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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— Nor may you say that the origination of jars, gold coins, and sour milk from clay, [48] F f 434 vedanta-sOtras. gold, and milk respectively is actually perceived ; that this perception is not sublated with regard to time and place — while, on the other hand, the perception of silver in the shell is so sublated — and that hence all those who trust perception must necessarily admit that the effect does originate from the cause* For this argumentation does not stand the test of being set forth in definite alternatives. Does the mere gold, &c, by itself originate the svastika- ornament ? or is it the gold coins (used for making orna- ments) which originate ? or is it the gold, as forming the substrate of the coins 1 ? The mere gold, in the first place, cannot be originative as there exists no effect different from the gold (to which the originative activity could apply itself) ; and a thing cannot possibly display originative activity with regard to itself. — But, an objection is raised, the svastika-ornament is perceived as different from the gold ! — It is not, we reply, different from the gold ; for the gold is recognised in it, and no other thing but gold is per- ceived.— But the existence of another thing is proved by the fact of there being a different idea, a different word, and so on! — By no means, we reply. Other ideas, words, and so on, which have reference to an altogether undefined thing are founded on error, no less than the idea of, and the word denoting, shell-silver, and hence have no power of proving the existence of another thing. Nor, in the second place, is the gold coin originative of the svastika-ornament ; for we do not perceive the coin in the svastika, as we do perceive the threads in the cloth. Nor, in the third place, is the effect originated by the gold in so far as being the substrate of the coin ; for the gold in so far as forming the substrate of the coin is not perceived in the svastika. As it thus appears that all effects viewed apart from their causal 1 In other words — is the golden ornament originated by the mere formless substance, gold ; or by the form belonging to that special piece of gold (a coin, a bar, &c), out of which the orna- ment is fashioned ; or by the substance, gold, in so far as possessing that special form ? The ru^aka of the text has to be taken in the sense of nishka. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 15. 435 substances are unreal, we arrive at the conclusion that the entire world, viewed apart from Brahman, is also something unreal ; for it also is an effect. In order to facilitate the understanding of the truth that everything apart from Brahman is false, we have so far reasoned on the assumption of things such as clay, gold, &c, being real, and have thereby proved the non-reality of all effects. In truth, however, all special causal substances are unreal quite as much as jars and golden ornaments are ; for they are all of them equally effects of Brahman.
2In truth, however, all special causal substances are unreal quite as much as jars and golden ornaments are ; for they are all of them equally effects of Brahman. * In that all this has its Self; it is the True ' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7) ; ' There is here no plurality ; from death to death goes he who sees here plurality as it were ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 19) ; ' For where there is duality as it were, there one sees another ; but when for him the Self only has become all, whereby then should he see and whom should he see ? ' (Brz. Up. II, 4, 13) ; ' Indra goes manifold by means of his mayas ' (Brz. Up. II, 5, 19) ; — these and other similar texts teach that whatever is different from Brahman is false. Nor must it be imagined that the truth intimated by Scripture can be in conflict with Perception ; for in the way set forth above we prove that all effects are false, and moreover Perception really has for its object pure Being only (cp. above, p. 30). And if there is a conflict between the two, superior force belongs to Scripture, to which no imperfection can be attributed ; which occupies a final position among the means of knowledge ; and which, although dependent on Perception, and so on, for the apprehension of the form and meaning of words, yet is in- dependent as far as proving power is concerned. Hence it follows that everything different from Brahman, the general cause, is unreal. Nor must this conclusion be objected to on the ground that from the falsity of the world it follows that the individual souls also are non-real. For it is Brahman itself which constitutes the individual souls: Brahman alone takes upon itself the condition of individual soul in all living bodies ; as we know from many texts : c Having entered into them with this living Self {Kh. Up. VI, 3); F f 2 436 VED ANTA-Sft TR AS. c The one god hidden within all beings ' (Svet. Up. VI, n) ; ' The one god entered in many places ' ; ' That Self hidden in all beings does not shine forth ' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 12) ; ' There is no other seer but he' (Br/. Up. Ill, 3, 23) ; and others. — But if you maintain that the one Brahman constitutes the soul in all living bodies, it follows that any particular pain or pleasure should affect the consciousness of all embodied beings, just as an agreeable sensation affecting the foot gives rise to a feeling of pleasure in the head ; and that there would be no distinction of individual soul and Lord, released souls and souls in bondage, pupils and teachers, men wise and ignorant, and so on.
