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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1that non-defined form which is the highest power, that non-defined form which is termed embodied soul, and constitutes the secondary (apara) power, and 90 vedanta-sCtras. Nescience in the form of work — which is called the third power, and is the cause of the Self, which is of the essence of the highest power, passing into the state of embodied soul. This defined form (which is the ' perfect object ') is proved by certain Vedanta-texts, such as c that great person of sun^like lustre* (5vet. Up. Ill, 8). We hence must take the ^loka, 'in which all differences vanish,' &c, to mean that the pure Self (the Self in so far as knowledge only) is not capable of constituting the c perfect object.' Analogously two other passages declare ' Because this cannot be reflected upon by the beginner in Yoga, the second (form) of Vishnu is to be meditated upon by Yogins — the highest abode/ ' That in which all these powers have their abode, that is the other great form of Hari, different from the (material) Vii-va form.' In an analogous manner, Para^ara declares that Brahma, iTaturmukha, Sanaka, and similar mighty beings which dwell within this world, cannot constitute the ' perfect object ' because they are involved in Nescience ; after that goes on to say that the beings found in the Sa^sara are in the same condition — for they are essentially devoid of purity since they reach their true nature only later on, when through Yoga knowledge has arisen in them — ; and finally teaches that the essential individual nature of the highest Brahman, i.e. Vishnu, constitutes the 'perfect object' ' From Brahma down to a blade of grass, all living beings that dwell within this world are in the power of the Sa^sara due to works, and hence no profit can be derived by the devout from making them objects of their meditation. They are all implicated in Nescience, and stand within the sphere of the Sa^sara ; knowledge arises in them only later on, and they are thus of no use in meditation. Their knowledge does not belong to them by essential nature, for it comes to them through something else. Therefore the stainless Brahman which possesses essential knowledge,' &c. &c. — All this proves that the passage 'in which all difference vanishes ' does not mean to deny the reality of the world. Nor, again, does the passage i that which has knowledge I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 9 1
2Therefore the stainless Brahman which possesses essential knowledge,' &c. &c. — All this proves that the passage 'in which all difference vanishes ' does not mean to deny the reality of the world. Nor, again, does the passage i that which has knowledge I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 9 1 for its essential nature' (Vi. Pu. I, 2,6) imply that the whole complex of things different from knowledge is false ; for it declares only that the appearance of the Self — the essential nature of which is knowledge — as gods, men, and so on, is erroneous. A declaration that the appearance of mother o' pearl as silver is founded on error surely does not imply that all the silver in the world is unreal ! — But if, on the ground of an insight into the oneness of Brahman and the world — as expressed in texts where the two appear in co-ordination — a text declares that it is an error to view Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, under the form of material things, this after all implies that the whole aggregate of things is false! — By no means, we rejoin. As our jastra distinctly teaches that the highest Brahman, i. e. Vish/zu, is free from all imperfections whatsoever, com- prises within himself all auspicious qualities, and reveals his power in mighty manifestations, the view of the world's reality cannot possibly be erroneous. That information as to the oneness of two things by means of co-ordination does not allow of sublation (of either of the two), and is non-con- tradictory, we shall prove further on. Hence also the jloka last referred to does not sublate the reality of the world. ' That from whence these beings are born, by which, when born, they live, into which they enter when they die, endeavour to know that; that is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. Ill, 1). From this scriptural text we ascertain that Brahman is the cause of the origination, and so on, of the world. After this we learn from a Pura;?a text ('He should make the Veda grow by means of Itihasa and Pura/za ; the Veda fears that a man of little reading may do it harm ') that the Veda should be made to grow by Itihasa and Pura^a. By this c making to grow ' we have to understand the elucidation of the sense of the Vedic texts studied by means of other texts, promul- gated by men who had mastered the entire Veda and its contents, and by the strength of their devotion had gained full intuition of Vedic truth. Such ' making to grow5 must needs be undertaken, since the purport of the entire Veda with all its Sakhas cannot be fathomed by one. 92 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. who has studied a small part only, and since without knowing that purport we cannot arrive at any certitude.
