Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1The assertion? that the cause only is real because it persists, while the non-continuous effects — such as jars and waterpots — are unreal, has also been refuted before, on the ground that the fact of a thing not existing at one place and one time does not sublate its 446 vedanta-sOtras. real existence at another time and place. Nor is there any soundness in the argumentation that the effect is false because, owing to its being perceived and its being perish- able, it cannot be defined either as real or unreal. For a thing's being perceived and its being perishable does not prove the thing's falseness, but only its non-permanency. To prove a thing's falseness it is required to show that it is sublated (i. e. that its non-existence is proved by valid means) with reference to that very place and time in connexion with which it is perceived ; but that a thing is sublated with reference to a place and time other than those in connexion with which it is perceived, proves only that the thing does not exist in connexion with that place and time> but not that it is false. This view also may be put in technical form, viz. effects such as jars and the like are real because they are not sublated with regard to their definite place and time ; just as the Self is. — Nor is there any truth in the assertion that the effect cannot originate from the cause either modified or unmodified; for the effect may originate from the cause if connected with certain favouring conditions of place, time, &c. Nor can you show any proof for the assertion that the cause, whether modified or non-modified, cannot enter into connexion with such favouring conditions ; as a matter of fact the cause may very well, without being modified, enter into such connexion. — But from this it follows that the cause must have been previously connected with those conditions, since previously also it was equally unmodified ! — Not so, we reply. The connexion with favouring conditions of time, place, &c, into which the cause enters, depends on some other cause, and not therefore on the fact of its not being modified. No fault then can be found with the view of the cause, when having entered into a special state depending on its connexion with time, place, &c, producing the effect. Nor can it be denied in any way that the cause possesses originative agency with regard to the effect ; for such agency is actually observed, and can- not be proved to be irrational. — Further there is no proof for the assertion that originative agency cannot belong II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 447
2Nor can it be denied in any way that the cause possesses originative agency with regard to the effect ; for such agency is actually observed, and can- not be proved to be irrational. — Further there is no proof for the assertion that originative agency cannot belong II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 447 either to mere gold or to a (first) effect of gold such as coined gold, or to gold in so far as forming the substrate for coins and the like ; for as a matter of fact mere gold (gold in general), if connected with the helpful factors men- tioned above, may very well possess originative capacity. To say that we do not perceive any effect different from gold is futile ; for as a matter of fact we perceive the svastika-ornament which is different from mere gold, and the existence of different terms and ideas moreover proves the existence of different things. Nor have we here to do with a mere error analogous to that of shell-silver. For a real effected thing, such as a golden ornament, is per- ceived during the whole period intervening between its origination and destruction, and such perception is not sublated with regard to that time and place. Nor is there any valid line of reasoning to sublate that perception. That at the same time when the previously non-perceived svastika- ornament is perceived the gold also is recognised, is due to the fact of the gold persisting as the substrate of the ornament, and hence such recognition of the causal substance does not disprove the reality of the effect. — And the attempts to prove the unreality of the world by means of scriptural texts we have already disposed of in a previous part of this work. We further object to the assertion that it is one Self which bestows on all bodies the property of being con- nected with the Self; as from this it would follow that one person is conscious of all the pains and pleasures caused by all bodies. For, as seen in the case of Saubhari and others, it is owing to the oneness of the Self that one person is conscious of the pains and pleasures due to several bodies. Nor again must you allege that the non- consciousness (on the part of one Self of all pleasures and pains whatever) is due to the plurality of the Egos, which are the subjects of cognition, and not to the plurality of Selfs ; for the Self is none other than the subject of cog- nition and the Ego. The organ of egoity (aha;^kara), on the other hand, which is the same as the internal organ (anta^kara^a), cannot be the knowing subject, for it is of a non-intelligent nature, and is a mere instrument like the 44-8 VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
