Fetching
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Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— You have further maintained that the distinction of souls as pure and impure, &c, admits of being accounted for in the same way as the dimness or clearness, and so on, of the different images of a face as 44-0 vedanta-sCtras. seen reflected in mirrors, crystals, sword-blades and the like. But here the following point requires consideration. On what occasion do the smallness, dimness and other imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts (i.e. the mirrors, &c.) pass away?— When the mirrors and other limiting adjuncts themselves pass away ! — Does then, we ask, the reflected image which is the substrate of those imperfections persist or not ? If you say that it persists, then by analogy the individual soul also must be assumed to persist, and from this it follows that it does not attain Release. And if the reflected image is held to perish together with its imperfections, by analogy the soul also will perish and then Release will be nothing but annihilation. — Consider the following point also. The destruction of a non- advantageous (apurush&rtha) defect is of advantage to him who is conscious of that disadvantage. Is it then, we ask, in the given case Brahman — which corresponds to the thing reflected — that is conscious of the imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts ? or is it the soul which corresponds to the reflected image ? or is it something else ? On the two former alternatives it appears that the comparison (between Brahman and the soul on the one hand, and the thing reflected and the reflection on the other— on which comparison your whole theory is founded) does not hold good ; for neither the face nor the reflection of the face is conscious of the imperfections due to the adjuncts ; for neither of the two is a being capable of conscious- ness. And, moreover, Brahman's being conscious of imper- fections would imply its being the abode of Nescience. And the third alternative, again, is impossible, since there is no other knowing subject but Brahman and the soul. — It would, moreover, be necessary to define who is the imaginatively shaping agent (kalpaka) with regard to the soul as formed from Nescience. It cannot be Nescience itself, because Nescience is not an intelligent principle. Nor can it be the soul, because this would imply the defect of what has to be proved being presupposed for the purposes of the proof; and because the existence of the soul is that which is formed by Nescience, just as II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 44 1
2Nor can it be the soul, because this would imply the defect of what has to be proved being presupposed for the purposes of the proof; and because the existence of the soul is that which is formed by Nescience, just as II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 44 1 shell-silver is. And if, finally, you should say that Brahman is the fictitiously forming agent, we have again arrived at a Brahman that is the abode of Nescience. — If Brahman is not allowed to be the abode of Nescience, we further must ask whether Brahman sees (is conscious of) the individual souls or not. If not, it is not possible that Brahman should give rise to this manifold creation which, as Scripture declares, is preceded by 'seeing1 on his part, and to the differentiation of names and forms. If, on the other hand. Brahman which is of an absolutely homogeneous nature sees the souls, it cannot do so without Nescience ; and thus we are again led to the view of Nescience abiding in Brahman. For similar reasons the theory of the distinction of Maya and Nescience must also be abandoned. For even if Brahman possesses Maya, i. e. illusive power, it cannot, without Nescience, be conscious of souls. And without being conscious of others the lord of Maya is unable to delude them by his Maya ; and Maya herself cannot bring about the consciousness of others on the part of its Lord, for it is a mere means to delude others, after they have (by other means) become objects of consciousness. — Perhaps you will say that the Maya of Brahman causes him to be conscious of souls, and at the same time is the cause of those souls' delusion. But if Maya causes Brahman — which is nothing but self-illuminated intelligence, absolutely homogeneous and free from all foreign elements — to become conscious of other beings, then May& is nothing but another name for Nescience. — Let it then be said that Nescience is the cause of the cognition of what is contrary to truth ; such being the case, Maya which presents all false things different from Brahman as false, and thus is not the cause of wrong cognition on the part of Brahman, is not avidya. — But this is inadmissible ; for, when the oneness of the moon is known, that which causes the , idea of the moon being double can be nothing else but avidya. Moreover, if Brahman recognises all beings apart from himself as false, he does not delude them ; for surely none but a madman would aim at deluding beings known by him to be unreal ! — 442 vedanta-s6tras.
