Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— In the case of one direction being mistaken for another (as when a person thinks the south to be where the north is), the fact is that, owing to the unseen principle (i. e. merit or demerit), the direction which actually exists in the other direction (for a point I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I 23 which is to the north of me is to the south of another point) is apprehended by itself, apart from the other elements of direction ; the apprehension which actually takes place is thus likewise true. — Similar is the case of the double moon. Here, either through pressure of the finger upon the eye, or owing to some abnormal affection of the eye, the visual rays are divided (split), and the double, mutually independent apparatus of vision thus originating, becomes the cause of a double apprehension of the moon. One apparatus apprehends the moon in her proper place ; the other which moves somewhat obliquely, apprehends at first a place close by the moon, and then the moon herself, which thus appears somewhat removed from her proper place. Although, therefore, what is apprehended is the one moon distinguished by connexion with two places at the same time — an apprehension due to the double apparatus of vision — yet, owing to the difference of apprehensions, there is a difference in the character of the object apprehended, and an absence of the apprehension of unity, and thus a double moon presents itself to perception. That the second spot is viewed as qualifying the moon, is due to the circumstance that the apprehension of that spot, and that of the moon which is not apprehended in her proper place, are simultaneous. Now here the doubleness of the apparatus is real, and hence the apprehension of the moon distinguished by connexion with two places is real also, and owing to this doubleness of apprehension, the doubleness of aspect of the object apprehended, i.e. the moon, is likewise real. That there is only one moon constituting the true object of the double apprehension, this is a matter for which ocular perception by itself does not suffice, and hence what is actually seen is a double moon. That, although the two eyes together constitute one visual apparatus only, the visual rays being divided through some defect of the eyes, give rise to a double apparatus — this we infer from the effect actually observed. When that defect is removed there takes place only one apprehension of the moon as connected with her proper place, and thus the idea of one moon only arises. It is at the same time 1 24 VEDANTA-sftTRAS. quite clear how the defect of the eye gives rise to a double visual apparatus, the latter to a double apprehension, and the latter again to a doubleness of the object of apprehension.
2It is at the same time 1 24 VEDANTA-sftTRAS. quite clear how the defect of the eye gives rise to a double visual apparatus, the latter to a double apprehension, and the latter again to a doubleness of the object of apprehension. We have thus proved that all cognition is true. The shortcomings of other views as to the nature of cognition have been set forth at length by other philosophers, and we therefore do not enter on that topic. What need is there, in fact, of lengthy proofs ? Those who acknowledge the validity of the different means of knowledge, perception, and so on, and — what is vouched for by sacred tradition — the existence of a highest Brahman — free from all shadow of imperfection, of measureless excellence, comprising within itself numberless auspicious qualities, all-knowing, immedi- ately realising all its purposes — , what should they not be able to prove? That holy highest Brahman — while producing the entire world as an object of fruition for the individual souls, in agreement with their respective good and ill deserts — creates certain things of such a nature as to become common objects of consciousness, either pleasant or un- pleasant, to all souls together, while certain other things are created in such a way as to be perceived only by particular persons, and to persist for a limited time only. And it is this distinction — viz. of things that are objects of general consciousness, and of things that are not so — which makes the difference between what is called ' things sublat- ing ' and 'things sublated.' — Everything is explained hereby. Neither Scripture nor Smnti and Purawa teach Nescience. The assertion that Nescience — to be defined neither as that which is nor as that which is not — rests on the authority of Scripture is untrue. In passages such as 'hidden by the untrue' {Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 2), the word ' untrue ' does not denote the Undefinable; it rather means that which is different from ' rzta,' and this latter word — as we see from the passage 'enjoying the rzta' (Ka. Up. Ill, 1) — denotes such actions as aim at no worldly end, but only at the propitiation of the highest Person, and thus I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I 25
