Fetching
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Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1This point will be further elucidated under II, i, 22. — The .Oandogya-text then further teaches that all sentient and non-sentient beings have their Self in Brahman ' in that all this has its Self ' ; and further inculcates this truth in ' Thou art that.' Texts met with in other sections also teach this same non-difference of the general cause and its effect : * All this indeed is Brahman' {Kk. Up. Ill, 14, 1) ; ' When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is known ' (Br/. Up. IV, 5y 6) ; < That Self is all this ' (Br/. Up. II, 4, 6) ; ' Brahman indeed is all this ' (Mai. Up. IV, 6); < The Self only is all this' {Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2). Other texts, too, negative difference : ' Everything abandons him who looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self (Br/. Up. II, 4, 6) ; * There is not any plurality here' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'From death to death goes he who sees here any plurality ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 19). And in the same spirit the passage ' For where there is duality as it were, one sees the other ; but when for him the Self has become all, whereby then should he see and whom ? ' (Br/. Up. II, 4, 13) — in setting forth that the view of duality belongs to him who does not know and the view of non-duality to him who knows — intimates that non-difference only is real. It is in this way that we prove, by means of the texts beginning with arambha^a, that the world is non-different from the universal cause, i.e. the highest Brahman. Brahman only, having the aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings for its body and hence for its modes (prakara), is denoted by all words whatsoever. The body of this Brahman is sometimes constituted by sentient and non- sentient beings in their subtle state, when — just owing to that subtle state — they are incapable of being (conceived II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 459 and) designated as apart from Brahman whose body they form: Brahman is then in its so-called causal condition. At other times the body of Brahman is constituted by all sentient and non-sentient beings in their gross, manifest state, owing to which they admit of being thought and spoken of as having distinct names and forms : Brahman then is in its ' effected ' state. The effect, i. e. the world, is thus seen to be non-different from the cause, i. e. the highest Brahman. And that in the effected as well as the causal state of Brahman's body as constituted by sentient and non-sentient beings, and of Brahman embodied therein, perfections and imperfections are distributed according to the difference of essential nature between Brahman and its body, as proved by hundreds of scriptural texts, we have shown above.
2Those on the other hand who establish the non-difference of cause and effect, on the basis of the theory of the effect's non- reality, are unable to prove what they wish to prove ; for the True and the False cannot possibly be one. If these two were one, it would follow either that Brahman is false or that the world is real. — Those again who (like Bhaskara) hold the effect also to be real — the difference of the soul and Brahman being due to limiting conditions, while their non-difference is essential ; and the difference as well as the non-difference of Brahman and matter being essential — enter into conflict with all those texts which declare that the soul and Brahman are distinct in so far as the soul is under the power of karman while Brahman is free from all evil, &c, and all those texts which teach that non-sentient matter undergoes changes while Brahman does not. For as, according to them, nothing exists but Brahman and the limiting adjuncts, Brahman — as being indivisible — must be undivided while entering into connexion with the upadhis, and hence itself undergoes a change into inferior forms. And if they say that it is only the power (i*akti), not Brahman itself, which undergoes a change ; this also is of no avail since Brahman and its power are non- different. Others again (Yadavapraklra) hold that the general 46O VEDANTA-sftTRAS.
3And if they say that it is only the power (i*akti), not Brahman itself, which undergoes a change ; this also is of no avail since Brahman and its power are non- different. Others again (Yadavapraklra) hold that the general 46O VEDANTA-sftTRAS. cause, i.e. Brahman, is pure Being in which all distinctions and changes such as being an enjoying subject, and so on, have vanished, while however it is endowed with all possible potentialities. During a pralaya this causal substance abides self-luminous, with all the distinctions of conscious- ness of pleasure and pain gone to rest, comparable to the soul of a man held by dreamless sleep, different however in nature from mere non-sentient matter. During the period of a creation, on the other hand, just as the substance called clay assumes the forms of jars, platters, and so on, or as the water of the sea turns itself into foam, waves, bubbles, and so on, the universal causal substance abides in the form of a triad of constituent parts, viz. enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and a ruler. The attributes of being a ruler, or an object of enjoyment, or an enjoying subject, and the perfections and imperfections depending on those attributes, are therefore distributed in the same way as the attributes of being a jar or pitcher or platter ; and the different effects of these attributes are distributed among different parts of the substance, clay. The objects of enjoyment, subjects of enjoyment, and the ruler are one, on the other hand, in so far as ' that which is ' constitutes their substance; just as jars, platters and pitchers are one in so far as their substance is constituted by clay. It is thus one substance only, viz. ' that which is/ that appears in different conditions, and it is in this sense that the world is non-different from Brahman. — But this theory is really in conflict with all Scripture, Smrzti, Itihasa, Pura/za and Reasoning. For Scripture, Smrzti, Itihasa and Pura/za alike teach that there is one supreme cause, viz. Brahman — a being that is the Lord of all Lords, all-knowing, all- powerful, instantaneously realising all its purposes, free of all blemish, not limited either by place or time, enjoying supreme unsurpassable bliss. Nor can it be held that above the Lord there is ' pure Being ' of which the Lord is a part only. For ' This which is " being " only was in the beginning one only, without a second ; it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth ' (Kk. Up. VI, 3, 3) ; ' Verily, in the beginning this was Brahman, one only. Being one II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 5. 46 1
