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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1■ — The cases are not analogous, the Purvapakshin replies. For the king and the spy are fundamentally separate, and hence the king is agent by implication only. But in the II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I 7. 579 case under discussion the soul is a part, and hence con- tributes to constitute the essential nature of, the highest Self; hence that highest Self itself enters and differentiates in the form of the soul. Nor can it be said that the instru- mental case (' with this soul-self') has the implied meaning of association (' together with this soul-self); for if a case can be taken in its primary sense, it is not proper to under- stand it in a sense which has to be expressed by means of a preposition. But the third case, ^"ivena, cannot here be understood even in its primary sense, i. e. that of the instrument of the action ; for if Brahman is the agent in the acts of entering and differentiating, the soul is not that which is most suitable to accomplish the end of action (while yet grammar defines the instrumental case — kara^a — on this basis). Nor can it be said that the activity of the soul comes to an end with the entering, while the differentiation of names and forms is Brahman's work, for the past participle (pravLsya) indicates (according to the rules of grammar) that the two actions — of entering and differentiating — belong to the same agent. And although the soul as being a part of the highest Self shares in its nature, yet in order to distinguish it from the highest Self, the text by means of the clause * with that living Self refers to it as something outward (not of the nature of the Self). The agent in the action of differentiation of names and forms therefore is Hira^yagarbha. Smrzti texts also ascribe to him this activity ; cp. ' he in the beginning made, from the words of the Veda, the names and forms of beings, of the gods and the rest, and of actions.' Against this view the Sutra declares itself. The differ- entiation of names and forms belongs to him who renders tripartite, i. e. the highest Brahman ; since it is assigned by Scripture to the latter only. For the text € That divinity thought, let me, having entered these three beings with this living-soul-self, differentiate names and forms — let me make each of these three tripartite,' shows that all the activities mentioned have one and the same agent. But the rendering tripartite cannot belong to Brahma (Hira^ya- garbha), who abides within the Brahma-egg, for that egg P p 2 580 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
2But the rendering tripartite cannot belong to Brahma (Hira^ya- garbha), who abides within the Brahma-egg, for that egg P p 2 580 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. itself is produced from fire, water, and earth, only after these elements have been rendered tripartite ; and Smrtti says that Brahma himself originated in that egg, t in that egg there originated Brahma, the grandfather of all the worlds/ As thus the action of rendering tripartite can belong to the highest Brahman only, the differentiation of names and forms, which belongs to the same agent, also is Brahman's only. — But how then does the clause ' with that living-soul-self ' fit in? — The co-ordination 'with that soul, with the Self/ shows that the term 'soul' here denotes the highest Brahman as having the soul for its body ; just as in the clauses ' that fire thought ' ; 'it sent forth water ' ; 'water thought,' and so on, what is meant each time is Brahman having fire, water, and so on, for its body. The work of differentiating names and forms thus belongs to the highest Brahman which has for its body Hira/zya- garbha, who represents the soul in its aggregate form. On this view the first person (in ' let me differentiate ') and the agency (conveyed by the form of ' pravuya ') may, without any difficulty, be taken in their primary literal senses ; and the common agency, implied in the connexion of pravi^ya and vyakarava/zi, is accounted for. The view here set forth as to the relation of Brahman and Hira^yagarbha also explains how the accounts of Hira/zyagarbha's (Brahma's) creative activity can say that he differentiated names and forms. The whole passus beginning c that divinity thought/ there- fore has the following meaning — f Having entered into those three beings, viz. Fire, Water, and Earth, with my Self which is qualified by the collective soul (as constituting its body), let me differentiate names and forms, i. e. let me produce gods and all the other kinds of individual beings, and give them names ; and to that end, since fire, water, and earth have not yet mutually combined, and hence are incapable of giving rise to particular things, let me make each of them tripartite, and thus fit them for creation.' — The settled conclusion then is, that the differentiation of names and forms is the work of the highest Brahman only. But, an objection is raised, the fact that the differentia- II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 8. 58 1
3But, an objection is raised, the fact that the differentia- II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 8. 58 1 tion of names and forms must be due to the same agent as the rendering tripartite, does not after all prove that the former is due to the highest Self. For the rendering tri- partite may itself belong to the individual soul. For the text relates how, after the creation of the cosmic eggy a process of tripartition was going on among the individual living beings created by Brahma. ' Learn from me, my friend, how those three beings having reached man become tripartite, each of them. The earth when eaten is disposed of in three ways ; its grossest portion becomes feces, its middle portion flesh, its subtlest portion mind,' and so on. Similarly, in the preceding section, it is described how the process of tripartition goes on in the case of fire, sun, moon, and lightning, which all belong to the world created by Brahma, ' the red colour of burning fire is the colour of fire/ &c. And the text moreover states the original tripartition to have taken place after the differentiation of names and forms : * That divinity having entered into these three beings differentiated names and forms. Each of these (beings) it rendered tripartite.' — To this objection the next Sutra replies. 18. Flesh is of earthy nature; in the case of the two others also according to the text. The view that the description of tripartition, given in the passage ' each of these he made tripartite/ refers to a time subsequent to the creation of the mundane egg and to the gods created by Brahma, cannot be upheld. For from it there would follow that, as in the passage ' earth when eaten is disposed of in three ways/ &c, flesh is declared to be more subtle than feces, and mind yet subtler, it would have to be assumed — in agreement with the nature of the causal substance — that flesh is made of water and manas of fire 1. And similarly we should have to assume that urine 1 I.e. if the tripartition of earth (i. e. solid food) when eaten, which is described in VI, 5, 1, were the same tripartition which is described in VI, 3, 3-4, we should have to conclude that the former tripartition consists, like the latter, in an admixture to earth of water and fire. 582 ved anta-s6tr as.