3Up. Ill, 1) — denotes such actions as aim at no worldly end, but only at the propitiation of the highest Person, and thus I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I 25 enable the devotee to reach him. The word ' anr/ta ' therefore denotes actions of a different kind, i. e. such as aim at worldly results and thus stand in the way of the soul reaching Brahman ; in agreement with the passage ' they do not find that Brahma-world, for they are carried away by anrz'ta' {Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 2). — Again, in the text ' Then there was neither non-Being nor Being' (Ri. Sa;^h. X, 129, 1), the terms 'being' and 'non-being' denote intelligent and non-intelligent beings in their distributive state. What that text aims at stating is that intelligent and non-intelli- gent beings, which at the time of the origination of the world are called 'sat' and 'tyat' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), are, during the period of reabsorption, merged in the collective totality of non-intelligent matter which the text denotes by the term 'darkness' (Ri. Sawh. X, 129, 3). There is thus no reference whatever to something 'not definable either as being or non-being ' : the terms ' being ' and ' non- being ' are applied to different modes of being at different times. That the term ' darkness ' denotes the collective totality of non-intelligent matter appears from another scriptural passage, viz. ' The Non-evolved (avyaktam) is merged in the Imperishable (akshara), the Imperishable in darkness (tamas), darkness becomes one with the highest divinity.' — True, the word ' darkness ' denotes the subtle condition of primeval matter (prakrzti), which forms the totality of non-intelligent things ; but this very Prakrzti is called Maya — in the text 'Know Prakrzti to be Maya,,' and this proves it be something ' undefinable ' ! — Not so, we reply ; we meet with no passages where the word ' M£ya ' denotes that which is undefinable ! — But the word ' Maya ' is synonymous with ' mithya,' i. e. falsehood, and hence denotes the Undefinable also ! — This, too, we cannot admit ; for the word ' Maya ' does not in all places refer to what is false ; we see it applied e. g. to such things as the weapons of Asuras and Rakshasas, which are not c false' but real. ' Maya/ in such passages, really denotes that which produces various wonderful effects, and it is in this sense that Praknti is called Maya. This appears from the passage (Svet Up. IV, 9) ' From that the " mayin " creates 126 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— In the case of one direction being mistaken for another (as when a person thinks the south to be where the north is), the fact is that, owing to the unseen principle (i. e. merit or demerit), the direction which actually exists in the other direction (for a point I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I 23 which is to the north of me is to the south of another point) is apprehended by itself, apart from the other elements of direction ; the apprehension which actually takes place is thus likewise true. — Similar is the case of the double moon. Here, either through pressure of the finger upon the eye, or owing to some abnormal affection of the eye, the visual rays are divided (split), and the double, mutually independent apparatus of vision thus originating, becomes the cause of a double apprehension of the moon. One apparatus apprehends the moon in her proper place ; the other which moves somewhat obliquely, apprehends at first a place close by the moon, and then the moon herself, which thus appears somewhat removed from her proper place. Although, therefore, what is apprehended is the one moon distinguished by connexion with two places at the same time — an apprehension due to the double apparatus of vision — yet, owing to the difference of apprehensions, there is a difference in the character of the object apprehended, and an absence of the apprehension of unity, and thus a double moon presents itself to perception. That the second spot is viewed as qualifying the moon, is due to the circumstance that the apprehension of that spot, and that of the moon which is not apprehended in her proper place, are simultaneous. Now here the doubleness of the apparatus is real, and hence the apprehension of the moon distinguished by connexion with two places is real also, and owing to this doubleness of apprehension, the doubleness of aspect of the object apprehended, i.e. the moon, is likewise real. That there is only one moon constituting the true object of the double apprehension, this is a matter for which ocular perception by itself does not suffice, and hence what is actually seen is a double moon. That, although the two eyes together constitute one visual apparatus only, the visual rays being divided through some defect of the eyes, give rise to a double apparatus — this we infer from the effect actually observed. When that defect is removed there takes place only one apprehension of the moon as connected with her proper place, and thus the idea of one moon only arises. It is at the same time 1 24 VEDANTA-sftTRAS. quite clear how the defect of the eye gives rise to a double visual apparatus, the latter to a double apprehension, and the latter again to a doubleness of the object of apprehension.
