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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I. 483 same time forfeiting its own essential nature, and which forms the general substrate for an infinity of different effects, from the Mahat downwards. This one general cause is the Pradhana constituted by the equipoise of the three gu^as. The reasons for the assumption of this Pra- dhana are as follows : — ' On account of the limitedness of particular things ; of connexion (anvaya) ; of activity proceeding from special power ; and of the difference and non-difference of cause and effect — the Non-evolved (Pra- dhana) is the general cause of this many-natured Universe ' (vaii-varupya) (Sarikhya Ka. I, 15; 16). — The term c vai- ^varupya ' denotes that which possesses, all forms, i. e. the entire world with its variously constituted parts — bodies, worlds, and so on. This world, which on account of its variegated constitution must be held to be an effect, has for its cause the Unevolved (avyakta = Prakrzti), which is of the same nature as the world. Why so ? Because it is an effect ; for we perceive that every effect is different from its special cause — which has the same nature as the effect — and at the same time is non-different. Such effected things as e. g. a jar and a gold ornament are different from their causes, i. e. clay and gold, which have the same nature as the effects, and at the same time non-different. Hence the manifold-natured world originates from the Pradhana which has the same nature, and is again merged in it : the world thus has the Pradhana alone for its cause. This Pradhana is constituted by the equipoise of the three gu/zas, and thus is a cause possessing a nature equal to that of its effect, i. e. the world ; for the world is of the nature of pleasure, pain, and dullness, which consist of sattva, ra^as, and tamas respectively. The case is analogous to that of a jar con- sisting of clay ; of that also the cause is none other than the substance clay. For in every case observation shows that only such causal substances as are of the same nature as the effects possess that power which is called the origination of the effect. That the general cause can be found only in the unevolved Pradhana, which consists of the three gu;^as in a state of equipoise and is unlimited with regard to space as well as time, follows from the limitedness of the particular I i 2 484 vedAnta-sAtras. things, viz. the Mahat, the ahankara, and so on. These latter things are limited like jars and so on, and hence incapable of originating the entire world. Hence it follows that this world, consisting of the three gu/zas, has for its only cause the Pradhana, which is constituted by those three gu;zas in a state of equipoise.
2These latter things are limited like jars and so on, and hence incapable of originating the entire world. Hence it follows that this world, consisting of the three gu/zas, has for its only cause the Pradhana, which is constituted by those three gu;zas in a state of equipoise. Against this argumentation the Sutra says, 'Not that which is inferred, on account of the impossibility of con- struction, and on account of activity/ — ' Inference ' means ( that which is inferred,' i. e. the Pradhana. The Pradhana postulated by you is not capable of constructing this mani- fold-natured world, because while itself being non-intelli- gent it is not guided by an intelligent being understanding its nature. Whatever is of this latter kind is incapable of producing effects ; as e. g. wood and the like by them- selves are not capable of constructing a palace or a carriage. As it is matter of observation that non-intelligent wood, not guided by an intelligent agent understanding its nature, cannot produce effects ; and as it is observed that if guided by such an agent matter does enter on action so as to produce effects ; the Pradhana, which is not ruled by an intelligent agent, cannot be the general cause. The c and ' in the Sutra is meant to add as a further argument that ' presence ' (anvaya) has no proving force. For whiteness present in cows and so on is not invariably accompanied by the quality of being the cause of the class characteristics of cows. Nor must it be said that qualities such as white- ness, although present in the effect, may not indeed be causes, but that substances such as gold and the like which are present in certain effects are invariably accompanied by the quality of being causes, and that hence also the substances called sattva, ra^as, and tamas, which are found present in all effects, are proved to be the causes of all those effects. For sattva and so on are attributes of substances, but not themselves substances. Sattva and so on are the causes of the lightness, light, &c, belonging to substances such as earth and the like, and hence distinctive attributes of the essential nature of those substances, but they are not observed to be present in any effects in II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 2. 485