3Such ' making to grow5 must needs be undertaken, since the purport of the entire Veda with all its Sakhas cannot be fathomed by one. 92 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. who has studied a small part only, and since without knowing that purport we cannot arrive at any certitude. The Vishnu Pura/za relates how Maitreya, wishing to have his knowledge of Vedic matters strengthened by the holy Parai-ara, who through the favour of Pulastya and Vasish^/za had obtained an insight into the true nature of the highest divinity, began to question Para^ara, ' I am desirous to hear from thee how this world originated, and how it will again originate in future, and of what it consists, and whence proceed animate and inanimate things ; how and into what it has been resolved, and into what it will in future be resolved ?' &c. (Vi. Pu. I, i). The questions asked refer to the essential nature of Brahman, the different modes of the manifestation of its power, and the different results of propitiating it. Among the questions belonging to the first category, the question ' whence proceed animate and inanimate things ? ' relates to the efficient and the material cause of the world, and hence the clause ' of what the world consists ' is to be taken as implying a question as to what constitutes the Self of this world, which is the object of creation, sustentation, and dissolution. The reply to this question is given in the words ' and the world is He.' Now the identity expressed by this clause is founded thereon that he (i. e. Brahman or Vishzzu) pervades the world as its Self in the character of its inward Ruler ; and is not founded on unity of substance of the pervading principle and the world pervaded. The phrase ' consists of ' (-maya) does not refer to an effect (so that the question asked would be as to the causal substance of which this world is an effect), for a separate question on this point would be needless. Nor does the -maya express, as it sometimes does — e. g. in the case of pra^a-maya \ the own sense of the word to which it is attached ; for in. that case the form of the reply ' and the world is He' (which implies a distinction between the world and Vish/zu) would be inappropriate ; the reply would in that case rather be * Vish/zu only.' What 'maya' actually denotes here is 1 ' Pra/zamaya ' is explained as meaning ' pra/za ' only. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1that non-defined form which is the highest power, that non-defined form which is termed embodied soul, and constitutes the secondary (apara) power, and 90 vedanta-sCtras. Nescience in the form of work — which is called the third power, and is the cause of the Self, which is of the essence of the highest power, passing into the state of embodied soul. This defined form (which is the ' perfect object ') is proved by certain Vedanta-texts, such as c that great person of sun^like lustre* (5vet. Up. Ill, 8). We hence must take the ^loka, 'in which all differences vanish,' &c, to mean that the pure Self (the Self in so far as knowledge only) is not capable of constituting the c perfect object.' Analogously two other passages declare ' Because this cannot be reflected upon by the beginner in Yoga, the second (form) of Vishnu is to be meditated upon by Yogins — the highest abode/ ' That in which all these powers have their abode, that is the other great form of Hari, different from the (material) Vii-va form.' In an analogous manner, Para^ara declares that Brahma, iTaturmukha, Sanaka, and similar mighty beings which dwell within this world, cannot constitute the ' perfect object ' because they are involved in Nescience ; after that goes on to say that the beings found in the Sa^sara are in the same condition — for they are essentially devoid of purity since they reach their true nature only later on, when through Yoga knowledge has arisen in them — ; and finally teaches that the essential individual nature of the highest Brahman, i.e. Vishnu, constitutes the 'perfect object' ' From Brahma down to a blade of grass, all living beings that dwell within this world are in the power of the Sa^sara due to works, and hence no profit can be derived by the devout from making them objects of their meditation. They are all implicated in Nescience, and stand within the sphere of the Sa^sara ; knowledge arises in them only later on, and they are thus of no use in meditation. Their knowledge does not belong to them by essential nature, for it comes to them through something else. Therefore the stainless Brahman which possesses essential knowledge,' &c. &c. — All this proves that the passage 'in which all difference vanishes ' does not mean to deny the reality of the world. Nor, again, does the passage i that which has knowledge I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 9 1
