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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1If they were not of a temporary nature, each element of the stream of cognitions, which are the cause of fear and the like, would give rise to a separate feeling of fear, and the result would be that there would be consciousness of many distinct I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I I 7 feelings of fear (and this we know not to be the case). — In conclusion we remark that in defining right knowledge as ' that which has for its antecedent another entity, different from its own antecedent non-existence,5 you do not give proof of very eminent logical acuteness ; for what sense has it to predicate of an entity that it is different from non- entity?— For all these reasons Inference also does not prove an a^Tzana which is a positive entity. And that it is not proved by Scripture and arthapatti, will be shown later on. And the reasoning under Su. II, i, 4, will dispose of the argument which maintains that of a false thing the substantial cause also must be false. We thus see that there is no cognition of any kind which has for its object a Nescience of 'inexplicable' nature. — Nor can such an inexplicable entity be admitted on the ground of apprehension, erroneous apprehension and subla- tion (cp. above, p. 102). For that only which is actually apprehended, can be the object of apprehension, error and sublation, and we have no right to assume, as an object of these states of consciousness, something which is appre- hended neither by them nor any other state of consciousness. — ' But in the case of the shell, &c, silver is actually appre- hended, and at the same time there arises the sublating consciousness " this silver is not real," and it is not possible that one thing should appear as another ; we therefore are driven to the hypothesis that owing to some defect, we actually apprehend silver of an altogether peculiar kind, viz. such as can be defined neither as real nor as unreal.' — This also we cannot allow, since this very assumption necessarily implies that one thing appears as another. For appre- hension, activity, sublation, and erroneous cognition, all result only from one thing appearing as another, and it is not reasonable to assume something altogether non- perceived and groundless. The silver, when apprehended, is not apprehended as something ' inexplicable,5 but as something real ; were it apprehended under the former aspect it could be the object neither of erroneous nor of sublative cognition, nor would the apprehending person endeavour to seize it. For these reasons you (the anirva- I I 8 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. £aniyatva-vadin) also must admit that the actual process is that of one thing appearing as another.
2For these reasons you (the anirva- I I 8 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. £aniyatva-vadin) also must admit that the actual process is that of one thing appearing as another. Those also who hold other theories as to the kind of cognition under discussion (of which the shell, mistaken for silver, is an instance) must — whatsoever effort they may make to avoid it — admit that their theory finally implies the appearing of one thing as another. The so-called asatkhyati-view implies that the non-existing appears as existing ; the atmakhyati-view, that the Self — which here means ' cognition ' — appears as a thing ; and the akhyati-view, that the attribute of one thing appears as that of another, that two acts of cognition appear as one, and — on the view of the non-existence of the object — that the non-existing appears as existing 1. Moreover, if you say that there is originated silver of a totally new inexplicable kind, you are bound to assign the cause of this origination. This cause cannot be the perception of the silver ; for the perception has the silver for its object, and hence has no existence before the origination of the silver. And should you say that the perception, having arisen without an object, produces the silver and thereupon makes it its object, we truly do not know what to say to such excellent reasoning ! — Let it then be said that the cause is some defect in the sense- organ. — This, too, is inadmissible ; for a defect abiding in the percipient person cannot produce an objective effect. — Nor can the organs of sense (apart from defects) give rise to the silver ; for they are causes of cognitions only (not of things cognised). Nor, again, the sense-organs in so far as modified by some defect ; for they also can only produce modifications in what is effected by them, i. e. cognition. — And the hypothesis of a beginningless, false a^Tzana consti- tuting the general material cause of all erroneous cognitions has been refuted above. How is it, moreover, that this new and inexplicable thing 1 For a full explanation of the nature of these ' khyatis/ see A.Venis' translation of the Vedanta Siddhanta Muktavali (Reprint from the Pandit, p. 130 ff.). I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I . I 1 9 (which you assume to account for the silver perceived on the shell) becomes to us the object of the idea and word c silver/ and not of some other idea and term, e.g. of a jar? — If you reply that this is due to its similarity to silver, we point out that in that case the idea and the word presenting themselves to our mind should be that of c something resembling silver.5 Should you, on the other hand, say that we apprehend the thing as silver because it possesses the generic characteristics of silver, we ask whether these generic characteristics are real or unreal. The former alternative is impossible, because something real cannot belong to what is unreal ; and the latter is impossible because something unreal cannot belong to what is real.