3Moreover, if Brahman recognises all beings apart from himself as false, he does not delude them ; for surely none but a madman would aim at deluding beings known by him to be unreal ! — 442 vedanta-s6tras. Let us then define avidya as the cause of a disadvantageous cognition of unreal things. Maya then, as not being the cause of such a disadvantageous cognition on Brahman's part, cannot be of the nature of avidyd ! — But this also is inadmissible ; for although the idea of the moon being double is not the cause of any pain, and hence not dis- advantageous to man, it is all the same caused by avidya ; and if, on the other hand, Maya which aims at dispelling that idea (in so far as it presents the image and idea of one moon) did not present what is of disadvantage, it would not be something to be destroyed, and hence would be permanently connected w{th Brahman's nature. — Well, if it were so, what harm would there be ? — The harm would be that such a view implies the theory of duality, and hence would be in conflict with the texts inculcating non- duality such as ' For where there is duality as it were, &c. ; but when for him the .Self only has become all, whereby then should he see, and whom should he see ? ' — But those texts set forth the Real ; Maya on the other hand is non- real, and hence the view of its permanency is not in real conflict with the texts !— Brahman, we reply, has for its essential nature unlimited bliss, and hence cannot be con- scious of, or affected with, unreal Maya, without avidya. Of what use, we further ask, should an eternal non-real Maya be to Brahman ? — Brahman by means of it deludes the individual souls! — But of what use should such delusion be to Brahman?— It affords to Brahman a kind of sport or play ! — But of what use is play to a being whose nature is unlimited bliss? — Do we not then see in ordinary life also that persons in the enjoyment of full happiness and pros- perity indulge all the same in play? — The cases are not parallel, we reply. For none but persons not in their right mind would take pleasure in an unreal play, carried on by means of implements unreal and known by them to be unreal, and in the consciousness, itself, unreal of such a play ! —The arguments set forth previously also prove the im- possibility of the fictitious existence of an individual soul considered as the abode of avidya, apart from Brahman considered as the abode of Maya. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 443
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— You have further maintained that the distinction of souls as pure and impure, &c, admits of being accounted for in the same way as the dimness or clearness, and so on, of the different images of a face as 44-0 vedanta-sCtras. seen reflected in mirrors, crystals, sword-blades and the like. But here the following point requires consideration. On what occasion do the smallness, dimness and other imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts (i.e. the mirrors, &c.) pass away?— When the mirrors and other limiting adjuncts themselves pass away ! — Does then, we ask, the reflected image which is the substrate of those imperfections persist or not ? If you say that it persists, then by analogy the individual soul also must be assumed to persist, and from this it follows that it does not attain Release. And if the reflected image is held to perish together with its imperfections, by analogy the soul also will perish and then Release will be nothing but annihilation. — Consider the following point also. The destruction of a non- advantageous (apurush&rtha) defect is of advantage to him who is conscious of that disadvantage. Is it then, we ask, in the given case Brahman — which corresponds to the thing reflected — that is conscious of the imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts ? or is it the soul which corresponds to the reflected image ? or is it something else ? On the two former alternatives it appears that the comparison (between Brahman and the soul on the one hand, and the thing reflected and the reflection on the other— on which comparison your whole theory is founded) does not hold good ; for neither the face nor the reflection of the face is conscious of the imperfections due to the adjuncts ; for neither of the two is a being capable of conscious- ness. And, moreover, Brahman's being conscious of imper- fections would imply its being the abode of Nescience. And the third alternative, again, is impossible, since there is no other knowing subject but Brahman and the soul. — It would, moreover, be necessary to define who is the imaginatively shaping agent (kalpaka) with regard to the soul as formed from Nescience. It cannot be Nescience itself, because Nescience is not an intelligent principle. Nor can it be the soul, because this would imply the defect of what has to be proved being presupposed for the purposes of the proof; and because the existence of the soul is that which is formed by Nescience, just as II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 44 1
