Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1particles of oil and wick) and from its coming to an end when those causes are completely consumed. Analogously to the lamp, the Self is essentially intelli- gent (£id-rupa), and has intelligence (£aitanya) for its quality. And to be essentially intelligent means to be 60 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. self-luminous. There are many scriptural texts declaring this, compare e. g. ' As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed that Self has neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 6, 12); 'There that person becomes self-luminous, there is no destruction of the know- ing of the knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 14; 30); ' He who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 4) ; ' Who is that Self ? That one who is made of know- ledge, among the pra/zas, within the heart, the light, the person ' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7) ; ' For it is he who sees, hears, smells, tastes, thinks, considers, acts, the person whose Self is knowledge' (Pr. Up. IV, 9); 'Whereby should one know the knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15). 'This person knows/ ' The seer does not see death nor illness nor pain ' (Kh. Up. VIII, 26, 2); 'That highest person not remem- bering this body into which he was born ' (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3) ; ' Thus these sixteen parts of the spectator that go towards the person ; when they have reached the person, sink into him ' (Pr. Up. VI, 5) ; ' From this consisting of mind, there is different an interior Self consisting of knowledge ' (Taitt. Up. II, 4). And the Sutrakara also will refer to the Self as a 'knower' in II, 3, 18. All which shows that the self-luminous Self is a knower, i. e. a knowing subject, and not pure light (non-personal intelligence). In general we may say that where there is light it must belong to some- thing, as shown by the light of a lamp. The Self thus cannot be mere consciousness. The grammarians moreover tell us that words such as ' consciousness,' ' knowledge,' &c, are relative ; neither ordinary nor Vedic language uses expressions such as 'he knows' without reference to an object known and an agent who knows. With reference to the assertion that consciousness con- stitutes the Self, because it (consciousness) is not non- intelligent (gads), we ask what you understand by this ' absence of non-intelligence.' If you reply ' luminousness due to the being of the thing itself (i. e. of the thing which is a^cu/a) ' ; we point out that this definition would wrongly include lamps also, and similar things ; and it would more- I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 6 1
2e. of the thing which is a^cu/a) ' ; we point out that this definition would wrongly include lamps also, and similar things ; and it would more- I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 6 1 over give rise to a contradiction, since you do not admit light as an attribute, different from consciousness itself. Nor can we allow you to define a^cu/atva as ' being of that nature that light is always present, without any exception,' for this definition would extend also to pleasure, pain, and similar states. Should you maintain that pleasure and so on, although being throughout of the nature of light, are non- intelligent for the reason that, like jars, &c, they shine forth (appear) to something else and hence belong to the sphere of the not-Self; we ask in reply: Do you mean then to say that knowledge appears to itself ? Knowledge no less than pleasure appears to some one else, viz. the ' I ' : there is, in that respect, no difference between the judgment ' 1 know/ and the judgment * I am pleased.' Non-intelli- gence in the sense of appearingness-to-itself is thus not proved for consciousness ; and hence it follows that what constitutes the Self is the non-^a^a ' I ' which is proved to itself by its very Being. That knowledge is of the nature of light depends altogether on its connexion with the knowing * I ' : it is due to the latter, that knowledge, like pleasure, manifests itself to that conscious person who is its substrate, and not to anybody else. The Self is thus not mere knowledge, but is the knowing ' I.' The view that the conscious subject is something unreal, due to the ahamkara, cannot be maintained. We turn to a further point. You maintain that con- sciousness which is in reality devoid alike of objects and substrate presents itself, owing to error, in the form of a knowing subject, just as mother o' pearl appears as silver ; (consciousness itself being viewed as a real substrate of an erroneous imputation), because an erroneous imputation cannot take place apart from a substrate. But this theory is indefensible. If things were as you describe them, the conscious ' I ' would be cognised as co-ordinate with the state of consciousness 'I am consciousness/ just as the shining thing presenting itself to our eyes is judged to be silver. But the fact is that the state of consciousness presents itself as something apart, constituting a distin- 6 2 VED anta-s6tras.
