The Vedânta-Sûtras with the Commentary of Râmânuja, Part III — SBE Vol. 48 (trans. George Thibaut, 1904)

VI, 11) ; * He encircled all, bright, bodiless, scatheless, without muscles, pure, untouched by evil' (l^a Up. 8). — All these texts distinguish from the aha^kartrz due to Nescience, the true Self, absolutely perfect and pure, free from all change. Release therefore

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— which is the Self — cannot be brought about in any way. — But, if this is so, what then is the use of the comprehension of the texts ? — It is of use, we reply, in so far as it puts an end to the obstacles in the way of Release. This scriptural texts declare: ' You indeed are our father, you who carry us from our ignorance to the other shore ' (Pra. Up. VI, 8) ; i I have heard from men like you that he who knows the Self overcomes grief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine' (Kh. Up. VII, i, 3); 'To him whose faults had thus been rubbed out Sanatkumara showed the other bank of Darkness' {Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2). This shows that what is effected by the comprehension of the meaning of texts is merely the cessation of impediments in the way of Release. This cessation itself, although something effected, is of the nature of that kind of non-existence which results from the destruction of something existent, and as such does not pass away. — Texts such as ' He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman ' (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 9) ; ' Having known him he passes beyond death ' (Svet Up. 111,8), declare that Release follows immediately on the cognition of Brahman, and thus negative the intervention of injunctions. — Nor can it be maintained that Brahman is related to action in so far as constituting the object of the action either of knowledge or of meditation ; for scriptural texts deny its being an object in either of these senses. Compare * Different is this from what is known, and from what is unknown' (Ke. Up. Ill); 'By whom he knows all this, whereby should he know him ? ' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15) ; ' That do thou know as Brahman, not that on which they meditate as being this ' (Ke. Up. IV, 4). Nor does this view imply that the sacred texts have no object at all ; for it is their object to put an end to the view of difference springing from avidya. Scripture does not objectivise Brahman in any definite form, but rather teaches that its true nature is to be non-object, and thereby puts an end to the distinction, fictitiously suggested by Nescience, of knowing subjects, acts of knowledge, and objects of knowledge. Compare the text ' You should not see a seer of seeing, you should not think a thinker of

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Compare the text ' You should not see a seer of seeing, you should not think a thinker ofp. 1 thought/ &c. (Brz. Up. Ill, 4, 2).— Nor, again, must it be said that, if knowledge alone puts an end to bondage, the injunctions of hearing and so on are purposeless ; for their function is to cause the origination of the comprehension of the texts, in so far as they divert from all other alternatives the student who is naturally inclined to yield to distractions.— Nor, again, can it be maintained that a cessation of bondage through mere knowledge is never observed to take place; for as bondage is something false (unreal) it cannot possibly persist after the rise of knowledge. For the same reason it is a mistake to maintain that the cessation of bondage takes place only after the death of the body. In order that the fear inspired by the imagined snake should come to an end, it is required only that the rope should be recognised as what it is, not that a snake should be destroyed. If the body were something real, its destruction would be necessary ; but being apart from Brahman it is unreal. He whose bondage does not come to an end, in him true knowledge has not arisen ; this we infer from the effect of such knowledge not being observed in him. Whether the body persist or not, he who has reached true knowledge is released from that very moment. — The general conclusion of all this is that, as Release is not something to be accomplished by injunctions of meditation, Brahman is not proved to be something standing in a supplementary relation to such injunctions ; but is rather proved by (non-injunctory) texts, such as 'Thou art that'; ' The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman ' ; * This Self is Brahman.'

This view (the holder of the dhyana-vidhi theory rejoins) is untenable ; since the cessation of bondage cannot possibly spring from the mere comprehension of the meaning of texts. Even if bondage were something unreal, and therefore capable of sublation by knowledge, yet being something direct, immediate, it could not be sublated by the indirect comprehension of the sense of texts. When a man directly conscious of a snake before him is told by a competent by-stander that it is not a snake but merely a rope, his fear is not dispelled by a mere cognition contrary to

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When a man directly conscious of a snake before him is told by a competent by-stander that it is not a snake but merely a rope, his fear is not dispelled by a mere cognition contrary toI ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 1 85 that of a snake, and due to the information received ; but the information brings about the cessation of his fear in that way that it rouses him to an activity aiming at the direct perception, by means of his senses, of what the thing before him really is. Having at first started back in fear of the imagined snake, he now proceeds to ascertain by means of ocular perception the true nature of the thing, and having accomplished this is freed from fear. It would not be correct to say that in this case words (viz. of the person informing) produce this perceptional knowledge; for words are not a sense-organ, and among the means of knowledge it is the sense-organs only that give rise to direct knowledge. Nor, again, can it be pleaded that in the special case of Vedic texts sentences may give rise to direct knowledge, owing to the fact that the person concerned has cleansed himself of all imperfection through the performance of actions not aiming at immediate results, and has been withdrawn from all outward objects by hearing, reflection, and meditation; for in other cases also, where special impediments in the way of knowledge are being removed, we never observe that the special means of knowledge, such as the sense-organs and so on, operate outside their proper limited sphere. — Nor, again, can it be maintained that meditation acts as a means helpful towards the comprehension of texts ; for this leads to vicious reciprocal dependence — when the meaning of the texts has been comprehended it becomes the object of meditation ; and when meditation has taken place there arises comprehension of the meaning of the texts ! — Nor can it be said that meditation and the comprehension of the meaning of texts have different objects ; for if this were so the comprehension of the texts could not be a means helpful towards meditation: meditation on one thing does not give rise to eagerness with regard to another thing! — For meditation which consists in uninterrupted remembrance of a thing cognised, the cognition of the sense of texts, moreover, forms an indispensable prerequisite ; for knowledge of Brahman — the object of meditation — cannot originate from any other source. — Nor can it be said that

1 86 vedanta-s^tras.