2Nor can it be the soul, because this would imply the defect of what has to be proved being presupposed for the purposes of the proof; and because the existence of the soul is that which is formed by Nescience, just as II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 44 1 shell-silver is. And if, finally, you should say that Brahman is the fictitiously forming agent, we have again arrived at a Brahman that is the abode of Nescience. — If Brahman is not allowed to be the abode of Nescience, we further must ask whether Brahman sees (is conscious of) the individual souls or not. If not, it is not possible that Brahman should give rise to this manifold creation which, as Scripture declares, is preceded by 'seeing1 on his part, and to the differentiation of names and forms. If, on the other hand. Brahman which is of an absolutely homogeneous nature sees the souls, it cannot do so without Nescience ; and thus we are again led to the view of Nescience abiding in Brahman. For similar reasons the theory of the distinction of Maya and Nescience must also be abandoned. For even if Brahman possesses Maya, i. e. illusive power, it cannot, without Nescience, be conscious of souls. And without being conscious of others the lord of Maya is unable to delude them by his Maya ; and Maya herself cannot bring about the consciousness of others on the part of its Lord, for it is a mere means to delude others, after they have (by other means) become objects of consciousness. — Perhaps you will say that the Maya of Brahman causes him to be conscious of souls, and at the same time is the cause of those souls' delusion. But if Maya causes Brahman — which is nothing but self-illuminated intelligence, absolutely homogeneous and free from all foreign elements — to become conscious of other beings, then May& is nothing but another name for Nescience. — Let it then be said that Nescience is the cause of the cognition of what is contrary to truth ; such being the case, Maya which presents all false things different from Brahman as false, and thus is not the cause of wrong cognition on the part of Brahman, is not avidya. — But this is inadmissible ; for, when the oneness of the moon is known, that which causes the , idea of the moon being double can be nothing else but avidya. Moreover, if Brahman recognises all beings apart from himself as false, he does not delude them ; for surely none but a madman would aim at deluding beings known by him to be unreal ! — 442 vedanta-s6tras.
3Moreover, if Brahman recognises all beings apart from himself as false, he does not delude them ; for surely none but a madman would aim at deluding beings known by him to be unreal ! — 442 vedanta-s6tras. Let us then define avidya as the cause of a disadvantageous cognition of unreal things. Maya then, as not being the cause of such a disadvantageous cognition on Brahman's part, cannot be of the nature of avidyd ! — But this also is inadmissible ; for although the idea of the moon being double is not the cause of any pain, and hence not dis- advantageous to man, it is all the same caused by avidya ; and if, on the other hand, Maya which aims at dispelling that idea (in so far as it presents the image and idea of one moon) did not present what is of disadvantage, it would not be something to be destroyed, and hence would be permanently connected w{th Brahman's nature. — Well, if it were so, what harm would there be ? — The harm would be that such a view implies the theory of duality, and hence would be in conflict with the texts inculcating non- duality such as ' For where there is duality as it were, &c. ; but when for him the .Self only has become all, whereby then should he see, and whom should he see ? ' — But those texts set forth the Real ; Maya on the other hand is non- real, and hence the view of its permanency is not in real conflict with the texts !— Brahman, we reply, has for its essential nature unlimited bliss, and hence cannot be con- scious of, or affected with, unreal Maya, without avidya. Of what use, we further ask, should an eternal non-real Maya be to Brahman ? — Brahman by means of it deludes the individual souls! — But of what use should such delusion be to Brahman?— It affords to Brahman a kind of sport or play ! — But of what use is play to a being whose nature is unlimited bliss? — Do we not then see in ordinary life also that persons in the enjoyment of full happiness and pros- perity indulge all the same in play? — The cases are not parallel, we reply. For none but persons not in their right mind would take pleasure in an unreal play, carried on by means of implements unreal and known by them to be unreal, and in the consciousness, itself, unreal of such a play ! —The arguments set forth previously also prove the im- possibility of the fictitious existence of an individual soul considered as the abode of avidya, apart from Brahman considered as the abode of Maya. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 443
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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