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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1For it is an acknowledged principle that Scripture has a meaning only with regard to what is not established by other sources of knowledge. — But what, to raise a prima facie counter objection, are those other sources of know- [48] M 1 62 vedAnta-s^tras. ledge ? It cannot, in the first place, be Perception. Perception is twofold, being based either on the sense- organs or on extraordinary concentration of mind (yoga). Of Perception of the former kind there are again two sub-species, according as Perception takes place either through the outer sense-organs or the internal organ (manas). Now the outer sense-organs produce knowledge of their respective objects, in so far as the latter are in actual contact with the organs, but are quite unable to give rise to the knowledge of the special object constituted by a supreme Self that is capable of being conscious of and creating the whole aggregate of things. Nor can internal perception give rise to such knowledge ; for only purely internal things, such as pleasure and pain, fall within its cognisance, and it is incapable of relating itself to external objects apart from the outer sense-organs. Nor, again, perception based on Yoga ; for although such perception — which springs from intense imagination — implies a vivid presentation of things, it is, after all, nothing more than a reproduction of objects perceived previously, and does not therefore rank as an instrument of knowledge ; for it has no means of applying itself to objects other than those perceived previously. And if, after all, it does so, it is (not a means of knowledge but) a source of error. — Nor also inference either of the kind which proceeds on the observation of special cases or of the kind which rests on generalizations (cp. Nyaya Sfi. I, i, 5). Not inference of the former kind, because such inference is not known to relate to anything lying beyond the reach of the senses. Nor inference of the latter kind, because we do not observe any characteristic feature that is invariably accompanied by the presence of a supreme Self capable of being conscious of, and constructing, the universe of things. — But there is such a feature, viz. the world's being an effected thing ; it being a matter of common experience that whatever is an effect or product, is due to an agent who possesses a knowledge of the material cause, the instru- mental cause, the final end, and the person meant to make use of the thing produced. It further is matter of ex- I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 1 63
2It further is matter of ex- I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 1 63 perience that whatever consists of non-sentient matter is dependent on, or ruled by, a single intelligent principle. The former generalization is exemplified by the case of jars and similar things, and the latter by a living body in good health, which consists of non-intelligent matter dependent on an intelligent principle. And that the body is an effected thing follows from its consisting of parts. — Against this argumentation also objections may be raised. What, it must be asked, do you understand by this depen- dence on an intelligent principle ? Not, we suppose, that the origination and subsistence of the non-intelligent thing should be dependent on the intelligent principle ; for in that case your example would not help to prove your contention. Neither the origin nor the subsistence of a person's healthy body depends on the intelligent soul of that person alone ; they rather are brought about by the merit and demerit of all those souls which in any way share the fruition of that body — the wife, e. g. of that person, and others. Moreover, the existence of a body made up of parts means that body's being connected with its parts in the way of so-called intimate relation (sama- vaya), and this requires a certain combination of the parts but not a presiding intelligent principle. The existence of animated bodies, moreover, has for its characteristic mark the process of breathing, which is absent in the case of the earth, sea, mountains, &c. — all of which are included in the class of things concerning which you wish to prove something — , and we therefore miss a uniform kind of exis- tence common to all those things. — Let us then understand by the dependence of a non-intelligent thing on an intelli- gent principle, the fact of the motion of the former de- pending on the latter ! — This definition, we rejoin, would comprehend also those cases in which heavy things, such as carriages, masses of stone, trees, &c, are set in motion by several intelligent beings (while what you want to prove is the dependence of a moving thing on one intelligent principle). If, on the other hand, you mean to say that all motion depends on intelligence in general, you only prove what requires no proof. — Another alternative, more- M 2 1 64 VEDANTA-Stf TRAS.
3If, on the other hand, you mean to say that all motion depends on intelligence in general, you only prove what requires no proof. — Another alternative, more- M 2 1 64 VEDANTA-Stf TRAS. over, here presents itself. As we both admit the existence of individual souls, it will be the more economical hypo- thesis to ascribe to them the agency implied in the con- struction of the world. Nor must you object to this view on the ground that such agency cannot belong to the individual souls because they do not possess the knowledge of material causes, &c, as specified above ; for all intelli- gent beings are capable of direct knowledge of material causes, such as earth and so on, and instrumental causes, such as sacrifices and the like. Earth and other material substances, as well as sacrifices and the like, are directly perceived by individual intelligent beings at the present time (and were no doubt equally perceived so at a former time when this world had to be planned and constructed). Nor does the fact that intelligent beings are not capable of direct insight into the unseen principle — called ' apurva/ or by similar names — which resides in the form of a power in sacrifices and other instrumental causes, in any way pre- clude their being agents in the construction of the world. Direct insight into powers is nowhere required for under- taking work : what is required for that purpose is only direct presentative knowledge of the things endowed with power, while of power itself it suffices to have some kind of knowledge. Potters apply themselves to the task of making pots and jars on the strength of the direct know- ledge they possess of the implements of their work — the wheel, the staff, &c. — without troubling about a similar knowledge of the powers inherent in those implements; and in the same way intelligent beings may apply them- selves to their work (to be effected by means of sacri- fices, &c), if only they are assured by sacred tradition of the existence of the various powers possessed by sacrifices and the like. — Moreover, experience teaches that agents having a knowledge of the material and other causes must be inferred only in the case of those effects which can be produced, and the material and other causes of which can be known: such things, on the other hand, as the earth, mountains, and oceans, can neither be produced, nor can their material and other causes ever be known ; we there- I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 3. 1 65