3The organ of egoity (aha;^kara), on the other hand, which is the same as the internal organ (anta^kara^a), cannot be the knowing subject, for it is of a non-intelligent nature, and is a mere instrument like the 44-8 VEDANTA-S<JTRAS. body and the sense-organs. This also has been proved before. — Nor is there any proof for your assertion that all bodies must be held to spring from the avidya of one subject, because they are bodies, non-intelligent, effects, fictitious. For that all bodies are the fictitious creations of avidya is not true ; since that which is not sublated by valid means of proof must be held to be real. — Nor again can you uphold the assertion that all intelligent subjects are non-different, i.e. one, because we observe that whatever is other than a subject of cognition is non-intelligent ; for this also is disproved by the fact of the plurality of intel- ligent subjects as proved by the individual distribution, among them, of pleasures and pains. — You have further maintained ' Through me only all bodies are animated by a Self ; they are the fictitious creations of my avidya ; / alone constitute the whole aggregate of intelligent sub- jects,' and, on the basis of these averments, have attempted to prove the oneness of the Ego. But all this is nothing but the random talk of a person who has not mastered even the principles of his own theory ; for according to your theory the Self is pure intelligence to which the whole distinction of ' I,' ' Thou,' &c.-, is altogether foreign. Moreover, if it be held that everything different from pure, non-differenced intelligence is false, it follows that all effort spent on learning the Veda with a view to Release is fruit- less, for the Veda also is the effect of avidya, and the effort spent on it therefore is analogous to the effort of taking hold of the silver wrongly imagined in the shell. Or, to put it from a different point of view, all effort devoted to Release is purposeless, since it is the effect of knowledge depending on teachers of merely fictitious existence. Knowledge produced by texts such as ' Thou art that ' does not put an end to bondage, because it is produced by texts which are the fictitious product of avidya ; or because it is itself of the nature of avidya ; or because it has for its abode knowing subjects, who are mere creatures of avidya; or because it is the product of a process of study which de- pends on teachers who are the mere creatures of avidya ; it is thus no better than knowledge resting on texts teaching II ADHYAYA, I PA DA, I 5. 449
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1The assertion? that the cause only is real because it persists, while the non-continuous effects — such as jars and waterpots — are unreal, has also been refuted before, on the ground that the fact of a thing not existing at one place and one time does not sublate its 446 vedanta-sOtras. real existence at another time and place. Nor is there any soundness in the argumentation that the effect is false because, owing to its being perceived and its being perish- able, it cannot be defined either as real or unreal. For a thing's being perceived and its being perishable does not prove the thing's falseness, but only its non-permanency. To prove a thing's falseness it is required to show that it is sublated (i. e. that its non-existence is proved by valid means) with reference to that very place and time in connexion with which it is perceived ; but that a thing is sublated with reference to a place and time other than those in connexion with which it is perceived, proves only that the thing does not exist in connexion with that place and time> but not that it is false. This view also may be put in technical form, viz. effects such as jars and the like are real because they are not sublated with regard to their definite place and time ; just as the Self is. — Nor is there any truth in the assertion that the effect cannot originate from the cause either modified or unmodified; for the effect may originate from the cause if connected with certain favouring conditions of place, time, &c. Nor can you show any proof for the assertion that the cause, whether modified or non-modified, cannot enter into connexion with such favouring conditions ; as a matter of fact the cause may very well, without being modified, enter into such connexion. — But from this it follows that the cause must have been previously connected with those conditions, since previously also it was equally unmodified ! — Not so, we reply. The connexion with favouring conditions of time, place, &c, into which the cause enters, depends on some other cause, and not therefore on the fact of its not being modified. No fault then can be found with the view of the cause, when having entered into a special state depending on its connexion with time, place, &c, producing the effect. Nor can it be denied in any way that the cause possesses originative agency with regard to the effect ; for such agency is actually observed, and can- not be proved to be irrational. — Further there is no proof for the assertion that originative agency cannot belong II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 447
