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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' Enquiry/ What then is that Brahman which is here said to be an object that should be enquired into ? — To this question the second Sutra gives a reply. 2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c, of this (world proceed). The expression ' the origin/ &c, means ' creation, sub- sistence, and reabsorption.' The ' this ' (in 'of this ') denotes this entire world with its manifold wonderful arrangements, not to be fathomed by thought, and comprising within itself the aggregate of living souls from Brahma down to blades of grass, all of which experience the fruits (of their former actions) in definite places and at definite times. ' That from which,' i. e. that highest Person who is the ruler of all ; whose nature is antagonistic to all evil ; whose purposes come true; who possesses infinite auspicious qualities, such as knowledge, blessedness, and so on ; who is omniscient, omnipotent, supremely merciful ; from whom the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of this world proceed — he is Brahman : such is the meaning of the Sutra. — The definition here given of Brahman is founded on the text Taitt. Up. Ill, 1, ' Bhrzgu Varum went to his father Varu//a, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman,' &c, up to ' That from which these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that into which they enter at their death, try to know that : that is Brahman.' A doubt arises here. Is it possible, or not, to gain a knowledge of Brahman from the characteristic marks stated in this passage? — It is not possible, the Purva- I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2. I 57
2Is it possible, or not, to gain a knowledge of Brahman from the characteristic marks stated in this passage? — It is not possible, the Purva- I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2. I 57 pakshin contends. The attributes stated in that passage — viz. being that from which the world originates, and so on — do not properly indicate Brahman ; for as the essence of an attribute lies in its separative or distinctive func- tion, there would result from the plurality of distinctive attributes plurality on the part of Brahman itself. — But when we say ' Devadatta is of a dark complexion, is young* has reddish eyes/ &c, we also make a statement as to several attributes, and yet we are understood to refer to one Devadatta only ; similarly we understand in the case under discussion also that there is one Brahman only ! — Not so, we reply. In Devadatta' s case we connect all attributes with one person, because we know his unity through other means of knowledge ; otherwise the dis- tinctive power of several attributes would lead us, in this case also, to the assumption of several substances to which the several attributes belong. In the case under discussion, on the other hand, we do not, apart from the statement as to attributes, know anything about the unity of Brahman, and the distinctive power of the attributes thus necessarily urges upon us the idea of several Brahmans. — But we maintain that the unity of the term * Brahman ' intimates the unity of the thing * Brahman ' !— By no means, we reply. If a man who knows nothing about cows, but wishes to know about them, is told ca cow is that which has either entire horns, or mutilated horns, or no horns/ the mutally exclusive ideas of the possession of entire horns, and so on, raise in his mind the ideas of several individual cows, although the term ' cow ' is one only ; and in the same way we are led to the idea of several distinct Brahmans. For this reason, even the different attributes combined are incapable of defining the thing, the definition of which is desired. — Nor again are the characteristics enumerated in the Taitt. passage (viz. creation of the world, &c.) capable of defining Brahman in the way of secondary marks (upalaksha^a), because the thing to be defined by them is not previously known in a different aspect. So-called secondary marks are the cause of some- thing already known from a certain point of view, being I58 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
3So-called secondary marks are the cause of some- thing already known from a certain point of view, being I58 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. known in a different aspect — as when it is said * Where that crane is standing, that is the irrigated field of Deva- datta.' — But may we not say that from the text 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman,' we already have an idea of Brahman, and that hence its being the cause of the origin, &c, of the world may be taken as collateral indi- cations (pointing to something already known in a certain way) ? — Not so, we reply ; either of these two defining texts has a meaning only with reference to an aspect of Brahman already known from the other one, and this mutual dependence deprives both of their force. — Brahman cannot therefore be known through the characteristic marks mentioned in the text under discussion. To this prima facie view we make the following reply. Brahman can be known on the basis of the origination, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world— these charac- teristics occupying the position of collateral marks. No objection can be raised against this view, on the ground that, apart from what these collateral marks point to, no other aspect of Brahman is known ; for as a matter of fact they point to that which is known to us as possess- ing supreme greatness (brzhattva) and power of growth (brz/^hana) — this being the meaning of the root brimh (from which c Brahman ' is derived). Of this Brahman, thus already known (on the basis of etymology), the origination, sustentation, and reabsorption of the world are collateral marks. Moreover, in the Taitt. text under dis- cussion, the relative pronoun — which appears in three forms, (that) ' from whence,' (that) ' by which,' (that) ' into which ' — refers to something which is already known as the cause of the origin, and so on, of the world. This previous know- ledge rests on the Kk. passage, ' Being only this was in the beginning/ &c, up to c it sent forth fire ' — which declares that the one principle denoted as ' being ' is the universal material, and instrumental cause. There the clause ' Being only this was in the beginning, one only,' establishes that one being as the general material cause ; the word ' without a second ' negatives the existence of a second operative cause ; and the clauses ' it thought, may I be many, may I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2. 1 59
