Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— But, our adversary now rejoins, what after all are we to do ? The holy text at first clearly promises that through the cognition of one thing everything will be known (' by which that which is 2 1 6 VED ANTA-S UTR AS. not heard is heard/ &c, Kh. Up. VI, i, 3) ; thereupon declares that Brahman is the sole cause of the world ('Being only this was in the beginning'), and possesses exalted qualities such as the power of realising its inten- tions (' it thought, may I be many ') ; and then finally, by means of the co-ordination, ' Thou art that/ intimates that Brahman is one with the individual soul, which we know to be subject to endless suffering ! Nothing therefore is left to us but the hypothesis that Brahman is the substrate of Nescience and all that springs from it 1 — Not even for the purpose, we reply, of making sense of Scripture may we assume what in itself is senseless and contradictory ! — Let us then say that Brahman's connexion with evil is real, and its absolute perfection unreal ! — Scripture, we reply, aims at comforting the soul afflicted by the assaults of threefold pain, and now, according to you, it teaches that the assaults of suffering are real, while its essential perfection and happiness are unreal figments, due to error ! This is excellent comfort indeed ! — To avoid these difficulties let us then assume that both aspects of Brahman — viz. on the one hand its entering into the distressful condition of indi- vidual souls other than non-differenced intelligence, and on the other its being the cause of the world, endowed with all perfections, &c. — are alike unreal ! — Well, we reply, we do not exactly admire the depth of your insight into the connected meaning of texts. The promise that through the knowledge of one thing everything will be known can certainly not be fulfilled if everything is false, for in that case there exists nothing that could be known. In so far as the cognition of one thing has something real for its object, and the cognition of all things is of the same kind, and moreover is comprised in the cognition of one thing ; in so far it can be said that everything is known through one thing being known. Through the cognition of the real shell we do not cognise the unreal silver of which the shell is the substrate. — Well, our adversary resumes, let it then be said that the meaning of the declaration that through the cognition of one thing everything is to be known is that only non-differenced Being is real, while everything I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 13. 21 7
2— Well, our adversary resumes, let it then be said that the meaning of the declaration that through the cognition of one thing everything is to be known is that only non-differenced Being is real, while everything I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 13. 21 7 else is unreal. — If this were so, we rejoin, the text would not say, 'by which the non-heard is heard — , the non-known is known ' ; for the meaning of this is, 'by which when heard and known ' (not ' known as false ') ' the non-heard is heard,' &c. Moreover, if the meaning were that only the one non- differenced substance understood to be the cause of the world is real, the illustrative instance, ' As by one lump of clay everything made of clay is known/ would not be suit- able ; for what is meant there is that through the cognition of the (real) lump of clay its (real) effects are known. Nor must you say that in the illustrative instance also the unreality of the effect is set forth ; for as the person to be informed is not in any way convinced at the outset that things made of clay are unreal, like the snake imagined in the rope, it is impossible that such unreality should be referred to as if it were something well known (and the clause, * as by one lump of clay/ &c, undoubtedly does refer to something well known), in order to render the initial assertion plausible. And we are not aware of any means of knowledge — assisted or non- assisted by ratio- cination— that would prove the non-reality of things effected, previous to the cognition produced by texts such as 'That art thou'; a point which will be discussed at length under II, 1. — * Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second ' ; * it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth ; it sent forth fire ' ; c Let me now enter those three beings with this living Self and evolve names and forms ' ; 'AH these creatures, my son, have their root in the True, they dwell in the True, they rest in the True/ &c. ; these passages declare in succession that that which really is is the Self of this world ; that previous to creation there is no distinction of names and forms ; that for the creation of the world Brahman, termed ' the True ' (or ' Real '), requires no other operative cause but itself; that at the time of creation it forms a resolution, possible to itself only, of making itself manifold in the form of endless movable and immovable things ; that in accordance with this resolution there takes place a creation, proceeding in a particular order, of an infinite number of manifold 2 1 8 VEDANTA-sdtRAS.
3beings ; that by Brahman entering into all non-intelligent beings with the living soul — which has its Self in Brahman — there takes place an evolution, infinite in extent, of all their particular names and forms ; and that everything different from Brahman has its root and abode in that, is moved by that, lives by that, rests on that. All the different points — to be learned from Scripture only — which are here set forth agree with what numerous other scriptural texts teach about Brahman, viz. that it is free from all evil, devoid of all imperfection, all-knowing, all-powerful ; that all its Wishes and purposes realise themselves ; that it is the cause of all bliss ; that it enjoys bliss not to be sur- passed. To maintain then that the word c that,' which refers back to the Brahman mentioned before, i.e. a Brahman possessing infinite attributes, should aim at con- veying instruction about a substance devoid of all attributes, is as unmeaning as the incoherent talk of a madman. The word ' thou ' again denotes the individual soul as distinguished by its implication in the course of transmigra- tory existence, and the proper sense of this term also would have to be abandoned if it were meant to suggest a sub- stance devoid of all distinctions. And that, in the case of a being consisting of non-differenced light, obscuration by Nescience would be tantamount to complete destruction, we have already explained above.— All this being thus, your interpretation would involve that the proper meaning of the two words * that ' and ' thou ' — which refer to one thing — would have to be abandoned, and both words would have to be taken in an implied sense only. Against this the Purvapakshin now may argue as follows. Several words which are applied to one thing are meant to express one sense, and as this is not possible in so far as the words connote different attributes, this part of their connotation becomes inoperative, and they denote only the unity of one substance ; implication (laksha^a), therefore, does not take place. When we say * blue (is) (the) lotus ' we employ two words with the intention of expressing the unity of one thing, and hence do not aim at expressing a duality of attributes, viz. the quality of blueness and the I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 3. 219