3Sattva and so on are the causes of the lightness, light, &c, belonging to substances such as earth and the like, and hence distinctive attributes of the essential nature of those substances, but they are not observed to be present in any effects in II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 2. 485 a substantial form, as clay, gold, and other substances are. It is for this reason that they are known as ' gu//as.' You have further said that the world's having one cause only must be postulated in order that an ultimate cause may be reached. But as the sattva, ra^as, and tamas are not one but three, you yourself do not assume one cause, and hence do not manage to arrive at an ultimate cause. For your Pradhana consists in the equipoise of the three gu/zas ; there are thus several causes, and you have no more an ultimate cause than others. Nor can you say that this end is accomplished through the three gu;/as being un- limited. For if the three gu/zas are all alike unlimited, and therefore omnipresent, there is nowhere a plus or minus of any of them, and as thus no inequality can result, effects cannot originate. In order to explain the origination of results it is therefore necessary to assume limitation of the gu/zas. Nor is our view confirmed by those cases only in which it is clearly perceived that matter produces effects only when guided by an intelligent principle ; other cases also (where the fact is not perceived with equal clearness) are in favour of our view. This the next Sutra declares. 2. If it be said — like milk or water ; there also (intelligence guides). What has been said — the Sankhya rejoins — as to the impossibility of the Pradhana not guided by an intelligent principle constructing this variously constituted world, is unfounded ; for the Pradhana may be supposed to act in the same way as milk and water do. Milk, when turning into sour milk, is capable of going by itself through a series of changes : it does not therefore depend on anything else. In the same way we observe that the homogeneous water discharged from the clouds spontaneously proceeds to trans- form itself into the various saps and juices of different plants, such as palm trees, mango trees, wood-apple trees, lime trees, tamarind trees, and so on. In the same way the Pradhana, of whose essential nature it is to change, may, without being guided by another agent, abide in the interval 486 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS. between two creations in a state of homogeneousness, and then when the time for creation comes modify itself into many various effects due to the loss of equilibrium on the part of the gu^as. As has been said '(the Pradhana acts), owing to modification, as water according to the difference of the abodes of the several gunas * (Sankhya Ka. I, 16). In this way the Unevolved acts independently of anything else.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I. 483 same time forfeiting its own essential nature, and which forms the general substrate for an infinity of different effects, from the Mahat downwards. This one general cause is the Pradhana constituted by the equipoise of the three gu^as. The reasons for the assumption of this Pra- dhana are as follows : — ' On account of the limitedness of particular things ; of connexion (anvaya) ; of activity proceeding from special power ; and of the difference and non-difference of cause and effect — the Non-evolved (Pra- dhana) is the general cause of this many-natured Universe ' (vaii-varupya) (Sarikhya Ka. I, 15; 16). — The term c vai- ^varupya ' denotes that which possesses, all forms, i. e. the entire world with its variously constituted parts — bodies, worlds, and so on. This world, which on account of its variegated constitution must be held to be an effect, has for its cause the Unevolved (avyakta = Prakrzti), which is of the same nature as the world. Why so ? Because it is an effect ; for we perceive that every effect is different from its special cause — which has the same nature as the effect — and at the same time is non-different. Such effected things as e. g. a jar and a gold ornament are different from their causes, i. e. clay and gold, which have the same nature as the effects, and at the same time non-different. Hence the manifold-natured world originates from the Pradhana which has the same nature, and is again merged in it : the world thus has the Pradhana alone for its cause. This Pradhana is constituted by the equipoise of the three gu/zas, and thus is a cause possessing a nature equal to that of its effect, i. e. the world ; for the world is of the nature of pleasure, pain, and dullness, which consist of sattva, ra^as, and tamas respectively. The case is analogous to that of a jar con- sisting of clay ; of that also the cause is none other than the substance clay. For in every case observation shows that only such causal substances as are of the same nature as the effects possess that power which is called the origination of the effect. That the general cause can be found only in the unevolved Pradhana, which consists of the three gu;^as in a state of equipoise and is unlimited with regard to space as well as time, follows from the limitedness of the particular I i 2 484 vedAnta-sAtras. things, viz. the Mahat, the ahankara, and so on. These latter things are limited like jars and so on, and hence incapable of originating the entire world. Hence it follows that this world, consisting of the three gu/zas, has for its only cause the Pradhana, which is constituted by those three gu;zas in a state of equipoise.