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' Enquiry/ What then is that Brahman which is here said to be an object that should be enquired into ? — To this question the second Sutra gives a reply. 2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c, of this (world proceed). The expression ' the origin/ &c, means ' creation, sub- sistence, and reabsorption.' The ' this ' (in 'of this ') denotes this entire world with its manifold wonderful arrangements, not to be fathomed by thought, and comprising within itself the aggregate of living souls from Brahma down to blades of grass, all of which experience the fruits (of their former actions) in definite places and at definite times. ' That from which,' i. e. that highest Person who is the ruler of all ; whose nature is antagonistic to all evil ; whose purposes come true; who possesses infinite auspicious qualities, such as knowledge, blessedness, and so on ; who is omniscient, omnipotent, supremely merciful ; from whom the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of this world proceed — he is Brahman : such is the meaning of the Sutra. — The definition here given of Brahman is founded on the text Taitt. Up. Ill, 1, ' Bhrzgu Varum went to his father Varu//a, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman,' &c, up to ' That from which these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that into which they enter at their death, try to know that : that is Brahman.' A doubt arises here. Is it possible, or not, to gain a knowledge of Brahman from the characteristic marks stated in this passage? — It is not possible, the Purva- I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2. I 57
2Is it possible, or not, to gain a knowledge of Brahman from the characteristic marks stated in this passage? — It is not possible, the Purva- I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2. I 57 pakshin contends. The attributes stated in that passage — viz. being that from which the world originates, and so on — do not properly indicate Brahman ; for as the essence of an attribute lies in its separative or distinctive func- tion, there would result from the plurality of distinctive attributes plurality on the part of Brahman itself. — But when we say ' Devadatta is of a dark complexion, is young* has reddish eyes/ &c, we also make a statement as to several attributes, and yet we are understood to refer to one Devadatta only ; similarly we understand in the case under discussion also that there is one Brahman only ! — Not so, we reply. In Devadatta' s case we connect all attributes with one person, because we know his unity through other means of knowledge ; otherwise the dis- tinctive power of several attributes would lead us, in this case also, to the assumption of several substances to which the several attributes belong. In the case under discussion, on the other hand, we do not, apart from the statement as to attributes, know anything about the unity of Brahman, and the distinctive power of the attributes thus necessarily urges upon us the idea of several Brahmans. — But we maintain that the unity of the term * Brahman ' intimates the unity of the thing * Brahman ' !— By no means, we reply. If a man who knows nothing about cows, but wishes to know about them, is told ca cow is that which has either entire horns, or mutilated horns, or no horns/ the mutally exclusive ideas of the possession of entire horns, and so on, raise in his mind the ideas of several individual cows, although the term ' cow ' is one only ; and in the same way we are led to the idea of several distinct Brahmans. For this reason, even the different attributes combined are incapable of defining the thing, the definition of which is desired. — Nor again are the characteristics enumerated in the Taitt. passage (viz. creation of the world, &c.) capable of defining Brahman in the way of secondary marks (upalaksha^a), because the thing to be defined by them is not previously known in a different aspect. So-called secondary marks are the cause of some- thing already known from a certain point of view, being I58 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
3So-called secondary marks are the cause of some- thing already known from a certain point of view, being I58 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. known in a different aspect — as when it is said * Where that crane is standing, that is the irrigated field of Deva- datta.' — But may we not say that from the text 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman,' we already have an idea of Brahman, and that hence its being the cause of the origin, &c, of the world may be taken as collateral indi- cations (pointing to something already known in a certain way) ? — Not so, we reply ; either of these two defining texts has a meaning only with reference to an aspect of Brahman already known from the other one, and this mutual dependence deprives both of their force. — Brahman cannot therefore be known through the characteristic marks mentioned in the text under discussion. To this prima facie view we make the following reply. Brahman can be known on the basis of the origination, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world— these charac- teristics occupying the position of collateral marks. No objection can be raised against this view, on the ground that, apart from what these collateral marks point to, no other aspect of Brahman is known ; for as a matter of fact they point to that which is known to us as possess- ing supreme greatness (brzhattva) and power of growth (brz/^hana) — this being the meaning of the root brimh (from which c Brahman ' is derived). Of this Brahman, thus already known (on the basis of etymology), the origination, sustentation, and reabsorption of the world are collateral marks. Moreover, in the Taitt. text under dis- cussion, the relative pronoun — which appears in three forms, (that) ' from whence,' (that) ' by which,' (that) ' into which ' — refers to something which is already known as the cause of the origin, and so on, of the world. This previous know- ledge rests on the Kk. passage, ' Being only this was in the beginning/ &c, up to c it sent forth fire ' — which declares that the one principle denoted as ' being ' is the universal material, and instrumental cause. There the clause ' Being only this was in the beginning, one only,' establishes that one being as the general material cause ; the word ' without a second ' negatives the existence of a second operative cause ; and the clauses ' it thought, may I be many, may I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2. 1 59
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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