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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— The Ill ADHYAYA, 3 pAdA, $6. 657 Sutra subjoins a parallel instance. 'As in the case of instruction.' As in the vidya of that which truly is [Kh. Up. VI, 1 ff.), question and reply are iterated several times, in order to set forth the various greatness and glory of Brahman. — Thus the two sections under discussion are of the same nature, in so far as setting forth that the one Brahman which is the inner Self of all is the cause of all life and raised beyond all imperfections ; and hence they constitute one meditation only. — To this a new objection is raised. The two sections may indeed both refer to the highest Brahman ; nevertheless there is a difference of meditation, as according to the one Brahman is to be meditated upon as the cause of all life, and according to the other as raised above all defects ; this difference of character distinguishes the two meditations. And further there is a difference of interrogators; the first question being asked by Ushasta, the second by Kahola. 36. There is interchange (of ideas), for the texts distinguish ; as in other cases. There is no difference of vidya because both questions and answers have one subject-matter, and because the one word that possesses enjoining power proves the connexion of the two sections. Both questions have for their topic Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all ; and in the second question the word 'eva' ('just/ 'very') in 'Tell me just that Brahman/ &c, proves that the question of Kahola has for its subject the Brahman, to the qualities of which the question of Ushasta had referred. Both answers again refer to the one Brahman, viewed as the Self of all. The idea of the injunction of the entire meditation again is suggested in the second section only, ' Therefore a Brahma/za, after he has done with learning, is to wish to stand by real strength/ The object of meditation being thus ascertained to be one, there must be effected a mutual interchange of the ideas of Ushasta and Kahola, i. e. Ushasta's conception of Brahman being the cause of all life must be entertained by the interrogating Kahola also ; and vice versa the con- ception of Kahola as to Brahman being beyond hunger, [48] u u 658 vedanta-sCtras.
2e. Ushasta's conception of Brahman being the cause of all life must be entertained by the interrogating Kahola also ; and vice versa the con- ception of Kahola as to Brahman being beyond hunger, [48] u u 658 vedanta-sCtras. thirst, and so on, must be entertained by Ushasta also. This interchange being made, the difference of Brahman, the inner Self of all, from the individual soul is determined by both sections. For this is the very object of Ya^Tzavalkya's replies : in order to intimate that the inner Self of all is different from the individual soul; they distinguish that Self as the cause of all life and as raised above hunger, thirst, and so on. Hence Brahman's being the inner Self of all is the only quality that is the subject of meditation ; that it is the cause of life and so on are only means to prove its being such, and are not therefore to be meditated on independently. — But if this is so, to what end must there be made an interchange, on the part of the two in- terrogators, of their respective ideas? — Brahman having, on the ground of being the cause of all life, been ascer- tained by Ushasta as the inner Self of all, and different from the individual soul, Kahola renews the question, thinking that the inner Self of all must be viewed as different from the soul, on the ground of some special attribute which cannot possibly belong to the soul; and Ya^avalkya divining his thought thereon declares that the inner Self possesses an attribute which cannot possibly belong to the soul, viz. being in essential opposition to all imperfection. The interchange of ideas therefore has to be made for the purpose of establishing the idea of the individual nature of the object of meditation. — 'As else- where/ i. e. as in the case of the knowledge of that which truly is, the repeated questions and replies only serve to define one and the same Brahman, not to convey the idea of the object of meditation having to be meditated on under new aspects. — But a new objection is raised — As there is. in the Sad-vidya also, a difference between the several questions and answers, how is that vidya known to be one ? — To this question the next Sutra replies. 37. For one and the same (highest divinity), called the ' truly being/ and so on (is the subject of that meditation). For the highest divinity, called there that which is — Ill ADHVAYA, 3 PADA, 3 J. 659 which was introduced in the clause * that divinity thought/ &c. — is intimated by all the following sections of that chapter. This is proved by the fact that the attributes — ' that which truly is* and so on — which were mentioned in the first section and confirmed in the subsequent ones, are finally summed up in the statement, ' in that all this has its Self, that is the True, that is the Self.'
