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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1e. the udga.tr i} viewed under the form of pra/za. And this proves that the two vidyas are separate. — Here terminates the adhikara/za of * dif- ference.1 10. On account of non-difference of everything, those elsewhere. The Kkandogya and the Va^asaneyaka alike record a meditation on Pra/za ; the object of meditation being Pra/za as possessing the qualities of being the oldest and the best, and also as possessing certain other qualities such as being the richest, and so on (Kk. Up. V, 1 ; Brz. Up. VI, 1). In the text of the Kaushitakins, on the other hand, there is a meditation on Pra/za which mentions the former qualities (' being the best ' and ' being the oldest '), but not the latter ('being the richest,' and so on). This, the Purvapakshin maintains, constitutes a difference between the objects of meditation, and hence between the medita- tions themselves. — This view the Sutra sets aside ' on account of non-difference of everything, those elsewhere.' There is no difference of meditation. Those qualities, viz. being the richest, and so on, are to be meditated upon in the other place also, viz. in the meditation on Pra/za of the Kaushitakins ; ' since there is non-difference of everything,' i. e. since the text of the Kaushitakins also exhibits the very same method, in all its details, for proving what it is undertaken to prove, viz. that Pra/za is the oldest and best. And for that proof it is required that Pra/za should be viewed as possessing also the quality of being the richest, and so on, and these qualities therefore have to be com- prised in the meditation of the Kaushitakins also. Hence there is no difference of meditation. — Here terminates the adhikara7za of ' non-difference of everything.' In the same way as the meditation on Pra/za as the Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 12. 637 oldest and best cannot be accomplished without Pra/za being also meditated upon as the richest, and so on, and as hence these latter qualities have to be comprised in the meditation on Pra;/a of the Kaushitakins, although they are not expressly mentioned there ; thus those qualities of Brahman also, without which the meditation on Brahman cannot be accomplished, must be included in all medita- tions on Brahman — this is the point to be proved next. 11. Bliss and other qualities, as belonging to the subject of the qualities.
211. Bliss and other qualities, as belonging to the subject of the qualities. The point to be decided here is whether, or not, the essential qualities of Brahman are to be included in all meditations on the highest Brahman. — Since there is no valid reason for including in a meditation those qualities which are not expressly mentioned in the section containing that meditation, only those qualities which are thus ex- pressly mentioned should be included ! — This prima facie view is negatived by the Sutra. The clause, ' on account of non-difference,' has to be carried on from the preceding Sutra. As the ' subject of the qualities/ i. e. Brahman is the same in all meditations, the qualities which do not exist apart from their subject, viz. bliss, and so on, are to be comprised in all meditations. — But for the same reason then such qualities as 'having joy for its head' (Taitt. Up. II, 5) would also have to be included in all meditations on Brahman ! — This the next Sutra negatives. 12. Such qualities as having joy for its head, and so on, are not established, for if there were difference (of members) there would be increase and decrease. The declaration that the essential qualities of Brahman are established for all meditations, does not imply that such attributes as ' having joy for its head ' are equally established. For the latter are not qualities of Brahman, since they are mere elements in a figurative representation of Brahman under the form of an animal body. Otherwise, i. e. if Brahman really possessed different members, such as head, wings, and so on, it would be liable to increase 6^8 VEDANTA-StjTRAS. and decrease, and this would be in conflict with texts such as ' the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman/ — But if this reasoning holds good, then all the infinite qualities belong- ing to Brahman such as lordly power, generosity, com- passion, and so on — all of which are incapable of existing apart from the subject to which they belong — would have to be comprehended in all those meditations on Brahman where they are not expressly mentioned ; and this could not possibly be done, as those qualities are infinite in number. — This difficulty the next Sutra removes. 13. But the others, on account of equality with the thing.