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1■ — The cases are not analogous, the Purvapakshin replies. For the king and the spy are fundamentally separate, and hence the king is agent by implication only. But in the II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I 7. 579 case under discussion the soul is a part, and hence con- tributes to constitute the essential nature of, the highest Self; hence that highest Self itself enters and differentiates in the form of the soul. Nor can it be said that the instru- mental case (' with this soul-self') has the implied meaning of association (' together with this soul-self); for if a case can be taken in its primary sense, it is not proper to under- stand it in a sense which has to be expressed by means of a preposition. But the third case, ^"ivena, cannot here be understood even in its primary sense, i. e. that of the instrument of the action ; for if Brahman is the agent in the acts of entering and differentiating, the soul is not that which is most suitable to accomplish the end of action (while yet grammar defines the instrumental case — kara^a — on this basis). Nor can it be said that the activity of the soul comes to an end with the entering, while the differentiation of names and forms is Brahman's work, for the past participle (pravLsya) indicates (according to the rules of grammar) that the two actions — of entering and differentiating — belong to the same agent. And although the soul as being a part of the highest Self shares in its nature, yet in order to distinguish it from the highest Self, the text by means of the clause * with that living Self refers to it as something outward (not of the nature of the Self). The agent in the action of differentiation of names and forms therefore is Hira^yagarbha. Smrzti texts also ascribe to him this activity ; cp. ' he in the beginning made, from the words of the Veda, the names and forms of beings, of the gods and the rest, and of actions.' Against this view the Sutra declares itself. The differ- entiation of names and forms belongs to him who renders tripartite, i. e. the highest Brahman ; since it is assigned by Scripture to the latter only. For the text € That divinity thought, let me, having entered these three beings with this living-soul-self, differentiate names and forms — let me make each of these three tripartite,' shows that all the activities mentioned have one and the same agent. But the rendering tripartite cannot belong to Brahma (Hira^ya- garbha), who abides within the Brahma-egg, for that egg P p 2 580 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
2But the rendering tripartite cannot belong to Brahma (Hira^ya- garbha), who abides within the Brahma-egg, for that egg P p 2 580 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. itself is produced from fire, water, and earth, only after these elements have been rendered tripartite ; and Smrtti says that Brahma himself originated in that egg, t in that egg there originated Brahma, the grandfather of all the worlds/ As thus the action of rendering tripartite can belong to the highest Brahman only, the differentiation of names and forms, which belongs to the same agent, also is Brahman's only. — But how then does the clause ' with that living-soul-self ' fit in? — The co-ordination 'with that soul, with the Self/ shows that the term 'soul' here denotes the highest Brahman as having the soul for its body ; just as in the clauses ' that fire thought ' ; 'it sent forth water ' ; 'water thought,' and so on, what is meant each time is Brahman having fire, water, and so on, for its body. The work of differentiating names and forms thus belongs to the highest Brahman which has for its body Hira/zya- garbha, who represents the soul in its aggregate form. On this view the first person (in ' let me differentiate ') and the agency (conveyed by the form of ' pravuya ') may, without any difficulty, be taken in their primary literal senses ; and the common agency, implied in the connexion of pravi^ya and vyakarava/zi, is accounted for. The view here set forth as to the relation of Brahman and Hira^yagarbha also explains how the accounts of Hira/zyagarbha's (Brahma's) creative activity can say that he differentiated names and forms. The whole passus beginning c that divinity thought/ there- fore has the following meaning — f Having entered into those three beings, viz. Fire, Water, and Earth, with my Self which is qualified by the collective soul (as constituting its body), let me differentiate names and forms, i. e. let me produce gods and all the other kinds of individual beings, and give them names ; and to that end, since fire, water, and earth have not yet mutually combined, and hence are incapable of giving rise to particular things, let me make each of them tripartite, and thus fit them for creation.' — The settled conclusion then is, that the differentiation of names and forms is the work of the highest Brahman only. But, an objection is raised, the fact that the differentia- II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 8. 58 1
3But, an objection is raised, the fact that the differentia- II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 8. 58 1 tion of names and forms must be due to the same agent as the rendering tripartite, does not after all prove that the former is due to the highest Self. For the rendering tri- partite may itself belong to the individual soul. For the text relates how, after the creation of the cosmic eggy a process of tripartition was going on among the individual living beings created by Brahma. ' Learn from me, my friend, how those three beings having reached man become tripartite, each of them. The earth when eaten is disposed of in three ways ; its grossest portion becomes feces, its middle portion flesh, its subtlest portion mind,' and so on. Similarly, in the preceding section, it is described how the process of tripartition goes on in the case of fire, sun, moon, and lightning, which all belong to the world created by Brahma, ' the red colour of burning fire is the colour of fire/ &c. And the text moreover states the original tripartition to have taken place after the differentiation of names and forms : * That divinity having entered into these three beings differentiated names and forms. Each of these (beings) it rendered tripartite.' — To this objection the next Sutra replies. 18. Flesh is of earthy nature; in the case of the two others also according to the text. The view that the description of tripartition, given in the passage ' each of these he made tripartite/ refers to a time subsequent to the creation of the mundane egg and to the gods created by Brahma, cannot be upheld. For from it there would follow that, as in the passage ' earth when eaten is disposed of in three ways/ &c, flesh is declared to be more subtle than feces, and mind yet subtler, it would have to be assumed — in agreement with the nature of the causal substance — that flesh is made of water and manas of fire 1. And similarly we should have to assume that urine 1 I.e. if the tripartition of earth (i. e. solid food) when eaten, which is described in VI, 5, 1, were the same tripartition which is described in VI, 3, 3-4, we should have to conclude that the former tripartition consists, like the latter, in an admixture to earth of water and fire. 582 ved anta-s6tr as.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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