Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Now antecedent non-existence of knowledge is admitted by you also, and is an undoubted object of consciousness ; the right conclusion therefore is that what we are conscious of in such judgments as c I am non-knowing,' &c., is this very antecedent non-existence of knowledge which we both admit. It, moreover, is impossible to ascribe to Brahman, whose nature is constituted by eternal free self-luminous in- telligence, the consciousness of Nescience ; for what con- stitutes its essence is consciousness of itself. If against this you urge that Brahman, although having consciousness of Self for its essential nature, yet is conscious of non-know- ledge in so far as its (Brahman's) nature is hidden ; we ask in return what we have to understand by Brahman's nature being hidden. You will perhaps say 'the fact of its not being illumined.' But how, we ask, can there be absence of illumination of the nature of that whose very nature con- sists in consciousness of Self, i. e. self-illumination ? If you reply that even that whose nature is consciousness of Self may be in the state of its nature not being illumined by an outside agency, we point out that as according to you light cannot be considered as an attribute, but constitutes the very nature of Brahman, it would — illumination coming from an external agency — follow that the very nature of Brahman can be destroyed from the outside. This we have already remarked. — Further, your view implies on the one hand that this non-knowledge which is the cause of the concealment of Brahman's nature hides Brahman in so far as Brahman is conscious of it, and on the other hand that having hidden Brahman, it becomes the object of consciousness on the part of Brahman ; and this evidently constitutes a logical see-saw. You will perhaps say l that it hides Brahman in so far only as Brahman is conscious of it. But, we point out, if the consciousness of a^Tzana takes place on the part of a Brahman whose nature is not hidden, the whole hypothesis of the ' hiding ' of Brahman's nature 3 Allowing the former view of the question only. 112 vedanta-s6tras. loses its purport, and with it the fundamental hypothesis as to the nature of agnana ; for if Brahman may be conscious of agn&na. (without a previous obscuration of its nature by agnkna) it may as well be held to be in the same way conscious of the world, which, by you, is considered to be an effect of a^Tzana.
2(without a previous obscuration of its nature by agnkna) it may as well be held to be in the same way conscious of the world, which, by you, is considered to be an effect of a^Tzana. How, further, do you conceive this consciousness of a^Tzana on Brahman's part? Is it due to Brahman itself, or to something else ? In the former case this conscious- ness would result from Brahman's essential nature, and hence there would never be any Release. Or else, con- sciousness of a^/zana constituting the nature of Brahman, which is admittedly pure consciousness, in the same way as the consciousness of false silver is terminated by that cognition which sublates the silver, so some terminating act of cognition would eventually put an end to Brahman's essential nature itself. — On the second alternative we ask what that something else should be. If you reply ' another a^ana,' we are led into a regressus in infinitum, — Let it then be said1 that a^/zana having first hidden Brahman then becomes the object of its consciousness. — This, we rejoin, would imply that a^Tzana — acting like a defect of the eye — by its very essential being hides Brahman, and then a^/zana could not be sublated by knowledge. — Let us then put the case as follows : — A^Tzana, which is by itself beginningless, at the very same time effects Brahman's witnessing it (being conscious of it), and Brahman's nature being hidden ; in this way the regressus in infinitum and other difficulties will be avoided. — But this also we cannot admit ; for Brahman is essentially consciousness of Self, and cannot become a witnessing principle unless its nature be previously hidden. — Let then Brahman be hidden by some other cause ! — This, we rejoin, would take away from a^Tzana its alleged beginninglessness, and further would also lead to an infinite regress. And if Brahman were assumed to become a witness, without its essential nature being hidden, it could not possess — what yet it is main- 1 Adopting the latter view only ; see preceding note. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I 13
3And if Brahman were assumed to become a witness, without its essential nature being hidden, it could not possess — what yet it is main- 1 Adopting the latter view only ; see preceding note. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I 13 tained to possess — the uniform character of consciousness of Self. — If, moreover, Brahman is hidden by avidya, does it then not shine forth at all, or does it shine forth to some extent ? On the former alternative the not shining forth of Brahman — whose nature is mere light — reduces it to an absolute non-entity. Regarding the latter alternative we ask, ' of Brahman, which is of an absolutely homogeneous nature, which part do you consider to be concealed, and which to shine forth?' To that substance which is pure light, free from all division and distinction, there cannot belong two modes of being, and hence obscuration and light cannot abide in it together. — Let us then say that Brahman, which is homogeneous being, intelligence, bliss, has its nature obscured by avidy&, and hence is seen indistinctly as it were. — But howr, we ask, are we to conceive the distinctness or indistinctness of that whose nature is pure light ? When an object of light which has parts and distinguishing attributes appears in its totality, we say that it appears distinctly ; while we say that its appearance is indistinct when some of its attributes do not appear. Now in those aspects of the thing which do not appear, light (illumination) is absent altogether, and hence we cannot there speak of indistinctness of light ; in those parts on the other hand which do appear, the light of which they are the object is distinct. Indistinctness is thus not possible at all where there is light. In the case of such things as are apprehended as objects, indistinctness may take place, viz. in so far as some of their distinguishing attributes are not apprehended. But in Brahman, which is not an object, without any distinguishing attributes, pure light, the essential nature of which it is to shine forth, indistinctness which consists in the non-apprehension of certain attributes can in no way be conceived, and hence not be explained as the effect of avidya. We, moreover, must ask the following question : * Is this indistinctness which you consider an effect of avidya put an end to by the rise of true knowledge or not ? ' On the latter alternative there would be no final release. In the former case we have to ask of what nature Reality is. ' It is of [48] I 1 1 4 vedanta-sOtras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Now