3But the fact is that the state of consciousness presents itself as something apart, constituting a distin- 6 2 VED anta-s6tras. guishing attribute of the I, just as the stick is an attribute of Devadatta who carries it. The judgment ' I am con- scious ' reveals an ' I ' distinguished by consciousness ; and to declare that it refers only to a state of consciousness — which is a mere attribute — is no better than to say that the judgment * Devadatta carries a stick ' is about the stick only. Nor are you right in saying that the idea of the Self being a knowing agent, presents itself to the mind of him only who erroneously identifies the Self and the body, an error expressing itself in judgments such as ' I am stout/ and is on that account false ; for from this it would follow that the consciousness which is erroneously imagined as a Self is also false ; for it presents itself to the mind of the same person. You will perhaps rejoin that consciousness is not false because it (alone) is not sublated by that cognition which sublates everything else. Well, we reply, then the knowership of the Self also is not false; for that also is not sublated. You further maintain that the character of being a knower, i. e. the agent in the action of knowing, does not become the non-changing Self; that being a knower is something implying change, of a non- intelligent kind (^a^a), and residing in the aha^kara which is the abode of change and a mere effect of the Unevolved (the Prakrzti) ; that being an agent and so on is like colour and other qualities, an attribute of what is objective ; and that if we admit the Self to be an agent and the object of the notion of the ' I,' it also follows that the Self is, like the body, not a real Self but something external and non- intelligent. But all this is unfounded, since the internal organ is, like the body, non-intelligent, an effect of Pra- krzti, an object of knowledge, something outward and for the sake of others merely; while being a knowing subject constitutes the special essential nature of intelligent beings. To explain. Just as the body, through its objectiveness, outwardness, and similar causes, is distinguished from what possesses the opposite attributes of subjectiveness, inward- ness, and so on ; for the same reason the aha/^kara also — which is of the same substantial nature as the body — is similarly distinguished. Hence the ahawkara is no more I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 63
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1particles of oil and wick) and from its coming to an end when those causes are completely consumed. Analogously to the lamp, the Self is essentially intelli- gent (£id-rupa), and has intelligence (£aitanya) for its quality. And to be essentially intelligent means to be 60 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. self-luminous. There are many scriptural texts declaring this, compare e. g. ' As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed that Self has neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 6, 12); 'There that person becomes self-luminous, there is no destruction of the know- ing of the knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 14; 30); ' He who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 4) ; ' Who is that Self ? That one who is made of know- ledge, among the pra/zas, within the heart, the light, the person ' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7) ; ' For it is he who sees, hears, smells, tastes, thinks, considers, acts, the person whose Self is knowledge' (Pr. Up. IV, 9); 'Whereby should one know the knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15). 'This person knows/ ' The seer does not see death nor illness nor pain ' (Kh. Up. VIII, 26, 2); 'That highest person not remem- bering this body into which he was born ' (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3) ; ' Thus these sixteen parts of the spectator that go towards the person ; when they have reached the person, sink into him ' (Pr. Up. VI, 5) ; ' From this consisting of mind, there is different an interior Self consisting of knowledge ' (Taitt. Up. II, 4). And the Sutrakara also will refer to the Self as a 'knower' in II, 3, 18. All which shows that the self-luminous Self is a knower, i. e. a knowing subject, and not pure light (non-personal intelligence). In general we may say that where there is light it must belong to some- thing, as shown by the light of a lamp. The Self thus cannot be mere consciousness. The grammarians moreover tell us that words such as ' consciousness,' ' knowledge,' &c, are relative ; neither ordinary nor Vedic language uses expressions such as 'he knows' without reference to an object known and an agent who knows. With reference to the assertion that consciousness con- stitutes the Self, because it (consciousness) is not non- intelligent (gads), we ask what you understand by this ' absence of non-intelligence.' If you reply ' luminousness due to the being of the thing itself (i. e. of the thing which is a^cu/a) ' ; we point out that this definition would wrongly include lamps also, and similar things ; and it would more- I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 6 1