3— This difficulty the next Sutra removes. 13. But the others, on account of equality with the thing. Those other qualities which are * equal to the thing,1 i. e. which are attributes determining the essential character of the thing, and therefore necessarily entering into the idea of the thing, must be included in all meditations, no less than the thing itself. To this class belong qualities such as true being, knowledge, bliss, purity, infinity, and so on. For of Brahman — which by texts such as ' that from which all these beings/ &c. had been suggested as the cause of the world — the essential definition is given in texts such as ' the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman ' ; ; bliss is Brahman/ and others ; and hence, in order that a true notion may be formed of Brahman as the object of meditation, such qualities as true being, bliss, and so on, have to be included in all meditations on Brahman. Such additional qualities, on the other hand, as e. g. compassion, which indeed cannot exist apart from the subject to which they belong, but are not necessary elements of the idea of Brahman, are to be included in those meditations only where they are specially mentioned. But, an objection is raised, if ' having joy for its head ' and the like are not qualities of Brahman, but merely serve the purpose of a figurative representation of Brahman, for what purpose then is this representation introduced ? For if something is represented as something else, there must be some motive for doing so. Where, e. g. the sacred text compares the meditating devotee to a charioteer, its body Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 5. 639 and organs to a chariot, and so on, it does so for the purpose of assisting the subjection to the Self of the means of meditation, i. e. the body, the senses, and so on. But in the present case no such purpose is to be discerned, and hence it must needs be admitted that having joy for its head, and so on, are real qualities of Brahman. — The next Sutra disposes of this difficulty. 14. For meditation, owing to the absence of purpose.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1e. the udga.tr i} viewed under the form of pra/za. And this proves that the two vidyas are separate. — Here terminates the adhikara/za of * dif- ference.1 10. On account of non-difference of everything, those elsewhere. The Kkandogya and the Va^asaneyaka alike record a meditation on Pra/za ; the object of meditation being Pra/za as possessing the qualities of being the oldest and the best, and also as possessing certain other qualities such as being the richest, and so on (Kk. Up. V, 1 ; Brz. Up. VI, 1). In the text of the Kaushitakins, on the other hand, there is a meditation on Pra/za which mentions the former qualities (' being the best ' and ' being the oldest '), but not the latter ('being the richest,' and so on). This, the Purvapakshin maintains, constitutes a difference between the objects of meditation, and hence between the medita- tions themselves. — This view the Sutra sets aside ' on account of non-difference of everything, those elsewhere.' There is no difference of meditation. Those qualities, viz. being the richest, and so on, are to be meditated upon in the other place also, viz. in the meditation on Pra/za of the Kaushitakins ; ' since there is non-difference of everything,' i. e. since the text of the Kaushitakins also exhibits the very same method, in all its details, for proving what it is undertaken to prove, viz. that Pra/za is the oldest and best. And for that proof it is required that Pra/za should be viewed as possessing also the quality of being the richest, and so on, and these qualities therefore have to be com- prised in the meditation of the Kaushitakins also. Hence there is no difference of meditation. — Here terminates the adhikara7za of ' non-difference of everything.' In the same way as the meditation on Pra/za as the Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 12. 637 oldest and best cannot be accomplished without Pra/za being also meditated upon as the richest, and so on, and as hence these latter qualities have to be comprised in the meditation on Pra;/a of the Kaushitakins, although they are not expressly mentioned there ; thus those qualities of Brahman also, without which the meditation on Brahman cannot be accomplished, must be included in all medita- tions on Brahman — this is the point to be proved next. 11. Bliss and other qualities, as belonging to the subject of the qualities.
211. Bliss and other qualities, as belonging to the subject of the qualities. The point to be decided here is whether, or not, the essential qualities of Brahman are to be included in all meditations on the highest Brahman. — Since there is no valid reason for including in a meditation those qualities which are not expressly mentioned in the section containing that meditation, only those qualities which are thus ex- pressly mentioned should be included ! — This prima facie view is negatived by the Sutra. The clause, ' on account of non-difference,' has to be carried on from the preceding Sutra. As the ' subject of the qualities/ i. e. Brahman is the same in all meditations, the qualities which do not exist apart from their subject, viz. bliss, and so on, are to be comprised in all meditations. — But for the same reason then such qualities as 'having joy for its head' (Taitt. Up. II, 5) would also have to be included in all meditations on Brahman ! — This the next Sutra negatives. 12. Such qualities as having joy for its head, and so on, are not established, for if there were difference (of members) there would be increase and decrease. The declaration that the essential qualities of Brahman are established for all meditations, does not imply that such attributes as ' having joy for its head ' are equally established. For the latter are not qualities of Brahman, since they are mere elements in a figurative representation of Brahman under the form of an animal body. Otherwise, i. e. if Brahman really possessed different members, such as head, wings, and so on, it would be liable to increase 6^8 VEDANTA-StjTRAS. and decrease, and this would be in conflict with texts such as ' the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman/ — But if this reasoning holds good, then all the infinite qualities belong- ing to Brahman such as lordly power, generosity, com- passion, and so on — all of which are incapable of existing apart from the subject to which they belong — would have to be comprehended in all those meditations on Brahman where they are not expressly mentioned ; and this could not possibly be done, as those qualities are infinite in number. — This difficulty the next Sutra removes. 13. But the others, on account of equality with the thing.
3— This difficulty the next Sutra removes. 13. But the others, on account of equality with the thing. Those other qualities which are * equal to the thing,1 i. e. which are attributes determining the essential character of the thing, and therefore necessarily entering into the idea of the thing, must be included in all meditations, no less than the thing itself. To this class belong qualities such as true being, knowledge, bliss, purity, infinity, and so on. For of Brahman — which by texts such as ' that from which all these beings/ &c. had been suggested as the cause of the world — the essential definition is given in texts such as ' the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman ' ; ; bliss is Brahman/ and others ; and hence, in order that a true notion may be formed of Brahman as the object of meditation, such qualities as true being, bliss, and so on, have to be included in all meditations on Brahman. Such additional qualities, on the other hand, as e. g. compassion, which indeed cannot exist apart from the subject to which they belong, but are not necessary elements of the idea of Brahman, are to be included in those meditations only where they are specially mentioned. But, an objection is raised, if ' having joy for its head ' and the like are not qualities of Brahman, but merely serve the purpose of a figurative representation of Brahman, for what purpose then is this representation introduced ? For if something is represented as something else, there must be some motive for doing so. Where, e. g. the sacred text compares the meditating devotee to a charioteer, its body Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 5. 639 and organs to a chariot, and so on, it does so for the purpose of assisting the subjection to the Self of the means of meditation, i. e. the body, the senses, and so on. But in the present case no such purpose is to be discerned, and hence it must needs be admitted that having joy for its head, and so on, are real qualities of Brahman. — The next Sutra disposes of this difficulty. 14. For meditation, owing to the absence of purpose.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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