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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1449 how bondage is to be put an end to, which one might have heard in a dream. Or, to put the matter again from a different point of view, Brahman constituted by pure non-differenced intelligence is false, since it is to be attained by knowledge, which is the effect of avidya ; or since it is to be attained by knowledge abiding in knowing subjects who are mere figments of avidya ; or because it is attained through knowledge which is the mere figment of avidya. For whatever is attained through knowledge of that kind is false ; as e.g. the things seen in dreams or a town of the Gandharvas (Fata Morgana). Nor does Brahman, constituted by pure non-differenced intelligence, shine forth by itself, so as not to need — for its cognition — other means of knowledge. And that that self-luminous knowledge which you declare to be borne witness to by itself, really consists in the knowledge of particular objects of knowledge — such knowledge abiding in particular cognising subjects — this also has been proved previously. And the different arguments which were set forth as proving Brahman's non-differenced nature, are sufficiently refuted by what we have said just now as to all such arguments themselves being the products of avidya. Nor again is there any sense in the theory that the principle of non-differenced intelligence * witnesses ' avidya, and implicates itself in the error of the world. For ( wit- nessing' and error are observed to abide only in definite conscious subjects, not in consciousness in general. Nor can that principle of pure intelligence be proved to possess illumining power or light depending on itself only. For by light (enlightenment) we can understand nothing but definite well-established knowledge (siddhi) on the part of some knowing subject with regard .to some particular object. It is on this basis only that you yourself prove the self-illuminedness of your universal principle ; to an absolutely non-differenced intelligence not implying the distinction of subject and object such ' svayamprakaUata ' could not possibly belong. With regard again to what you so loudly proclaim at your meetings, viz. that real effects are seen to spring even from unreal causes, we point [48] G g 450 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS.
2With regard again to what you so loudly proclaim at your meetings, viz. that real effects are seen to spring even from unreal causes, we point [48] G g 450 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS. out that although you allow to such effects, being non- sublated as it were, a kind of existence called ' empirical ' (or ' conventional ' — vyavaharika), you yourself acknow- ledge that fundamentally they are nothing but products of avidya ; you thus undermine your own position. We have, on the other hand, already disposed of this your view above, when proving that in all cases effects are originated by real causes only. Nor may you plead that what per- ception tells us in such cases is contradicted by Scripture ; for as, according to you, Scripture itself is an effect, and hence of the essence of avidya, it is in no better case than the instances quoted. — You have further declared that, although Brahman is to be attained only through unreal knowledge, yet it is real since when once attained it is not sublated by any subsequent cognition. But this reasoning also is not valid ; for when it has once been ascertained that some principle is attained through knowledge resting on a vicious basis, the fact that we are not aware of a subsequent sublation of that principle is irrelevant. That the principle ' the reality of things is a universal Void ' is false, we conclude therefrom that the reasoning leading to that principle is ascertained to be ill-founded, although we are not aware of any subsequent truth sublating that principle. Moreover, for texts such as ' There is here no plurality whatsoever/ ' Knowledge, bliss is Brahman,' the absence of subsequent sublation is claimed on the ground that they negative the whole aggregate of things different from mere intelligence, and hence are later in order than all other texts (which had established that aggregate of things). But somebody may rise and say ' the Reality is a Void/ and thus negative the existence of the principle of mere Intelligence also; and the latter principle is thus sublated by the assertion as to the Void, which is later in order than the texts which it negatives. On the other hand the assertion as to the Void being the universal principle is not liable to subsequent sublation; for it is impossible for any negation to go beyond it. And as to resting on a vicious basis, there is in that respect no difference between Perception and the other means of II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 45 I
3And as to resting on a vicious basis, there is in that respect no difference between Perception and the other means of II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 45 I knowledge, and the view of general unreality, founded on the Vedanta. The proper conclusion therefore is that all cognitions whatsoever abide in real subjects of cognition and are themselves real, consisting in mental certainty with regard to special objects. Some of these cognitions rest on defects which themselves are real ; others spring from a combination of causes, real and free from all defect. Unless we admit all this we shall not be able to account in a satisfactory way for the distinction of things true and things false, and for all empirical thought. For empirical thought, whether true or of the nature of error, presupposes inward light (illumination) in the form of certainty with regard to a particular object, and belonging to a real knowing subject ; mer>e non-differenced Being, on the other hand (not particularised in the form of a knowing subject), cannot be the cause of states of consciousness, whether referring to real or unreal things, and cannot therefore form the basis of empirical thought. Against our opponent's argument that pure Being must be held the real substrate of all erroneous superimposition (adhyasa), for the reason that no error can exist without a substrate, we remark that an error may take place even when its substrate is unreal, in the same way as an error may exist even when the defect (giving rise to the error), the abode of the defect, the subject of cognition and the cognition itself are unreal. The argument thus loses its force. Possibly he will now argue that as an error is never seen to exist where the substrate is unreal, the reality of pure Being (as furnishing the required basis for error) must necessarily be admitted. But, we point out, it also is a fact that errors are never observed where the defect, the abode of the defect, the knowing subject and the act of knowledge are unreal ; and if we pay regard to observation, we must therefore admit the reality of all these factors as well. There is really no difference between the two cases, unless our opponent chooses to.be obstinate. You further asserted that, on the theory of many really different Selfs, it would follow from the infinity of the past aeons that all souls must have been released before this, Gg2 452 ved anta-s6tr as.