3Now, in reply to this, some of those who hold the non- duality of Brahman give the following explanation. The many individual souls are the reflections of the one Brahman, and their states of pain, pleasure, and so on, remain distinct owing to the different limiting adjuncts (on which the existence of each individual soul as such depends), in the same way as the many reflected images of one and the same face in mirrors, crystals, sword- blades, &c, remain distinct owing to their limiting adjuncts (viz. mirrors, &c.) ; one image being small, another large, one being bright, another dim, and so on. — But you have said that scriptural texts such as ' Having entered with this living Self' show that the souls are not different from Brahman! — They are indeed not different in reality, but we maintain their distinction on the basis of an imagined difference. — To whom then does that imagination belong? Not to Brahman surely whose nature, consisting of pure intelligence, allows no room for imagination of any kind ! Nor also to the individual souls; for this would imply a faulty mutual dependence, the existence of the soul depending on imagination and that imagination residing in the soul ! — Not so, the advaita-vadin replies. Nescience (wrong imagination) and the existence of the souls form an endless retrogressive chain ; their relation is like that of the seed and the sprout. Moreover, mutual dependence and the like, which are held to constitute defects in the case of real things, are unable to disestablish Nescience, II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 437 the very nature of which consists in being that which cannot rationally be established, and which hence may be compared to somebody's swallowing a whole palace and the like (as seen in a dream or under the influence of a magical illusion). In reality the individual souls are non-different from Brahman, and hence essentially free from all impurity; but as they are liable to impurity caused by their limiting adjuncts — in the same way as the face reflected in a mirror is liable to be dimmed by the dimness of the mirror — they may be the abodes of Nescience and hence may be viewed as the figments of wrong imagination. Like the dimness of the reflected face, the imperfection adhering to the soul is a mere error; for otherwise it would follow that the soul can never obtain release. And as this error of the souls has proceeded from all eternity, the question as to its cause is not to be raised.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— Nor may you say that the origination of jars, gold coins, and sour milk from clay, [48] F f 434 vedanta-sOtras. gold, and milk respectively is actually perceived ; that this perception is not sublated with regard to time and place — while, on the other hand, the perception of silver in the shell is so sublated — and that hence all those who trust perception must necessarily admit that the effect does originate from the cause* For this argumentation does not stand the test of being set forth in definite alternatives. Does the mere gold, &c, by itself originate the svastika- ornament ? or is it the gold coins (used for making orna- ments) which originate ? or is it the gold, as forming the substrate of the coins 1 ? The mere gold, in the first place, cannot be originative as there exists no effect different from the gold (to which the originative activity could apply itself) ; and a thing cannot possibly display originative activity with regard to itself. — But, an objection is raised, the svastika-ornament is perceived as different from the gold ! — It is not, we reply, different from the gold ; for the gold is recognised in it, and no other thing but gold is per- ceived.— But the existence of another thing is proved by the fact of there being a different idea, a different word, and so on! — By no means, we reply. Other ideas, words, and so on, which have reference to an altogether undefined thing are founded on error, no less than the idea of, and the word denoting, shell-silver, and hence have no power of proving the existence of another thing. Nor, in the second place, is the gold coin originative of the svastika-ornament ; for we do not perceive the coin in the svastika, as we do perceive the threads in the cloth. Nor, in the third place, is the effect originated by the gold in so far as being the substrate of the coin ; for the gold in so far as forming the substrate of the coin is not perceived in the svastika. As it thus appears that all effects viewed apart from their causal 1 In other words — is the golden ornament originated by the mere formless substance, gold ; or by the form belonging to that special piece of gold (a coin, a bar, &c), out of which the orna- ment is fashioned ; or by the substance, gold, in so far as possessing that special form ? The ru^aka of the text has to be taken in the sense of nishka. II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 15. 435 substances are unreal, we arrive at the conclusion that the entire world, viewed apart from Brahman, is also something unreal ; for it also is an effect. In order to facilitate the understanding of the truth that everything apart from Brahman is false, we have so far reasoned on the assumption of things such as clay, gold, &c, being real, and have thereby proved the non-reality of all effects. In truth, however, all special causal substances are unreal quite as much as jars and golden ornaments are ; for they are all of them equally effects of Brahman.
