Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1In the case under discussion the genus constitutes the mode, and the individual that to which the mode belongs : the idea does not therefore possess the character of unity. For these very reasons the individual soul cannot stand to Brahman in the bhedabheda-relation. And as the view of non-difference is founded on Scripture, we assume that the view of difference rests on beginningless Nescience. — But on this view want of knowledge and all the imperfec- tions springing therefrom, such as birth, death, &c, would cling to Brahman itself, and this would contradict scriptural texts such as ' He who is all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9) ; ' That Self free from all evil' (Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 5). Not so, we reply. For all those imperfections we consider to be unreal. On your view on the other hand, which admits nothing but Brahman and its limiting adjuncts, all the imperfections which spring from contact with those adjuncts must really belong to Brahman. For as Brahman is without parts, indivisible, the upadhis cannot divide or split it so as to connect themselves with a part only ; but necessarily connect themselves with Brahman itself and produce their effects on it. — Here the following explanation may possibly be attempted. Brahman determined by an upadhi constitutes the individual soul. This soul is of atomic size since what determines it, viz. the internal organ, is itself of atomic size ; and the limitation itself is without beginning. All the imperfections therefore connect them- selves only with that special place that is determined by the upadhi, and do not affect the highest Brahman which is not limited by the upadhi. — In reply to this we ask — Do you mean to say that what constitutes the atomic individual soul is a part of Brahman which is limited and cut off by the limiting adjunct ; or some particular part of Brahman which, without being thereby divided off, is con- nected with an atomic upadhi ; or Brahman in its totality as connected with an upadhi; or some other intelligent O 2 I96 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
2being connected with an upadhi, or finally the upadhi itself? — The first alternative is not possible, because Brahman cannot be divided ; it would moreover imply that the individual soul has a beginning, for division means the making of one thing into two. — On the second alter- native it would follow that, as a part of Brahman would be connected with the upadhi, all the imperfections due to the upadhis would adhere to that part. And further, if the upadhi would not possess the power of attracting to itself the particular part of Brahman with which it is connected, it would follow that when the up&dhi moves the part with which it is connected would constantly change; in other words, bondage and release would take place at every moment. If, on the contrary, the upadhi possessed the power of attraction, the whole Brahman — as not being capable of division — would be attracted and move with the upadhi. And should it be said that what is all-pervading and without parts cannot be attracted and move, well then the upadhi only moves, and we are again met by the difficulties stated above. Moreover, if all the upadhis were connected with the parts of Brahman viewed as one and undivided, all individual souls, being nothing but parts of Brahman, would be considered as non-distinct. And should it be said that they are not thus cognised as one because they are constituted by different parts of Brahman, it would follow that as soon as the upadhi of one individual soul is moving, the identity of that soul would be lost (for it would, in successive moments, be constituted by different parts of Brahman). — On the third alternative (the whole of) Brahman itself being connected with the upadhi enters into the condition of individual soul, and there remains no non-conditioned Brahman. And, moreover, the soul in all bodies will then be one only. — On the fourth alternative the individual soul is something altogether different from Brahman, and the difference of the soul from Brahman thus ceases to depend on the upadhis of Brahman. — And the fifth alternative means the embracing of the view of the ATarv&ka (who makes no distinction between soul and matter). — The conclusion from all this is that on the I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 1 97 strength of the texts declaring non-difference we must admit that all difference is based on Nescience only. Hence, Scripture being an authoritative instrument of knowledge in so far only as it has for its end action and the cessation of action, the Vedanta-texts must be allowed to be a valid means of knowledge with regard to Brahman's nature, in so far as they stand in a supplementary relation to the injunctions of meditation.
3This view is finally combated by the Mima^saka. Even if, he says, we allow the Vedanta-texts to have a purport in so far as they are supplementary to injunctions of meditation, they cannot be viewed as valid means of knowledge with regard to Brahman. Do the texts referring to Brahman, we ask, occupy the position of valid means of knowledge in so far as they form a syntactic whole with the injunctions of meditation, or as independent sentences ? In the former case the purport of the syntactic whole is simply to enjoin meditation, and it cannot therefore aim at giving instruction about Brahman. If, on the other hand, the texts about Brahman are separate independent sentences, they cannot have the purport of prompting to action and are therefore devoid of instructive power. Nor must it be said that meditation is a kind of continued remembrance, and as such requires to be defined by the object remembered ; and that the demand of the injunction of meditation for something to be remembered is satisfied by texts such as ' All this is that Self/ * the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' &c, which set forth the nature and attributes of Brahman and — ■ forming a syntactic whole with the injunctions — are a valid means of knowledge with regard to the existence of the matter they convey. For the fact is that the demand on the part of an injunction of meditation for an object to be remembered may be satisfied even by something unreal (not true), as in the case of injunctions such as ' Let him meditate upon mind as Brahman ' (Kh. Up. II 1, 1 8, 1 ) : the real existence of the object of meditation is therefore not demanded. — -The final conclusion arrived at in this purvapaksha is therefore as follows. As the Vedanta-texts do not aim at prompting to action or the cessation of action ; as, even on the supposition I98 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS. of their being supplementary to injunctions of meditation, the only thing they effect is to set forth the nature of the object of meditation ; and as, even if they are viewed as independent sentences, they accomplish the end of man (i.e. please, gratify) by knowledge merely — being thus comparable to tales with which we soothe children or sick persons ; it does not lie within their province to establish the reality of an accomplished thing, and hence Scripture cannot be viewed as a valid means for the cognition of Brahman.