2Nor can it be denied in any way that the cause possesses originative agency with regard to the effect ; for such agency is actually observed, and can- not be proved to be irrational. — Further there is no proof for the assertion that originative agency cannot belong II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 447 either to mere gold or to a (first) effect of gold such as coined gold, or to gold in so far as forming the substrate for coins and the like ; for as a matter of fact mere gold (gold in general), if connected with the helpful factors men- tioned above, may very well possess originative capacity. To say that we do not perceive any effect different from gold is futile ; for as a matter of fact we perceive the svastika-ornament which is different from mere gold, and the existence of different terms and ideas moreover proves the existence of different things. Nor have we here to do with a mere error analogous to that of shell-silver. For a real effected thing, such as a golden ornament, is per- ceived during the whole period intervening between its origination and destruction, and such perception is not sublated with regard to that time and place. Nor is there any valid line of reasoning to sublate that perception. That at the same time when the previously non-perceived svastika- ornament is perceived the gold also is recognised, is due to the fact of the gold persisting as the substrate of the ornament, and hence such recognition of the causal substance does not disprove the reality of the effect. — And the attempts to prove the unreality of the world by means of scriptural texts we have already disposed of in a previous part of this work. We further object to the assertion that it is one Self which bestows on all bodies the property of being con- nected with the Self; as from this it would follow that one person is conscious of all the pains and pleasures caused by all bodies. For, as seen in the case of Saubhari and others, it is owing to the oneness of the Self that one person is conscious of the pains and pleasures due to several bodies. Nor again must you allege that the non- consciousness (on the part of one Self of all pleasures and pains whatever) is due to the plurality of the Egos, which are the subjects of cognition, and not to the plurality of Selfs ; for the Self is none other than the subject of cog- nition and the Ego. The organ of egoity (aha;^kara), on the other hand, which is the same as the internal organ (anta^kara^a), cannot be the knowing subject, for it is of a non-intelligent nature, and is a mere instrument like the 44-8 VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
3The organ of egoity (aha;^kara), on the other hand, which is the same as the internal organ (anta^kara^a), cannot be the knowing subject, for it is of a non-intelligent nature, and is a mere instrument like the 44-8 VEDANTA-S<JTRAS. body and the sense-organs. This also has been proved before. — Nor is there any proof for your assertion that all bodies must be held to spring from the avidya of one subject, because they are bodies, non-intelligent, effects, fictitious. For that all bodies are the fictitious creations of avidya is not true ; since that which is not sublated by valid means of proof must be held to be real. — Nor again can you uphold the assertion that all intelligent subjects are non-different, i.e. one, because we observe that whatever is other than a subject of cognition is non-intelligent ; for this also is disproved by the fact of the plurality of intel- ligent subjects as proved by the individual distribution, among them, of pleasures and pains. — You have further maintained ' Through me only all bodies are animated by a Self ; they are the fictitious creations of my avidya ; / alone constitute the whole aggregate of intelligent sub- jects,' and, on the basis of these averments, have attempted to prove the oneness of the Ego. But all this is nothing but the random talk of a person who has not mastered even the principles of his own theory ; for according to your theory the Self is pure intelligence to which the whole distinction of ' I,' ' Thou,' &c.-, is altogether foreign. Moreover, if it be held that everything different from pure, non-differenced intelligence is false, it follows that all effort spent on learning the Veda with a view to Release is fruit- less, for the Veda also is the effect of avidya, and the effort spent on it therefore is analogous to the effort of taking hold of the silver wrongly imagined in the shell. Or, to put it from a different point of view, all effort devoted to Release is purposeless, since it is the effect of knowledge depending on teachers of merely fictitious existence. Knowledge produced by texts such as ' Thou art that ' does not put an end to bondage, because it is produced by texts which are the fictitious product of avidya ; or because it is itself of the nature of avidya ; or because it has for its abode knowing subjects, who are mere creatures of avidya; or because it is the product of a process of study which de- pends on teachers who are the mere creatures of avidya ; it is thus no better than knowledge resting on texts teaching II ADHYAYA, I PA DA, I 5. 449
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
No commentary for this page.