2In truth, however, all special causal substances are unreal quite as much as jars and golden ornaments are ; for they are all of them equally effects of Brahman. * In that all this has its Self; it is the True ' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7) ; ' There is here no plurality ; from death to death goes he who sees here plurality as it were ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 19) ; ' For where there is duality as it were, there one sees another ; but when for him the Self only has become all, whereby then should he see and whom should he see ? ' (Brz. Up. II, 4, 13) ; ' Indra goes manifold by means of his mayas ' (Brz. Up. II, 5, 19) ; — these and other similar texts teach that whatever is different from Brahman is false. Nor must it be imagined that the truth intimated by Scripture can be in conflict with Perception ; for in the way set forth above we prove that all effects are false, and moreover Perception really has for its object pure Being only (cp. above, p. 30). And if there is a conflict between the two, superior force belongs to Scripture, to which no imperfection can be attributed ; which occupies a final position among the means of knowledge ; and which, although dependent on Perception, and so on, for the apprehension of the form and meaning of words, yet is in- dependent as far as proving power is concerned. Hence it follows that everything different from Brahman, the general cause, is unreal. Nor must this conclusion be objected to on the ground that from the falsity of the world it follows that the individual souls also are non-real. For it is Brahman itself which constitutes the individual souls: Brahman alone takes upon itself the condition of individual soul in all living bodies ; as we know from many texts : c Having entered into them with this living Self {Kh. Up. VI, 3); F f 2 436 VED ANTA-Sft TR AS. c The one god hidden within all beings ' (Svet. Up. VI, n) ; ' The one god entered in many places ' ; ' That Self hidden in all beings does not shine forth ' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 12) ; ' There is no other seer but he' (Br/. Up. Ill, 3, 23) ; and others. — But if you maintain that the one Brahman constitutes the soul in all living bodies, it follows that any particular pain or pleasure should affect the consciousness of all embodied beings, just as an agreeable sensation affecting the foot gives rise to a feeling of pleasure in the head ; and that there would be no distinction of individual soul and Lord, released souls and souls in bondage, pupils and teachers, men wise and ignorant, and so on.
3Now, in reply to this, some of those who hold the non- duality of Brahman give the following explanation. The many individual souls are the reflections of the one Brahman, and their states of pain, pleasure, and so on, remain distinct owing to the different limiting adjuncts (on which the existence of each individual soul as such depends), in the same way as the many reflected images of one and the same face in mirrors, crystals, sword- blades, &c, remain distinct owing to their limiting adjuncts (viz. mirrors, &c.) ; one image being small, another large, one being bright, another dim, and so on. — But you have said that scriptural texts such as ' Having entered with this living Self' show that the souls are not different from Brahman! — They are indeed not different in reality, but we maintain their distinction on the basis of an imagined difference. — To whom then does that imagination belong? Not to Brahman surely whose nature, consisting of pure intelligence, allows no room for imagination of any kind ! Nor also to the individual souls; for this would imply a faulty mutual dependence, the existence of the soul depending on imagination and that imagination residing in the soul ! — Not so, the advaita-vadin replies. Nescience (wrong imagination) and the existence of the souls form an endless retrogressive chain ; their relation is like that of the seed and the sprout. Moreover, mutual dependence and the like, which are held to constitute defects in the case of real things, are unable to disestablish Nescience, II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 437 the very nature of which consists in being that which cannot rationally be established, and which hence may be compared to somebody's swallowing a whole palace and the like (as seen in a dream or under the influence of a magical illusion). In reality the individual souls are non-different from Brahman, and hence essentially free from all impurity; but as they are liable to impurity caused by their limiting adjuncts — in the same way as the face reflected in a mirror is liable to be dimmed by the dimness of the mirror — they may be the abodes of Nescience and hence may be viewed as the figments of wrong imagination. Like the dimness of the reflected face, the imperfection adhering to the soul is a mere error; for otherwise it would follow that the soul can never obtain release. And as this error of the souls has proceeded from all eternity, the question as to its cause is not to be raised.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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