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1— But, our adversary now rejoins, what after all are we to do ? The holy text at first clearly promises that through the cognition of one thing everything will be known (' by which that which is 2 1 6 VED ANTA-S UTR AS. not heard is heard/ &c, Kh. Up. VI, i, 3) ; thereupon declares that Brahman is the sole cause of the world ('Being only this was in the beginning'), and possesses exalted qualities such as the power of realising its inten- tions (' it thought, may I be many ') ; and then finally, by means of the co-ordination, ' Thou art that/ intimates that Brahman is one with the individual soul, which we know to be subject to endless suffering ! Nothing therefore is left to us but the hypothesis that Brahman is the substrate of Nescience and all that springs from it 1 — Not even for the purpose, we reply, of making sense of Scripture may we assume what in itself is senseless and contradictory ! — Let us then say that Brahman's connexion with evil is real, and its absolute perfection unreal ! — Scripture, we reply, aims at comforting the soul afflicted by the assaults of threefold pain, and now, according to you, it teaches that the assaults of suffering are real, while its essential perfection and happiness are unreal figments, due to error ! This is excellent comfort indeed ! — To avoid these difficulties let us then assume that both aspects of Brahman — viz. on the one hand its entering into the distressful condition of indi- vidual souls other than non-differenced intelligence, and on the other its being the cause of the world, endowed with all perfections, &c. — are alike unreal ! — Well, we reply, we do not exactly admire the depth of your insight into the connected meaning of texts. The promise that through the knowledge of one thing everything will be known can certainly not be fulfilled if everything is false, for in that case there exists nothing that could be known. In so far as the cognition of one thing has something real for its object, and the cognition of all things is of the same kind, and moreover is comprised in the cognition of one thing ; in so far it can be said that everything is known through one thing being known. Through the cognition of the real shell we do not cognise the unreal silver of which the shell is the substrate. — Well, our adversary resumes, let it then be said that the meaning of the declaration that through the cognition of one thing everything is to be known is that only non-differenced Being is real, while everything I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 13. 21 7
2— Well, our adversary resumes, let it then be said that the meaning of the declaration that through the cognition of one thing everything is to be known is that only non-differenced Being is real, while everything I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 13. 21 7 else is unreal. — If this were so, we rejoin, the text would not say, 'by which the non-heard is heard — , the non-known is known ' ; for the meaning of this is, 'by which when heard and known ' (not ' known as false ') ' the non-heard is heard,' &c. Moreover, if the meaning were that only the one non- differenced substance understood to be the cause of the world is real, the illustrative instance, ' As by one lump of clay everything made of clay is known/ would not be suit- able ; for what is meant there is that through the cognition of the (real) lump of clay its (real) effects are known. Nor must you say that in the illustrative instance also the unreality of the effect is set forth ; for as the person to be informed is not in any way convinced at the outset that things made of clay are unreal, like the snake imagined in the rope, it is impossible that such unreality should be referred to as if it were something well known (and the clause, * as by one lump of clay/ &c, undoubtedly does refer to something well known), in order to render the initial assertion plausible. And we are not aware of any means of knowledge — assisted or non- assisted by ratio- cination— that would prove the non-reality of things effected, previous to the cognition produced by texts such as 'That art thou'; a point which will be discussed at length under II, 1. — * Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second ' ; * it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth ; it sent forth fire ' ; c Let me now enter those three beings with this living Self and evolve names and forms ' ; 'AH these creatures, my son, have their root in the True, they dwell in the True, they rest in the True/ &c. ; these passages declare in succession that that which really is is the Self of this world ; that previous to creation there is no distinction of names and forms ; that for the creation of the world Brahman, termed ' the True ' (or ' Real '), requires no other operative cause but itself; that at the time of creation it forms a resolution, possible to itself only, of making itself manifold in the form of endless movable and immovable things ; that in accordance with this resolution there takes place a creation, proceeding in a particular order, of an infinite number of manifold 2 1 8 VEDANTA-sdtRAS.
3beings ; that by Brahman entering into all non-intelligent beings with the living soul — which has its Self in Brahman — there takes place an evolution, infinite in extent, of all their particular names and forms ; and that everything different from Brahman has its root and abode in that, is moved by that, lives by that, rests on that. All the different points — to be learned from Scripture only — which are here set forth agree with what numerous other scriptural texts teach about Brahman, viz. that it is free from all evil, devoid of all imperfection, all-knowing, all-powerful ; that all its Wishes and purposes realise themselves ; that it is the cause of all bliss ; that it enjoys bliss not to be sur- passed. To maintain then that the word c that,' which refers back to the Brahman mentioned before, i.e. a Brahman possessing infinite attributes, should aim at con- veying instruction about a substance devoid of all attributes, is as unmeaning as the incoherent talk of a madman. The word ' thou ' again denotes the individual soul as distinguished by its implication in the course of transmigra- tory existence, and the proper sense of this term also would have to be abandoned if it were meant to suggest a sub- stance devoid of all distinctions. And that, in the case of a being consisting of non-differenced light, obscuration by Nescience would be tantamount to complete destruction, we have already explained above.— All this being thus, your interpretation would involve that the proper meaning of the two words * that ' and ' thou ' — which refer to one thing — would have to be abandoned, and both words would have to be taken in an implied sense only. Against this the Purvapakshin now may argue as follows. Several words which are applied to one thing are meant to express one sense, and as this is not possible in so far as the words connote different attributes, this part of their connotation becomes inoperative, and they denote only the unity of one substance ; implication (laksha^a), therefore, does not take place. When we say * blue (is) (the) lotus ' we employ two words with the intention of expressing the unity of one thing, and hence do not aim at expressing a duality of attributes, viz. the quality of blueness and the I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 3. 219
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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