2It is at the same time 1 24 VEDANTA-sftTRAS. quite clear how the defect of the eye gives rise to a double visual apparatus, the latter to a double apprehension, and the latter again to a doubleness of the object of apprehension. We have thus proved that all cognition is true. The shortcomings of other views as to the nature of cognition have been set forth at length by other philosophers, and we therefore do not enter on that topic. What need is there, in fact, of lengthy proofs ? Those who acknowledge the validity of the different means of knowledge, perception, and so on, and — what is vouched for by sacred tradition — the existence of a highest Brahman — free from all shadow of imperfection, of measureless excellence, comprising within itself numberless auspicious qualities, all-knowing, immedi- ately realising all its purposes — , what should they not be able to prove? That holy highest Brahman — while producing the entire world as an object of fruition for the individual souls, in agreement with their respective good and ill deserts — creates certain things of such a nature as to become common objects of consciousness, either pleasant or un- pleasant, to all souls together, while certain other things are created in such a way as to be perceived only by particular persons, and to persist for a limited time only. And it is this distinction — viz. of things that are objects of general consciousness, and of things that are not so — which makes the difference between what is called ' things sublat- ing ' and 'things sublated.' — Everything is explained hereby. Neither Scripture nor Smnti and Purawa teach Nescience. The assertion that Nescience — to be defined neither as that which is nor as that which is not — rests on the authority of Scripture is untrue. In passages such as 'hidden by the untrue' {Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 2), the word ' untrue ' does not denote the Undefinable; it rather means that which is different from ' rzta,' and this latter word — as we see from the passage 'enjoying the rzta' (Ka. Up. Ill, 1) — denotes such actions as aim at no worldly end, but only at the propitiation of the highest Person, and thus I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I 25
3Up. Ill, 1) — denotes such actions as aim at no worldly end, but only at the propitiation of the highest Person, and thus I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I 25 enable the devotee to reach him. The word ' anr/ta ' therefore denotes actions of a different kind, i. e. such as aim at worldly results and thus stand in the way of the soul reaching Brahman ; in agreement with the passage ' they do not find that Brahma-world, for they are carried away by anrz'ta' {Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 2). — Again, in the text ' Then there was neither non-Being nor Being' (Ri. Sa;^h. X, 129, 1), the terms 'being' and 'non-being' denote intelligent and non-intelligent beings in their distributive state. What that text aims at stating is that intelligent and non-intelli- gent beings, which at the time of the origination of the world are called 'sat' and 'tyat' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), are, during the period of reabsorption, merged in the collective totality of non-intelligent matter which the text denotes by the term 'darkness' (Ri. Sawh. X, 129, 3). There is thus no reference whatever to something 'not definable either as being or non-being ' : the terms ' being ' and ' non- being ' are applied to different modes of being at different times. That the term ' darkness ' denotes the collective totality of non-intelligent matter appears from another scriptural passage, viz. ' The Non-evolved (avyaktam) is merged in the Imperishable (akshara), the Imperishable in darkness (tamas), darkness becomes one with the highest divinity.' — True, the word ' darkness ' denotes the subtle condition of primeval matter (prakrzti), which forms the totality of non-intelligent things ; but this very Prakrzti is called Maya — in the text 'Know Prakrzti to be Maya,,' and this proves it be something ' undefinable ' ! — Not so, we reply ; we meet with no passages where the word ' M£ya ' denotes that which is undefinable ! — But the word ' Maya ' is synonymous with ' mithya,' i. e. falsehood, and hence denotes the Undefinable also ! — This, too, we cannot admit ; for the word ' Maya ' does not in all places refer to what is false ; we see it applied e. g. to such things as the weapons of Asuras and Rakshasas, which are not c false' but real. ' Maya/ in such passages, really denotes that which produces various wonderful effects, and it is in this sense that Praknti is called Maya. This appears from the passage (Svet Up. IV, 9) ' From that the " mayin " creates 126 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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