes Reality. For this avidya is apprehended through Perception as well as Inference. Brahman, in so far as limited by this avidya, is the material cause of the erroneous superimposition — upon the inward Self, which in itself is changeless pure intelligence, but has its true nature obscured by this superimposition — of that plurality which comprises the aha;/zkara, all acts of know- ledge and all objects of knowledge. Through special forms of this defect (i. e. avidya) there are produced, in this world superimposed upon Reality, the manifold special superim- positions presenting themselves in the form of things and cognitions of things — such as snakes (superimposed upon ropes), silver (superimposed on shells), and the like. Avidya constitutes the material cause of this entire false world ; since for a false thing we must needs infer a false cause. That this avidya or a^/zana (non-knowledge) is an object of internal Perception, follows from the fact that judgments such as ' I do not know,5 ' I do not know either myself or others,' directly present themselves to the mind. A mental state of this kind has for its object not that non-knowledge which is the antecedent non-existence of knowledge — for such absence of knowledge is ascertained by the sixth means of proof (anupalabdhi) ; it rather is a state which presents its object directly, and thus is of the same kind as the state expressed in the judgment ' I am experiencing pleasure.' Even if we admit that ' absence of something ' (abhava) can be the object of perception, the state of con- sciousness under discussion cannot have absence of know- ledge in the Self for its object. For at the very moment 1 08 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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