Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1To this objection the Sutra replies in the words, 'it may be, as in ordinary life/ The desired distinction in nature between the Lord and the individual soul may exist all the same. That a soul experiences pleasures and pains caused by the various states of the body is not due to the fact of its being joined to a body, but to its karman in the form of good and evil deeds. The scriptural text also which you quote refers to that body only which is originated by karman ; for other texts (' He is onefold, he is threefold ' ; ' If he desires the world of the Fathers'; 'He moves about there eating, playing, rejoicing'; Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2; VIII, 2, 1 ; 12, 3) show that the person who has freed himself from the bondage of karman and become manifest in his true nature is not touched by a shadow of evil while all the same he has a body. The highest Self, which is essentially free from all evil, thus has the entire world in its gross and its subtle form for its body ; but being in no way connected with karman it is all the less connected with evil of any kind. — ' As in ordinary life.' We observe in ordinary life that while those who either observe or transgress the ordinances of a ruler experience pleasure or pain according as the ruler shows them favour or restrains them, it does not follow from the mere fact of the ruler's having a body that he himself also experiences the pleasure and pain due to the observance or transgression of his commands. The author of the DranuWa-bhashya gives expression to II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 429
2The author of the DranuWa-bhashya gives expression to II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 429 the same view, 'As in ordinary life a prince, although staying in a very unpleasant place infested with mosquitoes and full of discomforts of all kind is yet not touched by all these troubles, his body being constantly refreshed by fans and other means of comfort, rules the countries for which he cares and continues to enjoy all possible pleasures, such as fragrant odours and the like ; so the Lord of creation, to whom his power serves as an ever- moving fan as it were, is not touched by the evils of that creation, but rules the world of Brahman and the other worlds for which he cares, and continues to enjoy all possible delights/ That the nature of Brahman should undergo changes like a lump of clay or gold we do not admit, since many texts declare Brahman to be free from all change and imperfection. — Others give a different explanation of this Sutra. According to them it refutes the purvapaksha that on the view of Brahman being the general cause the distinction of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment cannot be accounted for — proving the possibility of such distinction by means of the analogous instance of the sea and its waves and flakes of foam. But this interpretation is inappropriate, since for those who hold that creation proceeds from Brahman connected with some power or Nescience or a limiting adjunct (upadhi) no such primd facie view can arise. For on their theory the enjoying subject is that which is conditioned by the power or Nescience or upadhi inhering in the causal substance, and the power or Nescience or upadhi is the object of enjoyment ; and as the two are of different nature, they cannot pass over into each other. The view of Brahman itself undergoing an essential change (on which that prima facie view might possibly be held to arise) is not admitted by those philosophers ; for Sutra II, i, 35 teaches that the individual souls and their deeds form a stream which has no beginning (so that the distinction of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment is eternal). But even if it be held that Brahman itself undergoes a change, the doubt as to the non-distinction of subjects and objects of enjoyment does not arise ; for the distinction 430 vedanta-s6tras. of the two groups will, on that view, be analogous to that of jars and platters which are modifications of the one substance clay, or to that of bracelets and crowns fashioned out of the one substance gold. And on the view of Brahman itself undergoing a change there arises a further difficulty, viz. in so far as Brahman (which is nothing but pure non-conditioned intelligence) is held to transform itself into (limited) enjoying souls and (non-sentient) objects of enjoyment. 15. The non-difference (of the world) from that (viz. Brahman) follows from what begins with the word arambhana.
3in so far as Brahman (which is nothing but pure non-conditioned intelligence) is held to transform itself into (limited) enjoying souls and (non-sentient) objects of enjoyment. 15. The non-difference (of the world) from that (viz. Brahman) follows from what begins with the word arambhana. Under II, 1,7 and other Sutras the non-difference of the effect, i. e. the world from the cause, i. e. Brahman was assumed, and it was on this basis that the proof of Brahman being the cause of the world proceeded. The present Sutra now raises a prima facie objection against that very non-difference, and then proceeds to refute it. On the point in question the school of Ka^ada argues as follows. It is in no way possible that the effect should be non-different from the cause. For cause and effect are the objects of different ideas : the ideas which have for their respective objects threads and a piece of cloth, or a lump of clay and a jar, are distinctly not of one and the same kind. The difference of words supplies a second argument ; nobody applies to mere threads the word ' piece of cloth/ or vice versa. A third argument rests on the difference of effects : water is not fetched from the well in a lump of clay, nor is a well built with jars. There, fourthly, is the difference of time ; the cause is prior in time, the effect posterior. There is, fifthly, the difference of form : the cause has the shape of a lump, the effect (the jar) is shaped like a belly with a broad basis ; clay in the latter condition only is meant when we say ' The jar has gone to pieces/ There, sixthly, is a numerical difference : the threads are many, the piece of cloth is one only. In the seventh place, there is the uselessness of the activity of the producing agent (which would result from cause and effect being II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 5. 43 1