3This is proved by the fact that the attributes — ' that which truly is* and so on — which were mentioned in the first section and confirmed in the subsequent ones, are finally summed up in the statement, ' in that all this has its Self, that is the True, that is the Self.' Some interpreters construe the last two Sutras as con- stituting two adhikara/zas. The former Sfttra, they say, teaches that the text, 'I am thou, thou art 1/ enjoins a meditation on the soul and the highest Self as interchange- able. But as on the basis of texts such as 'All this is indeed Brahman/ 'all this has its Self in Brahman/ ' Thou art that/ the text quoted is as a matter of course understood to mean that there is one universal Self, the teaching which it is by those interpreters assumed to convey would be nothing new; and their interpretation therefore must be rejected. The point as to the oneness of the individual and the highest Self will moreover be discussed under IV, 1, 3. Moreover, there is no foundation for a special meditation on Brahman as the individual soul and the individual soul as Brahman, apart from the medita- tion on the Self of all being one. — The second Sfitra, they say, declares the oneness of the meditation on the True enjoined in the text, ' whosoever knows this great wonder- ful first-born as the True Brahman ' (Br/. Up. V, 4), and of the meditation enjoined in the subsequent passage (V, 5, a), ' Now what is true, that is the Aditya, the person that dwells in yonder orb, and the person in the right eye/ But this also is untenable. For the difference of abode mentioned in the latter passage (viz. the abode in the sun and in the eye) establishes difference of vidya, as already shown under Sil. Ill, 3, 21. Nor is it possible to assume that the two meditations comprised in the latter text which have a character of their own in so far as they view the True as embodied in syllables, and so on, and which are declared to be connected with a special result (' he who knows this destroys evil and leaves it '), should be identical with the one earlier meditation which has an independent U u 2 66o vedanta-s^tras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— The Ill ADHYAYA, 3 pAdA, $6. 657 Sutra subjoins a parallel instance. 'As in the case of instruction.' As in the vidya of that which truly is [Kh. Up. VI, 1 ff.), question and reply are iterated several times, in order to set forth the various greatness and glory of Brahman. — Thus the two sections under discussion are of the same nature, in so far as setting forth that the one Brahman which is the inner Self of all is the cause of all life and raised beyond all imperfections ; and hence they constitute one meditation only. — To this a new objection is raised. The two sections may indeed both refer to the highest Brahman ; nevertheless there is a difference of meditation, as according to the one Brahman is to be meditated upon as the cause of all life, and according to the other as raised above all defects ; this difference of character distinguishes the two meditations. And further there is a difference of interrogators; the first question being asked by Ushasta, the second by Kahola. 36. There is interchange (of ideas), for the texts distinguish ; as in other cases. There is no difference of vidya because both questions and answers have one subject-matter, and because the one word that possesses enjoining power proves the connexion of the two sections. Both questions have for their topic Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all ; and in the second question the word 'eva' ('just/ 'very') in 'Tell me just that Brahman/ &c, proves that the question of Kahola has for its subject the Brahman, to the qualities of which the question of Ushasta had referred. Both answers again refer to the one Brahman, viewed as the Self of all. The idea of the injunction of the entire meditation again is suggested in the second section only, ' Therefore a Brahma/za, after he has done with learning, is to wish to stand by real strength/ The object of meditation being thus ascertained to be one, there must be effected a mutual interchange of the ideas of Ushasta and Kahola, i. e. Ushasta's conception of Brahman being the cause of all life must be entertained by the interrogating Kahola also ; and vice versa the con- ception of Kahola as to Brahman being beyond hunger, [48] u u 658 vedanta-sCtras.