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1449 how bondage is to be put an end to, which one might have heard in a dream. Or, to put the matter again from a different point of view, Brahman constituted by pure non-differenced intelligence is false, since it is to be attained by knowledge, which is the effect of avidya ; or since it is to be attained by knowledge abiding in knowing subjects who are mere figments of avidya ; or because it is attained through knowledge which is the mere figment of avidya. For whatever is attained through knowledge of that kind is false ; as e.g. the things seen in dreams or a town of the Gandharvas (Fata Morgana). Nor does Brahman, constituted by pure non-differenced intelligence, shine forth by itself, so as not to need — for its cognition — other means of knowledge. And that that self-luminous knowledge which you declare to be borne witness to by itself, really consists in the knowledge of particular objects of knowledge — such knowledge abiding in particular cognising subjects — this also has been proved previously. And the different arguments which were set forth as proving Brahman's non-differenced nature, are sufficiently refuted by what we have said just now as to all such arguments themselves being the products of avidya. Nor again is there any sense in the theory that the principle of non-differenced intelligence * witnesses ' avidya, and implicates itself in the error of the world. For ( wit- nessing' and error are observed to abide only in definite conscious subjects, not in consciousness in general. Nor can that principle of pure intelligence be proved to possess illumining power or light depending on itself only. For by light (enlightenment) we can understand nothing but definite well-established knowledge (siddhi) on the part of some knowing subject with regard .to some particular object. It is on this basis only that you yourself prove the self-illuminedness of your universal principle ; to an absolutely non-differenced intelligence not implying the distinction of subject and object such ' svayamprakaUata ' could not possibly belong. With regard again to what you so loudly proclaim at your meetings, viz. that real effects are seen to spring even from unreal causes, we point [48] G g 450 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS.
2With regard again to what you so loudly proclaim at your meetings, viz. that real effects are seen to spring even from unreal causes, we point [48] G g 450 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS. out that although you allow to such effects, being non- sublated as it were, a kind of existence called ' empirical ' (or ' conventional ' — vyavaharika), you yourself acknow- ledge that fundamentally they are nothing but products of avidya ; you thus undermine your own position. We have, on the other hand, already disposed of this your view above, when proving that in all cases effects are originated by real causes only. Nor may you plead that what per- ception tells us in such cases is contradicted by Scripture ; for as, according to you, Scripture itself is an effect, and hence of the essence of avidya, it is in no better case than the instances quoted. — You have further declared that, although Brahman is to be attained only through unreal knowledge, yet it is real since when once attained it is not sublated by any subsequent cognition. But this reasoning also is not valid ; for when it has once been ascertained that some principle is attained through knowledge resting on a vicious basis, the fact that we are not aware of a subsequent sublation of that principle is irrelevant. That the principle ' the reality of things is a universal Void ' is false, we conclude therefrom that the reasoning leading to that principle is ascertained to be ill-founded, although we are not aware of any subsequent truth sublating that principle. Moreover, for texts such as ' There is here no plurality whatsoever/ ' Knowledge, bliss is Brahman,' the absence of subsequent sublation is claimed on the ground that they negative the whole aggregate of things different from mere intelligence, and hence are later in order than all other texts (which had established that aggregate of things). But somebody may rise and say ' the Reality is a Void/ and thus negative the existence of the principle of mere Intelligence also; and the latter principle is thus sublated by the assertion as to the Void, which is later in order than the texts which it negatives. On the other hand the assertion as to the Void being the universal principle is not liable to subsequent sublation; for it is impossible for any negation to go beyond it. And as to resting on a vicious basis, there is in that respect no difference between Perception and the other means of II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 45 I
3And as to resting on a vicious basis, there is in that respect no difference between Perception and the other means of II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 45 I knowledge, and the view of general unreality, founded on the Vedanta. The proper conclusion therefore is that all cognitions whatsoever abide in real subjects of cognition and are themselves real, consisting in mental certainty with regard to special objects. Some of these cognitions rest on defects which themselves are real ; others spring from a combination of causes, real and free from all defect. Unless we admit all this we shall not be able to account in a satisfactory way for the distinction of things true and things false, and for all empirical thought. For empirical thought, whether true or of the nature of error, presupposes inward light (illumination) in the form of certainty with regard to a particular object, and belonging to a real knowing subject ; mer>e non-differenced Being, on the other hand (not particularised in the form of a knowing subject), cannot be the cause of states of consciousness, whether referring to real or unreal things, and cannot therefore form the basis of empirical thought. Against our opponent's argument that pure Being must be held the real substrate of all erroneous superimposition (adhyasa), for the reason that no error can exist without a substrate, we remark that an error may take place even when its substrate is unreal, in the same way as an error may exist even when the defect (giving rise to the error), the abode of the defect, the subject of cognition and the cognition itself are unreal. The argument thus loses its force. Possibly he will now argue that as an error is never seen to exist where the substrate is unreal, the reality of pure Being (as furnishing the required basis for error) must necessarily be admitted. But, we point out, it also is a fact that errors are never observed where the defect, the abode of the defect, the knowing subject and the act of knowledge are unreal ; and if we pay regard to observation, we must therefore admit the reality of all these factors as well. There is really no difference between the two cases, unless our opponent chooses to.be obstinate. You further asserted that, on the theory of many really different Selfs, it would follow from the infinity of the past aeons that all souls must have been released before this, Gg2 452 ved anta-s6tr as.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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