antecedent non-existence of knowledge is admitted by you also, and is an undoubted object of consciousness ; the right conclusion therefore is that what we are conscious of in such judgments as c I am non-knowing,' &c., is this very antecedent non-existence of knowledge which we both admit. It, moreover, is impossible to ascribe to Brahman, whose nature is constituted by eternal free self-luminous in- telligence, the consciousness of Nescience ; for what con- stitutes its essence is consciousness of itself. If against this you urge that Brahman, although having consciousness of Self for its essential nature, yet is conscious of non-know- ledge in so far as its (Brahman's) nature is hidden ; we ask in return what we have to understand by Brahman's nature being hidden. You will perhaps say 'the fact of its not being illumined.' But how, we ask, can there be absence of illumination of the nature of that whose very nature con- sists in consciousness of Self, i. e. self-illumination ? If you reply that even that whose nature is consciousness of Self may be in the state of its nature not being illumined by an outside agency, we point out that as according to you light cannot be considered as an attribute, but constitutes the very nature of Brahman, it would — illumination coming from an external agency — follow that the very nature of Brahman can be destroyed from the outside. This we have already remarked. — Further, your view implies on the one hand that this non-knowledge which is the cause of the concealment of Brahman's nature hides Brahman in so far as Brahman is conscious of it, and on the other hand that having hidden Brahman, it becomes the object of consciousness on the part of Brahman ; and this evidently constitutes a logical see-saw. You will perhaps say l that it hides Brahman in so far only as Brahman is conscious of it. But, we point out, if the consciousness of a^Tzana takes place on the part of a Brahman whose nature is not hidden, the whole hypothesis of the ' hiding ' of Brahman's nature 3 Allowing the former view of the question only. 112 vedanta-s6tras. loses its purport, and with it the fundamental hypothesis as to the nature of agnana ; for if Brahman may be conscious of agn&na. (without a previous obscuration of its nature by agnkna) it may as well be held to be in the same way conscious of the world, which, by you, is considered to be an effect of a^Tzana.
2(without a previous obscuration of its nature by agnkna) it may as well be held to be in the same way conscious of the world, which, by you, is considered to be an effect of a^Tzana. How, further, do you conceive this consciousness of a^Tzana on Brahman's part? Is it due to Brahman itself, or to something else ? In the former case this conscious- ness would result from Brahman's essential nature, and hence there would never be any Release. Or else, con- sciousness of a^/zana constituting the nature of Brahman, which is admittedly pure consciousness, in the same way as the consciousness of false silver is terminated by that cognition which sublates the silver, so some terminating act of cognition would eventually put an end to Brahman's essential nature itself. — On the second alternative we ask what that something else should be. If you reply ' another a^ana,' we are led into a regressus in infinitum, — Let it then be said1 that a^/zana having first hidden Brahman then becomes the object of its consciousness. — This, we rejoin, would imply that a^Tzana — acting like a defect of the eye — by its very essential being hides Brahman, and then a^/zana could not be sublated by knowledge. — Let us then put the case as follows : — A^Tzana, which is by itself beginningless, at the very same time effects Brahman's witnessing it (being conscious of it), and Brahman's nature being hidden ; in this way the regressus in infinitum and other difficulties will be avoided. — But this also we cannot admit ; for Brahman is essentially consciousness of Self, and cannot become a witnessing principle unless its nature be previously hidden. — Let then Brahman be hidden by some other cause ! — This, we rejoin, would take away from a^Tzana its alleged beginninglessness, and further would also lead to an infinite regress. And if Brahman were assumed to become a witness, without its essential nature being hidden, it could not possess — what yet it is main- 1 Adopting the latter view only ; see preceding note. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I 13
3And if Brahman were assumed to become a witness, without its essential nature being hidden, it could not possess — what yet it is main- 1 Adopting the latter view only ; see preceding note. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I 13 tained to possess — the uniform character of consciousness of Self. — If, moreover, Brahman is hidden by avidya, does it then not shine forth at all, or does it shine forth to some extent ? On the former alternative the not shining forth of Brahman — whose nature is mere light — reduces it to an absolute non-entity. Regarding the latter alternative we ask, ' of Brahman, which is of an absolutely homogeneous nature, which part do you consider to be concealed, and which to shine forth?' To that substance which is pure light, free from all division and distinction, there cannot belong two modes of being, and hence obscuration and light cannot abide in it together. — Let us then say that Brahman, which is homogeneous being, intelligence, bliss, has its nature obscured by avidy&, and hence is seen indistinctly as it were. — But howr, we ask, are we to conceive the distinctness or indistinctness of that whose nature is pure light ? When an object of light which has parts and distinguishing attributes appears in its totality, we say that it appears distinctly ; while we say that its appearance is indistinct when some of its attributes do not appear. Now in those aspects of the thing which do not appear, light (illumination) is absent altogether, and hence we cannot there speak of indistinctness of light ; in those parts on the other hand which do appear, the light of which they are the object is distinct. Indistinctness is thus not possible at all where there is light. In the case of such things as are apprehended as objects, indistinctness may take place, viz. in so far as some of their distinguishing attributes are not apprehended. But in Brahman, which is not an object, without any distinguishing attributes, pure light, the essential nature of which it is to shine forth, indistinctness which consists in the non-apprehension of certain attributes can in no way be conceived, and hence not be explained as the effect of avidya. We, moreover, must ask the following question : * Is this indistinctness which you consider an effect of avidya put an end to by the rise of true knowledge or not ? ' On the latter alternative there would be no final release. In the former case we have to ask of what nature Reality is. ' It is of [48] I 1 1 4 vedanta-sOtras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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