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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1513 attempt to prove, on the basis of this very knowledge, that Reality is constituted by mere knowledge, are fit subjects for general derision. This point has already been set forth in detail in our refutation of those crypto-Baud- dhas who take shelter under a pretended Vedic theory. — To maintain, as the Yog&/£aras do, that the general rule of idea and thing presenting themselves together proves the non-difference of the thing from the idea, implies a self- contradiction ; for c going together ' can only be where there are different things. To hold that it is a general rule that of the idea — the essential nature of which is to make the thing to which it refers capable of entering into common thought and intercourse — we are always conscious together with the thing, and then to prove therefrom that the thing is not different from the idea, is a laughable proceeding indeed. And as, according to you, cognitions perish ab- solutely, and do not possess any permanently persisting aspect, it is rather difficult to prove that such cognitions form a series in which each member colours or affects the next one (vasana) ; for how is the earlier cognition, which has absolutely perished, to affect the later one, which has not yet arisen ? We conclude therefore that the manifold- ness of cognitions is due solely to the manifoldness of things. We are directly conscious of cognitions (ideas) as rendering the things to which they refer capable of being dealt with by ordinary thought and speech, and the specific char- acter of each cognition thus depends on the relation which connects it with a particular thing. This relation is of the nature of conjunction (sa^zyoga), since knowledge (cogni- tion) also is a substance. Just as light (prabha), although! a substance, stands to the lamp in the relation of an attri-| bute (gu#a), so knowledge stands in the relation of an attribute to the Self, but, viewed in itself, it is a substance. . ' — From all this it follows that external things are not non- j existent. 4 The next Sutra refutes the opinion of those who attempt to prove the baselessness of the cognitions of the waking state by comparing them to the cognitions of a dreaming person. [48] L 1 5 1 4 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. 28. And on account of difference of nature (they are) not like dreams.
24 The next Sutra refutes the opinion of those who attempt to prove the baselessness of the cognitions of the waking state by comparing them to the cognitions of a dreaming person. [48] L 1 5 1 4 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. 28. And on account of difference of nature (they are) not like dreams. Owing to the different nature of dream-cognitions, it cannot be said that, like them, the cognitions of the waking state also have no things to correspond to them. For dream-cognitions are originated by organs impaired by certain defects, such as drowsiness, and are moreover sub- lated by the cognitions of the waking state; while the cognitions of the waking state are of a contrary nature. There is thus no equality between the two sets. — Moreover, if all cognitions are empty of real content, you are unable to prove what you wish to prove since your inferential cognition also is devoid of true content. If, on the other hand, it be held to have a real content, then it follows that no cognition is devoid of such content ; for all of them are alike cognitions, just like the inferential cognition. 29. The existence (is) not, on account of the absence of perception. The existence of mere cognitions devoid of correspond- ing things is not possible, because such are nowhere per- ceived. For we nowhere perceive cognitions not inherent in a cognising subject and not referring to objects. That even dream-cognitions are not devoid of real matter we have explained in the discussion of the different khyatis (above, p. 118). — Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' per- ception' 30. And on account of its being unproved in every way. Here now come forward the Madhyamikas who teach that there is nothing but a universal Void. This theory of a universal Nothing is the real purport of Sugata's doctrine ; the theories of the momentariness of all exist- ence, &c, which imply the acknowledgment of the reality of things, were set forth by him merely as suiting the limited intellectual capacities of his pupils. — Neither cognitions nor external objects have real exist- ence; the Void (the 'Nothing') only constitutes Reality, and final Release means passing over into Non-being. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 30. 515
3— Neither cognitions nor external objects have real exist- ence; the Void (the 'Nothing') only constitutes Reality, and final Release means passing over into Non-being. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 30. 515 This is the real view of Buddha, and its truth is proved by the following considerations. As the Nothing is not to be proved by any argument, it is self-proved. For a cause has to be assigned for that only which is. But what is does not originate either from that which is or that which is not. We never observe that which is to originate from Being ; for things such as jars, and so on, do not originate as long as the lump of clay, &c, is non-destroyed. Nor can Being originate from Non-being ; for if the jar were supposed to originate from Non-being, i. e. that non-being which results from the destruction of the lump of clay, it would itself be of the nature of Non-being. Similarly it can be shown that nothing can originate either from itself or from anything else. For the former hypothesis would imply the vicious procedure of the explanation presupposing the thing to be explained ; and moreover no motive can be assigned for a thing originating from itself. And on the hypothesis of things originating from other things, it would follow that anything might originate from anything, for all things alike are other things. And as thus there is no origination there is also no destruction. Hence the Nothing constitutes Reality : Origination, destruction, Being, Non-being, and so on, are mere illusions (bhranti). Nor must it be said that as even an illusion cannot take place without a substrate we must assume something real to serve as a substrate ; for in the same way as an illusion may arise even when the defect, the abode of the defect, and the knowing subject are unreal, it also may arise even when the substrate of the illusion is unreal. Hence the Nothing is the only reality. — To this the Sutra replies, ' And on account of its being in every way improved ' — the theory of general Nothingness which you hold cannot stand. Do you hold that everything is being or non-being, or anything else? On none of these views the Nothingness maintained by you can be established. For the terms being and non-being and the ideas expressed by them are generally understood to refer to particular states of actually existing things only. If therefore you declare ' everything is nothing,' your declaration is equiva- Ll2 5 1 6 