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1This point will be further elucidated under II, i, 22. — The .Oandogya-text then further teaches that all sentient and non-sentient beings have their Self in Brahman ' in that all this has its Self ' ; and further inculcates this truth in ' Thou art that.' Texts met with in other sections also teach this same non-difference of the general cause and its effect : * All this indeed is Brahman' {Kk. Up. Ill, 14, 1) ; ' When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is known ' (Br/. Up. IV, 5y 6) ; < That Self is all this ' (Br/. Up. II, 4, 6) ; ' Brahman indeed is all this ' (Mai. Up. IV, 6); < The Self only is all this' {Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2). Other texts, too, negative difference : ' Everything abandons him who looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self (Br/. Up. II, 4, 6) ; * There is not any plurality here' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'From death to death goes he who sees here any plurality ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 19). And in the same spirit the passage ' For where there is duality as it were, one sees the other ; but when for him the Self has become all, whereby then should he see and whom ? ' (Br/. Up. II, 4, 13) — in setting forth that the view of duality belongs to him who does not know and the view of non-duality to him who knows — intimates that non-difference only is real. It is in this way that we prove, by means of the texts beginning with arambha^a, that the world is non-different from the universal cause, i.e. the highest Brahman. Brahman only, having the aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings for its body and hence for its modes (prakara), is denoted by all words whatsoever. The body of this Brahman is sometimes constituted by sentient and non- sentient beings in their subtle state, when — just owing to that subtle state — they are incapable of being (conceived II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 459 and) designated as apart from Brahman whose body they form: Brahman is then in its so-called causal condition. At other times the body of Brahman is constituted by all sentient and non-sentient beings in their gross, manifest state, owing to which they admit of being thought and spoken of as having distinct names and forms : Brahman then is in its ' effected ' state. The effect, i. e. the world, is thus seen to be non-different from the cause, i. e. the highest Brahman. And that in the effected as well as the causal state of Brahman's body as constituted by sentient and non-sentient beings, and of Brahman embodied therein, perfections and imperfections are distributed according to the difference of essential nature between Brahman and its body, as proved by hundreds of scriptural texts, we have shown above.
2Those on the other hand who establish the non-difference of cause and effect, on the basis of the theory of the effect's non- reality, are unable to prove what they wish to prove ; for the True and the False cannot possibly be one. If these two were one, it would follow either that Brahman is false or that the world is real. — Those again who (like Bhaskara) hold the effect also to be real — the difference of the soul and Brahman being due to limiting conditions, while their non-difference is essential ; and the difference as well as the non-difference of Brahman and matter being essential — enter into conflict with all those texts which declare that the soul and Brahman are distinct in so far as the soul is under the power of karman while Brahman is free from all evil, &c, and all those texts which teach that non-sentient matter undergoes changes while Brahman does not. For as, according to them, nothing exists but Brahman and the limiting adjuncts, Brahman — as being indivisible — must be undivided while entering into connexion with the upadhis, and hence itself undergoes a change into inferior forms. And if they say that it is only the power (i*akti), not Brahman itself, which undergoes a change ; this also is of no avail since Brahman and its power are non- different. Others again (Yadavapraklra) hold that the general 46O VEDANTA-sftTRAS.
3And if they say that it is only the power (i*akti), not Brahman itself, which undergoes a change ; this also is of no avail since Brahman and its power are non- different. Others again (Yadavapraklra) hold that the general 46O VEDANTA-sftTRAS. cause, i.e. Brahman, is pure Being in which all distinctions and changes such as being an enjoying subject, and so on, have vanished, while however it is endowed with all possible potentialities. During a pralaya this causal substance abides self-luminous, with all the distinctions of conscious- ness of pleasure and pain gone to rest, comparable to the soul of a man held by dreamless sleep, different however in nature from mere non-sentient matter. During the period of a creation, on the other hand, just as the substance called clay assumes the forms of jars, platters, and so on, or as the water of the sea turns itself into foam, waves, bubbles, and so on, the universal causal substance abides in the form of a triad of constituent parts, viz. enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and a ruler. The attributes of being a ruler, or an object of enjoyment, or an enjoying subject, and the perfections and imperfections depending on those attributes, are therefore distributed in the same way as the attributes of being a jar or pitcher or platter ; and the different effects of these attributes are distributed among different parts of the substance, clay. The objects of enjoyment, subjects of enjoyment, and the ruler are one, on the other hand, in so far as ' that which is ' constitutes their substance; just as jars, platters and pitchers are one in so far as their substance is constituted by clay. It is thus one substance only, viz. ' that which is/ that appears in different conditions, and it is in this sense that the world is non-different from Brahman. — But this theory is really in conflict with all Scripture, Smrzti, Itihasa, Pura/za and Reasoning. For Scripture, Smrzti, Itihasa and Pura/za alike teach that there is one supreme cause, viz. Brahman — a being that is the Lord of all Lords, all-knowing, all- powerful, instantaneously realising all its purposes, free of all blemish, not limited either by place or time, enjoying supreme unsurpassable bliss. Nor can it be held that above the Lord there is ' pure Being ' of which the Lord is a part only. For ' This which is " being " only was in the beginning one only, without a second ; it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth ' (Kk. Up. VI, 3, 3) ; ' Verily, in the beginning this was Brahman, one only. Being one II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 5. 46 1
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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