2e. Ushasta's conception of Brahman being the cause of all life must be entertained by the interrogating Kahola also ; and vice versa the con- ception of Kahola as to Brahman being beyond hunger, [48] u u 658 vedanta-sCtras. thirst, and so on, must be entertained by Ushasta also. This interchange being made, the difference of Brahman, the inner Self of all, from the individual soul is determined by both sections. For this is the very object of Ya^Tzavalkya's replies : in order to intimate that the inner Self of all is different from the individual soul; they distinguish that Self as the cause of all life and as raised above hunger, thirst, and so on. Hence Brahman's being the inner Self of all is the only quality that is the subject of meditation ; that it is the cause of life and so on are only means to prove its being such, and are not therefore to be meditated on independently. — But if this is so, to what end must there be made an interchange, on the part of the two in- terrogators, of their respective ideas? — Brahman having, on the ground of being the cause of all life, been ascer- tained by Ushasta as the inner Self of all, and different from the individual soul, Kahola renews the question, thinking that the inner Self of all must be viewed as different from the soul, on the ground of some special attribute which cannot possibly belong to the soul; and Ya^avalkya divining his thought thereon declares that the inner Self possesses an attribute which cannot possibly belong to the soul, viz. being in essential opposition to all imperfection. The interchange of ideas therefore has to be made for the purpose of establishing the idea of the individual nature of the object of meditation. — 'As else- where/ i. e. as in the case of the knowledge of that which truly is, the repeated questions and replies only serve to define one and the same Brahman, not to convey the idea of the object of meditation having to be meditated on under new aspects. — But a new objection is raised — As there is. in the Sad-vidya also, a difference between the several questions and answers, how is that vidya known to be one ? — To this question the next Sutra replies. 37. For one and the same (highest divinity), called the ' truly being/ and so on (is the subject of that meditation). For the highest divinity, called there that which is — Ill ADHVAYA, 3 PADA, 3 J. 659 which was introduced in the clause * that divinity thought/ &c. — is intimated by all the following sections of that chapter. This is proved by the fact that the attributes — ' that which truly is* and so on — which were mentioned in the first section and confirmed in the subsequent ones, are finally summed up in the statement, ' in that all this has its Self, that is the True, that is the Self.'
3This is proved by the fact that the attributes — ' that which truly is* and so on — which were mentioned in the first section and confirmed in the subsequent ones, are finally summed up in the statement, ' in that all this has its Self, that is the True, that is the Self.' Some interpreters construe the last two Sutras as con- stituting two adhikara/zas. The former Sfttra, they say, teaches that the text, 'I am thou, thou art 1/ enjoins a meditation on the soul and the highest Self as interchange- able. But as on the basis of texts such as 'All this is indeed Brahman/ 'all this has its Self in Brahman/ ' Thou art that/ the text quoted is as a matter of course understood to mean that there is one universal Self, the teaching which it is by those interpreters assumed to convey would be nothing new; and their interpretation therefore must be rejected. The point as to the oneness of the individual and the highest Self will moreover be discussed under IV, 1, 3. Moreover, there is no foundation for a special meditation on Brahman as the individual soul and the individual soul as Brahman, apart from the medita- tion on the Self of all being one. — The second Sfitra, they say, declares the oneness of the meditation on the True enjoined in the text, ' whosoever knows this great wonder- ful first-born as the True Brahman ' (Br/. Up. V, 4), and of the meditation enjoined in the subsequent passage (V, 5, a), ' Now what is true, that is the Aditya, the person that dwells in yonder orb, and the person in the right eye/ But this also is untenable. For the difference of abode mentioned in the latter passage (viz. the abode in the sun and in the eye) establishes difference of vidya, as already shown under Sil. Ill, 3, 21. Nor is it possible to assume that the two meditations comprised in the latter text which have a character of their own in so far as they view the True as embodied in syllables, and so on, and which are declared to be connected with a special result (' he who knows this destroys evil and leaves it '), should be identical with the one earlier meditation which has an independent U u 2 66o vedanta-s^tras.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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