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1513 attempt to prove, on the basis of this very knowledge, that Reality is constituted by mere knowledge, are fit subjects for general derision. This point has already been set forth in detail in our refutation of those crypto-Baud- dhas who take shelter under a pretended Vedic theory. — To maintain, as the Yog&/£aras do, that the general rule of idea and thing presenting themselves together proves the non-difference of the thing from the idea, implies a self- contradiction ; for c going together ' can only be where there are different things. To hold that it is a general rule that of the idea — the essential nature of which is to make the thing to which it refers capable of entering into common thought and intercourse — we are always conscious together with the thing, and then to prove therefrom that the thing is not different from the idea, is a laughable proceeding indeed. And as, according to you, cognitions perish ab- solutely, and do not possess any permanently persisting aspect, it is rather difficult to prove that such cognitions form a series in which each member colours or affects the next one (vasana) ; for how is the earlier cognition, which has absolutely perished, to affect the later one, which has not yet arisen ? We conclude therefore that the manifold- ness of cognitions is due solely to the manifoldness of things. We are directly conscious of cognitions (ideas) as rendering the things to which they refer capable of being dealt with by ordinary thought and speech, and the specific char- acter of each cognition thus depends on the relation which connects it with a particular thing. This relation is of the nature of conjunction (sa^zyoga), since knowledge (cogni- tion) also is a substance. Just as light (prabha), although! a substance, stands to the lamp in the relation of an attri-| bute (gu#a), so knowledge stands in the relation of an attribute to the Self, but, viewed in itself, it is a substance. . ' — From all this it follows that external things are not non- j existent. 4 The next Sutra refutes the opinion of those who attempt to prove the baselessness of the cognitions of the waking state by comparing them to the cognitions of a dreaming person. [48] L 1 5 1 4 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. 28. And on account of difference of nature (they are) not like dreams.
24 The next Sutra refutes the opinion of those who attempt to prove the baselessness of the cognitions of the waking state by comparing them to the cognitions of a dreaming person. [48] L 1 5 1 4 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. 28. And on account of difference of nature (they are) not like dreams. Owing to the different nature of dream-cognitions, it cannot be said that, like them, the cognitions of the waking state also have no things to correspond to them. For dream-cognitions are originated by organs impaired by certain defects, such as drowsiness, and are moreover sub- lated by the cognitions of the waking state; while the cognitions of the waking state are of a contrary nature. There is thus no equality between the two sets. — Moreover, if all cognitions are empty of real content, you are unable to prove what you wish to prove since your inferential cognition also is devoid of true content. If, on the other hand, it be held to have a real content, then it follows that no cognition is devoid of such content ; for all of them are alike cognitions, just like the inferential cognition. 29. The existence (is) not, on account of the absence of perception. The existence of mere cognitions devoid of correspond- ing things is not possible, because such are nowhere per- ceived. For we nowhere perceive cognitions not inherent in a cognising subject and not referring to objects. That even dream-cognitions are not devoid of real matter we have explained in the discussion of the different khyatis (above, p. 118). — Here terminates the adhikara^a of ' per- ception' 30. And on account of its being unproved in every way. Here now come forward the Madhyamikas who teach that there is nothing but a universal Void. This theory of a universal Nothing is the real purport of Sugata's doctrine ; the theories of the momentariness of all exist- ence, &c, which imply the acknowledgment of the reality of things, were set forth by him merely as suiting the limited intellectual capacities of his pupils. — Neither cognitions nor external objects have real exist- ence; the Void (the 'Nothing') only constitutes Reality, and final Release means passing over into Non-being. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 30. 515
3— Neither cognitions nor external objects have real exist- ence; the Void (the 'Nothing') only constitutes Reality, and final Release means passing over into Non-being. II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 30. 515 This is the real view of Buddha, and its truth is proved by the following considerations. As the Nothing is not to be proved by any argument, it is self-proved. For a cause has to be assigned for that only which is. But what is does not originate either from that which is or that which is not. We never observe that which is to originate from Being ; for things such as jars, and so on, do not originate as long as the lump of clay, &c, is non-destroyed. Nor can Being originate from Non-being ; for if the jar were supposed to originate from Non-being, i. e. that non-being which results from the destruction of the lump of clay, it would itself be of the nature of Non-being. Similarly it can be shown that nothing can originate either from itself or from anything else. For the former hypothesis would imply the vicious procedure of the explanation presupposing the thing to be explained ; and moreover no motive can be assigned for a thing originating from itself. And on the hypothesis of things originating from other things, it would follow that anything might originate from anything, for all things alike are other things. And as thus there is no origination there is also no destruction. Hence the Nothing constitutes Reality : Origination, destruction, Being, Non-being, and so on, are mere illusions (bhranti). Nor must it be said that as even an illusion cannot take place without a substrate we must assume something real to serve as a substrate ; for in the same way as an illusion may arise even when the defect, the abode of the defect, and the knowing subject are unreal, it also may arise even when the substrate of the illusion is unreal. Hence the Nothing is the only reality. — To this the Sutra replies, ' And on account of its being in every way improved ' — the theory of general Nothingness which you hold cannot stand. Do you hold that everything is being or non-being, or anything else? On none of these views the Nothingness maintained by you can be established. For the terms being and non-being and the ideas expressed by them are generally understood to refer to particular states of actually existing things only. If therefore you declare ' everything is nothing,' your declaration is equiva- Ll2 5 1 6 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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