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1For it is an acknowledged principle that Scripture has a meaning only with regard to what is not established by other sources of knowledge. — But what, to raise a prima facie counter objection, are those other sources of know- [48] M 1 62 vedAnta-s^tras. ledge ? It cannot, in the first place, be Perception. Perception is twofold, being based either on the sense- organs or on extraordinary concentration of mind (yoga). Of Perception of the former kind there are again two sub-species, according as Perception takes place either through the outer sense-organs or the internal organ (manas). Now the outer sense-organs produce knowledge of their respective objects, in so far as the latter are in actual contact with the organs, but are quite unable to give rise to the knowledge of the special object constituted by a supreme Self that is capable of being conscious of and creating the whole aggregate of things. Nor can internal perception give rise to such knowledge ; for only purely internal things, such as pleasure and pain, fall within its cognisance, and it is incapable of relating itself to external objects apart from the outer sense-organs. Nor, again, perception based on Yoga ; for although such perception — which springs from intense imagination — implies a vivid presentation of things, it is, after all, nothing more than a reproduction of objects perceived previously, and does not therefore rank as an instrument of knowledge ; for it has no means of applying itself to objects other than those perceived previously. And if, after all, it does so, it is (not a means of knowledge but) a source of error. — Nor also inference either of the kind which proceeds on the observation of special cases or of the kind which rests on generalizations (cp. Nyaya Sfi. I, i, 5). Not inference of the former kind, because such inference is not known to relate to anything lying beyond the reach of the senses. Nor inference of the latter kind, because we do not observe any characteristic feature that is invariably accompanied by the presence of a supreme Self capable of being conscious of, and constructing, the universe of things. — But there is such a feature, viz. the world's being an effected thing ; it being a matter of common experience that whatever is an effect or product, is due to an agent who possesses a knowledge of the material cause, the instru- mental cause, the final end, and the person meant to make use of the thing produced. It further is matter of ex- I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 1 63
2It further is matter of ex- I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 1 63 perience that whatever consists of non-sentient matter is dependent on, or ruled by, a single intelligent principle. The former generalization is exemplified by the case of jars and similar things, and the latter by a living body in good health, which consists of non-intelligent matter dependent on an intelligent principle. And that the body is an effected thing follows from its consisting of parts. — Against this argumentation also objections may be raised. What, it must be asked, do you understand by this depen- dence on an intelligent principle ? Not, we suppose, that the origination and subsistence of the non-intelligent thing should be dependent on the intelligent principle ; for in that case your example would not help to prove your contention. Neither the origin nor the subsistence of a person's healthy body depends on the intelligent soul of that person alone ; they rather are brought about by the merit and demerit of all those souls which in any way share the fruition of that body — the wife, e. g. of that person, and others. Moreover, the existence of a body made up of parts means that body's being connected with its parts in the way of so-called intimate relation (sama- vaya), and this requires a certain combination of the parts but not a presiding intelligent principle. The existence of animated bodies, moreover, has for its characteristic mark the process of breathing, which is absent in the case of the earth, sea, mountains, &c. — all of which are included in the class of things concerning which you wish to prove something — , and we therefore miss a uniform kind of exis- tence common to all those things. — Let us then understand by the dependence of a non-intelligent thing on an intelli- gent principle, the fact of the motion of the former de- pending on the latter ! — This definition, we rejoin, would comprehend also those cases in which heavy things, such as carriages, masses of stone, trees, &c, are set in motion by several intelligent beings (while what you want to prove is the dependence of a moving thing on one intelligent principle). If, on the other hand, you mean to say that all motion depends on intelligence in general, you only prove what requires no proof. — Another alternative, more- M 2 1 64 VEDANTA-Stf TRAS.
3If, on the other hand, you mean to say that all motion depends on intelligence in general, you only prove what requires no proof. — Another alternative, more- M 2 1 64 VEDANTA-Stf TRAS. over, here presents itself. As we both admit the existence of individual souls, it will be the more economical hypo- thesis to ascribe to them the agency implied in the con- struction of the world. Nor must you object to this view on the ground that such agency cannot belong to the individual souls because they do not possess the knowledge of material causes, &c, as specified above ; for all intelli- gent beings are capable of direct knowledge of material causes, such as earth and so on, and instrumental causes, such as sacrifices and the like. Earth and other material substances, as well as sacrifices and the like, are directly perceived by individual intelligent beings at the present time (and were no doubt equally perceived so at a former time when this world had to be planned and constructed). Nor does the fact that intelligent beings are not capable of direct insight into the unseen principle — called ' apurva/ or by similar names — which resides in the form of a power in sacrifices and other instrumental causes, in any way pre- clude their being agents in the construction of the world. Direct insight into powers is nowhere required for under- taking work : what is required for that purpose is only direct presentative knowledge of the things endowed with power, while of power itself it suffices to have some kind of knowledge. Potters apply themselves to the task of making pots and jars on the strength of the direct know- ledge they possess of the implements of their work — the wheel, the staff, &c. — without troubling about a similar knowledge of the powers inherent in those implements; and in the same way intelligent beings may apply them- selves to their work (to be effected by means of sacri- fices, &c), if only they are assured by sacred tradition of the existence of the various powers possessed by sacrifices and the like. — Moreover, experience teaches that agents having a knowledge of the material and other causes must be inferred only in the case of those effects which can be produced, and the material and other causes of which can be known: such things, on the other hand, as the earth, mountains, and oceans, can neither be produced, nor can their material and other causes ever be known ; we there- I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 3. 1 65
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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