2These latter things are limited like jars and so on, and hence incapable of originating the entire world. Hence it follows that this world, consisting of the three gu/zas, has for its only cause the Pradhana, which is constituted by those three gu;zas in a state of equipoise. Against this argumentation the Sutra says, 'Not that which is inferred, on account of the impossibility of con- struction, and on account of activity/ — ' Inference ' means ( that which is inferred,' i. e. the Pradhana. The Pradhana postulated by you is not capable of constructing this mani- fold-natured world, because while itself being non-intelli- gent it is not guided by an intelligent being understanding its nature. Whatever is of this latter kind is incapable of producing effects ; as e. g. wood and the like by them- selves are not capable of constructing a palace or a carriage. As it is matter of observation that non-intelligent wood, not guided by an intelligent agent understanding its nature, cannot produce effects ; and as it is observed that if guided by such an agent matter does enter on action so as to produce effects ; the Pradhana, which is not ruled by an intelligent agent, cannot be the general cause. The c and ' in the Sutra is meant to add as a further argument that ' presence ' (anvaya) has no proving force. For whiteness present in cows and so on is not invariably accompanied by the quality of being the cause of the class characteristics of cows. Nor must it be said that qualities such as white- ness, although present in the effect, may not indeed be causes, but that substances such as gold and the like which are present in certain effects are invariably accompanied by the quality of being causes, and that hence also the substances called sattva, ra^as, and tamas, which are found present in all effects, are proved to be the causes of all those effects. For sattva and so on are attributes of substances, but not themselves substances. Sattva and so on are the causes of the lightness, light, &c, belonging to substances such as earth and the like, and hence distinctive attributes of the essential nature of those substances, but they are not observed to be present in any effects in II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 2. 485
3Sattva and so on are the causes of the lightness, light, &c, belonging to substances such as earth and the like, and hence distinctive attributes of the essential nature of those substances, but they are not observed to be present in any effects in II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 2. 485 a substantial form, as clay, gold, and other substances are. It is for this reason that they are known as ' gu//as.' You have further said that the world's having one cause only must be postulated in order that an ultimate cause may be reached. But as the sattva, ra^as, and tamas are not one but three, you yourself do not assume one cause, and hence do not manage to arrive at an ultimate cause. For your Pradhana consists in the equipoise of the three gu/zas ; there are thus several causes, and you have no more an ultimate cause than others. Nor can you say that this end is accomplished through the three gu;/as being un- limited. For if the three gu/zas are all alike unlimited, and therefore omnipresent, there is nowhere a plus or minus of any of them, and as thus no inequality can result, effects cannot originate. In order to explain the origination of results it is therefore necessary to assume limitation of the gu/zas. Nor is our view confirmed by those cases only in which it is clearly perceived that matter produces effects only when guided by an intelligent principle ; other cases also (where the fact is not perceived with equal clearness) are in favour of our view. This the next Sutra declares. 2. If it be said — like milk or water ; there also (intelligence guides). What has been said — the Sankhya rejoins — as to the impossibility of the Pradhana not guided by an intelligent principle constructing this variously constituted world, is unfounded ; for the Pradhana may be supposed to act in the same way as milk and water do. Milk, when turning into sour milk, is capable of going by itself through a series of changes : it does not therefore depend on anything else. In the same way we observe that the homogeneous water discharged from the clouds spontaneously proceeds to trans- form itself into the various saps and juices of different plants, such as palm trees, mango trees, wood-apple trees, lime trees, tamarind trees, and so on. In the same way the Pradhana, of whose essential nature it is to change, may, without being guided by another agent, abide in the interval 486 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS. between two creations in a state of homogeneousness, and then when the time for creation comes modify itself into many various effects due to the loss of equilibrium on the part of the gu^as. As has been said '(the Pradhana acts), owing to modification, as water according to the difference of the abodes of the several gunas * (Sankhya Ka. I, 16). In this way the Unevolved acts independently of anything else.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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