2e. of the thing which is a^cu/a) ' ; we point out that this definition would wrongly include lamps also, and similar things ; and it would more- I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 6 1 over give rise to a contradiction, since you do not admit light as an attribute, different from consciousness itself. Nor can we allow you to define a^cu/atva as ' being of that nature that light is always present, without any exception,' for this definition would extend also to pleasure, pain, and similar states. Should you maintain that pleasure and so on, although being throughout of the nature of light, are non- intelligent for the reason that, like jars, &c, they shine forth (appear) to something else and hence belong to the sphere of the not-Self; we ask in reply: Do you mean then to say that knowledge appears to itself ? Knowledge no less than pleasure appears to some one else, viz. the ' I ' : there is, in that respect, no difference between the judgment ' 1 know/ and the judgment * I am pleased.' Non-intelli- gence in the sense of appearingness-to-itself is thus not proved for consciousness ; and hence it follows that what constitutes the Self is the non-^a^a ' I ' which is proved to itself by its very Being. That knowledge is of the nature of light depends altogether on its connexion with the knowing * I ' : it is due to the latter, that knowledge, like pleasure, manifests itself to that conscious person who is its substrate, and not to anybody else. The Self is thus not mere knowledge, but is the knowing ' I.' The view that the conscious subject is something unreal, due to the ahamkara, cannot be maintained. We turn to a further point. You maintain that con- sciousness which is in reality devoid alike of objects and substrate presents itself, owing to error, in the form of a knowing subject, just as mother o' pearl appears as silver ; (consciousness itself being viewed as a real substrate of an erroneous imputation), because an erroneous imputation cannot take place apart from a substrate. But this theory is indefensible. If things were as you describe them, the conscious ' I ' would be cognised as co-ordinate with the state of consciousness 'I am consciousness/ just as the shining thing presenting itself to our eyes is judged to be silver. But the fact is that the state of consciousness presents itself as something apart, constituting a distin- 6 2 VED anta-s6tras.
3But the fact is that the state of consciousness presents itself as something apart, constituting a distin- 6 2 VED anta-s6tras. guishing attribute of the I, just as the stick is an attribute of Devadatta who carries it. The judgment ' I am con- scious ' reveals an ' I ' distinguished by consciousness ; and to declare that it refers only to a state of consciousness — which is a mere attribute — is no better than to say that the judgment * Devadatta carries a stick ' is about the stick only. Nor are you right in saying that the idea of the Self being a knowing agent, presents itself to the mind of him only who erroneously identifies the Self and the body, an error expressing itself in judgments such as ' I am stout/ and is on that account false ; for from this it would follow that the consciousness which is erroneously imagined as a Self is also false ; for it presents itself to the mind of the same person. You will perhaps rejoin that consciousness is not false because it (alone) is not sublated by that cognition which sublates everything else. Well, we reply, then the knowership of the Self also is not false; for that also is not sublated. You further maintain that the character of being a knower, i. e. the agent in the action of knowing, does not become the non-changing Self; that being a knower is something implying change, of a non- intelligent kind (^a^a), and residing in the aha^kara which is the abode of change and a mere effect of the Unevolved (the Prakrzti) ; that being an agent and so on is like colour and other qualities, an attribute of what is objective ; and that if we admit the Self to be an agent and the object of the notion of the ' I,' it also follows that the Self is, like the body, not a real Self but something external and non- intelligent. But all this is unfounded, since the internal organ is, like the body, non-intelligent, an effect of Pra- krzti, an object of knowledge, something outward and for the sake of others merely; while being a knowing subject constitutes the special essential nature of intelligent beings. To explain. Just as the body, through its objectiveness, outwardness, and similar causes, is distinguished from what possesses the opposite attributes of subjectiveness, inward- ness, and so on ; for the same reason the aha/^kara also — which is of the same substantial nature as the body — is similarly distinguished. Hence the ahawkara is no more I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 63
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
No commentary for this page.