3The former alternative is impossible, because something real cannot belong to what is unreal ; and the latter is impossible because something unreal cannot belong to what is real. But we need not extend any further this refutation of an altogether ill-founded theory. All knowledge is of the Real. { Those who understand the Veda hold that all cognition has for its object what is real ; for 6ruti and Smrz'ti alike teach that everything participates in the nature of every- thing else. In the scriptural account of creation preceded by intention on the part of the Creator it is said that each of these elements was made tripartite ; and this tripartite constitution of all things is apprehended by Perception as well. The red colour in burning fire comes from (primal elementary) fire, the white colour from water, the black colour from earth — in this way Scripture explains the threefold nature of burning fire. In the same way all things are composed of elements of all things. The Vishnu Pura^a, in its account of creation, makes a similar statement : " The elements possessing various powers and being unconnected could not, without combination, produce living beings, not having mingled in any way. Having combined, therefore, with one another, and enter- ing into mutual associations — beginning with the principle called Mahat, and extending down to the gross elements — they formed an egg," &c. (Vi. Pu. I, 2, 50 ; 52). This tripartiteness of the elements the Sutrakara also de- 1 20 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1If they were not of a temporary nature, each element of the stream of cognitions, which are the cause of fear and the like, would give rise to a separate feeling of fear, and the result would be that there would be consciousness of many distinct I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I I 7 feelings of fear (and this we know not to be the case). — In conclusion we remark that in defining right knowledge as ' that which has for its antecedent another entity, different from its own antecedent non-existence,5 you do not give proof of very eminent logical acuteness ; for what sense has it to predicate of an entity that it is different from non- entity?— For all these reasons Inference also does not prove an a^Tzana which is a positive entity. And that it is not proved by Scripture and arthapatti, will be shown later on. And the reasoning under Su. II, i, 4, will dispose of the argument which maintains that of a false thing the substantial cause also must be false. We thus see that there is no cognition of any kind which has for its object a Nescience of 'inexplicable' nature. — Nor can such an inexplicable entity be admitted on the ground of apprehension, erroneous apprehension and subla- tion (cp. above, p. 102). For that only which is actually apprehended, can be the object of apprehension, error and sublation, and we have no right to assume, as an object of these states of consciousness, something which is appre- hended neither by them nor any other state of consciousness. — ' But in the case of the shell, &c, silver is actually appre- hended, and at the same time there arises the sublating consciousness " this silver is not real," and it is not possible that one thing should appear as another ; we therefore are driven to the hypothesis that owing to some defect, we actually apprehend silver of an altogether peculiar kind, viz. such as can be defined neither as real nor as unreal.' — This also we cannot allow, since this very assumption necessarily implies that one thing appears as another. For appre- hension, activity, sublation, and erroneous cognition, all result only from one thing appearing as another, and it is not reasonable to assume something altogether non- perceived and groundless. The silver, when apprehended, is not apprehended as something ' inexplicable,5 but as something real ; were it apprehended under the former aspect it could be the object neither of erroneous nor of sublative cognition, nor would the apprehending person endeavour to seize it. For these reasons you (the anirva- I I 8 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. £aniyatva-vadin) also must admit that the actual process is that of one thing appearing as another.
2For these reasons you (the anirva- I I 8 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. £aniyatva-vadin) also must admit that the actual process is that of one thing appearing as another. Those also who hold other theories as to the kind of cognition under discussion (of which the shell, mistaken for silver, is an instance) must — whatsoever effort they may make to avoid it — admit that their theory finally implies the appearing of one thing as another. The so-called asatkhyati-view implies that the non-existing appears as existing ; the atmakhyati-view, that the Self — which here means ' cognition ' — appears as a thing ; and the akhyati-view, that the attribute of one thing appears as that of another, that two acts of cognition appear as one, and — on the view of the non-existence of the object — that the non-existing appears as existing 1. Moreover, if you say that there is originated silver of a totally new inexplicable kind, you are bound to assign the cause of this origination. This cause cannot be the perception of the silver ; for the perception has the silver for its object, and hence has no existence before the origination of the silver. And should you say that the perception, having arisen without an object, produces the silver and thereupon makes it its object, we truly do not know what to say to such excellent reasoning ! — Let it then be said that the cause is some defect in the sense- organ. — This, too, is inadmissible ; for a defect abiding in the percipient person cannot produce an objective effect. — Nor can the organs of sense (apart from defects) give rise to the silver ; for they are causes of cognitions only (not of things cognised). Nor, again, the sense-organs in so far as modified by some defect ; for they also can only produce modifications in what is effected by them, i. e. cognition. — And the hypothesis of a beginningless, false a^Tzana consti- tuting the general material cause of all erroneous cognitions has been refuted above. How is it, moreover, that this new and inexplicable thing 1 For a full explanation of the nature of these ' khyatis/ see A.Venis' translation of the Vedanta Siddhanta Muktavali (Reprint from the Pandit, p. 130 ff.). I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I . I 1 9 (which you assume to account for the silver perceived on the shell) becomes to us the object of the idea and word c silver/ and not of some other idea and term, e.g. of a jar? — If you reply that this is due to its similarity to silver, we point out that in that case the idea and the word presenting themselves to our mind should be that of c something resembling silver.5 Should you, on the other hand, say that we apprehend the thing as silver because it possesses the generic characteristics of silver, we ask whether these generic characteristics are real or unreal. The former alternative is impossible, because something real cannot belong to what is unreal ; and the latter is impossible because something unreal cannot belong to what is real.
3The former alternative is impossible, because something real cannot belong to what is unreal ; and the latter is impossible because something unreal cannot belong to what is real. But we need not extend any further this refutation of an altogether ill-founded theory. All knowledge is of the Real. { Those who understand the Veda hold that all cognition has for its object what is real ; for 6ruti and Smrz'ti alike teach that everything participates in the nature of every- thing else. In the scriptural account of creation preceded by intention on the part of the Creator it is said that each of these elements was made tripartite ; and this tripartite constitution of all things is apprehended by Perception as well. The red colour in burning fire comes from (primal elementary) fire, the white colour from water, the black colour from earth — in this way Scripture explains the threefold nature of burning fire. In the same way all things are composed of elements of all things. The Vishnu Pura^a, in its account of creation, makes a similar statement : " The elements possessing various powers and being unconnected could not, without combination, produce living beings, not having mingled in any way. Having combined, therefore, with one another, and enter- ing into mutual associations — beginning with the principle called Mahat, and extending down to the gross elements — they formed an egg," &c. (Vi. Pu. I, 2, 50 ; 52). This tripartiteness of the elements the Sutrakara also de- 1 20 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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