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1In the case under discussion the genus constitutes the mode, and the individual that to which the mode belongs : the idea does not therefore possess the character of unity. For these very reasons the individual soul cannot stand to Brahman in the bhedabheda-relation. And as the view of non-difference is founded on Scripture, we assume that the view of difference rests on beginningless Nescience. — But on this view want of knowledge and all the imperfec- tions springing therefrom, such as birth, death, &c, would cling to Brahman itself, and this would contradict scriptural texts such as ' He who is all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9) ; ' That Self free from all evil' (Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 5). Not so, we reply. For all those imperfections we consider to be unreal. On your view on the other hand, which admits nothing but Brahman and its limiting adjuncts, all the imperfections which spring from contact with those adjuncts must really belong to Brahman. For as Brahman is without parts, indivisible, the upadhis cannot divide or split it so as to connect themselves with a part only ; but necessarily connect themselves with Brahman itself and produce their effects on it. — Here the following explanation may possibly be attempted. Brahman determined by an upadhi constitutes the individual soul. This soul is of atomic size since what determines it, viz. the internal organ, is itself of atomic size ; and the limitation itself is without beginning. All the imperfections therefore connect them- selves only with that special place that is determined by the upadhi, and do not affect the highest Brahman which is not limited by the upadhi. — In reply to this we ask — Do you mean to say that what constitutes the atomic individual soul is a part of Brahman which is limited and cut off by the limiting adjunct ; or some particular part of Brahman which, without being thereby divided off, is con- nected with an atomic upadhi ; or Brahman in its totality as connected with an upadhi; or some other intelligent O 2 I96 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
2being connected with an upadhi, or finally the upadhi itself? — The first alternative is not possible, because Brahman cannot be divided ; it would moreover imply that the individual soul has a beginning, for division means the making of one thing into two. — On the second alter- native it would follow that, as a part of Brahman would be connected with the upadhi, all the imperfections due to the upadhis would adhere to that part. And further, if the upadhi would not possess the power of attracting to itself the particular part of Brahman with which it is connected, it would follow that when the up&dhi moves the part with which it is connected would constantly change; in other words, bondage and release would take place at every moment. If, on the contrary, the upadhi possessed the power of attraction, the whole Brahman — as not being capable of division — would be attracted and move with the upadhi. And should it be said that what is all-pervading and without parts cannot be attracted and move, well then the upadhi only moves, and we are again met by the difficulties stated above. Moreover, if all the upadhis were connected with the parts of Brahman viewed as one and undivided, all individual souls, being nothing but parts of Brahman, would be considered as non-distinct. And should it be said that they are not thus cognised as one because they are constituted by different parts of Brahman, it would follow that as soon as the upadhi of one individual soul is moving, the identity of that soul would be lost (for it would, in successive moments, be constituted by different parts of Brahman). — On the third alternative (the whole of) Brahman itself being connected with the upadhi enters into the condition of individual soul, and there remains no non-conditioned Brahman. And, moreover, the soul in all bodies will then be one only. — On the fourth alternative the individual soul is something altogether different from Brahman, and the difference of the soul from Brahman thus ceases to depend on the upadhis of Brahman. — And the fifth alternative means the embracing of the view of the ATarv&ka (who makes no distinction between soul and matter). — The conclusion from all this is that on the I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 1 97 strength of the texts declaring non-difference we must admit that all difference is based on Nescience only. Hence, Scripture being an authoritative instrument of knowledge in so far only as it has for its end action and the cessation of action, the Vedanta-texts must be allowed to be a valid means of knowledge with regard to Brahman's nature, in so far as they stand in a supplementary relation to the injunctions of meditation.
3This view is finally combated by the Mima^saka. Even if, he says, we allow the Vedanta-texts to have a purport in so far as they are supplementary to injunctions of meditation, they cannot be viewed as valid means of knowledge with regard to Brahman. Do the texts referring to Brahman, we ask, occupy the position of valid means of knowledge in so far as they form a syntactic whole with the injunctions of meditation, or as independent sentences ? In the former case the purport of the syntactic whole is simply to enjoin meditation, and it cannot therefore aim at giving instruction about Brahman. If, on the other hand, the texts about Brahman are separate independent sentences, they cannot have the purport of prompting to action and are therefore devoid of instructive power. Nor must it be said that meditation is a kind of continued remembrance, and as such requires to be defined by the object remembered ; and that the demand of the injunction of meditation for something to be remembered is satisfied by texts such as ' All this is that Self/ * the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' &c, which set forth the nature and attributes of Brahman and — ■ forming a syntactic whole with the injunctions — are a valid means of knowledge with regard to the existence of the matter they convey. For the fact is that the demand on the part of an injunction of meditation for an object to be remembered may be satisfied even by something unreal (not true), as in the case of injunctions such as ' Let him meditate upon mind as Brahman ' (Kh. Up. II 1, 1 8, 1 ) : the real existence of the object of meditation is therefore not demanded. — -The final conclusion arrived at in this purvapaksha is therefore as follows. As the Vedanta-texts do not aim at prompting to action or the cessation of action ; as, even on the supposition I98 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS. of their being supplementary to injunctions of meditation, the only thing they effect is to set forth the nature of the object of meditation ; and as, even if they are viewed as independent sentences, they accomplish the end of man (i.e. please, gratify) by knowledge merely — being thus comparable to tales with which we soothe children or sick persons ; it does not lie within their province to establish the reality of an accomplished thing, and hence Scripture cannot be viewed as a valid means for the cognition of Brahman.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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