2Therefore the stainless Brahman which possesses essential knowledge,' &c. &c. — All this proves that the passage 'in which all difference vanishes ' does not mean to deny the reality of the world. Nor, again, does the passage i that which has knowledge I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 9 1 for its essential nature' (Vi. Pu. I, 2,6) imply that the whole complex of things different from knowledge is false ; for it declares only that the appearance of the Self — the essential nature of which is knowledge — as gods, men, and so on, is erroneous. A declaration that the appearance of mother o' pearl as silver is founded on error surely does not imply that all the silver in the world is unreal ! — But if, on the ground of an insight into the oneness of Brahman and the world — as expressed in texts where the two appear in co-ordination — a text declares that it is an error to view Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, under the form of material things, this after all implies that the whole aggregate of things is false! — By no means, we rejoin. As our jastra distinctly teaches that the highest Brahman, i. e. Vish/zu, is free from all imperfections whatsoever, com- prises within himself all auspicious qualities, and reveals his power in mighty manifestations, the view of the world's reality cannot possibly be erroneous. That information as to the oneness of two things by means of co-ordination does not allow of sublation (of either of the two), and is non-con- tradictory, we shall prove further on. Hence also the jloka last referred to does not sublate the reality of the world. ' That from whence these beings are born, by which, when born, they live, into which they enter when they die, endeavour to know that; that is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. Ill, 1). From this scriptural text we ascertain that Brahman is the cause of the origination, and so on, of the world. After this we learn from a Pura;?a text ('He should make the Veda grow by means of Itihasa and Pura/za ; the Veda fears that a man of little reading may do it harm ') that the Veda should be made to grow by Itihasa and Pura^a. By this c making to grow ' we have to understand the elucidation of the sense of the Vedic texts studied by means of other texts, promul- gated by men who had mastered the entire Veda and its contents, and by the strength of their devotion had gained full intuition of Vedic truth. Such ' making to grow5 must needs be undertaken, since the purport of the entire Veda with all its Sakhas cannot be fathomed by one. 92 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. who has studied a small part only, and since without knowing that purport we cannot arrive at any certitude.
3Such ' making to grow5 must needs be undertaken, since the purport of the entire Veda with all its Sakhas cannot be fathomed by one. 92 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. who has studied a small part only, and since without knowing that purport we cannot arrive at any certitude. The Vishnu Pura/za relates how Maitreya, wishing to have his knowledge of Vedic matters strengthened by the holy Parai-ara, who through the favour of Pulastya and Vasish^/za had obtained an insight into the true nature of the highest divinity, began to question Para^ara, ' I am desirous to hear from thee how this world originated, and how it will again originate in future, and of what it consists, and whence proceed animate and inanimate things ; how and into what it has been resolved, and into what it will in future be resolved ?' &c. (Vi. Pu. I, i). The questions asked refer to the essential nature of Brahman, the different modes of the manifestation of its power, and the different results of propitiating it. Among the questions belonging to the first category, the question ' whence proceed animate and inanimate things ? ' relates to the efficient and the material cause of the world, and hence the clause ' of what the world consists ' is to be taken as implying a question as to what constitutes the Self of this world, which is the object of creation, sustentation, and dissolution. The reply to this question is given in the words ' and the world is He.' Now the identity expressed by this clause is founded thereon that he (i. e. Brahman or Vishzzu) pervades the world as its Self in the character of its inward Ruler ; and is not founded on unity of substance of the pervading principle and the world pervaded. The phrase ' consists of ' (-maya) does not refer to an effect (so that the question asked would be as to the causal substance of which this world is an effect), for a separate question on this point would be needless. Nor does the -maya express, as it sometimes does — e. g. in the case of pra^a-maya \ the own sense of the word to which it is attached ; for in. that case the form of the reply ' and the world is He' (which implies a distinction between the world and Vish/zu) would be inappropriate ; the reply would in that case rather be * Vish/zu only.' What 'maya' actually denotes here is 1 ' Pra/zamaya ' is explained as meaning ' pra/za ' only. I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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