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1To this objection the Sutra replies in the words, 'it may be, as in ordinary life/ The desired distinction in nature between the Lord and the individual soul may exist all the same. That a soul experiences pleasures and pains caused by the various states of the body is not due to the fact of its being joined to a body, but to its karman in the form of good and evil deeds. The scriptural text also which you quote refers to that body only which is originated by karman ; for other texts (' He is onefold, he is threefold ' ; ' If he desires the world of the Fathers'; 'He moves about there eating, playing, rejoicing'; Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2; VIII, 2, 1 ; 12, 3) show that the person who has freed himself from the bondage of karman and become manifest in his true nature is not touched by a shadow of evil while all the same he has a body. The highest Self, which is essentially free from all evil, thus has the entire world in its gross and its subtle form for its body ; but being in no way connected with karman it is all the less connected with evil of any kind. — ' As in ordinary life.' We observe in ordinary life that while those who either observe or transgress the ordinances of a ruler experience pleasure or pain according as the ruler shows them favour or restrains them, it does not follow from the mere fact of the ruler's having a body that he himself also experiences the pleasure and pain due to the observance or transgression of his commands. The author of the DranuWa-bhashya gives expression to II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 429
2The author of the DranuWa-bhashya gives expression to II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 429 the same view, 'As in ordinary life a prince, although staying in a very unpleasant place infested with mosquitoes and full of discomforts of all kind is yet not touched by all these troubles, his body being constantly refreshed by fans and other means of comfort, rules the countries for which he cares and continues to enjoy all possible pleasures, such as fragrant odours and the like ; so the Lord of creation, to whom his power serves as an ever- moving fan as it were, is not touched by the evils of that creation, but rules the world of Brahman and the other worlds for which he cares, and continues to enjoy all possible delights/ That the nature of Brahman should undergo changes like a lump of clay or gold we do not admit, since many texts declare Brahman to be free from all change and imperfection. — Others give a different explanation of this Sutra. According to them it refutes the purvapaksha that on the view of Brahman being the general cause the distinction of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment cannot be accounted for — proving the possibility of such distinction by means of the analogous instance of the sea and its waves and flakes of foam. But this interpretation is inappropriate, since for those who hold that creation proceeds from Brahman connected with some power or Nescience or a limiting adjunct (upadhi) no such primd facie view can arise. For on their theory the enjoying subject is that which is conditioned by the power or Nescience or upadhi inhering in the causal substance, and the power or Nescience or upadhi is the object of enjoyment ; and as the two are of different nature, they cannot pass over into each other. The view of Brahman itself undergoing an essential change (on which that prima facie view might possibly be held to arise) is not admitted by those philosophers ; for Sutra II, i, 35 teaches that the individual souls and their deeds form a stream which has no beginning (so that the distinction of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment is eternal). But even if it be held that Brahman itself undergoes a change, the doubt as to the non-distinction of subjects and objects of enjoyment does not arise ; for the distinction 430 vedanta-s6tras. of the two groups will, on that view, be analogous to that of jars and platters which are modifications of the one substance clay, or to that of bracelets and crowns fashioned out of the one substance gold. And on the view of Brahman itself undergoing a change there arises a further difficulty, viz. in so far as Brahman (which is nothing but pure non-conditioned intelligence) is held to transform itself into (limited) enjoying souls and (non-sentient) objects of enjoyment. 15. The non-difference (of the world) from that (viz. Brahman) follows from what begins with the word arambhana.
3in so far as Brahman (which is nothing but pure non-conditioned intelligence) is held to transform itself into (limited) enjoying souls and (non-sentient) objects of enjoyment. 15. The non-difference (of the world) from that (viz. Brahman) follows from what begins with the word arambhana. Under II, 1,7 and other Sutras the non-difference of the effect, i. e. the world from the cause, i. e. Brahman was assumed, and it was on this basis that the proof of Brahman being the cause of the world proceeded. The present Sutra now raises a prima facie objection against that very non-difference, and then proceeds to refute it. On the point in question the school of Ka^ada argues as follows. It is in no way possible that the effect should be non-different from the cause. For cause and effect are the objects of different ideas : the ideas which have for their respective objects threads and a piece of cloth, or a lump of clay and a jar, are distinctly not of one and the same kind. The difference of words supplies a second argument ; nobody applies to mere threads the word ' piece of cloth/ or vice versa. A third argument rests on the difference of effects : water is not fetched from the well in a lump of clay, nor is a well built with jars. There, fourthly, is the difference of time ; the cause is prior in time, the effect posterior. There is, fifthly, the difference of form : the cause has the shape of a lump, the effect (the jar) is shaped like a belly with a broad basis ; clay in the latter condition only is meant when we say ' The jar has gone to pieces/ There, sixthly, is a numerical difference : the threads are many, the piece of cloth is one only. In the seventh place, there is the uselessness of the activity of the producing agent (which would result from cause and effect being II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 5. 43 1
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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